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fiENBERG, WILLIAM J
0 4793227 06/27/1989

WD

6138
2830
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06/23/1989 SALT LAKE I N T R N T L CTR PL 1A

tfENBERG, WILLIAM J
E 4793228 06/27/1989

TRD

6138
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WENBERG, WILLIAM J
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01/14/1982
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RXAU ENTRY # 5015202
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GTO
1ST LOWCNDCRG, WILLIAM J
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WITNESS, the hand

of a*Id zrantor
, this
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, A. D. 1975
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Signed !n the Presence of
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STATE OF UTAH.
Count7 of

Salt

Laka

October*
19?S
Cn the ?ourt**ntn
day of
fA.D.
p^rjonjLU/ appeared before 2 « i?
Srrith
*zd Feb
^ h o beicx by me d u l / n r o m did ».;/, eAch for himself, t h i t he, the w i d ,?. Fred S^riih •
U the preiideat, rnd he, Lhe xxid Fcbert
S. HaUzrdsr
>* -he lecrtUry
of
PlcTt-ric/r Corpcnztian
CompAn/, i n d t h i t the "»ithia ir.d forejoin^
instrument "^x* xijned in behxif of uld c o r p o n t l o a by authority of a resolution oti^i beard of dir?ct o n and i±ld
R, Frsd &niih
and Rcber^S^,
-Sa'zzr^ar ."
each duly xclcaowledsred to me that said c o r p o n t i o n executed the xame ari'd Ofit--,rr» # >e>Lxffusd .
!a the K * J of axid corpontloa.

My CooimLiilon «xpfni...-.l'?Z?Z / 7i....
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Dip. Book.
Kill Ux notlct t o .
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on
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WARRANTY DEED

HINSON-HALANDER, INC.
Ci
* S*lc Lakt
CONVEY
and WARRANT to

.County or

grantor
, StaU ot Utah, h«raby

S a l t Lake

grantee
for the «um of
DOLLARS.

WESTERN MANAGEMENT - A Partnership
Of

County,
the following' deicribed trtct
of land In
S a l t Lnke
S u t t o t Utah:
BECINNINC t t ft 'point North (WCtt^S" East 1,083.00 f e e t and Weat 2556.812 feet
and North 3»'»0.00 feet from the Salt Lake County Survey Monument nt the center
of S o c i e n 22, Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
running ther.oc North 508.434 f e e t to the. South right of way l i n e of the 1-215 "F"
ramp e x i t ; thence Southwesterly 68.833 feet along said r i g h t of way around 1146.23
f e e t radius curve Co the l e f t chord bears South 59*46'53" We«t 69.822 f e e t ; thence
South 5 8 # 1 9 ' 2 K West 227.053 feet along arid right-of-way; thence South 16 w 2'36"
Eaac 3 6 7.9 .c- i. f e e t ; thence East 152.542 t'jet to the point of beginning.
SUBJECT TO AND TOCETHER WITH A R'CCHT-OF-WAY: Beginning at c point on the North lin«{
of 2300 South S t r e e t ; said poinc being North 00*03'48" East 1086.539 feet and West
35.84 f c o t froai the West quarter comer of Section 22, Township 1 South, Range 1
West, S a l t Lake Base tnd Meridian, and running cbcn:e North 104.00 f e e t ; thence
Sorlh 16*02'36" Vest 67.00 f e e t ; thence North 73°57'24 M Enst 82.00 f e e t ; thence
North 16 B G2 , 36" West 414.161 f e e t , more or l e s s to the East boundary l i n e of
property conveyed MARCON Investment by Chat c e r t a i n Warranty Deed dated October
14, 1975, recorded Nov^nrer 18, 1975, as Entry No. 2761314 in Book 4029 at page
329; and running ther.ee North 02'30'00" West 122.157 f e a t to the South l i n e of the
1-215 Interchange and running thence South 58 # 19'02" Weat 225.832 feet along said
South l i n e ; thence South 53"28'29 M Wr-»c 159.555 f e e t along: said South l i n e ; thence
South 1 6 ' 0 2 f 3 6 " East 526.012 feet to ;.ie North l i n e of LLIA 2300 South S t r e e t ;
thence N o r t h e a s t e r l y along said North l i n e of 61.922 f e e t around a 22.1143 f e e t
(CONTINUED ON 3ACK)
day of
WITNESS, the hand of laid grtntor , thia
, A. X). 19
filmed In the Preienca of
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STATE OF UTAH,
3*.

County of

thi ilm«r
iim*.

•••,.;:;-T^>--'

y.

On tho 3 ixi of
personally appeartd bafora mi

,'A. D. 10? f

of tht within lnatrum«nt, who duly acknowUdgad to ma that
C
^X

/
My commlsilon txplraii.
ir-~?i, — y r gr ^ ^

rl

__

~—*=*--3s*i=-,=z^

i

I \ r \

RWdln* In jC (/<*r

•UTTriMI

^f^^t

ll"W • liHIMIJufe

ha

•xtcuttd tht
-j

^^/W/Pubiic..
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. ^ ^

^fi
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ridtviA curve to the right (chord b e e n North
fii'ia'fF
thence Kent 169.16 f e e t to the point of BZCINNING.

. . _
EciVc 61.720 f e e t ) ;

BEGINNING i t t point on the North, eide of 2300 South S t r e e t , i t i d pointbeing
North 0 ' 0 2 ' 3 3 " EASU 1033.00 feet and Wait 2356.812 f e e t fron tht Uilt Ulce
City Survey Monument *t tho center nf Section 22, Tovmhlp 1 South, Renge 1
Weet, S i l t Like Been end Huriditn tnd running thencti North 340.00 f e a t ; chtnce
Weet 132..U2 f e e t | thence South 15<%02,36M E*et 134.984 f t t t ; ehence South 73*
37'2AM Veat 82.00 f#Qtj thence South 16*02 ! 36" E n t 67.00 f e e t ; thence South
104.00 f e e t to iii.d North l i n e of S t r e e t ; thence Eeat 170.00 feat to ch* point
of beginning.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TabC
*'

•

••

'

•

•

\

•

r

{

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

mwammmM
3

Recorded at Request of
at

S
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Dcp. Book
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Ref.:
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.Address

WARRANTY DEED
[CORPORATE

MIIGCI.'-HALMDL'R,

FORM]

I.VC.

organized ind existing under the lawi of the State of U t a h ,
S a l t :^'K<: Cit.y
, of C o u n t y of
^ A l t Lake
grantor, hereby C O N V E Y S A N D W A R R A N T S to

, a co.-f.-Tration
with icj principal •«>•.:ice at
, State cf Utah,

WEST-?.:: MA;iAG2'fHi7 - a P a r t n e r s h i p
gr.intcc
for the s u n of
DOLL/i RS.

C u l t Lake C i t y , S a l t Lake C o u n t y , f t a t c oC Utah
Ten d o l l a r - and o t h e r good and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n
the following described trace
State of U t a h :

of land in

g a 1 l Lnks

Sec E x h i b i t "A" a t t a c h e d h e r e t o , and by t h i s

Cou"ty.

reference

made a p a r t

$

hereof.

\
a:

The officers who sign this deed hereby certify t h a t this deed ,md Yne transfer represented
thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted b y the board of directors of the
grantor t a lawful meeting duly held and attended b y a q u o r u m .
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name amii seal to be hereunto affixed
by its duly a u t h o d z r d of/iccn this <J/±J-—
day of / ^ b . / v f ^ C ^
, A. D. V) V?
AtCic:

MINSQ/I-HAkANDSR, P C . .

[

'{JM^ ^

.om pany

Secretary.

•

•

*

-

•

'

«

;

.

' ,

President.

"".{•oaSl'O/.^TK SEAL

''ca V v

;

< <r* '. t 1: r„.

'STrttCOJ UTAH,
'J.'

C "

" - • ' • -

."C-o^/.uf
-rdbi'the Zl*
day of
O^*•£«-'
personally appeared before me R ^ •
ft.\/t«t/tr-~
a n c J /"*>>/«
who bein.j by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, rhe said O W * . / ^ * ^ i r>rV^ "*••'*
Is the president, and lie, the said R. £ A J M / U « I / * » - '
/ ifif the %cctltl&\
M{ttity'\ °
Of r T \ , A tjC'M . ^J«WM i . c / f , I A C
C o m p a n y , ind that thz withirr aod, foregoing '
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by a u t h o r i t y of x resplution'of
\U\(^T^pfdirectors and said ^ « \ U ^- p \ . . \ ^ . . ^
md fC o p*« ( u 'r» "'>.*.""
each duly acknowledged to rrte that said corpo;ation executed the .umc and t h a t ' t h e .teaUaYfiA-c!
is the seal of said corporation.
(

LUJL^JZ:
My commission expiree.S//.£.//..tfJ2-

\j~\
_\\y residence is (Citd.^teftl*!

• NpUrjcPuWic
J^fffr.l)

J
UTAH T u n AH* ABSTRACT COMPANY
Si/t Lake 355-7533

Too«!t 832-3511

-~* Davis 867-2273

773-1653

534-042?

Wtb«r 621-754
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UT:AI. DESCRIPTION
EXHIBIT " A "

BEGINNING at
p o i n t on the North l i n e of 2300 South S t r e e t , »»{d point
fll-'o b e i n g Nor th 00*
0 3 ' 48" East 1086.539 f e e t i-id E a s t 8 4 . 1 6 feet from
t h ?! n £ 11 quarter corn er of S e c t i o n 2 1 , Tovnship I S o u t h , Range I West,
S i l f U l £ Base and Me r i d i a n , and running thence North 8 5 1 . 0 5 feet t o the
Soiit.1" Right of Way l i n* of 1-215, Chen-? S o u t h w e s t e r l y 6 3 . 8 1 2 feet along
a I 1 4 6 . I ? foot rodiua
curve to the l e f t (Chord beara South 59* 37' 52"
Went 6 3 . 8 0 * f* f t ) ; th uncc South 58* 19» 02" We»t 2 0 5 . 0 0 f e e t along
aid
R i g h t of U'av I 11.?; th ence South 02* 30" 00" East 1 2 2 . 1 5 7 f e e t ; thenca
South 16" 0 2 ' 3 6 ' E..- - 4 1 4 . 1 6 1 f e e t , thence South 73* 5 7 ' 24" West 8 2 . 0 0
f e e t ; thence S ou c.*. * 6* C " 36" Eaat 6 7 . 0 0 f e e t ; t h e n c t South 104.00 f e e t
t o t h e North I inc of s a i d i t r - e t ; thence Eaat 170.00 f e e t Along aaid
North l i n e Co the poi (ll of BEGINS INC.
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Recorded it Requett of
IL

v-

M. FeePiJdJ

by

Dtp, BccL

Pift

Mtil nx nodce to,

Addmi

3645188

:f

M.u

WARRANTY DEEP
frxncor

WESTERN MANAGEMENT, a P a r t n e r s h i p
of S a l t Lake C i t y
CONVEY andWAR&ANT

County of

Stttt of Utth, hereby

S a l t Lake

to

WILLIAM . ! . LOWENBERC, * .

m a r r i e d man, a s h i a s o l e and s e p a r a t e p r o p e r t y

of

44 Montgomery S t r e e t
County
San F r a n c i s c o , C a l i f o r n i a
94104
forthexutnof TEN DOLLARS and o t h e r gbnd and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s

frtntee
California
, Sate of UM/
&DUJX3i$

S a l t Lake

the followinf dacribed met of Und In

County,

Scire of Ucih, to-wit:

SEE LEGAL DESCRIPTION M REVERSE SIDE HEREOF.

.1
51

If
WITNESS the hand of stid jrantor , this

2 7 th

day of
WES

C3
•~*J

u>
CO
O

— O/ O \ -

c:.«j^

7
.
A. D. 19 82
NT, a P a r t n e r s h i p

Signed In the presence of

/ v..--'
--A
STATE gSIHtty
••>:
I

'CCtoHTY OF-Sclt Lako

Co

4 ^ d a y of
V H . pfeO.^SMf-TH, "RONALD W. SMII

AA^S
DALE

, 1982, pe r s o n a l l y appeared b e f o r e me

N. MINSON and ROBERT S. HALANDER, who b e i n g by

me- d u i y - s ^ o r i / d i d s a y t h a t they a r c t h e P a r t n e r s of WESTER*. MANAGEMENT, a P a r t n e r s h i p
and Lhat t h e foregoing i n s t r u m e n t was s i g n e d i n b e h a l f of r a i d P n r t n e r s h l p , and a a ' .
H. FKF.D SMITH, RONALD W. SMITH, DALE N. MINSON and ROBERT
HAUyNDER acknowledged
T S.
S. HALAN!
to me t h a t s a i d P a r t n e r s h i p executed t h e same.
My CommUrion Expdtit
Notary
Public
o
/ »
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CD

LEGAL DESCRIPTION
.uEClh"NZNC a : a p o i n t on the North aide of 2200 Sou:h S t r e e t , j a i d p o i n t
being North 0* 0 2 ' 35" £ a s : 1033.00 f a - : and Veac 25:5.312 f e e : f r U :hc
S a l : Laki Count/ Survey M c n u ^ n : a : :he c e n t e r of S c : : i c n 22, Tc~-T.3hip 1
South, Range 1 W C J : , S a l : Lake Base and M e r i d i a n , s a i d seine* nl*3 b e i o j
North 0 ' 0 2 ' 14" W 2 3 : along tha s e c t i o n l i n e 1025.91 feet '(byde<-d North
CO* 0 3 ' 4 3 " r . i a : 1035.539 f e e t ) and Eajt 36.73 f e e : (by Deed East 34.15 f e - : )
froa :h« W*jt q u a r t e r c o r n e r of S e c t i o n 22, Tcvr.ship 1 South, Ran;? 1 West,
S a l : Laka Bar.e and M e r i d i a n , and running thence L'T-r. 3:1.05 feet to the
Scu:h Right of Way l i n e of 1-215, ther.es Seuthvea te r l y 52.312 f e e : a i m ;
a 1146.22 foot r a d i u s c u r / a :o the I s : : (Chord bear3 South 59* 2 7 ' 52" Wen:
62.304 f « < : ) ; thence South 53* 19' 02" W 2 3 : 205.00 f e e : along aaid.Rl.3h: 0:
Way l i n e ; th.tnca South 02* 2 0 ' 00" East 122.157 f a - : ; -ther.ca South IS* 0 2 ' 25
East 414.151 f e e : , thence Scu:h 72* 5 7 ' 24" Weat 32.20 f e e : ; ther.ce South
16* 0 2 ' 36" East 57.00 f e e : ; thence Scu:h 104.00 f e e : :o :he North l i n e of
s a i d s t r e e t ; thence Eaa : 170.00 f e e t along s a i d North l i n e to the p o i n t
of 3SCINNING.
SL3JECT TO A:;0 TGCE~tER WITH A RIGHT Or WAV: Beginning a t a p o i n t on the
North l i n e of- 2300 South S t r e e t ; s a i d p c i n : b e i n g North 00 s 0 3 ' 43" East
1036.539 f e e t ar.d West 35.34 f e e t frcrs the West q u a r t e r c o r n e r of S e c t i o n 22
Township 1 South, Range 1 We**:, S a l t Lake 3a3e and M e r i d i a n , and running then
North 104.00 f e e t ; theno* North I 6 a 0 2 ' 36" West 67.20 :az;
thence North
73* 5 7 ' 24" East 32.00 f e e t ; t h e n c e North 1 5 ' 0 2 ' 3'V West, 414.151 f e e t , more
or l e s s tr» Che East boundary l i n e of p r o p e r : / conveyed to MARCCN INVESTMENT
by t h a t c e r t a i n Warranty Deed d a t e d October 1 4 , 19 75, recorded November 13,
1975 a* Entry No. 2761314 in Book 4029 a t page 329; and running thence
North 02* 2 0 ' 00" West 122.157 f e e t to the South l i n e 0 : the 1-215 i n t e r change and -running thence North 53* 1 9 ' 02" East 225.322 f e e t along s a i d
South l i n e ; thence South 53* 2 3 ' 29" West 159.555 f e e t along s a i d South l i n e ;
thence South 16* C2' 26" East 525.912 f e e t to the North l i n e of s a i d 2300
South S t r e e t ; thence N o r t h e a s t e r l y along s a i d North l i n e of 61.922 f e e t aroun
a 22.1143 f e e t r a d i u s curve to the r i g h t (cr.otd b e a r s North 31° 5 3 ' 42" East
61.720 f e e t ) ; thence East 169.15 f e e t to the p o i n t of BEGINNING.
Thi3 conveyance i s ruade and a c c e p t e d s u b j e c t to a Deed of T r u s t in favor c :
3ETTILT0N MORTGAGE LOAN GO. r e c o r d e d December 19, 19 79, in 3cok 5009 a t
page 1061 of O f f i c i a l R. :ords and amended by Aner.drr.er.: recorded J u l y 6,
1931 i n 3ook 526 7 a : pa; r 311 of O f f i c i a l Records, and s u b s e q u e n t l y a s s i g n e d
to OLD STCNE 3ANK, by A f - i g r . - e n t 01 deed of T r u s t r e c o r d e d A p r i l 9, 1930
in Book 5035 a t page 117 of O f f i c i a l Records having an unpaid p r i n c i p a l
b a l a n c e of 3 6 9 7 , 0 5 9 . 1 0
as of
Jar.V-rr- 2 7 , 19?I
which Deed of
T r u s t and the debt s^c-jj:^d t h e r e b y the G r a n t e e s h e r e i n hereby assume and
aftre.e to pay.
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jmMMsmi^

'***^^mm*MmtMM%fflLJi
« /

04

*b
\

W^n fttcordfirt Return tot

5Q132D2
23 JHW&1 ?J

04J17 PT1

K A T I E
L..
DIXOK
KSCSflfcO^ SALT UC£ CXWTYr UTAH

W i l l i a m J . Lovenber
44 Stontgca-orj St.ro e t
SEJI F r s n c i a c o , C a l i f o r n i a 941C4

FIRST tfSSIUM TirU
fc£C BTl SJttfcCH VCST

r DCPUTT

CQBiwcnvg ^JtR^jmr &CTP
HHSREA5,
Lake

City #

Western

County

of

Management,

Salt

a

Lake, ^tat*

Partnership,
of

Utah,

of

as

Salt

grantor,

?>';.,(

CC«YJY2D and WAJUIAHT3D to WILLIAM J. LOHStfBSKG; !;a »arried man, as

II

h i a v a o l a - a n d ^aiparata

property

?rancisco, California,
ation

received

Warranty
Lake
: • •

Deed

County
•

•

:

94104

tlm ;./r<ial
dat*d

- • • • • : .

•

aa

.

-

Montgcaary

granted

for

Strait.

valuable

described

in

•

;

February

,

,

.

.

i

r

'

,

3, 1982,

. ; . * ,

•

•

•

:

San

consider-

that

27, 1S82 awl recorded

Office

•

44

property

January

Recorder's
* ; • ' .

of

in

certain
the

in Book

Salt
5337,

•

cxm»*ncing at Page 1149, a# Entry Xo. 3645180 {'Warranty Died").
i

'

. ! - • ' • ; !

:

.'•

*•'

,

;

;'.

•

;

r

' '

' • '

i :

•"*'$%•»

KH35U2AJB, the parties tOj thia Corrective Warranty

;; Iwa: disport rid va«^

Deed

the Warranty

>;j E^Mki vhich thay, dasira' to corract. '• <••.- .:/: -;«;^£.-v '#l.[.' Ml
,*;:. - • •• ^

• .*•;••.:'* : •"• -.-.•• -t-r.^ £ j - * « V ; - > 1 ^

NSSXSAS#'"tK# partiom
•

=••.-•,•••.•':•'

i

':^

to' this CorrectiVe Warranty

: .v\'.:-

•• ":•:)$•

Died

V r . f - ' • s •'^•.•.p;':

htva discovered irrora:;;in tha rnairvction-cnd grant of the righto£-v*y .dsscrilxtd -in v the
convey

a

right-of-vay

for

Warranty
ingraaa

Dead
and

which *jva*
agr^aa; aa

intended

necessary

to
and

appropriate for the convenient use of Ga*ntei*a property over the
.adjoining

prx^party - conveyed

to r; tfaw

deacription, by mutual. ,miataJia of
auch eaa«m«nt

to appropriate

Grantor;-; hovever,

thft pvartita, /failed

ingreaa and agress^cver

to

limit

the acceac

vays ax tha *&m*. a*ist;»3 or may be improved or ^odifiid.

irrnjt uofam
inaa^isi

such

^ •• • m
.I't-.-C1'1'
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^ixm^wj&a^m^

^jfcsssasfa^

VfliZRX^S, >*astern> Managaia*nt,
nership

cormistJng

of

H,

7r*d

Xinson,

and Robert

S. Halander;

formerly

S^ith,

Ronald

and Saith,

a general

part}i.

*W. £**ith, Dale

Halandftr, feith and

AjiaociaU/a, a partnership, consisting of H. Fred Siaith, Ronald W.
Gnith ar\d Rcbort 2. Halander
of the property described
is presently

titled

in

(successor in interest to a portion

in the amended legal description vhich

the na»* of

Associates) herein collectively

Saith,

lUiandor,

art acting

^nd

Saiith

as grantors of their

riisjpflctivo interests^-1'"-,.
WHZPSA3, Wllll&n J.

ir»di v idu/*\ ly, h^i

Lovenberg,

bean

designated arxl is acting in the capacity as a grantee herein, but
vith respect: to tho corrections of the description of the riqhtof-vay

for

ingress

and

egress,

Loventxrg

shall

also

net

as

grantor for thu purpose cf partially releasing and raconveying to
granv.ors naaad hereinabove
burdin,

encumbrance

necessary

or

tc accomplish

or their successors

restrictions

of

!

the

in interact,

the

right-of-vay

a/j

the purpose oi the parties

in correcting

the aistaXa in the description of the right-of-vay.
WHEREAS, the parties hereto intend that the corrections
shall

relate

w

:-?ujrranty

back

D**£m,

to
so

the
that

date
the

of

the

estate

pi ior
of

Willie

. gr.ytnt»a, vill be as intended by the parties.
lnt//.nd land

do

not

hereby

create

any

nev

conveyance
J.

by

the

U3venbtjrg,

The parties do not

1 i»i'vat'ion p^ricxls on

action* or extend the sasae by virtue of this D^*d.
T>IXRZrOR2#

to

correct

such

aiatakes,

tht

partits

this !><i*il hereby aj**nd the legal descript ion on. the Warranty

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to
D*L<1

CD

en
CO

*#£i&>2^^

i^3L2£S£Stf^

to

the

legal

descriptions

as

.

set

forth

on

..JE^§&£mWJB2g%iMi

Exhibit

*A*

attached

hereto.
IH WITNESS
been

made

2 Zr

day

and
of

agreed

ymZPJZQT, t h i s
t.o aaong

~J /\<7]x.>4fl-r

the

Corrected

Warranty

folloving

parties

Deed

dated

has
this

. 1991.

y-lXLIAX J .

L0*r2.MBSR<V

'WBSTZRM MANAGEMENT, A PARTNERSHIP

/
FAXU *HTTR% G*ntr* T

Partner

l#ai,//

/fo<tdj&j£J>?*

'JfcGHALD W, SttlTH, G e n e r a l

U>2 H.

KA^SCN,

/General

Partner

P a r t n er

^li^^klz^

ROBLRt $• HALAND&R, General Partner
(/
SMITH, HAUUfDRR, S>II TH and
ASSOCIATES, A PARTNERSHIP
/

•

^
H. F,^!)" SMITH, G e n e r a l

Partner
CX7

CO

,* •
-3-

CO

en
CO
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~\^a

/

ALD W. SftlTli,
Rt**A

GeA*ral

'JfOB5B??y3. IIA^ANDXH,

57AT3 OV CAI.I70«MIA
.

.

. „ •

General

Partner

)
:

f\^r^..^kV

Partner

••:.

: s .

) '•• • •,-..L ....••
On fch* ^l^V)r da? of ^r^vo^^N-r-V,
1991, personally
'..«Fpfi«r-wl' bafor.*ra<sW.TU. ^ J. LCWENBSWG, th* signer of the above
instrument, yhu duly acknowledged before zvc that he executed the
1 ytSSS-X

crfo

1

Vs^ \3^lCU>^>(g^

Sga*

NOTARY PU.II.IC
Residing at: ^

>*y Ccraaiasion Empires:

/

c<v

STATS 0 ? iJTA2i
32.

CCUXTT OF SALT LAK2
x
<^ * h *
/^
da*/ vCz>~z*fr-£{(&-t~s1
.-^ 1991 _ p e r s o n a l l y
l'
S ^ r t H ; RCtfAI^
RGHAL^ W. SMITH,
SHI'
a p p e a r e d ; f c a £ o r e a a It. FFLSD S^VVA)
0AL2 N.
MIMSOtf, and K002RT S. IlALAHDEfl, vho b«irKJ d u l y s v o r n , d i d j a y
th&t t h e y a r * t h e g e n e r a l p a r t n e r s of W^STSJltf MAHAGZXEirr, n
partnership,
*nd.-! ; that t h * f o r e g o i n g
iastruaent
v a s s itj r,*d in
b u h a l f oiT s a i d p i r t n e r s h i p and s a i d H. FR2D SXIT74, RCWAU) W.
SXITH, DAJL3 H. WINSGH, and ROBERT 3 . HAUOfDEJ* a c k n o w l e d g e d t o » e
that *aid partnership executed the'sao*.

"c:
My Cccmixjaion E x p i r e s :

**»«»A^_^^^
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STAT2 0? UTAH
,13 ,

CCUKTT 0? SALT LAitP.

)

id

1951
On t h«
day ti\?*&<<*2&£LLC£*
'
personally
spp*nra<i
7R2D
^©IJlT?^
RCtJALD/Wi
SMITH,
PODZKT
S.
H.
HALADDER, Yho b e i n g d u l y s v o r n , dicf zn1/ t h a t t h * y art t h * g * n * r a l
p a r t n e r s of SMITH, HAL*>iD2ft, 5XITH ar\d" ASSCCIATZS, a p a r t n e r s h i p ,
and t h . i t t h * f o r e g o i n g i a s t r u » < n t v&£ s i g n e d in b e h a l f of s a i d
FHZO S^ITH, RONALD V. SMITH, ?,CHALD S.
p a r t n e r s h i p and s ^ i d H
IULAMD2R a c i i n o v 1 *dc? ed t o »* thAt s a i d p a r t n e r s h i p e x e c u t e d the
sane.

*' Sss^
My Ccrtaaission

-

Szpires,

: 12<s L*+**+

(VUG-

384/1103S0A
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:

jjj«»uirof% **$*< ••/•.! f>*. >"r^-i>-r>j^xj.«*-cjvv

."^CU^-'i-C-SCl—%LJ*-»« w - » »

SXHI3IT "A*
3EG1N3SIMG a t 3 po::nt on t h e H o r t h l i n e of
2200 South S t r e e t ,
said point being
Hcrth
0 * 0 2 ' 3 5 * Sarit 1 0 8 3 . 0 0 f e e t end W*st 2 5 5 6 . 5 1 2
f e e t f r c a t h e S a l t Lake County S u r v e y Mcrvj» c n t a t th<f c e n t e r of S e c t i o n 2 2 , T o w n s h i p 1
South,
Psange 2 W i s t ,
Salt
L^Xe Ba3e aul
M e r i d i a n , and r u n n i n g t h e n c e H o r t h 8 4 3 . 4 3 A
f e ^ t t o t h e South r i g h t - o f - w a y l i n e of t h e
1-215
• / ' • ranp e i i t ;
thence
Southwesterly
6 9 . 8 3 3 f e e t , along s a i d South
right-of-way
l i n e , around a 1J.46.23 f o o t radium c u r v « t o
the l e f t
(Chord b e a r * South 5 3 * * 6 , 5 3 " V e s t
69.822
f**t);
thewce South 5 8 * 1 9 , 0 2 West
a l o n g »-ai^2 . S o u t h r i g h t - o f ' ^ v a y l i n e
227.853
feet;
t h e n c e S o u t h 16 % 0i § ."3b" E a s t 5 2 2 . 9 3 5
f e e t ; t h e n c e South 7 3 * 5 7 ' 2 4 * West 8 2 . 0 f e e
t h s n e a S o u t h 1 6 * 0 2 e 3 6 * ZWC':61.0
f e e t ; thence
S o u t h 1 0 4 . 0 0 f e e t t o t h e N o r t h l i n e of s a i d
2 300 S o u t h S t r e e t ;
then;:* ; :; Zas t a l o n g
said
Horth
line
170.00
fe x tt . t o t h e poim
o?
B;;G1HHIKG.
Contains 3.304 ^c/.'es.
ttUDJSCT TO AhU TOGETHER WITK A RIGHT. OF WAY
for the convenience of ingrus& ap.c1. egress
ov-^r the following described property for the
b-enelit
of
the above-described
property
excepting
thsrefrcta
existing
buildings,
landscaping areas, and othtr improved areas
not necessary or suitable for or" iincidentcl
to Grantea's use for access to his adjoining
property da-scribed abovu.'4 The Grantee is
granted the right over tti<} existing access
vays for convenient ingrea's and egress to
Grantee's adjoining property as the sajae
exists or as X.)MI saiae Piaj subsequently be
jvadifiedf
provided,
however,
access
will
always b<s conver, ient and) Grantor or its
successors and sssigns shnll not prevent
Grantoe or his successors:_ iti*n-d Assigns f :oa
convenient: access to the >djoining property
described nboye.
The property, subject to
i.h* right: of way i.s described as follows:
IW&GXHHJHG at a point on th<? North 1:
2300 South Street, said point being
00 # 02'35 S w t , 1083.00 • f«et and
272S.812 t'a*t fro* the ,£a,lt Lelic
Suivey Monure-ent at
T c v n s M p 1 South,
Base and Meridian,
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if

- A

104.00
feet;
tnence North
14*02* 3 6 ^
West
67.03 feet; therYce North 7 3 0 5 7 \ 2 4 " ?.d^. 82.00
fee'.; thence North 16*02'36- West
5*2.935
fe'.'t to the South lin^ of the *?m rrmp of
1-^15; thcnc* South 5 8 * 1 9 ' 0 2 " We.st l*-2.072
J**t along Skid South line; thence
South
!5J # 28'29" V.23t 159.555 feet, alon^ s a i d itouth
Una;
ther.c* South 16*02 , 36 , < R^st 520.312
i
:r**t to t."i<: Worth line of said 2 3 0 0 South
J
S'trssL,
thrnc*
Northeasterly
61.322
feet
,
d round * 221.143 foot radius c u r v e to the
rlyht (chord bears North 8 1 ' 5 8 ' 4 2 % £ast 61.72
f w e t ) ; thunce Zast 169.16 feet to the point
---•' --.•*: --' • . ...oi* S2G12CHXHG.
•• •••^ •
'•':. \s c o n v e y a n c e is m a d e and accepted subject
• •' •
to .a .Deed of Tru-t in favor- of 3 K T T I L Y O N
>*0lirGAG2 LOAN C O . recorded December 1 9 , 1979,
ir. Book 5009 at p/*ge lOGlvOf O f f i c i a l Records
end a m e n d e d by Amendment recorded J u l y 6,
1?01 in Book 5267 at page 811 of O f f i c i a l
Rscor&s
and subsequently
assigned
to O L D
S T O N E 8&KX, by Assignment of De<-d of Trust
r e c o r d e d April 9, 1930 in book 5085 at page
117 of Official Records having
an unpaid
principal
balance
of j£$697,069.10
as
of
'
J a n u a r y 27, 1 5 3 2 , which &eed of T r u s t and the
debt
secured
thereby
the G r a n t e e s
herein
•'
. h e r e b y assu»yy ; and agree tc £ y.
j
•;•'•;•'•; :'..,',;• .-. t. .. • • .• T H I S 1 : C O N V E Y A N C E .is-; madai- subject . tp< !„cncuni: :
';; '';,:.;r;-' ».
"• brances/^eastrasnts and restrict ions ( including
restrictive
covenants 'and
amendments
• t h e r e t o ) e x i t i n g of record on J a n u a r y 2 7 ,
1932; an<3 is .further subject to any -and all
b o u n d a r y line d i s c r e p a n c i e s or e n c r o a c h m e n t s ,
r h e t h e r ezis-ing before "or after J a n u a r y 2 7 ,
1 9 8 2 (except c.s provided$by casnacnt or other
.;** ';•».a $ r e s » € n t s as at fact ingi either • p r o p e r t y as
d e s c r i b e d h e r e i n } ; a n d ^ n y end all encuaab r ^ n c o a , restrictions or easewentrt e n f o r ^ able in lav or equity, .created or p e r f e c t e d
on or after January 2 7 , i l 5 8 2 , Ur.lr*s any of
the
above
v«rc
cr*at4KS o : p e r f e c t e d
by
W e s t e r n Managera^nt or Saith, H a ^ a n d e r , Saith
k A s s o c i a t e s or any of their p a r t n e r s .

'•. '.
; }
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CRAm-EE'S ADDRESS
Los A l t o s . C a l i f o r n i a

94022

Rec 8T:Z JCHAH30N

, 0 £ ? u n - WI

w
WARRANTY DEED

CO

o

WILLIAM J . LOWEN3ERG
e/

San

CONVEY

Francisco

San Francisco

Q»WO{

and WARRANT to
WILLI All S . LOVE and IREUE C. LOVE
as j o i n t t e n a n t s with f u l l r i g h t s of

rf

pxntof
CA
Sate olAJt&, hereby

L o s AltOS

fof the mm erf

TE tf

survivorship

County

, Scire of )}p$i CA

DOLLARS AND OTHER OOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION DOLLARS

the followin« described snxt of land In •

S a l t Lake

County

5ft re of Utah, to*«Hr?
S e e E x h i b i t "A" a t t a c h e d h e r e t o
a n d by t h i s r e f e r e n c e made a p a r t
hereofGrantor q u i t - c l a i m s , b u t does n o t warrant, t h e f o l l o w i n g describ:-.: t r a c t
o f l a n d l o c a t e d i n S a l t Lake C o u n t y , S t a t e o f U t a h , t o - w i t :
,
S e e E x h i b i t "B" a t t a c h e d h e r e t o
a n d by t h i s r e f e r e n c e made a p a r t
hereof.

» '

This conveyance is made subject to those items set forth in Exhibit n C M
attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof.

WITNESS the hand ofuSdmuicor ,thii

l l / 0 * day of

A.D. 19

January

95

/-g£0?^<

Signed in the presence of

*" WILLIAM J . LOWENBE&G

STATE OF yj*fl
COUNTY OF

California

SS.

San F r a n c i s c o
On the

dif cC

•ppared before me

January

A. D. 19 9 5

peowieily

WILLIAM J . LOWENBERG

the aifcxr of the within inurnment who duly *c&oowi*dftd
' vo am that bt exeaxed the jam*

Notary Public,
Betiding al

ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY My<*™*«°°w«Or«kt N o _
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CALIFORNIA ALL-PURPOSE ACKNOWLEDGMENT

8«. Ste
State of
™

rjftU.f%vpxlP

County of ^ r r ^ s ^ g y ^ cc^-=s
On zSwouLft^-y \ U 1455* before ma.
6*TS

/

personally appeared

NAAC. 7IU.E O f CFRCCM • 6 . 0 , 'JAN6 00€. MlfAAY

U'I IV «n r r

^Tv

WCUC

V-OCogr^Qg<aLg^
HUC{SlC^SX3N€ntSj

S^personally known to me - OR - • proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence
to be the parson(^whose name/s^is/pro
subscribed xo the within instrument a^d acknowledged to me that hefch^they'f-xec-jted
the same in his/JjetYtbsrf^authorized
capacity£€^ f and that by his/her/their
signaturej^on the instrument the person(e^f
or the entity upon behalf of which the
CKSSuNS J. HHN0RICX3ON
C0MM. * 1045192
person^f acted, executed the instrument.
Noiav PUrfc - Cdfomta
SAN FRANC3CO COUNTY
3ir«0eC!2.19O«l
\*t Comm. b&tm
C

v Mmwww v

WITNESS my hand and official seal.

OPTIONAL •wmwjg
Though the data betow is not required by law, it may prove valuable to persons relying on the document and cculd prevent
fraudulent reattachment cf this form.

CAPACITY CLAIMED BY SIGNER
•
•

INDIVIDUAL
CORPORATE OFFICER

Q

PARTNER(S)

•
D
•
G

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

^fi,rrfrNn7

lP5g^?,

D UMTTED
D GENERAL

ATTORNEY-IMPACT
TRUSTEE(S)
GUARD1ANC0NSEHVATOR
OTHER'
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EXHIBIT "A"
(PROPSXTY DBscximoH)
Those certain parcels of real property situated in Salt Lake County, State cf Utah and
more particularly described as follows:
BEGINNING at a point on the north line of 2300 South Straot. said point
being North 0°02'35" East 1083.00 feet and West 2555.812 feet from
the Salt Lake County Survey Monument at the Center of Section 22,
Township 1 South. Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
running thence North 848.4-34 feet to the south right of way line of the
1-215 mF" ramp exit; thence Southwesterly 69.833 feet along said south
right of way line, around a 1146.23 foot radius curve to the left (chord
bears South 59°46'53* West 69.822 feet); thence South 58°19'02"
West along said south right of way line 227.853 feet; thence South
16°02'36" East 522.935 fe-rt; thence South 73°57'24" West 82.0 feet;
thence South 16 o 02'36 - East 67.0 feet; thence South 104.00 feet to the
north line of said 2300 South Street; thence East along said north line
170.00 feet to the point of BEGINNING.
TOGETHER WITH A RIGHT OF WAY as was obtained by Grantor pursuant
to that Corrective Warranty Deed entered into betweon Western
Management, a partnership, as grantor, and conveyed and werranted to
William J . Lowenberg, as grantee, and dated January 22. 1991, and
recorded January 23, 1991, in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office as
Entry No. 5015202, in Book 6284, at Page 1366-1372. The proparty,
subject to the right of way is described as follows:
BEGINNING at a point on the North line of 2300 South
Street, said point being North QQ°Q2'35m East. 1083.00 feet
and West 2726.812 feet from the Salt Lake County Survey
Monument at the center of Section 22, Township 1 South,
Rcr.gb 1 West. Sait Lake Base and Meridian, and running
thence forth 104.00 feat; thence North 16°02'36" West
67.00 feet; thence North 73 3 57'24" East 82.00 fnet;
thenc8 North 16°02'36" Wast 522.935 feet to the South
line of the "F" ramp of i-215; thence South 58° 19'02" West
1 9 2 . 0 7 2 feet along said South line; thance Soutn
53°28'29" West 159.555 feet along said South line; thence
South 16°02'38" East 526.912 feet to the North line of
said 2300 South Street; thsnca Northeasterly 61.922 feet
around a 221.143 foct radius curve to the right {chord bears
North 81°58,42"r East 61.72 feet); thenca East 169.16 feet
to the point of BEGINNING.

as
O
CD

$
Ui CD
^2
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EXHIBIT "B"
(PROPERTY DESCRIPTION)

That certain parcel of real property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and
more particularly described ao follows:
TOGETHER WITH A perpetual easement for the purpose of providing
access to and from 8 loading dock, as disclosed in that certain Grant of
Easement recorded April 08, 1980 as Entry No. 3421031, in Book
5084, at Page 322 and effecting the following described property:
BEGINNING at a point which is North 0°02'35" East
1083.00 feet, West 2666.520 feet and North 191.074
feet from the Salt Lake County Survey Monument at the
center of Section 22, Township 1 South, Range 1 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 73°57'24"
W8st 5.30 feet to the West side of a concrete retaining
wall; thence North 00°02'39" Wast along said wall 4.68
feet; thence North 89.°57'21" East 4.17 feec; thence
South 1 6 ° 0 2 ' 3 6 " East 3.35 feet to the point of
BEGINNING.

i
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EXHIBIT " C
(EXCEPTIONS TO TTTLE)

Taxe9 for the year 1995 and thereafter. {Tax Pares! No. 15-21-226-006)

Said property is located within the boundaries of West Valley City and GrangerHunter improvement District and Is subject to charges and assessments levied
thereunder.

Assignment of Leases, Contracts and Warranties, dated January 27. 1981,
wherein WESTERN MANAGEMENT, a Partnership, as Assignor, assigns to
WILLIAM J . LOWENBERG, an individual, as Assignee, all its right title and
interest in and to those certain Leases. Said Assignment recorded February 03,
1982, as Entry No. 3645189, in Book 5337, at Page 1151, Salt Lake County
Recorder's Office.

Subject to a drainage easement along the Northerly 10 feet of the subject
property as disclosed in that certain Quit Claim Dsed dated September 19,
1979, recorded October 15, 1979, as Entry No. 3350222, in Book 4964, at
Page 11, Salt Lake County Recorder's Office.

A non-access reservation to the property owned by the State Road
Commission of Utah, being along the Northwesterly line thereof as disclosed
by various instruments of record.

Subject to the following matters disclosed on that certain survey prepared by
Robert G. Walker, having been certified under the data of August 12, 1986,
by Robert G. Walker, a Registered Land Surveyor holding License No. 3559:
a.
b.
c.
d.

overhead utility lines
buried concrete storm flume & inlet boxes
10 foot drainage easement
sewer manhole

Restrictive Covenants, signed July 01, 1968 and recorded October 17, 1969,
as Entry No. 2307259, in Book 2799, at Page 156, Salt Lake County
Recorder's Office.
Amendment to Restrictive Covenents of Redwood Park, executed July 27,
1972, recorded August 14, 1972, as Entry No. 2476874, in Book 3129. at
Page 110, Salt Lake County Recorder's Office.

An Ordinance No. 82 15 changing the name of 2300 South Street in West
Valley City from Cecker Lake Boulevard to Printers Row, recorded May 19,
1982. as Entry No. 3676608, in Book 5374, at Page 304, Salt Lake County
Recorder's Office.

Subject to the rights of parties In possession of the subject property under
unrecorded Leases, Rental or Occupancy Agreements and any claims
thereunder.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TabG

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I5ird<? /
Recorded At Request of . . . .
at

M.Fee Paid.

by

Dtp. Book

MiiiiaxnotkAto

Pit*

Ref.

Qr.an.tjw

Address

6SP..N9r/u/iw j-rfe..Cnvr.t.
Los A l t o s , Ca„ 94 022

QUIT CLAIM DEEft
r*
in

o
CO

6037304
1/10/W 1H32 Art
1?-C
NANCY
UORKttAN
RECORDER i SALT LAKE COUNTY t UTAH
ASSOCIATED TITLE
REC »YiB GRAY
rOEPOTY - UI
j>
grtnlor
State of Utah, hereby

LOVE and IRENE C . LOVE
WILLIAM S .
.County of
Lo3 A l t o s
QUIT CLAIM to
WILLIAM S . LOVE and IRENE C . LOVE, a s c o - t r u s t e e s u n d e r THE
WILLIAM S . AND IRENE C. LOVE LIVING TRUST d a t e d March 2 2 , 1 9 9 0

iHo-4

0f

of

grantee
for the turn of
DOLLARS
County,

Los Altos, California
TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION

the following described tract
Stat* of Utah, to wit:

ofkodin

Salt

See E x h i b i t ' s A and B a t t a c h e d
r e f e r e n c e made a p a r t h e r e o f .

Lake

hereto

and b y

this

COURTESY RECOitLM.J
This document is berng recorded solely «- •> «w:*.v/
and an acco /irncxjitlcn to the parties tatted thei »nv
Associated Title Company hereby expressly disclaims
any responiibUity or liability for the accuracy or me
content thereof.

WITNESS the land

of tnidgraator

.thie

24th

dayof

March

sjt^t^.

<.<J*— C

If

95

5*gpid in the pretence of
.

-p^rrx^-

IRENE C. LOVE

STATE OF l/fti 1 ./

California

County of
OBUM

day of

WILLIAM S .
tbtalfntr

If
95
per tonally appeared before a
LOVE AND IRENE C . LOVE

March

of in* fotnjueng betnueem. who duly acknowledged to eae that

executed the lame.

Notary kNbifc, raiding at

S
o
-o

ASSOCIATED TITLE COMf*NY
en

on
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EXHIBIT "A"
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION)

Those certain parcels of real property situated in Salt Lake County* State of Utah and
more particularly described as follows:
BEGINNING at a point on the north line of 2300 South Street, said point
being North O°02'35w East 1083.00 feet and West 2556.812 feet from
the Salt Lake County Survey Monument at the Center of Section 22,
Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
running th6nc6 North 848.434 feet to the south right of way l»n» of the
1-215 "F" ramp exit; thence Southwesterly 69.833 feet along said south
right of way line, eround a 1146.23 foot radius curve to the left (chord
bears South 59°46'53 w West 89.822 feet); thence South 5B°19'02"
West along said south right of way line 227.853 feet; thence South
16°02'38" East 522.935 faet; thence South 73°57'24H West 82.0 feet:
thence South 16o02'36" East 67.0 feet; thence South 104.00 feet to the
north line of said 2300 South Street; thence East along said north line
170.00 feet to the point of BEGINNING.
TOGETHER WITH A RIGHT OF WAY as was obtained by Grantor pursuant
to that Corrective Warranty Deed entered into between Western
Management, a partnership, as grantor, and conveyed and warranted to
WilKam J . Lowenberg, as grantee, and dated January 22. 1991, and
recorded January 23, 1991, in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office as
Entry No. 5015202, in Book 6284, at Page 1366-1372. The property,
subject to the right of way is described as follows:
BEGINNING at a point on the North line of 2300 South
Street, said point being North O0°02'35" East. 1083.00 feet
Bnd West 2726.812 feet from the Salt Lake County Survey
Monument at the center of Section 22. Township 1 South,
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
thence North 104.00 feet; thence North 16°02'36" West
67.00 feet; thence North 73°57'24" East 82.00 feet;
thence North 16°02'36" West 522.935 feet to the South
line of the "FH ramp of 1-215; thence South 5B°19'02M West
192.072 feet along said South line; thence South
53°28'29M West 159.655 feet along said South lino; thence
South 16°02'36" East 526.912 feet to the North line of
said 2300 South Street; thence Northeesterly 61.922 feet
around a 221.143 foot radius curvo to the right {chord bears
North 81°58'42" East 61.72 feet); thence East 169.18 feet
to the point of BEGINNING.
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EXHIBIT "B"
(PROPERTY DESCRIPTION)

That certain parcel of real property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and
more particularly described as follows:
TOGETHER WITH A perpetual easement for the purpose of providing
access to and from a loading dock, as disclosed in that certain Grant of
E l e m e n t recorded April 08. 1980 as Entry No. 3421031, in Book
5084, at Page 322 and a Hading the following described property:
BEGINNING at a point which is North 0°02#35* East
1083.00 feet, West 2666.520 feet and North 191.074
feet from the Salt Lake County Survey Monument at the
center of Section 22, Township 1 South, Range 1 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 73°57'24"
West 6.30 feet to the West side of a concrete retaining
wall; thence North 0O°02'39 H West along said wall 4.6B
feet: thence North 89°57'21 M East 4.17 feet; thence
South l e * ^ ^ " East 3.35 feet to the point of
BEGINNING.
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CALIFORNIA ALL-PURPOSE ACKNOWLIDOMINT

State of
County of

<^>i-/ fi>/£0/Tf
^HTTth

CA/HOfr-

On MAA^UVJ 'iohsDAif

before me,

/

h\&/ZTA
»

personally appeared

- 3 ^ Z.Q

MJOMAA

iJM<g m e e m r r m i v . i t >*nt peg NOTAEV m a n e

* 2 ^ c t A / x ^ y y «x7 • ^h>-vA-c^> C ^ J L - * » £ > U ^ > ^ L , C - •

t J peroonelly known to me * O R -jSf proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence
to be the person(s) whose name(s)/^/are
subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that p^sh^/they executed
the same in J*6/rjji(r/their authorized
capacitjf(ies), and that by WgltiXffXheir
signature(s) on the instrument the person(s)>
or the entity upon behalf of which the
person(s) acted, executed the instrument.

l

i
I

WITNESS my hand and official seal.
7

~~~~"

SKiMATU^OTMOtAII*

«

•OPTIONAL'
Though the data below is not required by law. it may prove valuable !o persons relying on ths document and could prevent
Irtudulent reattachment of this loan
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• INDIVDUAL
D CORPORATE OFFICER
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TITLE OR TYPE OF DOCUMENT

D
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D LIMITED
D GENERAL

Q
El
HI
D

ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
TRUSTEES)
GUARDIAN/CONSERVATOR
OTHER:

.3

_

NUMBER OF PAGES

. . ... 7f°**A<> ..A^j/f€~
DATEOFDOCUWENT

8JQNER ti REPREtCNTWW:
MMIO»PfMaN(S)OWfMiriT!lll»1

«

_JSpjJer^
SIGNER(S) OTHER THAN NAMED ABOVE
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JUL
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—^-rv——

Recorded a! Requeat of
»»/*
fry

^7l\(.^.f

=

WQV 1 8 1975

'J.*^

t\^J

Xatls L 0;i:a. Salt Late Ccur.ly r.:::r::r

M. Fat Paid t ^ i L
(17)^0HUV.

. Dep. 3ook_

Mail tax notice to_

. Paje.

!;;;

Ref.-_

_Addreej

: i

M

2761314

WARRANTY DEED

Plan-Tech Corp.
of
Salt Lake City
CONVEY and WARRANT

^arcon

0f

Investment

to

(A

partnership)

Salt Lake City, Utah
Ten dollars and other

the following described tract
State of Utah:

jrantor
, State of Utah, hereby

Salt Lake

, Count7 of

£&/?

good and valuable
Salt

of land In

jrantee
for the sum of
DOLLARS,

consideration

Lake

County,

BEGINNING AT A POINT ON TKE NORTH LINE OF 2300 SOUTH STREETj
SAID POINT BEING N 00* 0 2 ' 35" E 1 0 8 3 . 0 0 * AND DUE WEST 2 7 5 7 - 316 •
FROM TKE S^LT LAKE COUNTY MONUMENT AT TKE CENTS?: OF SECTION 2 2 ,
T. I S . , R. 1 W., SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN AND RUNNING TKENCE
N 0 2 ' 0 1 ' 56" W 7 1 2 . 7 6 1 * TO TKE SOUTH RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE OF THE
"F" RAMP OF TKE PROPOSED 1 - 2 1 5 : THENCE S 5 $ ' 1 9 ' 02" W 2 2 5 - 3 3 2 '
ALONG SAID SOUTH LINE: TKENCE S 53* 28* 29" W 1 5 9 - 5 5 5 ' ALONG
SAID SOUTH LINE; TKENCE S 16* 0 2 ' 36" E S27-912* TO TKE NORTH
LIifE OF SAID 2300 SOUTH STREET; THENCE NORTHEASTERLY ALONG
SAID NORTH LINE 6 1 . 9 2 2 * AROUND A 2 2 1 . IkV RADIUS CURVE TO
THE RIGHT (CHORD 3EARS N 81* 58* U2" E 6 1 . 7 2 0 " ) $ TKENCE EAST
1 3 8 . 6 5 6 ' TO TKE POINT OF BEGINNING.

.-*#
^

1:1
i.M

CONTAINS*

WITNESS, the hand

of said jrantor
October

f

3 . 8 7 9 ACRES

f thU
/ . D . 19 75

Fourteenth

day of

i/d&LS.
fJn^Jz.

Signed In the Presence of

Pre3.
Sec.

KCt4if?/>s\

STATE OF UTAH,
Cotmtjo*

Salt

Lake

CO

On the Fourteenth
day of
October
personal!/ appeared before me, £. Fred 5brtt>rf QTSSarti^. Balander

CO

the iljrnerj of the within imtrurnent, irh OfStetf *$)cnp&fc^pd
aame.

CO

\
Mr cotnmUaion «xpir*e_

m

-^-»WA*nt

f>+*

io/s/73

y

\&^.&<:&t

m. r* /[ mSS^uuMiSSa

t*k* city. vtA
• ^ : - T T :

g

"

;

^ f .

SE3
Mill
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at

M M . 1 ?.?£A J ^ ^ ^

M. Fee Paid J
Dep. Book

by

Mall tax notice to...y.e3.c.errK.Ma3£?.^nf

Page..

Ref.;

Addrejj....338.5...Wes^..I32p._South

Salt Lake. City, Utah

3625896

S4104

QUIT-CLAIM DEED
[CORPOXATE FORM]

corporation
, a corporation
#CARRER\ CORPORATION, a U t a h
organized and existing under the laws of the Stace of Utah, wicb its principal office at
S a l t Lake C i t y
, of County of S a l t Lake
, Stace of Utah,
xrantor. hereby QUIT CLAIMS to
H. F r e d SrLith, R o n a l d W. S m i t h , D a l e N. M l n s o n , & R o b e r t S. H a l a n d e r /
H. F r e d S n d t h
Ronald S m i t h
Dale Vinson
.
~?n5C
? " ?Rn c!
3151 Craig Drive
17G1 J a n e l ' I a C i r c l e
3 3 3 5 !/. 1 8 2 0 S .
* ,
f s , • Z?°
S a l t L a k e C i t y , Utah Shandy* TJtah
„ S a l t X a k e , C i t y , UT ^ ^ e f e a k e C i c > r
h
of
S a l t Lake C i t y , S a l e 7 L a k e C o u n t y , S t a t e o f l f t a h
for che sum of
TEN ( o t h e r g o o d and ".-\luable c o n s i d e r a t i o n )
DOLLARS,
the following described trace of land in
S a l t Lake
Councy,
Stace of Utah: B e g i n n i n g a t a p o i n t o n t h e N o r t h l i n e o f 2 3 0 0 S o u t h
,
S t r e e t ; s a i d p o i n t b e i n g N o r t h 0 0 ° 0 2 3 5 " E a 3 t 1 0 8 3 . 0 0 f e e t and due
W e s t 2 7 2 6 . U 1 2 f e e t from t h e S a l t L a k e County S u r v e y Monument a t t h e
c e n t e r o f S e c t i o n 2 2 , T o w n s h i p 1 S o u t h , Range 1 W e s t , S a l t Lake B a s e
a n d M e d i d i a n , end r u n n i n g t h e n c e N o r t h 1 0 4 . 0 0 f e e t , t h e n c e N o r t h 1 6 °
0 2 ' 3 6 " W e s t 6 7 . 0 0 f e e t ; r.hence N o r t h 7 3 ° 5 7 ' 2 4 " E a s t 8 2 . 0 0 f e e t ; t h e n c e
N o r t h 1 6 ° 0 2 ' 3 6 " West 5 2 3 . 9 3 5 f e e t t o t h e S o u t h l i n e o f t h e "F" Ramp
of 1 - 2 1 5 ; thence South 5 8 d 1 9 ' 0 2 " West 1 9 2 . 0 7 2 f e e t a l o n g s a i d South
l i n e ; t h e n c e South 5 3 ° 2 8 ' 2 9 " West 1 5 9 . 5 5 5 f e e t a l o n g s a i d South l i n e ;
t h e n c e South 1 6 ° 0 2 , 3 6 " East 5 2 7 . 9 1 2 f e e t to the North l i n e of s a i d
2300 South S t r e e t ; thence N o r t h e a s t e r l y 6 1 . 9 2 2 f e e t around a 2 2 1 . 1 4 3
f o o t r a d i u s c u r v e t o t h e r i g h t ( C h o r d bear;* N o r t h 8 1 0 5 8 ' 4 2 " E a s t 6 1 . 7 2
f e e t ) ; t h e n c e E a s t 1 6 9 . 1 6 f e e t t o t h e D o i n t o f b e g i n n i n g , l y i n g and
s i t u a t e d "in S a l t Lake C o u n t y , S t a t e o f * U t a h .
FURTHER IDENTIFIED AS:
2 2 1 2 W e s t 2 3 0 0 S o u t h , S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h
84119.
The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and che transfer represented
'thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopced by the board of direccors of the
grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and atcended by a quorum.
^L* WT*»«$S whereof^ne grantor ha.i caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto affixed
b y its .du^T" luiKbr
day of
, A. D. 19

/}

Attex

.CARKM..CORPORATIQN
By

H.

'

Company
^

[CORPORATE 'SEA L/f

• \ .••

.. *

ST/n^QE^UTAH,
.<^^f^y

T

^ L T LAKE

jCTn'tnc
3Dth
October,
1 9 8 1 , A. D.
aay o f
peysoWaTlf-ip peered"* be fore me H. FRED 3 KITH
and
ROBERT S. HALANDER
FRED SMITH,
% • who bein^ by.'me.duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said
i ; n W p £ F d & L . 4 r ^ r * , the said ROBERTS. HALANDER
is the secretary
* o f " - ..CARRERA CORPOR
:0RP0RATI0N
Company, and tha:
.Kiri and foregoing
instrument w u ligned in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its board of
dirccton and said H. FRED SMITH
and ROBERT S. HALANDER
each duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed che same^nd chat the seal affixed
is the seal of laid corporation.

My commission expires..

kh lis.

J
.My residence!i il

.

Notan£Pt)b!ic.

• ^4^y...^Z.^J.

fLAUK ttf/i lO»Q^- O i i n r r n f l ^ i i i i i f l naa t i n . m T i u f NTY'
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"THIS 15 A LSGALLY 5IN0ING CONTRACT. If NOT UNCERSTGCO SR>. COMPETENT AC'.'tCS."

Aecottied it Request of

!'

I i

at

.yE?X?.^i..?MAp.^?.;!.T.

M. Fee Paid )

bv

Dep. Book

Mail tax norce co.3;fe.?..?.^n^^

362435'!

Pu*e

Ref.:

Address. .3.385. Wes.t. 13Z0_.South
S a l e ' LakV'Citv'r'u'c'an*

9S104

QUIT-CLAIM DEED

ri. F?£D SMITH. RONALD W. SMITH,
DALE N. MINSON, AND ROBERT S. HALAHDF.R,
vancors
of H a l t Lake C i t y
, County of
S a l e Lake
, Scire of Utah hereby
QUIT-CLAIM
to
W e s t e r n Management, A Utah p e : n - r a l p a r t n e r s h i p
(address:

3 3 6 5 V.'est 1820 S o u t h ,

Salt

Lake C i t y ,

of S a l t Lake C i t y , S a l t T-ike C o u n t y , S t a t e o f
TEN ( o t h e r g o o d and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n )

Utah

84L04)

grantee
for the sum of
DOLLARS,

Utah

the following described tract
of land in
S a l t Lake
County,
i
State of Utah: B e g i n n i n g a t a p o i n t on chfi N o r t h l i n e o f 2 3 0 0 S o u t h
S t r e e t ; s a i d p o i n t b e i n g N o r t h 0 0 ° 0 2 ' 3 5 M E a s t 1 0 8 3 . 0 0 f e e t find due " e s t !
2 7 2 6 . 8 1 2 f e e t from t h e S a l t Lake County S u r v e y Monument a t the-, c e n t e r on
S e c t i o n 2 2 , T o v n s h i D 1 S o u t h , Range 1 W e s t , S a l t Lake B a s e zc\d M e r i d i a n ,
and r u i m l r g t h e n c e N o r t h 1 0 ^ . 0 0 f e a t , t h e n c e N o r t h 1 6 ° 0 2 , 3 6 M West 6 7 . 0 0 !
f e e t ; thence North 7 3 ° 5 7 , 2 V F a s t 8 2 . 0 0 f e e t ; t h e n c e North l b 3 02*36"
j
West 5 2 3 . 9 3 5 f e e t t o t h e S o u t h l i n e o f t h e "F" R.amp o f 1 - 2 1 5 ; t h e n c e
I I
S o u t h 56°}.9'02n
West 1 9 2 . 0 7 2 f e e t a l o n g s a i d S o u t h l i n e ; t h e n c e S o u t h
,:
5 3 ° 2 8 ' 2 9 ' West 1 5 9 . 5 5 5 f e d . a l o n g s a i d S o u t h l i n e ; t h e n c e S o u t h 16°
0 2 ' 3 6 " East 5 2 7 . 9 1 1 f e e t to the North l i n e of s a i d 2300 Soutn S c r f S t ;
t h e n c e N o r t h o a s t e r l y 6 1 . 9 2 2 f e e t a r o u n d a 2 2 1 . 1 4 3 f o o t r a d i u s c u r v e no
t h e r i g h t ( C h o r d b e a r s N o r t h 0 1 ° 5 8 ' 4 2 " E a s t 6 1 . 7 2 f e e t ) ; t h e n c e Eas>'^
1 6 9 . 1 6 f e e t t o t h e p o i n t o f b e g i n n i n g , l y i n g and s i t u a t e d i n S a l t Lake
v->unty, S t a t e o f U t a h .

2212 West 2300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
8U19.

FURTHER IDENTIFIED AS:

r-£- tf
VITNESS the hand of jaid grantor , chia
3&S' A£•'0 l~6 L^ /**] & I
, A. D. one thousand nine hundrecka,
Signed in the presence of

i^

^-^m- £-£*• ~-t-p+

Ron'^?*wTSpvT
Dale^r:i bunion

^
/

} „~^0 IW«, < w
7<^d it

\

'
'
'
Onto'' ;.$h.t-'
penonilJx.tpppiTod before me

day of

,A.D. 19 c f /

il»e ilgncr••• of the */':],;n lusirumenl, who duly acknowledged to me^hat
name.

/

/

' (7 -"

IS

HZ l a n d e r

/?

/

he

executed the

*N°li5 ^ ^ c -

My commlnion expirei_.
AfPSOYf0 'ORM - UTAH SCCURIT1C5 COMMISSION
'»•> » « U l l «
U C . U K H
fOXM lOl—©U»T CLAIM O f t D - a l t
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2Ucocd«d it Requett of„I^„arJSOM MAByrr..'.g£jBLURBIDGEr-MAAg>/ A vrrTrurrT.

m

it_

by-

&*v

</

• M. Pit piU }

'»/.

i.?*

111L

t

'., ,-V';

;1

.Dt^BooL.

^

^
™ Pr^

\
lUf.r

Mia ux ood« bJllEUUauWffiMlltlflru, Add«M_13fli-H«Jl.tJL.82a^ttthL.
..•••>
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 U 0 4

: 3634 ? li ; K ; QUIT-CLAIM DEED

.

..' '< *
R. FRED SKTTH, RONALD W.-SMITH, DALE.U. MINSOH, ROHERT S. HALAHSfcR;
and WESTEKT MANAGEMENT/ a Utah general p a r t n e r a h l p V ^ 7 ^ ^ " » irmu*
<^ S a l r Lake City j
. County of S a l t Lake
, Scat* of Uuh/1

HMaH

Cajrrera Corporation,' a Utah corporation,
•:. .°* S a l t Laktv.City, Salt Lake Comity, S t a t e of Utah
''TEH (other good arid«valuable c o n s i d e r a t i o n )

$8

grin a*
foe the mm of
DOLLARS,
- the following described tnct of land In S a l t Lake
• County,
Seak of Ucab: Beginning at a point on the North l i n e of 2300 South
S t r e e t ; aaid p o i n t being North 00*02*35" East 1083.00 f e e t and due'
Vest :2726.812 f e e t from the S a l t Lake County Survey Moninaent at the
•.center of S e c t i o n 22, Township 1 South, Ranee 1 West, S a l t Lake Base
* and.Meridian, and running thence North 104.00 f e e t ; thenct North 16*
G2,36"i West 6J.0O. f e e t ; thence North 73*57'24" East 82.00>feet; thence|
.1 iHorth % -i6*02 , J6 M .Veat 523.935
f e e f t o the South l i n e of the "F". R*np ' t o f 1-215; thenen South 5 8 , 1 n9 , 0 2 n West 192.072 f e e t along aaid S o u t h * .
* l i n e ; thence : South ! 53*28'29 West 159.555 f e e t along s a i d South l i n e ;
'thence South 16*02 36"\East.527.912 f e e t to the North line-"of s a i d •..••
2300 South S t r e e t ; thence Northeasterly 61.922 f e e t around a 221.1*3
foot'radiua curve to the r i g h t (Chord bears North 81°5S'42" East 61.72
' f e e t ) ; thence East»169.1G f e e t ' to. the. p o i n t of beginning, l y i n g and -%
' s i t u a t e d in S a l t ' Lake County / S t a t e of- Utah. '"• TURXHER IDENTIFIED AS:- .
• 2 2 1 2 West 2300 S o u t h , - S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84119.
•
••} .-.•
? V

If!

•.'•-..,-,

,^;i^\-

.

, . • • . • . : • ,

"

:

,:

-'--

•'

v Y m n w tb* Sand of MH? jprantoc s, tbii \ vizf^C •".
!!•:• : " ^ ^ ^ Z ^ T T U I ^ ^ ^ A*®' °°* thouiixid'iiine hundrtd and 81

:£

ft**'.

••'>'
Sjned In tie proieccf of

l#fi

w

r.t^orrTi tf-/SalC* L i i c t ^ : ? 4 '^ H

d i v i d u a l l y and a
eneral .partner
v i d u a l l y and^ai
partner •••/;
..individually-an
a s , j t n e r a l nart ^V
i n d i v i d u a l l y , and A*

m
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m «=» ^
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s M~-^=

-—u^
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Recorded at Request o£™C.V^TM..!;5.K5.?firfcO!«

a*

M. ? « Paid ;

by

«

Mail tax notice co...foL*r!;. J. u .&aUn^er

3724936

\J I 1
* *'
*...»

Pa^e

Dep. Book..
j\ddre«

Red.-i

1 1
Tr>i
° South
__
'"*sriV"Uka""Cicy* ,**''UtTh**T4TQ6
772 2aaC

330

i•

QUIT-CLAIM DEED

I

!

[C0*r0*A7E FORM]

CARRI3A CORPORATION, A Utah cor?ora:icn
f a corporation
organized and existing under die laws of the Sta:e of Utah, with its principal office at
Sal- La'-- Cicx
. of County of Sale Lake
, State of Utah.
gr?nwr^cre5y QUIT CLAIMS to
H. Fred Saich, Ronald W. Smith, Dale N. Minscn, & Robert S. Halnnder,
H. Fred Saich
Ronald Saich
Dale MInson
Roberr Halander
3151 Craig Drive
2090 Pinecrest Lane 3774 So. 3145 Ea. 1150 I r i s Lane
Sale Lake Cicy, Utah Sandy, Utah
Sale Lake Cicy, UT SLC, V?for
. S-'^tee
£ t!'e
sum of
°Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Scare of Ucah
DOLLARS,
TE2J (other good and valuable consideration)
the following described tract of land in Salt Lake
County,
Stiwe of Utah: Beginning ac a point on Che North line of 2300 Souch Scree:
juld poinc beiug North 00°02 , 35 M East 1033.00 feet and due Went 2726.S12
feet froa the Salt Lake County Survey Monument at the center of Section 22,
Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 3ase and Medidian, and running
thence North 104.00 feet, thence North 16 o 02 , 36" Woat 67.00 feet; thence
North 73°57»24" East 82.00 feet; thence North 16°02 , 36 M West 523.935 fee
to the South line of the M ? " Ranp of 1-215; thence South 58 o 19'02" West
192.072 feet along said South line; thence South 53°28'29" West 159.555
feet along said South line; thence South 16°02 , 36 M East 527.912 feet to
the North line of aaid 2300 South Street; thence Northeasterly 61.922 fe et
around a 221.143 foot radius curve to the right (Chord bears North 81°53 I " H I
EaaC 61.72 faet); thence East 169.16 feet to the point of beginning, lyi ng
and situate 1 in Salt Lake County, Scat- of Utah. FURTHER IDENTIFIED AS:
2222 Weat 2300 South, Sale Lake City, Utah 34119

The officert who sign this dctd hereby certify chat this derd and the transfer represented
thereby waa duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the
jranto'r at a lawful meeting duJ/ held and attended by 1 quorum.
In w i t n « whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and xal co be hereunto affixed
by its duly authc^zedjftfpcen this 29th
day of October
, A. D. 19*'
Company
Secretary.

_

S S ^

President.

STATt'OrVTAK
C*yny'of ''jJ<ZJL}-.Xcdj--.
Z\<$T^b*

29ta
day of October,
1982
, A. D.
rid bfcfort me \\, FRZU SMITH
and ROBERT S. HALANDER
*****
y rpfc^uly sworn did uy, each for himself, that he, the said H. FRED SMITH,
k ^ W i O i n i W h * , the said ROB&T S. HALANDER
U the xcretary
of--QJSxiAX CpAPORATION
Company, ind that the within and foregoing
inatrumerrr'^aj lijned in behalf of uid corporation by authority of a resolution of its board of
dirtcron m i aid H.7RED SMITH
l n d ROBERT S. HALANDER
e*ch duly »c^now!edjtd to me that uld corporation executed the same lr.d that the xal affixed
\% tha xal of said corporation.
• *f

• 11

.

- -

•

* 1 -

-<lidtT.£...&u^J^^
My commission cxpirei

Y.J.lL .?..£..

My residence

\\^\L^^j^j...^Li

>i
I

C?
>+>

CT5

IS

?••* r XAWf X . • *frfl-> —IS »«» " t w i - » t t ^ i t m ^ i ***• 1 *V> *A
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Recorded at Requeic o L . . 3 C 3 E ? T . ^ A . . H ^
RONALD w"V SMITH*"
v

M. Fee Piid ;

by

Dtp. Book

Pige

Mai! tax notice toWSSnSJLJiAHAffSKEHI

R«f.:

Addrwi.i7.?...?A».?.J.M.S.?.y.$h
Salt Uka City, Utah

G4106

3724937 QUIT-CLAIM DEED
H. FR£D SMITH, RONALD W. SMITH, DALE N. MTNSCN, ROBERT S. HALANDER,
of Salt U k a CI.7

QUIT-CLAIM

$ C l C e ? f tjl:'

, Coui.ty of Salt Lake

. .^ntor
^:z'0y

to

Western Hanageaent, a Utah general partnership,
>;. rttee
for the x;m nf
HOLLARS,

of Salt Laka City, Salt Laka County, State of Utah
TEN (othtr jood ind valuable consideration)

County,
the following described tract of land In Salt Lake
Scare of Utah:3eginning at a point on the North line of 7.300 South Street;
aaid point being North OOVQl'lS"
Eact 1083.00 feet and due West 2726.312
feet from the Salt Lake County Survey Monument at the cent er of Section 22,
Township 1 South, Ilnnge 1 V»>st, Salt Laka Baae and Meridia n, and running thenca
North 1 U . 0 0 teet; thence North 16° 02'36" West 67 .00 feet ; thence North
73°b7'24" East 32.00 feet; thence North 16 o 02 , 36" West 523 .935 f eet to the
South line of the " 7 M Ilnnp of 1-215; thence Scuth 58°19'Q2 " West 192.072 feet'
along naid Scuth line; thence South 53°28'29" West 159.555 e e t along aaid
South line; thenct South 16 o 02'36 M East 527.912 fe ec to the Nort h line of said
2300 South Street; thtnee Northeasterly 61.922 fee t around a 221 .143 foot radius
curve to the right (Chord bears North 81°58'42 M Ea st 61.72 f e e t ) ; thence East
169.16 fiet to tha point of beginning, lying and aituated i n S a l t Lake County,
State of Utah. FURTHER. IDENTIFIED AS: 2222 West 2300 Sou t h , Sa It Lake City,
Utah 84119

£*;

m •<-

o

e

I'll

V I T N E J S the Kind of said grantors , this 29th
OCTOBER
, A . D . one thouiind nine hur

day of

,.%Sk^^L.S

d i y o f October
\ / T Q Q d* . ^ h
A. D. one
y.^buiW^ciJinjJrtd ind 82
penonilly lppcired before me H . FRED SMITH,
lOKALD V* SMITH, DALE N. MINSON, AND ROBERT S. HALANDER

the xigner of the forejoin j trutrument, who duly acknowledjt to mi th*: i hey

My commluicn ixpirti

W / /JO

Addrwt

SLANK HO. I0>— C »»« r t : S». - »II» » • »*— l*IT — »*WT WA*.

/

/

,

executed the

(

\
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Recorded i t R * q u « t of
it

i r e !>»'low

M. Fw ?»id J..

by

. Dtp. 3oo!c

-.

Mail tax notice to

°

^

394=3375

1

Page

.... K r : > . :

6 2

Addrc*s..A. ^ ..:^:?.=..ir.v£.i?.^Al.Ll L .r.». .^. : .? h .... 34L

^

WARRANTY DEED
(Special)

WESTERN MANAGEMENT, a Utah G e n e r ? ] P a r t n e r s h i p

jranrcr

of

hereby

S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah

CONVEY

AND V A R I A N T

againat ill claiming by, through or under

I i
co

SMITH HALANDER SMITH AND ASSOCIATES
grantee

of

for the sum of

S a l t Lake C i t y , ULaii

TEN AND NO/100

,— ,--.r— T
ana o t n e r rjooa and v a l u a b l e

..DOLLARS.

."..
consideration

County,
chc following described cr.-::

of land in

S a l t Lake C i t y .

Salt

Lake

Scste of U t a h :

i:

SEE EXHI3IT "A" ATTACHED HERETO

rS><
Tc
v

^

.1

~
L-

<r
i'
*>>
HP}

~T3

r-

:--o--ici

w R
U
W I T N E S S , the h a n d s
May

of .'aid g r a n t o r

s , this
, A. D . \9 84

-a

25 th

C : 3 Q

oV; of
a Utah Geptfral

Partnership

$»»r>rd in the Prestnc; of

ji

II

STATE OF U T A H ,
County of

Salt

Lake

o

On the
25th
day of
May
, A. D . 1984
personally appeared before me H. FRED SMITH, ROBERT S. HALANOER. RONALD W. SMITH AND
. .
DALE N. MINSON
th&ffc+F*? <J?OiR>uchin instrument, w h o duly acknowledgrd co me that
The y executed the

2z**.c<S.
^>
OUrJ^^L
- » i u to

ti9oi»i

1

Vfiwrf

F.eiidintf i n , . . . ^ ^ . i ^ , . . ^ ^ ^ 7 . . .
- U U U « « : I M
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EXHIBIT "A"

BEGINNING' at a point or. the North l i n e Of 2.ICG South S t r e e t ; srJd peine
being North 0O°02,35" East 1003.00 feet and du* West 2726.312 *eet f r o *
the Salt Lake County Survey Monument at the center of Section 22, Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and M e r i d i a n , and r-nning
the.nce North 104.00 feat; thence North 16aQ2'3b'" West 57.00 feet; thence
North 73°57'24" East 92.00 f e e t ; thence North 16*02'36 M West 523.935 feet
to the South lir»«* of the "F" Ramp of 1-215; thence South 53°1? , 02" West
192.C/2 feet along said South l i n e ; thence Sout'.i 53°25'29" West 159.555
feet along said South l i n e ; thtnce South 16°02'36" East 527.012 feet to
the North l i n e of said 2300 South S t r e e t ; thence Northuasterr. 51.922 feet
around a 221.143 foot radius curve to the right (Chord bears North
o f BEGINNING.
3 r 5 3 ' 4 2 " East 61.72 f e e t ) ; thence East 169.16 feet to the pio i r

On
CP.
O

o
O
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iarrantg SEE&
, grantor,

SMITH HALANDER SMITH AND ASSOCIATES
of

.Countyof

Salt: Lake

.State of Utah.

S a l t Lake

..•tateof Utah.

i1

m

hereby CONVEY and WARRANT to
KAY L . WALKER and LAWRENCE A . McELLIOTT
of

, grantee.

, County of

forthesumof

TEN ANO NO/100

'
the folloving described tract

3--re

J"-T~CT

*i~-z"

' "

DOLLARS.

and o t h e r good and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o ; . s .

of land in

County. State of Utah, to-wit.

Sa 11 L a k e

BEGINNING a t a p o i n t on the North l i n e of 2200 South S t r e e t , s a i d p o i n t being
North 0 ° 0 2 , 3 5 " E a s t 1083.00 f e e t and due West 2726.8 12 f e e t from the S a l t Lake
County Survey Monument a t the c e n t e r o f S e c t i o n 2 2 , Township 1 S o u t h , Range 1
West, S a l t Lake Base and M e r i d i a n , and runniruj thenc e North 104.00 f e e t ; thence
North 16°02 , 36 H West 67.00 f e e t ; thence N o r t h ' / 3 ° 5 7 ' 24" East 82.00 f e e t ; thence
North 16°02 * 36M West 523.935 f e e t t o the South l i n e of the " F " Ramp o f 1-215;
thence bouth 58 o 19'02" West 192.072 f e e t a l o n g s a i d South l i n e ; thence South 53°
,
M
2 8 ' 2 9 " West 159.555 f e e t a l o n g s a i d South l i r e ; then ce South 16°02 36 East
527.912 f e e t t o the North l i n e o f s a i d 2300 South S t r e e t ; thence N o r t h e a s t e r l y
e r i g h t (chord bears North
61.922 f e e t ground a 221.143 f o o t r a d i u s curve t o th
8 r 5 8 ' 4 2 " E a s t c'1.72 f e e t ) ; thence East 169.16 f e e t to the p o i n t o f BEGINNING.

S u b j e c t to c u r r e n t general

BC'

t a x o s , easemei:w.s and r e s t r i c t i o n s .

W I T N & B t f i e hands of said grantor 5 . this

18th

d*»yof

1 84

June

Signed In the presence of

i I

SJATE-tiP UTAH .^ \ .
cotS^OF-

-SALT^KE
June

On the
fin

f(CyS*\] l/i j'ftubfff

w.5. kW/t''\(t*'-

,19 84 .personally appeared before me

l

* - kr**et \'I :0 ^S/>/, ^< § »he iignec.3 of the above instrument.

who duly acknowledged to me that • he / executed the same.

/inl^;/

/yy.^S-f
Notary Public

My Corr.mbahm Expire*:

6 / ' ' / . ) ^

Residing at: ^ y ) . ^ / . /

^Vul <l

rOFJ4 101.J - WARRANTY DtXD — KM\j Co.. M W. Ninth South. S.L.C.. IfUh
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"THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT. IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, SEEK COMFETENT ADVICE."

Recorded at Requestor
at

.M. Fee Paid $

by

Dcp. Book

Mail tax notice to

(ryyy^-u CT^.

Ref.:_

Pa£e_

772. g .

Address.

3300

So.

QMt-GUatoi 8aei>
KAY L. WALKER and LAWRENCE A. McELLIOTT
Salt Lake City
.Countyof

. grantor?
.State of Utah, hereby
QUIT-CLAIM tc
SMITH, HALAMDER, SMITH 6c ASSOCIATES, a U t a h g e n e r a l p a r t n e r s h i p
and WALKER, McELLIOTT AND WILKINSON & ASSOCIATES, a M i s s o u r i g e n e r a l p a r t n e r s h i p
. grantees
772 E a s t 3 3 0 0 S o u t h , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84106
0f
of

Salt Lake

Ten and n o / 1 0 0
and o t h e r good and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n
the following described tract of land in
S a l t Lake C o u i t v
Stele of Utah:

forthesumof
DOLLARS,
County,

n

As described in the attached Exhibit "A"

,

1

CT^J

~;

"t

Z3C
3>ZS3

—o

%^

ccJ?
o V
w \

>-

r-o

12 05

o

en

5

DC

>»
-<

CO

WITNESS the hand of said grantor .this
22nd
7
February
, A.D., one thousand nine hundred and 1 e i ^ n t y

Xn o o
xz^o
^

at

—t

<~n

~<

CO
O
C3

day of

CD
Signed in the presence of

is

5
STATE OF UTAH
>

COUNTY OF

S.L.

On the 22nd

S3.

j

day of

February

119 85

KAY L. WALKER
duly acknowledged to me thai she

i personally app*&r£dIbefov mev *] ;\

the signer

of the wilhin:ins£r\jmenrf<\<5fy

executed the seme.
Notary Public

My Commission Expires:

Residing at:
APPROVED FORM - UTAH SECURITIES COMM
[MISSION

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
may contain errors.

OCR,
FORM 103.1 - QUIT-CLAIMTIEED - Kally Co., M W. Machine-generated
NInlh South, S.L.C., UUh

y\

•ii

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF

)
:
)

ss.

On the gg7^ day of February, 1985, personally appeared before
me LAWRENCE A. McELLIOTT, the signer of the within instrument, who
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC

^

\~^\

'»*

. ••.••

Residing at: 7U^T-. £fr I&f, W & # f l
My Commission Expires:

' •• ' 0 Y ^

CD
O

rv
CM

2
cn
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EXHIBIT "A1

THE GSA

PROPERTY;

B E G I N N I N G at a p o i n t on the N o r t h line of 2300 South
S t r e e t , said p o i n t being N o r t h 0 ° 0 2 , 3 5 H East 1 0 8 3 . 0 0
feet and due West 2 7 2 6 . 8 1 2 feet from the Salt Lake
C o u n t y s u r v e y M o n u m e n t at the c e n t e r of S e c t i o n 2 2 ,
T o w n s h i p 1 S o u t h , R a n g e 1 W e s t , Salt L a k e Base and
M e r i d i a n , and r u n n i n g thence: N o r t h 1 0 4 . 0 0 feet; thence
N o r t h 1 6 ° 0 2 J 36 n West 6 7 . 0 0 f e e t ; t h e n c e N o r t h 7 3 ° 5 7 l 2 4 n
East 8 2 . 0 0 feet; t h e n c e N o r t h 1 6 ° 0 2 , 3 6 u West 5 2 3 . 9 3 5
feet to the South line of the "F" Ramp of 1-215; thence
S o u t h 5 8 ° 1 9 , 0 2 H W e s t 1 9 2 . 0 7 2 feet along said South
l i n e ; t h e n c e S o u t h 5 3 ° 2 8 , 2 9 " West 1 5 9 . 5 5 5 feet along
said S o u t h line; t h e n c e S o u t h 1 6 ° 0 2 , 3 6 " East 5 2 7 . 9 1 2
feet to the N o r t h line of said 2300 S o u t h S t r e e t ;
t h e n c e N o r t h e a s t e r l y 6 1 . 9 2 2 feet a r o u n d a 2 2 1 . 1 4 3 foot
r a d i u s curve to the right [chord b e a r s N o r t h 8 1 0 5 8 ' 4 2 "
East 6 1 . 7 2 f e e t ) ; thence. East 1 6 9 . 1 6 feet to the point
of B E G I N N I N G .

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT. IF NOT UNDERSTOOD. SEEK COMPETED ADVICE/"

Roconicdit Request of
n

Smith Halander Smith & Associates

H. Fee Paid $

:
Dtp.

byHAU

Ux DO-:I« to H- Fred Snith

4416765

Book^

P*gt_

A^T^

Ref.:_

772 East 3300 South, Suite 200
S a l t Lake City, Utah 84106

ONt-QIlata! $££*>

cr*

Scrith Halander Smith & A s s o c i a t e s , a Utah general partnership
of

S a l t Lake C i t y

.Countyof

S a l t Lake

.rrantor,

, Sat* of Uah, hereby

QtJTT-CLAJLM lo
of

H. Fred Smith, Pcbert S. Halandcr, Dale N Minsoa and Ronald
W. Smith
772 East 3300 South, S u i t e 2CO, S a l t Lake City, UI 84106 .grmnuc.
S a l t Lake City, Salt Lake County, S t a t e of Utah
for the Run of
DOLLARS,
County,

TEN (ether good and valuable consideration)
the fotknrinjf described tract

of land In

S a l t Lake

oo

•

suaotuah:
Described nnre particularly on Exhibit "A" attached hereto and inooTDorated
herein.
^n
o '

^5

T
^5

I—

WITNESS the haixi of aaid grantor .th.U
23rd
February
, A.D.t oo« LhoufcAnd nine huiKired and
Siftxd In th« prtatence cf

STATE Or UTAH

)

coomrorSalt

j

•

ft

i

V

^
- —

O
7

^
=*>

5s

^

I-

!X
C
d«ycf

87. ^

Smith Halander Smith & A s s o c i a t e s , a
•Utah w&vdLul uaj/uy.',Li>LjLLu,

Octbt 23rd^yof February
, i* 87 ,p«rKxiattytpp*ir^bcforom«.
Robert 5." Halander and H. Fred Smith, general p a r t n e r s of
Sd.^1*^""^^1
dc Associates, a Utah general p a r t n e r s h i p
_
,tori$r*<rflcfjyh '
&ify tcfaw^k^id tu EM that^. W

txaarUd tbt Mine.

M7 OoaunWloQ EzplrM*

******* n: S a l t L a k e ' v i t ^ UtA->
Amctia rant - UTAM ncuxrrm ooncwwn
"*

1-2-90
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Machine-generated
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• W. Mr* tak, OCR,
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EXHIBIT "A"

THC G S A

PKUPUTY :

B E G I N N I N G al a p o i n t on the N o r t h l i n e of 2 3 0 0 S o u t h
S t r e e t , said p o i n t bein.j Worth
0 ° 0 2 ' 3 f East
10G3.00
feel
and d u e W n s t
2 7 2 6 . 8 1 2 feel
f r o m the S a l t
Lake
County survey M o n u m e n t
at the c e n t e r of S e c t i o n
22,
T o w n s h i p 1 S o u t h , Ran-je 1 W e s t , S a l t L a k e Cc-sc a n d
M e r i d i a n , and r u n n i n g t h e n c e N o r t h 1 0 4 . O U f e e l ; I h e n c e
North- 1 0 * 0 2 * 3 6 " W e s t 6 7 . U U f e e t ; t h e n c e N o r t h 7 3 ° 5 7 , L M d
East 8 2 . 0 0 feet; t h e n c e North 1 6 ° 0 2 ' 3 6 M West
523.935
feet to the S o u t h l i n e of the H F " R a m p of 1 - 2 1 5 ; t h e n c e
South
5B°19'02H
West
19 2 .07 2 f e e t
alony said
South
l i n e ; t h e n c e S o u t h 5 3 ° 2 B I 2 4 " W e s t 1 5 9 . bS5 feet aloncj
s a i d S o u t h l U e ; t h e n c e S o u t h 1 6 ° 0 2 ' 3 6 M East
527.912
feet
to t h e K o r t h
l i n e of said
2 3 0 0 South
Street;
t h e n c e N o r t h e a s t e r l y 6 1 . 9 2 2 feet a r o u n d a 2 2 1 . 1 4 3 f o o t
r a d i u s c u r v e to t h e t'iyhl ( c h o r d b e a r s N o r t h B l ° 5 0 , 4 2 w
East 6 1 . 7 2 f e e l ) ; t h e n c e East 1 6 9 . 1 6 feet to the p o i n t
of B E G I N N I N G .
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KAT u :

I _

.'.i

11

DIXON
l

?EF J

Mirrphy, TnlhnP-frMa

w

_-*?»

376 East'400 South;^
S a l t Lake City, UtahJS

*j&?-~ V -

Space Above for Reccrder's U«

ifKTr'"...

v Jp
!»i ;-3i

Walker, McElliott and Wilkinson1 & Associates, a Missouri general
of

n

Dart:n

fn§riri-

. •V'<5^:V^f:;.H:.^V; :'•:.'-•

here*

CONVEY AND WARRANT agalratallcUiming^throueh or undo- said partnership or the
:
individual partners
^•W^^i^^'MV^to H. Fred Smith, Robe~T S.'Halandef; r -Dale N. Minson and Ronald W. Smith
772 East 3300 Souui, Suite;200,';..Salt Lake City, Utah S410fi
.grants,
:
0/ S a l t Lake City, Salt LakeiCouity, S t a t e of Utah
for the sum of
TEN (other good and valiiable^ consideration)
DOLLARS.
the following described tract
SuteofUuh:

ofItadln^->^ Salt"Lake

County,

See attached Exhibit "A" hereto and incorporated bv reference hcreiLH
»v*

•

-

V
WITNESS, tha hand of said gnu&r..', this '
April
.AJU1...87
Slgaad in tht prcaeoca of

?0-:^-;
W

• * . •

.-*

"15th
/
/7
day of •'*>'
Walker, McElliott apd Wilkinson £ Associate
' a Missouri^^^r^V^^tn^shin

•

• v.
v

, a. Kay II.

-x

ir,

al partner
general

;w.

$'

i

5TATX0F

r ..Sale M T • - ^ s g ^ ? a ^ i ^
^ i ^ o ^ ^ ' lr5I5th>y
0 i > y oQ^
^:
m^^^m
Jeer ;* ^^alipaitrii^b^wal
-fRay't'^ VZalkeriv^^alipaitrii
m ' ^ KtauwWdcrt to m

#Jfc£lliot

, 19 87 . p«*ocjd]^«#iS£Httt>a(y« mt
, UM lipw ' o< W within lnrtri*oi£hrbo JiJI
"'.;.^.*-.-.':cf •

t\m:m\

^*and ; Vftlkin5Gn - SJAstocli
f a Miisouri% generidlr

::v^;.^,NoUryPi^c ^ ^ ; » J - H ; •*»'.

wO coflEkssttioa JEMCDC^MM

&SaltjtLato-aty,'-.Ucah-4!K5^
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EXHIBIT "A" TO SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED
TIIL

CSA

PKQPLhTy

I N N I N G «t a point on the North line of 2 .0
en Str et-t, said point being North C 8 o r "»{>
t J ^ t 10 8 1
.00 feet and du C Kcat 2726.812 ( v a f rein
t Tic: Salt
Lake County Survey Monument at » h«C c f i ter of
Section 22, Vownship 1 South, K,:,^ 1
*» s t ,
Sal t Ldke Base and Meridian
*-•» - .. n
L ; . C nee N O
rtn 104.00 feet; thenceforth lb'02'
We£ t 67.0
0 teet; thence North 7J*57 f 24- Last
b 2 . 00 fee
t; thence North 16*02'J6~ Kcir 52J.> 3b
f e e t to t
he South line of the T " Rc-nu o' 1-2 1 5 ;
U . c ncc So uth 5 6 M 9 ' 0 2 - West 192.072 f.-e/alcn
S J l d Sout
n line; thence Soath 53 tt 2a , 29" K«st
1 5* .555 f eet along said South line; thr--.ee <c
itn
1 6 ' 02'36^ s t 527.912 feet to the North line of
- . » 1 d 2300
South Street; thence Northeasterly
t 1 .c;2 2 f
et around a 221.143 foot radium curv
t o the n gnc (chord bears North fcl«56S2" z
Jb
6 1 . 72 fee t ) ; thence East 165.16 feet to the
;.t of BLGiNNING.

S u b j e c t co a rru.se deed n o t e o b l i g a t i o n and t r u s t deed in f.r.-^r •: ;V; •
l i f e Insurance Ccroany ( o r i g i n a l p r i n c i p a l sun of r *J. 70<V;M/: )• .-«••
r e c o r d e d March 22." 1985. as Entry to. /^064555. Bcxxk 56.5,:>, ac r-;u.-.c . r \
Countv r e c o r d e r ' s r e c o r d s , and s u b j e c t t o r e l a t e d - A f n j . c r r v q t ^C l e a ^ s ar..;
•1064556) arri Financing Statement (Entry No. 40b4:>:>/; EW-:-. Mnr'/l <T':
:v.rr7-:,Subject t o g e n e r a l r e a l Droperty *;axes a c c r u i n g f o r "he year 19" 7 . • • •/,-.•:
S p e c i a l w a r r a n t y deed in s a t i s f a c t i o n and c a n c e l l a t i o n of .in :c-ii,:a:.i-.--. .-v
by a r.rust deed d a t e d >tarch 1. .1984, s e c u r i n g a nor.? Lr t'ne ^rie.ir.al n:::.
S2. 7^9.^39.42, che b e n e f i c i a l i n t e r e s t of which was C-.-V"! )-.- ^rancc. •:.
R e l e a s i n g any and a l l c l a i r a by Grantor, o r anyone ov, through T iir.vJe. ''.•:.
t o t h e b u i l d i n g on che s u b j e c t r e a l p r o p e r t y o r under a r~j-Verves'•.;::•?•• r»
between Grantor and Grantses under date of October *. I. !"^R e l e a s i n g t o and a s s i n g i n g t o Grantees a l l r i g h t . ti:.U- .mc i::cerv>:
a c e r t a i n l e a s e made v/ith t h e United S c a t e s of America r e s p e c t m t ; :.v\p r o p e r t y w i t h Lease No. CS-08,8-10728, as amended o r .;u:"oli , rer.ced. an.
income and r i g h t s a c c r u i n g tlhereunder.

.1": i i J •*.

:':LU:ii
:»; q»; ^

i '

Like

r:d n a v a b . ^ .
"or secured
p of
in anu
."TVl'.ie

;uid und.."
real
• with a l l

Walker. XcKi I :••: • ^,.1 V:Lk:;.,v- c<
As.-.oriace^ a".:.* e .ouri i»encral n o r t n e r s h i D
Bv
S3y*L. ^alkcr.""ppncivi 1" ;>«rtncr
STATE OF l/rAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
) ss

Ot t h e 15th day of A p r i l . 1987, p e r s o n a l l y anpearcd before rij Vjiy L. Walker
g e n e r a l p a r t n e r of Walker. M c E l l i o t t and W i l k i n s c n & .Associaces, a Missouri general
p a r t n e r s h i p , and executed t h e w i t h i n S p e c i a l Warranty Deed.
h
Rjcsry PuEIic
R e s i d i n g « S a l t ' L a k e C^ry. Uc^h
My C a n r d s s i o n E x p i r e s
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i*#£?5?*3 ?}'??&'*r- **

R«»cord*d at tha r*qu*st of La Bamion Hab«y
Murphy, Tolboa & iteb«y
124 S o u t h 600 E a a t ,
8LC # UT.
84102

#100

H. P H Pmid $
-,-•
at
Page_
By
f u l l tMX notic* t o : 315J.:XWULg Driva
S a l t Laka City, Utah 8A124

Ref

OTIT*CMTM PIKP
1. HOtD SXTtt, BOttttf S. AXJUflrKft, and KOSXJUO W» 5M1TB,
aa Crantora, of S a l t LaJcatfCoonty, s t a t a of Utah, htraby QUITCLAXX and conray t o OOaWaJT, m e . , a Utah corporation, 3151
Craig Driva, S a l t , Lalca Goonty, Stata of Utah, aa Grantaa, for
tha rai of TfV D0tLlXS'(ota«r good and Tainan l a con* i deration),
tha raal pcupaity which baa tha comon addraae of 2222 Waat 2300
South, Waat Vallay City, Utah
84119, aor<» particularly
daacribad aa a t r a c t of land i n S a l t LaXa County, s t a t a of Utah:

(an

ARICSID

nonsn

ossernxmov)

th« hand Of aald Crantora, thi» 28th day of
N3V«ab«r, 1990.

STATX OF UTAH

cotnrrr or

SALT LAO

On tha 28th day of Kovaabar, 1990, and tha abov« personally
appaarad bafora M , tha aignaro H. rPED SMITH, ROBERTAS.
HALAKTTH and RONALD M. SHITH^af—tha forgoing; in«tru»«nt, Who
duly acfcnovladgad t o mm tlyrtTthay axacuta<l tha-**»*.
;^afw

r1

1
1
Li

.1

/

1
1
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QTL't*

j

~"Y ' ' ' ^ \ ^ ^ B a a ^ m ^ p . * : ^

" ISM'!'

Bejlnnin? *t a point on tht North I t * of 2300 South Street, said point being f»rth
0*02'35" Eest 1083.00 feet end dt»« tttit 2724.812 feet frc* the Salt Lake County Surrey
Homaewat «t the center of 5ect1oa'22i'Toii«Jh1p 1 South, Range 1 West, SaH »_ake B»se
end HtrldUn, end running
th*i«t;iiorih'10«;00 fett; thence worth 16*C2*36- west 67.00
f t t t ; tbt*ct north 73#57'2«« |«»ti;82 : ;06tfttt^thtnce north IS'02'36" West 522.935 feet
to tht Sooth lint of tht ."F^Raap:0fgt<415i'tlitflCt South 58'19'02" West 192.072 feet
•lo*« *etd Swth l i n t : tht.Xt So«th 53*28'2> West 159.555 feet along said South line;
thtuce South 16*02'36* E«U ^1.112 feet to the *o*th line of said 2300 Soyth Street;
thtnet northeasterly 61.922 ftvt*r«md 1 221.143 foot radius cu«-ve lo th« right (chord
btert north Bl*Sa'*2- East 61.7.! f t t t ) ; thtnet Eest 169.16 feet to the point of
btflnftUf.
?•

Sltaatt In Salt lake Count/, State of Utah.
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notice to:

I.*

li'Ki-

3 vU7 n

33007330

: , c . , » ' o u h corporation ,nd

"AHJR^D"

D 2

DALS

2

0

, . ,: N3C .y

4 Utah corporation

GRANT22
ah, for tha iua of TZN AND 00/100's
<UID VALUA3L2 CON3IDZRATION, the following
and in JALT LAX2 County, State of Utah:
Beginning at a point on the Jforth line of 2300 South Straat,
aaid point being North 0 deg. 02 , 33" Zaat 1033.00 feat and dua
Heat 2726.312 feet frosi the 3alt Lake County Survey Monument at
the center of Section 22, Townahip 1 South, Range I Heat, 3ait
Lake B a n and Meridian; and running thenco North 104.00 faat/
thence North 15 deg. 02 , 35" Kest 67.00 faet/ thanca North 73
deg. 37 , 24" 2aat 32.00 fast; thence North 15 dag. 02'36" Neat
322.933 faet to tha 3outh line of tha V
Ramp of 1-213; thence
3outh 33 dag. 19*02" Keat 192.072 faat along i/iid South line;
thence South 33 dag. 23*29" *est 139.333 fact along aaid South
lina; thane* South 16 dag. 02*36* 2ast 326.912 faat to tha North
U n a of aaid 2300 South atraat; thanca Northeasterly 61.922
faat around a 221.143 foot radius curvs to tha right (chord
bears North 31 dag. 33*42" Saat 61.72 faat); thanca 2aat 169.16
faat to tha point of beginning*

deaoribed t r a c t f s ^ o f

SU3J2CT TO: County and/or City Taaaa net delinquent/ Sondt
and/or Special Assessments not delinquent and Covenants,
Conditions, aestrictione, aighta-of-Hay, Zaienanta, Leases and
Reservations now of Record.
3UBJ2CT TO! A Deed of Truit and all aodificationa and amendments
thereto dated March 22, 1993 aiecuted by XALX2R, McZLLIOTT and
HILXIN30N & A330CIAT33 as Trustor(t) to secure payn>ent of a nota
bearing even data thersof in the original sun of $3,700,000.00
with interest thereon, p*yabl* as theroin provided to UTAH TITLZ
• A33TRACT CO. as Trustee), in favor of MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL Lirs
INSURANCE COMPANY as Beneficiary, recorded MARCH 22, 1933 in Book
3639 at Page 409 as Intry No. 4064333 of Official Recorda, which
Deed of Trust the Grantee fa) hereby aaaume(s) and agree(a) to
pay and a g r e e d ) to be) bound by all of the provision* of the aaid
Dead of Truat to the J A M effect than the signer(a) of the aaid
document as Trustor(s) art bound*

JITJ1M. th. h.nd„, ofM l d
OM:,

9 r m o r ( > ) # thi, 13fch

^

^
JULY,

ac.
<%

te

CTJ
STAtS OF UTA3, County of JALT LAX1 ) is:

On t h i s data, J u l y £ j t a 1 9 9 3 personally appeared before rrva
DAL* ft, MlftSO* the) tign#r(«) of the within instrument, who duly
acknowledged to M>*that^hir MMtittd the ia:»e.

-T3
CT7

C/V
CO
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Notary Ac)wo*]*4ga*antUcontinuid)

HI > * » • * * * Kit

--*':?* .-'i

My cciaoiajion'-tipirtjt ^ r w «
Staiding ini "'JAM LAI3 q m ^ U T A H
JTAT3 OF UTA3, County oi JALT LAK3 ) aai
Cn £ M a datt,. July ,tS^1393 personally appaarad b«£or* me.
/V ^/^'t^^r^^K'
^ * ? ° ^ ^ n g by n* duly iworn did
jay, that _ h a ij/ar* tha
^if^r^Tf— ^
°r
C0NMA37, INC., th* corporation that ax«icut*d tha abova and
foraaoing inJtnawnt and that laid inatrura«nt *aa signed in
bahali oi laid corporation by authority at ita by-lava (or by
authorj^y oi^X r«oluticrwof ita board ot diractora) and aaid
*£ ^^'^'-x^+^^X
acknowladgad to m* that laid
corporation
aaacutad tha iaja««
?Krr>vrrpu3LC
My coMinion tapir.ai
4 ^ ^ 2 ^ L
Raaiding int 3ALT LAX3 CITY, UTAH

Ml I t j u i i i i p i m

I
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Ref.:

-

Address J ^ § L & ^ ^

WARRANTY DEE)

CO

[CORPORATE FORM]

ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC., a Ucah Corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of
S a l t Lake C i t y
, of County of
Salt
grantor, hereby CONVEYS A N D W A R R A N T S to

r

, a corporation
with its principal office at
ar*
t State of Utah,

2212 WEST, L . L . C . , a Delaware l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y oonpany,
grantee
for the sum of

of Sail. Lake C i t y , County of S a l t Lake, S t a t e o f Utah
TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION
the following described tract
State of Utah:

of land in

County,

S a l t Lake

See Exhibit "A" a t t a c h e d h e r e t o and
by t h i s r e f e r e n c e made a p a r t h e r e o f .

The officcri who sign this d^cJ hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented
thereby was duly authorized vndtr a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the
grantor at a lawful meeting; duly held and attended by a quorum.
In witness whereof, the grantor has earned its corporate name and seal to be hereunto affixed
by its duly authorized officers this
fch
day of February
, A. D. 1? 97
Attest:

ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC., a
jOEah Corporation
Secretary.
PETER

[CORPORATE SEAL]

STATE CF UTAH,
County of

President.

h

S a l t Lake

On the
15- I In
ds? of
Bebruary
A . D . 1997
personally appeared befoie me P E I E * J . AENQLD
" XHil
who being by me duly sworn did fay.jeffik&fiOtoufiatkfc that he, the said PEIER J . AFNOLD
it the president, 6B&taQ&b€tfkk
iXXJtJWKECGW
of ARNOLD ECUSTRIES, INC.
tftomQQSt*
and that th« within and foregoing
instrument was signed in behalf of aaid corporation by authority of a resolution of its board of
director! #nd said PETER J . WWCII?
Xjrfx
each duly acknowledged to me that *a»d corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed
is the seal of Mid corporation.
Notary Public.

'°*>

My rcidence

b^StiJ±^.„LlY/._±if?_^
cr;

WW

BXWmUMMfJUZ
K|B^B!£ggBg^^
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fcSCHIBIT mK>
A parcel cf land situated in the Northeast quarter of Section 2 1 ,
township 1 South, Range 1 Woot, Salt Lake rvuoe and Meridian, more
particularly described as follows;
BEGINNING a t a point on the North l i n e of 2300 South Street, said
point being North 0°02 , 35 w Eaot 1083.00 f e e t and due Vfest 2726.812
f e e t f rem the Salt Lake County Survey Monument a t the center of
Section 22, Tovns^ip 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Dane and
Meridian; and running thence North 104.00 feet; thence North 16°02 , 36"
Wcut 67.00 f e e t ; thenco torth 73°57 , 24" Fant 02.00 f e e t ; thence Tbrth
16°02'36M Wcr.t 522.935 f o e t t o the South l i n e of the "FM Ranp of
1-215; thence South 58°19 l 02" West 192.072 feet along said South 1 ine;
thence South 53°28 , 29" Went 159.555 f e e t along aald South l i n e ; thence
South 16°02 , 3 6M Ear.t 526.912 f e e t t o the North l i n e of said 2300 South
Street; thence Northeasterly 61.922 f e e t around a 221.143 foot radiuc
curve t o the r i c h t (chord bears fbrth 81°58'42 M East 61.72 f e e t ) ;
thence Ea3t 169.16 feet t o the point of BBGINMINC.
SUBJECT TO current general ta>cs, easements, r e s t r i c t i v e covenants and
righto of way of record.
Tax ferial No. 15-21-226-004

KtUJKUEKf SALT LAKE COUNTYF UTAH

LANDttARK TITLE
REC BT:J FERGUSON
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RECORDER! SALT LAKE COUHTTt UTAH

ReturnTo: ~ A o o o n TT „ . T _
GSA 2 2 2 2 West , i , . L . C
c / o Arnold I n d u s t r i e s

LAMOOARK TITLE
R£C BYiV ASHBT

^DEPUTY - UI

324 South State Street, Suite 157
Salt Leke City, Utah 84111

,„,

WARRANTY DEED,

2212 West, L.L.C., a Dalaware limited l i a b i l i t y coapany new known as
GSA 2222 WEST, L . L . C , a Delaware lihdted l i a b i l i t y conpany
tranter
of Salt Lake City,
.County of Salt Lake
• State of Utah, hereby
CONVEY and WARRANT to
GSA 2222 WEST, L . L . C , a Delaware Limited Liability Company

grantee
for the mm of
DOLLARS.

°t S a l t Lake C i t y , Q n n t y o f S a l t Lake, S t a t e o f Utah
TEN DOLLARS AND No/100
AND CMER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION !
the following described tract of land in s a ] ^ t L ^

County,

State of Utah:
SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT "A"

Sidwell No. 15-21-226-004
SUBJECT TO CURRENT GENERAL TAXES, EASEfriENTS, RESTRICTIONS AND RIGHTS OF WAY OF
RECORD.
WITNESS, the hand

of eaid grantor

A p r i l

, this
' ' '

Signed in the Presence of

3rd

day of

GSA 2222 WEST, L . L . C , a Delaware limited
l i a b i l i t y ccqpany
| BY;
Kimbers I I I , I n c . , a Delaware corporation

is'gftniflgingUmber
BY; 7***>? ^ U . ^ M
Peter J. Arnold, President
STATE OVVTXSt,
County of * J ^ D W * « C -

}-

A
9 7
OB the
3rd
day of
Pril
#A.D. I *
personally appeared before ma PEflER J* ARNOLD, President of KIMBERS III.- INC., a Delaware
corporation, Managing Motber of GSA 2222 WEST, L . L . C , a Delaware limited l i a b i l i t y cxjipagfr
the signer of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that lie executed the
^*]
same, for and on behalf of GSA 2222 WEST, L . L . C , a Delaware limited l i a b i l i t y company, ^J
as Managing Member therein.
^
J

5fc*S&*S*%.
' "

Notary Public.
JUsiding i n " « M

AiMrtm *YtW*ft6

"5^^i^SSSwROC.MUU)M

^

£f

i^<>^^O^T^^02MUSOS70S7
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EXHIBIT » * '

h parcel nf land situated in the Northeast quarter of Section 2),
Township 1 South, Range 1 Vest, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, *ore
particularly described as follow:
BEGINNING at a point on the
North line of 2300 South Street, said
point bein? North 0"02'15M East. 1083.00 feet and due West 2726.812
feet troa the Salt Lake County Survey Monument at the renter of
Section 22, Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian; ana running thence North 104.00 feet; thence North 16'02 , 36 M
West 67.00
f*»*t; thence North 73'57'24" East 82.00 feet; thence North
16'02 , 36" West 522.935 # feet to
the South line of the T Rawp of
T-215; thence Sooth 58 19«02H West 192.072 feet along said Sonth l i n e ;
thence South 53*28'29" West 159.555 feet along said South l i n e ; thence
South 16*02* 36" Fast 526.912 feet to the North line of said 2300 Sonth
Street; thence Northeasterly 61.922 feet around
a 221.143 foot radius
curve to the right (chord bears North 8r58 , 42* East 61.72 feet);
thence Bast 169.16 feet to the point of BEGINNING.
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EXHIBIT 3
Case Law and Other Authorities
ITEM1

Selected Cases

Bartlome v. State Farm & Casualty Co.
Boyer v. Pahvant Mercantile and Investment Co.
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine
Hamner v. B.K. Bloch & Co.
Hanson v. Zoller
In re Granada, Inc.
In re Ostler's Estate
Klinger v. Kightly
Noronha v. Stewart
Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Co.
Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Knee & Sports
Medicine
Sevy v. Security Title Co. of Southern Utah
Sharp v. Riekhof
Wall Investment Co. v. Garden Gate Distributing, Inc.
ITEM 2

Other Authorities

23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds § 15
59A Am. Jur. 2d, Partnership § 384
26A C.J.S., Deeds §§ 42, 43
31 C.J.S., Estoppel & Waiver § 10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Selected Cases
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256 Cal.Rptr. 719
(Cite as: 208 CaI.App.3d 1235, 256 Cal.Rptr. 719)
Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1,
California.
Nancy BARTLOME, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent.

Page 1

217k2272
(Formerly 217k435.22(l))
Personal liability policy of partner in boat rental
operation which covered boats owned by the named
insured did not include a boat registered to the
partnership and used exclusively for partnership
purposes.

No. A041940.
March 23, 1989.
Certified for Partial Publication [FN*]
FN* Pursuant to rules 976 and 976.1 of the
California Rules of Court, this opinion is certified
for publication only through the end of section I,
excluding text enclosed in [].
Party injured in collision with rental boat brought
action to establish coverage under personal liability
umbrella policy issued to one of the partners of the
boat rental firm.
The Superior Court, Alameda
County, Robert K. Byers, J., entered judgment in
favor of insurer, and injured plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeal, Stein, J., held that policy
which provided coverage to boat owned by partner
did not provide coverage for boat registered to
partnership and used exclusively for partnership
purposes.

[4] Partnership <@^1
289kl
Partnership is a hybrid organization which is viewed
as an aggregation of individuals for some purposes
and as an entity for others.
[5] Partnership <@=>63
289k63
One of the primary areas in which a partnership is
viewed as an entity is with respect to ownership of
property.
*1237 **720 Stanley Pedder, Malott, Pedder,
Stover & Hesseltine, Lafayette, for plaintiff and
appellant.
J. Scott Buresh, Steven K. Austin, York, Buresh &
Kaplan, Berkeley, for defendant and respondent.
STEIN, Associate Justice.

Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Insurance 0=^1832(1)
217kl832(l)
(Formerly 217kl46.7(l))
If an ambiguity exists in an insurance policy, it shall
be construed against the insurer if that construction
conforms to the reasonable expectations of the
insured.
[2] Insurance <®^1808
217kl808
(Formerly 217kl46.1(2))
If term in insurance policy has been judicially
construed, it is not ambiguous and the judicial
construction of the term should be read into the
policy unless the parties express a contrary intent.
[3] Insurance <®^=>2272
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim

Nancy Bartlome appeals from a judgment in favor
of respondent State Farm Fire & Casualty (State
Farm) in a declaratory judgment action.
After settling her personal injury claim for the
limits of a commercial liability policy issued to
"Tahoe Boat Rental," Bartlome sought to establish
additional coverage under a personal liability
umbrella policy issued by State Farm to Lloyd
Canton, one of the partners of Tahoe Boat Rental.
On appeal she contends[ - ]The operators of the boat
that caused her injury were *1238 insureds under
Canton's policy because any property owned by the
partnership was also "owned by" Canton, as an
individual.[ - ]
We hold that the definition of "insureds," as
including permissive users of boats "owned by" the
named insured under Canton's personal liability
policy, did not include permissive users of a boat
owned by the partnership.! - ]
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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256 Cal.Rptr. 719
(Cite as: 208 CaI.App.3d 1235, *1238, 256 Cal.Rptr.
FACTS
On July 7, 1986, a motorboat operated by Warren
Eacret collided with appellant causing the
amputation of one of her legs below the knee. Kreg
Eacret rented the boat from Tahoe Boat Rental
earlier that day.
The motor boat was registered
with the Department of Motor Vehicles in the name
of "Tahoe Boat Rental," which is a California
partnership formed for the purpose of renting
pleasure boats along the northwest shore of Lake
Tahoe. Lloyd Canton and John Kearns are the sole
partners of Tahoe Boat Rental.
A comprehensive business liability policy issued by
United National Insurance Company to Tahoe Boat
Rental was in effect on the date of this boating
accident.
The boat involved in the accident was
specifically identified as a covered boat in the
United National policy, which provided coverage in
the amount of $500,000 for losses arising from the
operation of the Tahoe Boat Rental business.
Appellant filed a personal injury action against
Kreg Eacret, Warren Robert Eacret, and Lloyd
Canton and John V. Kearns both individually and
doing business as the general partnership "Tahoe
Boat Rental." United National Insurance Company
acknowledged that its comprehensive business policy
issued to Tahoe Boat Rental provided coverage and
the parties negotiated a settlement resulting in the
payment of the United National policy limit of
$500,0000 to appellant.
Appellant continued to pursue the instant
declaratory relief action against State Farm which
had issued a policy entitled "Personal Liability
Umbrella Policy" to Lloyd E. Canton and his wife
Sharon.
[-]
The trial court held that the Eacrets were not
"insureds" under Canton's personal liability
umbrella policy because the boat involved in the
accident belonged to the partnership and was not
"owned" by Canton, the named insured. [ - ]
*1239 ANALYSIS
I.
Appellant relies on the following portion of the
definition of "insured" as the basis for finding
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim

Page 2
», **720)

coverage for the Eacrets:
**721 "any person or organization while using or
holding an automobile, recreational motor vehicle,
or watercraft owned, rented by, or loaned to the
named insured, provided that the named insured
gave permission for the type of use."
Appellant contends that the Eacrets were permissive
users of a boat "owned" by Lloyd Canton, and that
they therefore are insureds as defined by Canton's
personal liability umbrella policy. She asserts that,
despite the absence of any facts showing that Canton
considered the boat, which was registered to the
partnership, to be his personal property, or that he
exercised any actual control over it, he must
nonetheless, be deemed the "owner" of each of the
partnership's specific assets because a partnership is
not an entity, but rather is an "aggregation of
individuals."
[1][2] It is by now well established that words used
in an insurance policy are to be interpreted
according to their plain meaning, and the courts will
not adopt a strained or absurd interpretation in order
to create an ambiguity where none exists. (Reserve
Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800,
807, 180 Cal.Rptr. 628, 640 P.2d 764.)
If an
ambiguity does exist it shall be construed against the
insurer, if that construction conforms to the
reasonable expectations of the insured. (Id., at p.
808, 180 Cal.Rptr. 628, 640 P.2d 764.)
If,
however, a term in an insurance policy has been
judicially construed, it is not ambiguous and the
judicial construction of the term should be read into
the policy unless the parties express a contrary
intent. (Couch on Insurance, 2d ed., § 15:20;
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Chirm (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d
274, 279, 76 Cal.Rptr. 264.)
[3] Neither party cites any California case
specifically addressing the question whether a policy
insuring permissive users of property "owned" by an
individual also covers permissive users of property
of a partnership of which the individual is a
member. We are persuaded by cases from other
jurisdictions, by our own interpretation of California
partnership law, and the particular facts of this case
that the term "owned by ... the named insured" in
Canton's personal liability insurance policy cannot
include a boat registered to Tahoe Boat Rental, and
used exclusively for partnership purposes.

Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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256 Cal.Rptr. 719
(Cite as: 208 Cal.App.3d 1235, H239, 256 Cal.Rptr.
[4][5] The premise of appellant's argument is that
individual partners must be deemed the owners of
partnership property because a partnership is merely
an aggregation of individuals.
In support of this
proposition she *1240 relies on several cases that
she contends stand for the proposition that California
follows the "aggregate theory of partnership": Reed
v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1937) 10 Cal.2d 191, 73
P.2d 1212 and, National Auto Ins. Co. v. Indus.
Ace. Com. (1938) 11 Cal.2d 689, 81 P.2d 926.
[FN1] Although these cases do announce that
general principle, California law treats a partnership
as a "hybrid" organization that is viewed as an
aggregation of individuals for some purposes, and as
an entity for others. (Epstein v. Frank (1981) 125
Cal.App.3d 111, 119, 177 Cal.Rptr. 831.) One of
the primary areas in which a partnership is viewed
as an entity is with respect to ownership of property.
California Corporations Code section 15008
specifically provides that a partnership may hold
title to real property, and further defines any
property, real or personal, that is acquired "on
account of the partnership," as partnership property.
FN1. Southwestern Financial Corp. v. Kelly (1987)
233 Cal.Rptr. 639, relied upon by appellant, was
ordered depublished on April 30, 1987.
California Corporations Code section 15025 defines
an individual partner's interest in specific
partnership assets. Section 15025 begins by stating
that "[a] partner is a coowner with the other partners
of specific partnership property holding as a tenant
in partnership," however, the restrictions placed on
an individual partner's interest in partnership
property by section 15025 are all encompassing.
The section states that a partner has no right to
possess
specific
partnership
property
for
nonpartnership purposes without the consent of his
fellow partners; it prohibits a partner **722 from
assigning or selling his interest in specific
partnership property without the consent of his
partners; it prohibits enforcement of a money
judgment against specific partnership property in
connection with the debt of an individual partner; it
requires that the right to specific partnership
property vests in surviving partners rather than in
the estate of a deceased partner; and it states that
specific partnership property is not the community
property of any individual partner. Thus, most of
the normal incidents of ownership are held by the
partnership as a group rather than the individual
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim

Page 3
», **721)
partners. [FN2]
FN2. Except for the substitution of gender neutral
language and the phrase "enforcement of a money
judgment" for "attachment and execution,"
California Corporations Code section 15025 is
identical to section 25 of the Uniform Partnership
Act.
The only California case arguably addressing the
issue whether a partner possesses what are
commonly understood as the rights of an owner,
with respect to specific partnership assets, is Becker
v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. (1975) 52
Cal.App.3d 282, 124 Cal.Rptr. 739. In that case
the plaintiff was injured by a truck the parties
characterized as "owned by" a partnership.
The
plaintiff obtained a settlement for the limits of the
policy issued to the partnership and then sought
declaratory relief that a policy issued to one of the
partners, individually, also provided coverage.
That policy *1241 provided coverage to the
individual for damages arising out of the use of an
automobile "owned by" him or for nonowned
vehicles "used by the named insured or a relative."
The court stated that the truck was not owned by the
individual partner but rather was owned by the
partnership. (Id., at p. 285, 124 Cal.Rptr. 739.)
Becker, while instructive, is not dispositive of this
issue for two reasons: The policy in Becker defined
an "owned automobile" as one which was listed in
the declarations, a temporary substitute or a newly
acquired automobile. The truck was not listed in
the declarations. Thus, the court's statement that
the individual partner did not "own" the
partnership's truck may have been based on this
definition.
Second, the court stated later in its
opinion that it was stipulated that the truck was
"owned by the partnership."
Respondent cites Mission Ins. Co. v. Feldt (1964)
62 Cal.2d 97, 41 Cal.Rptr. 293, 396 P.2d 709 as
authority for the proposition that an individual
partner should not be deemed the "owner" of a
vehicle registered to the partnership.
In Mission
Ins. a vehicle registered to a joint venture was
involved in an accident. One of the partners of the
joint venture had an automobile liability policy that
provided coverage only for the use of a motor
vehicle "not owned" by the individual partner. At
the time he took out the policy he did not own any
vehicles and had not yet formed the joint venture.
The court held that the vehicle was "not owned" by
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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256 Cal.Rptr. 719
(Cite as: 208 CaI.App.3d 1235, *1241, 256 Cal.Rptr. 719, **722)
the individual partner despite the fact that, as a
partner, he had an "equitable interest" in the
vehicle. (Id,, at p. 102, 41 Cal.Rptr. 293, 396 P.2d
709.) This case is also distinguishable because the
decision to construe ownership to mean only
registered ownership was based primarily on certain
vehicle code provisions requiring proof of financial
responsibility that were relevant to the particular
policy in that case.
There are, however, persuasive decisions from
other jurisdictions that are directly on point. In
Employers Casualty Co. v. Employers Commercial
Union (5th Cir.1980) 632 F.2d 1215, an individual,
Robert Owens, was a member of several
partnerships including Russellville Steel Company,
and Owens Fabricating. A vehicle that was owned
by Russellville was involved in an accident while
being driven by an employee of Owens Fabricating.
A condition of the Commercial Union policy in
dispute provided that it was only excess insurance as
to any vehicles not owned by the named insured,
Robert Owens dba Owens Fabricating. The issue
before the court was whether Robert Owens was
also an owner of the truck by virtue of his status as
a partner in Russellville. If Robert Owens did not
own the truck, Commercial Union was only an
excess insurer.
Employers, the insurer of
Russellville, made an argument in support **723 of
its claim for contribution identical to that advanced
by appellant in this case:
"Employers argues that Alabama has rejected the
entity concept of a partnership and adopted the
theory that a partnership is merely an aggregate of
its individual members.
Thus, any property
owned by the partnership of Owens and Brignet,
doing business as *1242 Russellville, would be
owned, separately and severally, by Owens and
Brignet." (Id., at p. 1219.)
The court rejected this argument based on its
interpretation of the relevant provision of the
Alabama partnership law, which is identical in all
substantive respects to section 25 of the Uniform
Partnership Act and California Corporations Code
section 15025.
The court reasoned as follows:
"Alabama has adopted the Uniform Partnership Act
(UPA) with some modifications not material to our
discussion. Although Ala.Code § 10-8-72(a) (UPA)
§ 25(a) states that '[a] partner is a co-owner with his
partners of specific partnership property holdings as
a tenant in partnership,' it proceeds to destroy the
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traditional incidents of ownership. For example, a
partner has no right to possess the property without
the consent of the partners; a partner's right to
specific partnership property is not assignable; and
the right to property vests in the surviving partners
rather than the estate of a deceased partner. One
authority has made the following observation:
"Although stating that each partner is a co-owner of
the partnership property, the [ - ] Act systematically
destroys the usual attributes of ownership....
Functionally, despite the literal language, the
partnership owns its property and the partners do
not. The Act would be better if it conceded this
rather than accomplishing it by indirection. Crane
and Bloomberg, Law of Partnership, § 40(b) (1968)
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added)." (Id., at pp.
1219-1220.)
Another federal court reached the same conclusion
in Saint Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Helfin (1956
D.C.Ark.) 137 F.Supp. 520. In that case the court,
analyzing the same provisions of the Uniform
Partnership Act, held that an individual partner was
not the owner of a vehicle purchased with
partnership funds and used only for partnership
purposes. (Id., at p. 523.)
We consider these decisions from other jurisdictions
interpreting provisions of the Uniform Act as
persuasive authority. (Estate of Butler (1947) 29
Cal.2d 644, 177 P.2d 16.)
Appellant, attempting to distinguish Employers,
argues that the court's analysis in that case is
inapplicable because that case involved a dispute
between two insurers. She contends that in the
context of this case, " 'owner' would be defined in
the broadest sense and would include ... a partner
like CANTON." Underlying appellant's argument
is an assumption that the term "owned by" is
ambiguous as applied to the interest of a partner in
specific partnership assets. Although the concept of
ownership *1243 may be ambiguous in other
contexts (see, e.g., Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Condon (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 148, 151, 243
Cal.Rptr. 623), it is not in this case in light of the
provisions of the California Corporations Code and
prior judicial construction of the term as applied to
these facts. (Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v.
Sentry Ins. Co. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 903, 916, fn. 7,
226 Cal.Rptr. 558, 718 P.2d 920.)
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Even assuming, arguendo, the term is ambiguous
the interpretation urged by appellant is unreasonable
in light of the extrinsic evidence admitted below. In
his application Canton never disclosed his
partnership affiliation. Appellant asserts that this
was purely inadvertent because the policy was
routinely renewed after Canton became a partner
without amending the application.
Appellant's
argument misses the point. The significance of this
omission is not that Canton intentionally
misrepresented the facts on his application; rather,
the failure to make any effort to correct this
omission strongly supports the inference that Canton
did not expect or intend that this personal liability
umbrella would provide coverage for losses incurred
through his business partnership. Further support
for this inference is found in the fact that each of the
policies listed as underlying insurance in the
application for **724 the umbrella policy were
clearly policies covering vehicles owned by Canton
and/or his wife, individually.
In addition to the insurance application, respondent
offered Canton's deposition testimony that he never
used the boat for his personal purposes. Appellant
offered no evidence that Canton, in any way
exercised dominion and control over the boat, or
that there was any commingling of his personal
property with partnership assets. Thus, there was
no evidence to refute the characterization of the boat
as partnership property as defined by California
Corporations Code section 15008.
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In light of these facts, we conclude that the only
reasonable construction of Canton's personal
liability umbrella policy is that the boat registered to
Tahoe Boat Rental, and used exclusively for
partnership purposes, was not "owned by" Lloyd
Canton individually.
Our decision should not,
however, be construed to mean that a vehicle legally
registered to a partnership can never be deemed
"owned by" one of the individual partners for
purposes of finding insurance coverage under a
definition of "insured" such as the one set forth in
Canton's personal liability umbrella coverage policy.
We merely reject the proposition that an individual
partner is, in effect by operation of law, deemed the
owner of specific partnership assets, simply by
virtue of his status as a partner. As the court below
observed, the effect of such an interpretation would
be to permit individuals, who also happen to be
members of partnerships, to take out personal
liability policies at a comparatively *1244 small
premium and then read into them coverage for any
number of undisclosed partnerships.
II. [FN**]
FN** See footnote *, ante.
THE JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED.
RACANELLI, P.J., and NEWSOM, J., concur.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Charles D. Moore, of Salt Lake City, for
respondent.

76 Utah 1
FOLLAND, J.
Supreme Court of Utah.
BOYER
v.
PAHVANT MERCANTILE & INVESTMENT CO.
No. 4614.
April 22, 1930.
Appeal from District Court, Salt Lake County;
William M. McCrea, Judge.
Action by T. W. Boyer, as trustee for the First
National Bank of Rock Springs, Wyo., against the
Pahvant Mercantile & Investment Company.
Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

An opinion was heretofore written and filed in this
case wherein the judgment of the district court was
reversed and the cause remanded, with directions.
Upon consideration of a petition for rehearing which
was filed by respondent, we entertained some doubts
as to the correctness of that opinion and granted a
rehearing. The case was again argued by respective
counsel. Upon further consideration we are of the
view that the conclusions reached in the former
opinion as to the disposition of the case were
correct, although we reach such result by means of
other reasons than those heretofore expressed. The
former opinion, therefore, is withdrawn and will not
be printed, but this opinion will stand and be
published as the decision of the cause.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.
STRAUP and ELIAS HANSEN, JJ., dissenting.
West Headnotes
Mortgages <@=> 171(6)
266 —
266III Construction and Operation
266111(D) Lien and Priority
266kl66 Notice of Mortgage Affecting Priority
266kl71 Record of Mortgage as Notice
266kl71(6) Sufficiency of Record in General.
Mortgage index disclosing enough to put ordinarily
prudent examiner on inquiry is sufficient (Comp.
Laws 1917, § 1579).
Mortgages <©==> 171(6)
266 —
266III Construction and Operation
266111(D) Lien and Priority
266kl66 Notice of Mortgage Affecting Priority
266kl71 Record of Mortgage as Notice
266kl71(6) Sufficiency of Record in General.
Record of trust deed held sufficient, though
description of land was not entered in indices and
entry book and deed was not entered in abstract
record (Comp. Laws 1917, §§ 1576, 1579, 1592,
4875, 4900, 4901).
*189 Hamilton Gardner, of Salt Lake City, for
appellant.
Copyright (c) West Group 2001

This case involves a controversy as to the priority
of a trust deed and a warranty deed, both executed
by a common grantor and affecting real estate
situate in Millard county, this state. The execution
of the trust deed was prior in time. The case hinges
on the question of whether the trust deed was
properly or effectively recorded so as to impart
constructive notice of its contents to the grantee of
the warranty deed, a subsequent purchaser for value
and without knowledge of the trust deed. The
plaintiff claims under the trust deed, the defendant
under the warranty deed. No claim is made that
defendant had knowledge or actual notice of the trust
deed. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
defendant adjudging the warranty deed the superior
and better title. Plaintiff appeals, claiming that on
the facts found and stipulated, which are not in
dispute, he, instead of defendant, was entitled to a
judgment declaring the trust deed, which in effect is
a mortgage, a lien superior to the warranty deed.
The material and stipulated facts are:
To secure the payment of a loan William D.
Livingston and his wife executed and delivered the
trust deed of the property in question, and of other
real estate, to Boyer as trustee for the bank, which,
on January 20, 1917, was filed for record by the
plaintiff with the county recorder of Millard county,
and entered in the entry book as entry No. 7001.
The information entered in the entry book contains
all that was required by the statute except a brief
o claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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description of the property. The number of the
instrument, name of grantor and grantee, the kind of
instrument, date and time of filing were correctly
noted.
The trust deed was thereafter timely
recorded, or copied, at length in Book E of
Mortgages, pages 351 to 359 of the Record of the
county recorder. It was indexed in the indices of
grantors, grantees, and mortgagors and mortgagees
of the records, but without any description of the
property covered by said deed being entered in the
indices or any of them except for the words "See
record for description." The trust deed was at the
time abstracted as to all of the land described in it
except the property in question, which was omitted
from the abstract record. Some time during the
years 1925 and 1926 the county recorder corrected
the abstract record by including therein a proper
description of the land in question.
On February 7, 1921, for value, the Livingstons,
by warranty deed, conveyed the property in question
to the Western Securities Investment Company,
who, by warranty deed, in June, 1921, for value,
conveyed it to Pahvant Mercantile & Investment
Company, the defendant here. These warranty
deeds, on the face of each, purported to convey a
clear and unincumbered title to the land described,
and each was timely and properly filed for record
and recorded in the office of the county recorder of
Millard county.
It is also stipulated and found that, when the
Western Securities Investment Company purchased
the property, it caused a search of the record title of
the property to be made in the office of the county
recorder by the Fillmore Abstract Company,
licensed to search land titles and make abstracts
thereof, but, because of the failure of the county
recorder to make any notation of the trust deed in
the abstract record pertaining to the particular land
in question, the abstract company failed to find the
record of it, and failed to report the trust deed to the
company.
The Western Securities Investment
Company and the defendant, at the time of their
respective purchases, both were without actual
knowledge of the existence or transcription upon the
official records of said county of said deed of trust
or of the contents thereof as far as said deed of trust
covers or relates to the land in controversy other
than such knowledge and notice, if any, as they may
be chargeable with by reason of the recording of the
trust deed in the manner stated.
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The trial court entertained the view that under our
recording statutes the record was such that it did not
impart notice to subsequent purchasers of the
contents of the trust deed, and held respondent's title
superior to the claim of appellant.
Here are two claimants to a parcel of land-the
appellant as prior mortgagee, the respondent as the
subsequent purchaser. Both *190 acted in good
faith and paid a valuable consideration. Through
fault of the county recorder in failing to enter a
description of the land referred to in the trust deed
in the indices and entry book, and to make any entry
thereof in the abstract record, one of the parties
must lose the land and be left to his action for
damages against his warrantor or the county
recorder.
The legal questions presented are stated by
respondent as follows:
"(1) Did the mere filing of appellant's mortgage
for record absolve appellant from all further
responsibility in respect of seeing that the instrument
was properly recorded and charge the appellee with
constructive notice of the contents of the recorded
instrument irrespective of the sufficiency of the
record?
(2) If the burden rested on the appellant to see that
the mortgage was recorded in the manner required
by Statute, was the record of the mortgage in
question sufficient to impart constructive notice of
its contents to appellee?"
Both these questions have been ably and fully
argued in the briefs. In view of the facts stipulated
by the parties, which are substantially followed in
the findings of the court, we deem it unnecessary to
pass directly on the first question stated above,
notwithstanding both parties in their briefs devote
most of their space to that point.
It may become necessary at some future time, and
in a proper case, for this court to decide whether a
mere filing of an instrument for record with the
recording officer is sufficient to impart constructive
notice. The facts before us do not call for a decision
on this point. Anything we say not required by the
facts stipulated by the parties and found by the court
may well be regarded as dicta.
The trust deed was not only filed for record with
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the proper recording officer, but was noted in the
entry book with the information required by statute
as to names of parties thereto, its date, time of
filing, and number. The requirement of a brief
description of the premises was omitted. The
instrument was fully and accurately recorded by
being copied into the proper record book, and
correctly noted in the grantor's, grantee's,
mortgagor's, and mortgagee's indices. All that was
lacking in these index entries was the "brief
description of the premises," but in lieu thereof was
written the words, "See record for description."
The recorder is required by statute (section 1579,
Comp. Laws Utah 1917, subd. 6) to keep an
"abstract record" in which shall be entered all
mortgages, deeds of trust, and other instruments
showing the number of the instrument, names of
parties, brief description of property charged, etc.
There was an entire failure on the part of the
recorder to make any entry affecting the property in
question in the "abstract record" until some time
after respondent had acquired its deed to the
premises.
It is specifically stated in the stipulation of facts
that "because of the failure of the County Recorder
of Millard County to make any notation of the said
trust deed in the abstract record in the county
recorder's office pertaining to the land above
described, the said abstract company failed to find
the record of said deed of trust," etc.
It is nowhere said in the stipulation of facts that the
failure to find the record of the trust deed was
because of any faulty indexing or deficient entry in
the entry book, but it is definitely stated to be
because it was not included in the abstract record.
After a careful search and the reading of scores of
cases, we are unable to find any case which turns
upon the failure of the recorder to abstract any
instrument in the abstract record. No such case is
cited in the briefs. The relevant cases all involve
one or more of the following deficiencies, namely,
of faulty recording (that is, copying into the record
book): Failure to index at all, or failure to correctly
index. The naked question for decision, therefore,
is whether or not the record of the trust deed by
filing, entry in the entry book, copying into the
record book, and the indexing, though incomplete,
was nevertheless sufficient to impart constructive
notice to subsequent purchasers. The sections of the
statute, Comp. Laws Utah 1917, material to be
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considered here are sections 4875, 4900, and 4901.
These sections are in title 93 under the general
heading "Real Estate." Section 4875 requires that
"every instrument of writing, * * * to operate as
notice to third persons, shall be proved or
acknowledged and certified in the manner prescribed
by this title and recorded in the office of the
recorder of the county in which such real estate is
situated. * * *" Section 4900 states that "Every
conveyance or instrument in writing * * * required
by law to be recorded in the office of the county
recorder, shall, from the time of filing the same
with the recorder for record, impart notice to all
persons of the contents thereof, and subsequent
purchasers, mortgagees, and lienholders shall be
deemed to purchase and take with notice." Section
4901 provides that every such conveyance "which
shall not be recorded as provided in this title, shall
be void as against any subsequent purchaser," etc.
There is nothing in these sections nor the other
sections in title 93 which specifically defines what is
meant by the word "recorded." Sections 1576,
1579, and 1592, all in title 20 under the general
heading "Counties," and in the chapter entitled,
"County Recorder," contain matter pertinent to the
recording of instruments. *191
Section 1576
specifies the manner of recording documents, thus:
"He [the recorder] must, on the payment of the
fees for the same, record in books provided for the
purpose, in a fair hand, or by means of a typewriter,
camera, or other machine, all papers, documents,
records, and other writings required or permitted by
law to be recorded."
This section, which defines the manner of
recording, indicates that this is done by transcribing
or copying into the proper record book, and by
implication negatives the idea that "recording"
includes indexing or abstracting. Section 1579
provides for the books which the recorder must
keep, and under each heading specifies the kind of
entries to be made therein. In this section it is
provided that the recorder must keep an "entry
book," a "grantor's index," a "grantee's index," a
"mortgagor's index," "mortgagee's index," and an
"abstract record." Section 1592 covers the liability
of the recorder for failure to do his required duty:
"If any recorder to whom any instrument proved
or acknowledged according to law, or any paper or
notice which may by law be recorded, is delivered
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for record:
1. Neglects, or refuses to record such instrument,
paper, or notice within a reasonable time after
receiving the same; or
2. Records any instrument, papers, or notices,
wilfully or negligently, untruly, or in any other
manner than is hereinbefore directed; or
3. Neglects or refuses to keep in his office such
indexes as are required by this chapter, or to make
the proper entries therein; or
4. Neglects or refuses to make the searches and to
give the certificate required by this chapter; or
5. Alters, changes, or obliterates any record or
paper deposited in his office, or inserts any new
matter therein,
He shall be liable to the party aggrieved for three
times the amount of damages which may be
occasioned thereby."
It will be noted that the basis for liability is
segregated. Subdivision 1 has to do with the failure
to record an instrument. Subdivision 2 covers faulty
recordation. No. 3 has to do with failure to index.
This section would indicate that the word "record"
as used in the statute has reference alone to the
transcription of a document into the record book.
This language, taken in connection with that
contained in section 1576, would seem to indicate
that an instrument might be "recorded," though not
indexed or abstracted.
The weight of authority seems to be that an index
is no part of the record, and that a mistake in it does
not invalidate the notice afforded by a record
otherwise properly made. 5 Thompson on Real
Property, 146, § 4124; 23 R. C. L. 190, § 48; 1
Jones on Mortgages, 907, § 637; Warvelle on
Abstracts, 72, § 68. Note in 96 Am. St. Rep. 404;
Sinclair v. Gunzehauser, 179 Ind. 78, 98 N. E. 37,
100 N. E. 376; Seat v. Louisville & Jefferson
County Land Co., 219 Ky. 418, 293 S. W. 986.
The rule is stated in Jones on Mortgages, supra, as
follows:
"The general policy of the recording acts is to
make the filing of a deed, duly executed and
acknowledged, with the proper recording officer,
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constructive notice from that time; and although it
be provided that the register shall make an index for
the purpose of affording a correct and easy
reference to the books of record in his office, the
index is designed, not for the protection of the party
recording his conveyance, but for the convenience of
those searching the records; and instead of being a
part of the record, it only shows the way to the
record. It is in no way necessary that a conveyance
shall be indexed, as well as recorded, in order to
make it a valid notice."
There are cases, however, to the contrary,
particularly in the states of Iowa, Washington, and
North Carolina. It is unnecessary for us in this case
to align this court with either the majority or
minority rule on that question.
[1] Irrespective of whether the index is considered
essential to complete recording or not, the rule is
that it will be sufficient if enough is disclosed by the
index to put an ordinarily prudent examiner upon
inquiry. 1 Jones on Mortgages, 910; 23 R. C. L.
193; 5 Thompson on Real Property 152, 153, §
4126; 41 C. J. 568, "Mortgages"; 91 Am. Dec.
109, Note; Warvelle on Abstracts, 73.
In Iowa it is held that indexing is essential to
complete recording. Barney v. McCarty, 15 Iowa,
510, 83 Am. Dec. 427. The record is, nevertheless,
sufficient to impart notice where the recorder,
instead of noting the description of the property in
the index, has, in lieu thereof, written "see record"
(Calvin v. Bowman, 10 Iowa, 529; White v.
Hampton, 13 Iowa, 259), or "certain lots of land"
(Bostwick v. Powers, 12 Iowa, 456). In each
instance the subsequent purchaser was charged with
constructive notice. To similar effect are Oconto v.
Jerrard, 46 Wis. 317, 50 N. W. 591; Bardon v.
Land & River Imp. Co., 157 U. S. 327, 15 S. Ct.
650, 39 L. Ed. 719; Breed v. Conley, 14 Iowa, 269,
81 Am. Dec. 485; Jones v. Berkshire, 15 Iowa,
248, 83 Am. Dec. 412; Sinclair v. Slawson, 44
Mich. 123, 6 N. W. 207, 38 Am. Rep. 235.
The case of Barney v. McCarty, supra, is relied
upon and quoted at length in respondent's brief.
The decision was written by Judge Dillon. A
mortgage, given by the owner of real property, was
filed for record and recorded at large in the proper
record book, *192 but an index of the instrument
was entirely lacking. Later the property was sold
and a deed given. The question for determination
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was whether the record as made imparted notice; the
mortgage not being indexed at all. The court held
that the index was essential under the statutes of
Iowa to impart notice. That the case of Barney v.
McCarty supra, did not go beyond that specific point
is clearly indicated by the case of Barney v. Little,
15 Iowa, 527. That decision was also written by
Judge Dillon speaking for a unanimous court. In
Barney v. Little, handed down the day after the
decision in Barney v. McCarty, the only question
presented was whether the registry of a mortgage
was so imperfect and incomplete as not to charge
subsequent purchasers and mortgagees with
constructive notice. The statute provided that the
recorder must keep an entry book and an index
which must show (1) the grantors, (2) the grantees,
(3) the time when the instrument is filed, (4) the
date of the instrument, (5) the nature of the
instrument, (6) the book and page where the record
may be found, and (7) the description of the lands.
The mortgage was recorded in the proper book.
The index gave the name of the mortgagor and
mortgagee and the nature of the instrument, but, in
referring to the page where recorded, it gave the
paging inaccurately. There was wholly omitted
from the index the time of filing, the date of the
instrument, and a description of the lands conveyed.
It was held, however, that subsequent searchers of
the record were chargeable with notice of plaintiff's
mortgage. In the course of the opinion Judge Dillon
says:
"In the case of Barney v. McCarty, decided at the
present term, we had occasion to consider the nature
of the index book under the former recording act in
this State. It was there held that the total omission
to index the plaintiff's mortgage, deprived the
record of it of the quality of imparting implied
notice.
The general nature and spirit of that law and of the
present one are the same. * * * The chief object of
the index book is that which its name implies. Its
function is in the first place to indicate the existence
of all instruments which are recorded or on file to
be recorded. If there is no index of an instrument
the searcher after titles has a right to assume that
none such is on file or on the record.
Its office in the next place is to point out the book
and page where the instrument is recorded. These
are the essential uses and purposes of the index
book. To facilitate the examination of titles, the
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present law, it is true, has directed the index to
contain the date of the instrument; the date of filing
and description of the property. Still this does not
supersede the necessity of a record. * * *
The prior decisions of this Court have settled that,
while the index, which serves, so to speak, as a
finger board to direct the inquirer, must not mislead
him by giving a totally wrong description of the
lands. (Scoles v. Wilsey et al., 11 Iowa, 261), yet
it is not necessarily and essentially a prerequisite to
a valid registration that the index should contain a
description of the lands conveyed. It is sufficient if
it points to the record with reasonable certainty.
Bostwick v. Powers, 12 Iowa, 456; Calvin v.
Bowman, 10 Iowa, 529.
If the grantor's and grantees' names are given in
the index, with the book and page where the
instrument is recorded, and if the instrument is there
really recorded, we believe that this, so far as the
object of the recording act is concerned, is a
substantial, though it may not be in all respects, as
to the index book a literal compliance with the law.
For the record book and the index book are not to be
considered as detached and independent books, but
related and connected ones, and a party (assuming it
to be an instrument which the law authorizes and
requires to be recorded) is, where the index makes
the requisite reference, affected with notice of any
facts which either book contains with respect to the
title of his proposed grantor.
Were it not for the mispaging in the index of the
plaintiff's mortgage, we are all agreed that the
requirements of the law were, in substance,
observed. It remains briefly to consider the effect
of this error.
The proposition is indisputable and clear, founded
in reason, and sanctioned by authority, that 'if an
ordinarily diligent search of the records will bring to
an inquirer knowledge of a prior incumbrance or
alienation, he is presumed to know of it.' 2 Wash.
Real Prop. 596, § 63; Flynt v. Arnold, 2 Mete.
[Mass.] 619-625. The prior decisions of this court
(Bostwick v. Powers, and Calvin v. Bowman), rest
upon this principle; and although questioned by
counsel, they have not produced any authority
showing, or tending to show, that these cases should
have been decided differently."
The court then points out that, notwithstanding the
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inaccuracy of the paging, a competent and careful
searcher of the records would be led to the
document recorded, and that subsequent purchasers
are chargeable with notice.
Another case strongly relied upon by respondent is
Ritchie v. Griffiths, 1 Wash. 429, 25 P. 341, 12 L.
R. A. 384, 22 Am. St. Rep. 155. This case holds
that mere delivery of a deed for record does not
impart constructive notice, as, under the Washington
statute, indexing is an essential part of recording.
Here the prior deed, while copied into a record
book, was not indexed at all in any of the index
books.
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appellant to recover costs.
CHERRY, C. J., and EPHRAIM HANSEN, J.,
concur.
STRAUP, J. (dissenting).
The statutes which I think are material to the
controversy are section 1579 of chapter 10, title 20;
section 4875 of chapter 2; and sections 4900 and
4901 of chapter 4, title 93, Comp. Laws Utah 1917.
Section 1579 provides:
"Every recorder must keep:

*193 Other cases are cited in the briefs addressed
to the point of whether mere filing for record
imparts notice. In view of the position we take as to
the decisive question in the case, there is no need to
further refer to them.
[2] Our conclusion is that sufficient appeared on
the records of the county recorder of Millard county
to bind respondent with effective notice of the prior
trust deed of appellants.

1. An 'entry book,' in which he shall immediately
upon receipt of any instrument to be recorded * * *
enter in the order of its reception or entry, as the
case may be, the names of the parties thereto, its
date, the day of the month, the hour, and the year of
filing any such statement or marginal entry, and a
brief description of the premises" and endorse
thereon the number of such entry.
"2. A 'grantor's index,' in which shall be indexed
all deeds * * * which shall show the number of the
instrument, the name of each grantor, in alphabetical
order, the name of the grantee, date of instrument,
time of filing, kind of instrument, consideration, the
book and page in which it is recorded, and a brief
description of the premises."

This, of course, in no way affects the duty of the
county recorder to fully comply with the statute in
the making of full and proper entries in the various
books it is his duty to keep, including indices and an
abstract record. "Public policy and the rights of
those directly interested in the proper recording of
instruments require that recorders be held to a strict
and literal performance of their official duties." 23
R. C. L. 271. His duty in respect to entering
recorded instruments in the abstract record is a duty
owing to the subsequent purchaser rather than to the
original grantee. Green v. Garrington, 16 Ohio St.
548, 91 Am. Dec. 103. The recorder may be liable
to a subsequent purchaser who sustains damage as a
necessary and proximate result of such official
negligence. Rising v. Dickinson, 18 N. D. 478, 121
N. W. 616, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 127, 138 Am. St.
Rep. 779, 20 Ann. Cas. 484; Title Guaranty &
Surety Co. v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 570, 133 S.
W. 577. The index and abstract record are for the
convenience of those who desire to examine the
record. 23 R. C. L. 191.

"4. A 'mortgagor's index,' in which shall be
entered all mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, and all
other instruments in the nature of an incumbrance
upon real estate, which shall show the number of the
instrument, name of each mortgagor, debtor, or
person charged with incumbrance, in alphabetical
order, the name of the mortgagee, lienholder,
creditor, or claimant, date of instrument, time of
filing, nature of instrument, consideration, the book
and page in which it is recorded, and a brief
description of the property charged."

The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the
cause remanded to the district court of Salt Lake
county, with directions to proceed with the case in
conformity with the views expressed herein;

"5. A 'mortgagee's [mortgagor's] index,' in which
shall be entered" and noted all matters required in
the mortgagor's index, including "a brief description
of the property charged."

"3. A 'grantee's index,' * * * which shall show"
the same notations including "a brief description of
the premises" as are required in the grantor's index.
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"6. An 'abstract record,' which shall show by
tracts every conveyance or incumbrance recorded,
the date and character of the instrument, time of
filing the same, and the book and page where the
same is recorded, which book shall be so kept as to
show a true chain of title to each tract and the
incumbrances thereon, as shown by the records of
his office." (Italics added.)
Section 4875 provides:
"Every conveyance of real estate, and every
instrument of writing, setting forth an agreement to
convey any real estate, or whereby any real estate
may be affected, to operate as notice to third
persons, shall be proved or acknowledged and
certified in the manner prescribed by this title and
recorded in the office of the recorder of the county
in which such real estate is situated, but shall be
valid and binding between the parties thereto without
such proof, acknowledgment, certification, or
record, and to all other persons who have had actual
notice."
Section 4900 provides:
"Every conveyance or instrument in writing
affecting real estate, executed, acknowledged, or
proved, and certified in the manner prescribed by
this title * * * required by law to be recorded in the
office of the county recorder, shall, from the time of
filing the same with the recorder for record, impart
notice to all persons of the contents thereof, and
subsequent purchasers, mortgagees, and lienholders
shall be deemed to purchase and take with notice."
Section 4901 provides:
"Every conveyance of real estate within this state
hereafter made, which shall not be *194 recorded
as provided in this title, shall be void as against any
subsequent purchaser, in good faith and for a
valuable consideration, of the same real estate, or
any portion thereof, where his own conveyance shall
be first duly recorded."
In January, 1917, William D. Livingston and his
wife, for a valuable consideration, and to secure the
payment of sums of money therein specified,
executed and delivered to the plaintiff, T. W. Boyer,
trustee, a trust deed in which a number of separate
parcels of land in Millard county, Utah, are
described: One parcel described as the E. 1/2 of the
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N. W. 1/4 and the W. 1/2 of the S. E. 1/4 of
sec-17, tp. 16 S., R. 8 W.; a parcel in sec. 32, tp.
16 S., R. 7 W.; a parcel in sec. 33, tp. 16 S., R. 7
W.; a parcel in sec. 28, tp. 16 S., R. 7 W.; a parcel
in sec. 4, tp. 17 S., R. 8 W.; a parcel in sec. 27, tp.
16 S., R. 8 W.; a parcel in sec. 33, tp. 16 S., R. 8
W.; a parcel in sec. 15, tp. 16 S., R. 8 W., a parcel
in sec. 26, tp. 16 S., R. 8 W.; a parcel in sec. 26,
tp. 16 S., R. 8 W.; a parcel in sec. 31, tp. 16 S., R.
7 W.; a parcel in sec. 31, tp. 19 S., R. 1 E.; a
parcel in sec. 25, tp. 19 S., R. 1 W.; a parcel in
sec. 36, tp. 19 S., R. 1 W.; a parcel in sec. 7, tp.
20 S., R. 1 E.; together with described water rights
and easements.
The only land in controversy is the land described
in sec. 17, tp. 16, etc. It is to be noticed that all of
the other parcels are in other sections. The trust
deed, about a month after its execution, was left
with the county recorder for filing and recordation.
It was entered in the entry book and copied and
transcribed in Book E of Mortgages, at pages 351 to
359, in the recorder's office. It was indexed in the
general indices of grantors and grantees and of
mortgagors and mortgagees without a brief or any
description of the premises conveyed or charged by
the instrument, except a notation "See record for
description." The instrument was also abstracted in
the "abstract record" as to all of the lands described
in the instrument, except the parcel in section 17,
the land in controversy, which was wholly omitted
from the abstract record.
Since divergent views are entertained as to the
manner in which the trust deed was exhibited on the
records of the county recorder, I set forth the
findings of the trial court with respect thereto. The
court found:
"That on the 20th day of January, 1917, the said
trust deed was filed for record by the plaintiff with
the County Recorder of Millard County, State of
Utah, at 2:11 p. m., on said day; that the said trust
deed was thereupon copied at length in Book 'E' of
Mortgages, at Pages 351 to 359 of the records of the
County Recorder of said Millard County, Utah, and
entered in Entry Book or Reception Book, as it is
some times called, No. 7001, in the following form:
Number From To
7001 Wm. D. Livingston, et ux. T. W. Boyer,
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'Date of instrument Trustee.

abstract record.

12-26-1916.

The court further found that, when the Western
Securities Investment Company purchased the lands
in section 17, "and at the time of such purchase it
caused search of the record title of said land to be
made in the office of the County Recorder of
Millard County, Utah, by the Fillmore Abstract
Company, a Utah corporation licensed to search
land titles and make abstracts thereof within the
State of Utah; that because of the failure o] *194
the County Recorder of Millard County to *195
make any notation of the said trust deed in the
abstract record in the county recorder's office
pertaining to the land above described (in Sec. 17),
and of the other failures in properly entering and
indexing said trust deed the said abstract company
failed to find the record of said deed of trust as
pertaining to the land above described (in Sec. 17)
and failed to report said trust deed to the said
Western Securities Investment Company, and the
said last named corporation purchased the said
described land without any actual knowledge of the
existence or transcription upon which the official
records of said county of said deed of trust or of the
contents thereof so far as said deed of trust covered
or relates to the land above described, other than
such knowledge, if any, as it may be chargeable
with by reason of the recording of said trust deed in
the manner aforesaid." (Italics added.)

Time of Filing Kind of Inst.
1-20-1917, at 2:11 p. m. Trust Deed
Recorded at Request of Continental National
Bank.'
That the said entry in the said reception book
contained no description or reference to the property
covered by said trust deed; that the said trust deed
was at the same time indexed in the General Indices
of Grantors, Grantees and Mortgagors and
Mortgagees of the records of said county recorder's
office, but without any description of the property
covered by said deed being entered in said indices or
any of them except for the words 'see record for
description;' that the said trust deed was at said time
abstracted as to all of the land described in it except
that certain parcel hereinbefore particularly
described (in Sec. 17, the land in controversy),
which said parcel was omitted from the said abstract
on the said county recorder's records." (Italics
added.)
Such finding is not questioned, and is in the
language of the stipulation of the parties. So the
matter stood when, on February 17, 1921, about
four years thereafter, the Western Securities
Investment Company, for a valuable consideration,
purchased the lands in section 17, the lands in
controversy, from the Livingston Land & Cattle
Company, and at which time William D. Livingston
and his wife, for value, executed and delivered to
the Western Securities Investment Company a
warranty deed conveying a clear and unincumbered
title to such lands, which deed was duly recorded
February 21, 1921. Thereafter, and on June 19,
1921, the Western Securities Investment Company,
for value, by warranty deed free and clear of
incumbrances, conveyed the lands in section 17 to
the Pahvant Mercantile & Investment Company, the
defendant herein, which deed was also duly
recorded. So the matter again stood until "some
time during the years 1925 and 1926," and after this
action was commenced, when the recorder corrected
the abstract record in the recorder's office wherein
the trust deed was abstracted so as to include a
description of the lands in section 17, and which, up
to that time, had been wholly omitted from the

The court also found that the Pahvant Mercantile
& Investment Company,
for
a valuable
consideration, purchased the lands in section 17,
"without actual knowledge of the existence of said
trust deed with relation to the lands above described
(in section 17) other than such knowledge and
notice, if any, as it may be chargeable with by
reason of the recording of said trust deed in the
manner aforesaid."
As a conclusion of law the trial court found that
the title of the Pahvant Mercantile & Investment
Company was superior to and free from the lien of
the trust deed, and rendered a judgment accordingly,
from which the plaintiff and his beneficiary under
the trust have prosecuted this appeal. The theory on
which the case was presented to the trial court was
upon the contention of the plaintiff that, under
section 4900, the trust deed from the time of filing it
with the recorder for record imparted notice of its
contents to subsequent purchasers, regardless of any
defects or omissions in recording it, and even
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though it had not been spread on the records, or any
notation made of it in the indices or abstract record;
that, when the plaintiff presented the trust deed,
properly executed and acknowledged and entitled to
be recorded, to the recorder for filing and for
record, and paid the fee therefor, he had done all he
was required to do; and, if the recorder failed or
omitted to record the instrument so as to impart
notice to subsequent purchasers of its existence and
contents, such failure or omission may not be visited
on the plaintiff because the recorder, a public officer
charged with public duties, was not the agent of the
plaintiff.
The contrary was contended by the
defendant. The plaintiff also contended that the
statutory provisions relating to indices and the
abstract record are not a part of our recording acts,
and in no particular modify or control section 4900,
and hence need not be considered with it, and that
under the provisions of section 4900 the trust deed,
"from the time of filing the same with the recorder
for record," imparted notice of its contents to all
subsequent purchasers, though it may have been
improperly or defectively recorded or wholly
omitted from the records.
On the other hand, the defendant contended that
the statutory provisions respecting the entry book,
the indices, and the abstract record are a part of our
recording acts, and hence must be considered in
connection with sections 4875, 4900, and 4901; that
an instrument "to operate as notice to third persons"
is required, not only to be acknowledged and left
with the recorder for record, but must also be
"recorded in the office of the recorder of the
county" (section 4875); that depositing or filing an
instrument with the recorder for record is not
recording it, and that it is not recorded so as to
impart notice until transcribed and entered in the
proper record books kept for such purpose; that the
language in section 4900 that an instrument imparts
notice to subsequent purchasers "from the time of
filing the same with the recorder for record" but
means that, when an instrument in due course is
transcribed and entered in books kept for that
purpose, the record relates back and takes effect
from the time the instrument was filed with the
recorder for record, and that it is the record which
imparts notice of the contents of the instrument; that
the entry book and indices and abstract record are
requisites of our recording acts; that failures or
omissions of the recorder in not properly and
sufficiently recording instruments so that the record
may affect notice may not be visited on subsequent
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purchasers searching the record title.
The case was here presented on such respective
theories. Nearly the whole of the appellant's brief
of one hundred fourteen pages, and the whole of the
respondent's brief of fifty-eight pages, are devoted
to a consideration of such theories and propositions.
Many cases are cited by each party in support of his
contention. On the first hearing the majority of this
court, three members thereof, adopted the theory of
the appellant, and thus reversed the judgment of the
court below. Two members of the court dissented.
That the cases are in conflict on the subject was
conceded. The prevailing opinion followed the
minority rule (Mangold v. Barlow, 61 Miss. 593, 48
Am. Rep. 84) as being the better rule, and the
dissenting members the majority rule. Ritchie v.
Griffiths, 1 Wash. 429, 25 P. 341, 12 L. R. A. 384,
22 Am. St. Rep. 155.
A petition for a rehearing was granted, the case
reargued and resubmitted on the same briefs
theretofore filed in the cause. A prevailing opinion
is now rendered to the effect that the theory stated in
the former opinion, and on which the case was
ruled, was not necessary to a proper disposition of
the case, *196 and that the only question necessary
to a decision is as to whether the entries in the entry
book, the indices, and the abstract record with
respect to the trust deed, though not in compliance
with the statute, nevertheless were sufficient to put
one with due diligence on notice of the existence and
contents of the trust deed as to all of the lands
described therein, including the lands in controversy
in section 17. In the appellant's brief the point also
is briefly adverted to and cases cited in support of
the doctrine "that a person searching a record is
charged with notice of every fact which the records
disclose and of all other facts with which, by the
exercise of reasonable diligence, he ought to become
acquainted," and in such connection again urged that
indices and abstract records are mere conveniences
and facilities in searching record titles, but are not
dependable nor to be relied on, nor requisites to a
complete recordation of an instrument. On an
examination of the pleadings, the stipulation of
facts, and the findings, I do not see wherein the case
was presented or submitted to the trial court on the
theory on which it is now ruled. I have set up all of
the findings bearing on the subject. No finding is
made that the licensed abstract company, employed
by the defendant's predecessor to search and report
on the record title of the Livingstons and as to their
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right to convey the premises in controversy, was
negligent or failed to exercise due or reasonable
diligence, or that by the exercise of diligence it
could or ought to have been discovered that the
contents of the trust deed as to the property
conveyed or charged by it was not accurately noted
or reflected in the abstract record, and that such
deed related to, or was a charge on, the lands in
question. What the court found was, not that the
licensed abstract company was negligent or failed to
exercise due diligence, but that "because of the
failure of the County Recorder of Millard County to
make any notation of the said trust deed in the
abstract record in the county recorder's office
pertaining to the lands above described (in Sec. 17)
and of the other failures in properly entering and
indexing said trust deed, the said abstract company
failed to find the record of said deed of trust as
pertaining to the land above described (in Sec. 17)
and failed to report said trust deed to the said
Western Securities Investment Company," the
predecessor of the defendant. It is such stated
failures of the recorder, and not because of any want
of diligence upon the part of the licensed abstract
company, which, as found by the court, led to the
failure to find that the trust deed pertained to or
included the lands in question.
It is, however, suggested that the further finding
that the defendant and its predecessor purchased
without "actual knowledge" of the existence of the
trust deed, and that it conveyed and covered the land
in question, "other than such knowledge and notice,
if any, as it may be chargeable with by reason of the
recording of such trust deed in the manner
aforesaid," involved the question of diligence or the
want of it in examining the record title and the
question of constructive notice. But no finding was
made on the subject. The reason for that I think is
apparent, and is because the plaintiff asserted, and
the defendant denied, that the mere presentation of
the trust deed to the recorder for record and the
mere filing of it, under section 4900, constituted
notice of the existence and contents of the trust deed
to all subsequent purchasers, no matter how
improperly or defectively it may have been entered
in the records of the county recorder. And such was
the proposition or question presented on this appeal.
Though it be assumed that the finding as made
included or involved the proposition of whether one
in searching the record title of the Livingstons with
respect to the lands in question with due diligence
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could or ought to have discovered the contents of the
trust deed, and that it conveyed or charged lands,
not only as described in the abstract record, but also
lands not therein described, yet I think sufficient
facts were not made to appear to lead to a discovery
of the trust deed in such particular. In considering
the case from such viewpoint, I think it important to
consider the effect of the statute relating to the entry
book, the indices, and the abstract record required to
be kept by the recorder and the entries to be made
therein. In the prevailing opinion it is said that "an
index" by the weight of authority is no part of the
record, and that a mistake in it does not "invalidate
the notice afforded by a record otherwise properly
made." That but begs the question and assumes the
proposition that there was a "record properly made"
which afforded notice. Further, we are concerned
not alone with a mere "index" or even with a mere
"mistake" in an index. To support the contention
that "an index" is no part of our recording acts the
prevailing opinion cites and quotes from 1 Jones on
Mortgages, 907, § 637. It is to be noted that by
reading the whole section it is seen the author adopts
the rule that an instrument properly acknowledged
and entitled to be recorded is constructive notice of
its contents affecting all subsequent purchasers from
the time the instrument is left in the recorder's
office for record, whether it is in fact recorded or
not; that, when a grantee has delivered the
instrument to the recorder for record, he has done
all the law requires of him for his protection, and, if
a subsequent purchaser is injured because the
instrument was not recorded or was improperly or
defectively recorded, he and not *196 the grantee
must stand the loss. I think such doctrine is against
the undoubted weight of judicial authority when
applied to recording acts such as ours, and *197 is
inconsistent with the meaning and intent of such
acts. White v. Himmelberger-Harrison Lumber
Co., 240 Mo. 13, 139 S. W. 553, 42 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 151; Cady v. Purser, 131 Cal. 552, 63 P. 844,
82 Am. St. Rep. 391; Federal Const. Co. v. Curd,
179 Cal. 479, 177 P. 473; Ritchie v. Griffiths, 1
Wash. 429, 25 P. 341, 12 L. R. A. 384, 22 Am. St.
Rep. 155; Bernard v. Benson, 58 Wash. 191, 108 P.
439, 137 Am. St. Rep. 1051; Barney v. McCarty,
15 Iowa, 510, 83 Am. Dec. 427; Koch v. West, 118
Iowa, 468, 92 N. W. 663, 96 Am. St. Rep. 394;
James v. Newman, 147 Iowa, 574, 126 N. W. 781;
Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Penn. Cordage Co., 65
N. J. Eq. 181, 55 A. 231; Pringle v. Dunn, 37 Wis.
449, 19 Am. Rep. 772; Gordon v. Constantine
Hydraulic Co., 117 Mich. 620, 76 N. W. 142;
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Sawyer v. Adams, 8 Vt. 172, 30 Am. Dec. 459.
Warvelle on Abstracts, § 68, also is cited as
holding that "an index" is no part of recording acts.
Some indices may not be, depending upon statutes
with respect thereto. But how about "an abstract
record" required to be kept by the recorder which,
among other things, "shall show by tracts every
conveyance or incumbrance recorded" and "a true
chain of title to each tract and the incumbrances
thereon?" In sections 67 and 81 the author discusses
the subject of a "tract index," here our "abstract
record," the purpose and necessity thereof, and
which the author calls an "indispensable adjunct,"
and says is "the source from whence the examiner
draws all his primary information in preparing the
abstract" and "is arranged with sole reference to the
land in the county, by sections, or parts of sections
in case of unsubdivided lands, and by lots, blocks or
subdivisions in respect to such as have been
resurveyed and platted."
The cited cases of Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser, 179
Ind. 78, 98 N. E. 37, 100 N. E. 376 and Seat v.
Louisville & Jefferson County Land Co., 219 Ky.
418, 293 S. W. 986, do not, as I think, support the
proposition to the extent to which the cases are
cited. 23 R. C. L. 190, also is cited. The author
there says that courts are in agreement as to the
utility and practical necessity for "an index" to
public records. He says that in most, if not in all,
jurisdictions, there are statutes requiring a recorder
to keep "an index." He also says that there is a
sharp conflict, due in a great measure to the
difference in the statutes in the several jurisdictions,
in determining whether "an index" is necessary to
complete the record so as to make it constructive
notice. Then on page 191 the author says that
"under statutes which designate the particular steps
in the act of making a record, and require that all
instruments shall be duly indexed in a book to be
kept for that purpose, and that the index shall be
made up in a certain manner, it is held that the
record is not complete, so as to give notice, if the
index is not properly made." He further says: "And
indeed to hold that an index is not essentially part of
a valid and complete registration would overlook the
uniform practice of relying wholly on it to find the
names of the various owners in tracing titles, and
would also ignore the fundamental design of the
recording acts, which is to give certainty and
security to titles, by requiring all deeds and all liens
to be made matters of public record, and thus
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discoverable by all persons who are interested in
ascertaining their existence, and who will examine
the records in the mode which the law has pointed
out." And on page 193 he further says that "an
index entry of a deed describing the land conveyed
as in a different section, township and range from
those of the deed, and containing the words 'for
description, see record,' is not constructive notice of
such deed to a subsequent purchaser." He further
says that in some jurisdictions there must not only be
a name index but also a "tract index," which gives
to the investigator of a title a double check or
protection against prior liens.
Cases are cited by the author supporting the
propositions stated in the text. Under statutes
similar to ours, I think the weight of judicial
authority is that indices and abstract records
required to be kept and entries to be made therein by
the recorder, as required by the statute, are parts of
the recording act, especially the "abstract record."
Ritchie v. Griffiths, 1 Wash. 429, 25 P. 341, 12 L.
R. A. 384, 22 Am. St. Rep. 155; Bernard v.
Benson, 58 Wash. 191, 108 P. 439, 137 Am. St.
Rep. 1051; Barney v. McCarty, 15 Iowa, 510, 83
Am. Dec. 427; Koch v. West, 118 Iowa, 468, 92 N.
W. 663, 96 Am. St. Rep. 394; James v. Newman,
147 Iowa, 574, 126 N. W. 781; Pringle v. Dunn, 37
Wis. 449, 19 Am. Rep. 772; Hall v. Baker, 74 Wis.
118, 42 N. W. 104; Lander v. Bromley, 79 Wis.
372, 48 N. W. 594; Bardon v. Land, etc., Imp.
Co., 157 U. S. 327, 15 S. Ct. 650, 39 L. Ed. 719;
Ely v. Norman, 175 N. C. 294, 95 S. E. 543;
Fowle & Son v. Ham, 176 N. C. 12, 96 S. E. 639;
Speer v. Evans, 47 Pa. 141; Prouty v. Marshall,
225 Pa. 570, 74 A. 550, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1211.
While in the prevailing opinion it is stated that the
authorities on the subject are in conflict (which I
concede, but due largely to differences in statutes in
the several jurisdictions), and that the weight of
authority is that "an index" is not a part of recording
acts, nevertheless it *197 further is considered that
it is not necessary to now determine the question,
and the case ruled on the theory that sufficient was
made to appear on the indices and abstract record to
impart constructive notice that the trust deed
conveyed or charged the lands in question. In
considering and in determining that, I again think it
important to consider whether, under our statute,
indices and an abstract record *198 are or are not a
part of our recording acts, the use and necessity of
them, and what reliance and dependability may be
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given them. If they be regarded as mere facilities
and conveniences in searching record titles, but not
as being dependable nor to be relied on, that is one
thing. If, on the other hand, they are to be regarded
as a part of our recording acts, and may be relied
on, then that is another thing. To assert the former
and not the latter proposition does not, as I think,
reflect the true intent and purpose of the statute. If
sufficient was made to appear by the entries in the
indices and in the abstract record to impart notice
that the trust deed conveyed or charged the lands in
controversy, then I see no necessity of considering
or discussing questions of defaults or negligence of
the recorder, nor as to his duty to comply with the
statute in making full and proper entries in the
indices and in the abstract record as required by the
statute. I, of course, readily concede the proposition
that, if from the entries appearing in the indices and
in the abstract record it is disclosed that the trust
deed conveyed or charged the lands in question, and
thus affected the record title of the Livingstons with
respect thereto, and whose record title was being
investigated, or that such facts were disclosed by the
entries as made that one, examining such record title
as to the lands in question with reasonable diligence,
ought to have discovered that the trust deed did
affect the lands in question, then sufficient was made
to appear to impart constructive notice. But what
was disclosed by such entries? As to that, I take, as
we all are required to take, the findings of the trial
court. We are not permitted to enlarge upon them
or read anything into them. The court found in
express language the kind of entry as made in the
"entry book." Not anything is there made to appear
what lands, or that the lands in question, were
conveyed or charged by the trust deed. The court
found that the entry book contained no description or
reference to the property covered by the trust deed.
Then the court found that the trust deed "was at the
same time indexed in the general indices of grantors,
grantees, mortgagors and mortgagees of the records
of said county recorder's office, but without any
description of the property covered by said deed
being entered in said indices or any of them except
for the words 'see record for description.'" Other
than that, the finding does not show how the trust
deed was indexed. Nor is it found that it was
indexed so as to show where or in what book the
trust deed was recorded. It is found that it was
indexed "at the same time" it was entered in the
entry book. The recorder was required to enter the
trust deed in the entry book "immediately upon
receipt of" it, and of necessity before it was spread
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on the record or transcribed in a book kept for that
purpose. If, as found by the court, the recorder
indexed the trust deed "at the same time" that he
entered it in the entry book, it follows that the deed
also was indexed before it was transcribed in a book
kept for that purpose, and hence, when it was
indexed, no notation in the indices was or could
have been made of the book and page where the
deed was recorded. Thus, from the finding, I think
it clear that the recorder entered the trust deed in the
general indices at the same time and in the same
manner he entered it in the entry book and before
the deed was spread or transcribed on the record or
in a book kept for that purpose. While a finding is
made that the deed was copied at length in Book E
of Mortgages at pages 351 to 359, yet it is not found
that any entry was made in the general indices
showing in what book or at what page the deed was
copied or spread on the record. Hence the statement
in the prevailing opinion that the book and page in
which the trust deed was transcribed was shown by
entries in the general indices is not borne out by the
findings. True, the appellant in his brief in effect
asserts that the book and pages in which the deed
was transcribed were indicated by entries in the
general indices. But we as to the facts are required
to look to the findings and not to assertions of
counsel except as supported by the findings.
I now come to how the matter was exhibited in the
abstract record. Here we again must look to the
findings. As to that the court found "that the said
trust deed was at the same time (at the time it was
entered in the entry book and in the general indices)
abstracted as to all of the lands described in it except
that parcel hereinbefore particularly described (the
lands in Section 17 and in controversy) which said
parcel was omitted from the said abstract on the said
county recorder's records." How was it there
abstracted, except as to the description of the lands
and omitting a description of or any reference to the
land in question? When it is found that the deed was
abstracted in the abstract record "at the same time"
it was entered in the entry book, it again follows that
it was abstracted before the deed was transcribed in
a book kept for that purpose, and hence no notation
was or could have been made in the abstract record
as to the book or page where the trust deed was
recorded. From the findings I think it may not be
inferred or implied that the book or pages where the
*198 trust deed was recorded were noted either in
the indices or in the abstract record. So regarding
the findings I do not see anything which would put
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one searching the record title of the Livingstons on
notice that the trust deed covered lands other than,
or different from, those as disclosed by the abstract
record.
Though it be assumed, as asserted by the appellant
in his brief and as stated in the *199 prevailing
opinion, that in the abstract record the book and
page where the trust deed was recorded was noted,
yet how should the matter be regarded from such
viewpoint? The consideration of it still involves the
question of whether the abstract record is or is not a
part of our recording acts, the purpose and necessity
of it, and the reliance to be put upon it. The
abstract record which the recorder is required to
keep is something more than a mere index. It is a
kind of record which, among other things, says the
statute, "shall show by tracts every conveyance or
incumbrance recorded," and "shall be so kept as to
show a true chain of title to each tract and the
incumbrance thereon as shown by the records" of
the recorder's office. The distinction between a
mere "index" and a "tract record" or "tract book,"
here our "abstract record," as has been seen, is
pointed out by Warvelle. The obvious purpose of
the Legislature requiring the recorder to keep an
abstract record showing by tracts every conveyance
or incumbrance recorded and a true chain of title to
each tract as to the incumbrances thereon was,
among other things, to save examiners of title to any
particular tract the necessity of running down every
instrument indicated on the record as having been
executed or given by the person whose title to the
particular tract is being investigated, irrespective of
whether the instrument or instruments refer to or
affect title to the particular tract the title to which is
under investigation, or of examining records of
transcribed instruments in the recorder's office
irrespective of whether they do or do not involve the
title under investigation. The appellant in his brief
concedes, and says: "It is true abstracters in Utah
rely to a large extent upon the 'abstract record' in
the recorder's office." I think they have the right to
do so. Warvelle, § 81, says: "The tract index
occupies much the same position in the abstract
office that the great ledger does in the counting
room. It is the receptacle for all the notes of the
entry books, where the great mass of each day's
transactions is separated, classified and arranged,
and exhibits at a glance on its broad pages the
balance sheet of all land titles of the county." The
examiner turns to it as the foundation stone, and
from it derives his primary information. He turns to
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the tract in which is embraced the lands the title to
which is being investigated as "a true chain of title"
and "the incumbrances thereon." There finding no
conveyance or incumbrance affecting the title under
investigation he may rightly assume there is none.
To hold otherwise is, I think, to overlook the
practice of relying on the abstract record and indices
and to ignore the fundamental design of our
recording acts.
Let it be assumed that an examiner is investigating
the record title of another to a parcel of land, say in
a particular section in the southern part of Salt Lake
county. In the general indices and in the abstract
record the examiner finds that the person whose title
is being investigated had made conveyances of lands
in a section or sections in the northern part of the
county or of parcels in Salt Lake City, and which
briefly are described in the abstract record without a
description of any other lands or parcels or in any
wise relating to or pertaining to the lands or the tract
the record title of which is being searched and
investigated. Is there in such case any good reason,
either in fact or in law, that the examiner,
nevertheless, is required to examine the recorded
contents of all of such other transcribed conveyances
or incumbrances to ascertain if by chance any of
them-they may be numerous, hundreds of them-may
or may not convey or charge the lands the title to
which is being investigated? I think not. If the
examiner is required to do that and may not rely on
the abstract record, then equally well is he required
to examine and inspect every instrument transcribed
on the records to ascertain if it affects the title to
lands under investigation. Here the examiner, in
investigating the record title of the Livingstons and
as to their right to convey the parcel of land in
section 17, finds by examining the abstract record
that the Livingstons theretofore had given a trust
deed to lands described in other sections of the
county, and which deed, as there noted, in no way
affected or involved the title to the parcel of land the
title of which was being investigated. Under such
circumstances I see no good reason, either in law or
in fact, why the examiner was required to inspect or
examine the trust deed as transcribed on the records
to ascertain if the description of the lands conveyed
or charged by it was or was not properly entered in
the abstract record, or as to whether or not the trust
deed differently from the description as contained in
the abstract record included lands in section 17. any
more than, if it had been indicated on the abstract
record that the Livingstons had conveyed parcels of
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land in Fillmore or in Delta in Millard county, the
examiner was required to inspect such conveyances
to ascertain if any of them did or did not also
include the lands in question, though on the abstract
record there was not anything to indicate that such
lands were affected by such conveyances. If due
care or diligence requires that, and does not permit
reliance on the abstract record and indices as by the
mandatory provisions of the statute required to be
kept, then they, instead of being aids and facilities in
searching record titles, become a mere delusion and
a snare and a ready vehicle to mislead and deceive.
Stress, however, is put on the notation in the
indices "see record *199 for description" as being
sufficient information to put the examiner on inquiry
that the trust deed did convey or charge, or may
have conveyed or charged, or *200. in some
manner affected, the lands in section 17, the title of
which was being investigated; which, had it been
followed up and the trust deed as transcribed on the
record inspected, would have disclosed that it
included the lands in section 17. As is seen, under
the statute, the recorder in the indices, among other
things, was required to show the book and page in
which the instrument is recorded and a "brief
description of the property charged" by it. The
court found no kind of a description was given in the
indices except "see record for description." While
the court found that the deed was indexed in the
general indices, yet did not find that it was properly
indexed, or how it was indexed, or that it was
indexed as by the statute required, except the finding
that no description of the property was given.
Nevertheless it is now assumed that the book and
pages in which the deed was transcribed were given
or noted in the indices. As already indicated, if as
found by the court, the deed was indexed in the
general indices "at the same time" it was entered in
the entry or reception book, it was indexed before it
was transcribed on the record.
To uphold a
judgment, inferences or assumptions in support of it
are sometimes indulged. But they are not indulged
to throw down or reverse a judgment. That is
especially true in considering findings when
unassailed and unchallenged. In such view the
notation is of little, if of any, significance.
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In the next place, though in the general indices the
book and pages where the deed was transcribed
were noted, but without in any manner indicating or
even suggesting that the deed in any particular
affected the lands, the title to which was being
investigated, how would such a notation reasonably
or fairly put one examining the title on notice or
inquiry that the deed did or might affect such lands?
That but brings us back to the proposition that one
examining the record title to a particular parcel of
land or tract, finding on the indices a conveyance or
conveyances by those whose title is being
investigated of lands which, as disclosed by the
indices and by the abstract record, in no particular
pertain or relate to the lands the title of which is
being investigated, must, nevertheless, inspect such
instruments or conveyances and ascertain if they do
or do not affect such lands. I think he is not either
as matter of fact; nor especially as matter of law as
in the prevailing opinion held, required to do so.
Besides, the notation may as well lead the examiner
to the "abstract record" where the property of the
trust deed is so described as not to include or affect
lands in section 17 the title of which was being
investigated, and, finding such to be the fact, the
examiner may have considered it unnecessary to
look elsewhere. In view of that I am not as matter
of law prepared to say he was required to do so
whatever may be said of it as a matter of fact. The
holding that sufficient was made to appear on the
indices to constitute constructive notice of the
contents of the trust deed and that it affected the
lands in question, in effect, relieves the recorder of
legal liability and casts it on the abstract company
who failed to discover and report to those employing
it that the trust deed affected the lands and the title
thereto in controversy.
I think the judgment of the court below should be
affirmed.
ELIAS HANSEN, J.
I concur in the views expressed by Mr. Justice
STRAUP in his dissenting opinion.

Copyright (c) West Group 2001 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

767 P.2d 499, Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, (Utah 1988)
*499 767P.2d499
Supreme Court of Utah.
COTTONWOOD MALL COMPANY, Plaintiff,
Appellee, and Cross-Appellant,
v.
Wesley F. SINE, dba Cottonwood Bowling Lanes,
etal.,
Defendant, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee.
COTTONWOOD MALL COMPANY, a joint
venture, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Wesley F. SINE, dba Cottonwood Bowling Lanes,
Defendant and
Appellant.
Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, Inc., Intervenor.
Nos. 19839, 19861.
Nov. 17, 1988.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 25, 1989.
Lessor brought action to recover possession of
space occupied by lessee. The Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, J. Dennis Frederick, J., entered
judgment in favor of lessor and denied attorney fees
to lessor. Lessee appealed judgment in favor of
lessor and lessor appealed denial of attorney fees.
The Supreme Court, Howe, Associate C.J., held
that: (1) trial court properly declined to find or
make an agreement to renew a lease which had
terminated by its own terms at its expiration date
where commercial lessor and lessee had failed to
negotiate a renewal on their own, and (2) provision
in lease regarding attorney fees remained binding on
lessee deemed to have established a month-to-month
tenancy with lessor where no evidence as to
modification of the provision was presented.
Affirmed, and case remanded to determine amount
of fees and costs.
West Headnotes
[1] Joint Adventures <®=>8
224 —
224k6 Rights and Liabilities of Parties as to Third
Persons
224k8 Actions by or Against Third Persons.
Joint venture can bring suit in its common name
without the necessity of naming the joint venturers
as plaintiffs.
[2] Landlord and Tenant <@^=>81.5
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233 —
233IV Terms for Years
233IV(D) Extensions and Renewals
233k81.5 Nature of Right in General.
(Formerly 233k811/2)
Trial court properly declined to find or make an
agreement to renew a lease which had terminated by
its own terms at its expiration date in situation
where commercial lessor and lessee had failed to
negotiate a renewal on their own.
[3] Landlord and Tenant <@=>44(1)
233 —
233II Leases and Agreements in General
23311(B) Construction and Operation
233k44 Express Covenants in General
233k44(l) In General.
Proof of a holding over after the expiration of a
fixed term in a lease gives rise to the presumption,
which in the absence of contrary evidence will be
controlling, that the holdover tenant continues to be
bound by the covenants which were binding upon
him during the fixed term; this rule prevails even
though certain of the provisions in the expired lease
are changed.
[4] Landlord and Tenant <§==>285(9)
233 —
233IX Re-Entry and Recovery of Possession by
Landlord
233k279 Actions for Recovery of Possession
233k285 Jurisdiction and Proceedings
233k285(9) Costs.
In absence of evidence by either party that
provisions and conditions of written lease were
modified during month-to-month tenancy, except for
the increase in the amount of rent, provision in
written lease regarding attorney fees remained
binding on the parties until expiration of month-tomonth tenancy established as a result of lessee
holding over.
Raymond Scott Berry,
Cottonwood Mall Co.

Salt Lake City,

for

Jack L. Schoenhals, Salt Lake City, for Wesley F.
Sine.
Ronald C. Barker, Salt Lake City, for Cottonwood
Bowling Lanes.
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
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Plaintiff Cottonwood Mall Co., a joint venture,
brought this action to recover possession of space in
the Cottonwood Mall occupied by defendant Wesley
F. Sine and intervenor Cottonwood Bowling Lanes,
Inc., a corporation of which Sine is the president.
Defendant and intervenor (hereinafter defendant or
Sine) counterclaimed to enforce an alleged oral
agreement to renew the expired lease under which
the space was held. From a judgment in favor of
plaintiff, defendant appeals. Plaintiff cross-appeals
from the denial of an award *500 of attorney fees
incurred in recovering possession of the space.
On May 4, 1961, Sidney M. Horman, as lessor,
and S.W. Pugsley, as lessee, entered into a twentyyear lease of space in the Cottonwood Mall, a
shopping center in Salt Lake County, Utah, to be
used for bowling lanes.
In 1979, Sine was
contemplating the purchase of the outstanding stock
of Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, Inc., a corporation,
which operated the bowling lanes. The corporation
was controlled by Pugsley's son. Sine caused his
real estate agents to approach Horman and inquire as
to his willingness to renew the lease which was due
to expire on September 14, 1981. On at least two
occasions, Horman advised the agents that he would
be willing to renew the lease on reasonable terms,
but that he would not sign a new agreement until
closer to the time the lease expired. Allegedly based
on these representations, Sine purchased the
outstanding stock of the Cottonwood Bowling Lanes,
Inc., for $338,000, took an assignment of the lease,
and began to operate the bowling lanes.
Prior to expending money for improvements on his
newly acquired space, Sine again requested his
agents to inquire of Horman regarding renewal of
the lease. Horman allegedly assured the agents that
he would renew the lease on reasonable terms at or
about the time the present lease would expire. Sine
contends that he spent $10,000 to $20,000 to
improve and remodel the leased space, based on the
additional representation by Horman and his
reputation for being a man of his word. Horman's
interest in the lease was thereafter assigned to
plaintiff.
Prior to the expiration of the lease, plaintiff
notified defendant that the lease would expire by its
terms on September 14, 1981, and that defendant
would become a tenant on a month-to-month basis as
provided for in the lease. In October of 1981,
plaintiff increased the monthly rental substantially

Page 2
and shortly thereafter notified defendant that the
month-to-month tenancy was terminated and the
premises should be vacated by November 30, 1981.
Defendant did not vacate by that date, as the parties
were involved in negotiating a new lease. When
those efforts failed, plaintiff brought this action to
recover possession and its attorney fees thereby
incurred. Defendant counterclaimed, seeking to
enforce Horman's oral promise to renew upon
reasonable terms. Before trial, defendant vacated
and moved to other premises. The trial court denied
defendant any relief on its counterclaim and awarded
judgment to plaintiff for the reasonable rental value
of the leased space during the time that defendant
occupied it after the expiration of the written lease.
Plaintiff, however, was refused any attorney fees.
Defendant appeals, and plaintiff cross-appeals from
the judgment.
I
In its answer to plaintiff's complaint, defendant
asserted the defense of lack of standing of plaintiff,
a joint venture, to sue in die name of the joint
venture as indispensable parties plaintiff. It argued
that the individual members are the "real party in
interest" under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a).
The trial court denied a pretrial motion to dismiss
the complaint based on this defense. Utah Code
Ann. § 48-1-3.1 (1981, Supp.1987) defines a "joint
venture" as "an association of two or more persons
to carry on as co-owners of a single business
enterprise" and provides that the property and
transfer rights of joint ventures shall be governed by
the same statutes as general partnerships. Sections
48-1-1 through -40 contain Utah's adaptation of the
Uniform Partnership Act. Its provisions are silent
on whether a partnership may sue in its own name.
Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
states that a partnership may be sued in its common
name, but whether the partnership may sue is not
specified. We noted in Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d
758, 759 (Utah 1984), that whether a partnership is
empowered to sue in the partnership's name has not
been decided in this state.
Earlier in Wall
Investment Co. v. Garden Gate Distributing, Inc.,
593 P.2d 542 (Utah 1979), we held that a limited
partnership is a statutory creation and, having
characteristics somewhat similar to corporations,
could sue in *501 the courts of this state in its own
name without identifying its partners or making
them plaintiffs. We noted in that case that the
common law rule that partners were required to join
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as plaintiffs in actions to enforce partnership rights
has been criticized as a "useless relic of strict
procedural rules with nothing, apparently, to justify
its continued existence" and that the modern
tendency is to depart from it.
Recently, in Gary Energy Corp. v. Metro Oil
Products, 114 F.R.D. 69 (D.Utah 1987), Judge
Winder analyzed the issue under Utah law and
concluded that a joint venture can bring suit in its
common name without the necessity of naming the
joint venturers as plaintiffs. Noting our criticism in
Wall Investment Co. of the common law rule and the
tendency of courts to depart from it, Judge Winder
opined that this Court would, when faced squarely
with the issue, hold that joint venturers may sue in
the name of the joint venture. In that decision, he
also relied upon a recent opinion, Decker Coal Co.
v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 714 P.2d 155, 56
A.L.R.4th 1227 (Mont. 1986), which came to that
same conclusion after an analysis of Montana
statutes and rules of procedure. The court there
noted that there was no statute or rule of procedure
in Montana granting partnerships or joint ventures
the right to sue in their own names. Montana Rule
of Civil Procedure 17(b) states that the capacity of
persons to sue and be sued should be determined by
appropriate statutory provisions.
The court
therefore looked to provisions of the Uniform
Partnership Act, which has been adopted in
Montana. Section 8 of the Act (our section 48-1-5)
provides that partnerships may own property.
Section 9(3)(e) (our section 48-l-6(3)(e) speaks of
partnership "claim[sj." Another Montana statute
allows partnerships to be sued in their own names.
Finally, the court noted that partnerships are
authorized to file small claims actions.
In
commenting on the effect of the foregoing statutes,
the court stated:
[T]his Court has little choice but to follow the
clear intent of the Montana Legislature to treat
partnerships as distinct entities with power to sue.
It would be illogical and unfair to conclude that a
partnership may own a claim but cannot enforce it;
may own property but cannot protect it; may be
sued but cannot sue; may sue in small claims
court but not in Federal Court. The Montana
Legislature should not be deemed to have acted so
capriciously.
Decker Coal Co., 714 P.2d at 157. To the list of
examples given by the Montana court where the

Page 3
Uniform Partnership Act treats a partnership as an
entity, we add section 13 of the Act (which is our
section 48-1-10), making the partnership entity liable
for the negligence of one of the partners while
acting within the ordinary course of the business of
the partnership.
See Wayne-Oakland Bank v.
Adams' Rib, 48 Mich.App. 144, 210 N.W.2d 121
(1973) (where a partnership was held liable for a
partner's negligence even though the partner had
immunity under the law by reason of his parental
relation to the injured party).
[1] We agree with the analysis and reasoning of
Judge Winder in Gary Energy Corp. and with the
Montana Supreme Court in Decker Coal Co. and
hold that the trial court properly denied defendant's
motion to dismiss.
II
Defendant contends that the expressed affirmations
and promises of Horman and defendant's reliance
thereon either renewed the written lease or, in the
alternative, entitled defendant to a renewal of the
lease upon "reasonable terms."
In that event,
"reasonable terms" would be based on the written
lease, the only issues to be determined being the
amount of rent and the term of the renewed lease.
This contention is fully answered by Pingree v.
Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317
(Utah 1976). There, the lease granted the lessee the
option to renew the lease for two separate additional
five-year terms upon the same terms and conditions
of the original lease, except
*502 that the rental amount will be renegotiated;
however, maximum total monthly rental shall not
exceed $900 per month.
Factors of tax increase, costs of business
increases or decreases, business volume and
success, insurance costs and other reasonable
allowances, will be the basis for terms of
negotiation.
Pingree, 558 P.2d at 1320.
The lessee gave timely notice of his exercise of the
option to renew. The lessors responded that the new
rental would be $900 per month, basing their
demand on the increase in taxes and insurance and
what they considered to be a fair return on their
investment in the leased premises. The lessee
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replied and proposed $500-per-month rent based on
his increased costs of doing business and a decrease
in his volume. When the parties were unable to
agree on the rent for the renewal period, the lessor
brought an action to recover possession. The lessee
counterclaimed for enforcement of a five-year
renewal at $500 per month. The trial court found
that the parties had impliedly agreed on a reasonable
rental figure which the court determined and fixed at
$900 per month. On appeal, this Court reversed the
trial court, stating that it had nullified the express
factors specified by the parties in the lease and had
substituted a new agreement to which the parties had
not committed themselves. We held that the option
to renew was too vague and indefinite to be
enforceable and that the lease terminated at the end
of the original term. We cited with approval and
relied on Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362
P.2d 427, 428 (1961), where we stated, "[A]
condition precedent to the enforcement of any
contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of
the parties, which must be spelled out, either
expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness
to be enforced." In so ruling, this Court followed
what was termed the majority rule in Slayter v.
Pasley, 199 Or. 616, 264 P.2d 444 (1953), which
was stated to be
that a provision for the extension or renewal of a
lease must specify the time the lease is to extend
and the rate of rent to be paid with such a degree
of certainty and definiteness that nothing is left to
future determination. If it falls short of this
requirement, it is not enforceable.
Pingree, 558 P.2d at 1321. In reversing the trial
court, this Court expressly rejected its attempt to fix
a reasonable rent for the parties when their
negotiations bogged down.
[2] Defendant would have us now do what we
refused to do in Pingree. While it is true that
defendant adduced evidence as to what would be a
reasonable renewal term and what would be a
reasonable rent, the trial court properly spurned
defendant's invitation to find or make an agreement
where the parties had themselves failed. Defendant
argues that in Pingree, the court declined to fix the
renewal rent because of the difficulty in balancing
the several factors which the lease required the
parties to consider in fixing the rent. Here,
defendant's argument continues, no factors are listed
in the lease and the task is less complicated. We do
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not agree. In determining what is "reasonable rent,"
many factors must be weighed and put into the
equation. Business judgments must be made.
Horman testified that he would not negotiate a new
lease at the time Sine's real estate agents approached
him because of inflation and instability in the
commercial leasing market. He was unwilling to
enter into another lease, either long term or short
term, unless he could consider the costs of operating
and owning the building as they compared to the
amount of rent received. He only indicated that he
would be willing to enter into a new lease at a
reasonable figure and at the appropriate time. After
he sold his interest in the leased property to plaintiff,
plaintiff and defendant were unable to agree on the
amount of rent. Courts simply are not equipped to
make monetary decisions impacted by the fluctuating
commercial world and are even less prepared to
impose paternalistic agreements on litigants. We
therefore conclude that the written lease terminated
by its own terms at its expiration date, was not
renewed by the parties, and cannot be renewed for
them by the courts.
*503. Ill
Turning now to plaintiff's cross-appeal, namely,
that the trial court erred in denying it attorney fees,
plaintiff's claim for fee was premised on the
following provision in the 1961 written lease:
If, during the terms of this lease, lessor is required
to commence any action to collect any of the rental
due under this lease, or to enforce any of the
provisions herein, or to secure possession of the
leased premises in the event this lease is
terminated as herein provided, or at the expiration
of the term, lessee agrees, in such event or events,
to pay all costs of such action or actions, together
with reasonable attorney's fee.
The trial court denied fees "for the reason that the
lease agreement upon which plaintiff makes claim
for attorney's fees expired by its terms, and the
plaintiff terminated the lease agreement and treated
the lease agreement as though it had expired and
been terminated...."
[3][4] We do not agree with that conclusion. It is
true that the 1961 written lease was for a twentyyear term that expired on September 14, 1981;
however, paragraph 36 of that lease provided: "Any
holdover beyond the termination of this lease, and
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any acceptance of rental beyond the term of this
lease shall be deemed to have established a monthto-month tenancy as between lessor and lessee."
Nothing is there stated, however, regarding whether
the provisions and conditions of the written lease are
binding on the parties during the month-to-month
tenancy. It is a firmly established rule that proof of
a holding over after the expiration of a fixed term in
a lease gives rise to the presumption, which in the
absence of contrary evidence will be controlling,
that the holdover tenant continues to be bound by the
covenants which were binding upon him during the
fixed term. Annotation, Binding Effect on Tenant
Holding Over of Covenants in Expired Lease, 49
A.L.R.2d 480 (1956). It is further pointed out there
that this rule obtains even though certain of the
provisions in the expired lease are changed, such as,
for example, the provision as to the amount of rent
to be paid.
Applying those rules to the instant case, when the
twenty-year term of the 1961 written lease expired
on September 14, 1981, defendant held over on a
month-to-month basis and continued to be bound by
the provisions and conditions of the written lease
during that holdover period. The fact that on
October 12, 1981, plaintiff notified defendant that
the monthly rental was being increased from $2,150
per month to $4,500 per month did not affect the
binding force of the other provisions of the written

Page 5
lease. On October 23, 1981, plaintiff advised
defendant that it had elected to "nullify" the monthto-month tenancy and requested that defendant
vacate the premises by November 30, 1981. Since
there was no evidence by either party that the
provisions and conditions of the written lease were
modified during the month-to-month tenancy, except
for the increase in the amount of rent, the provision
in the 1961 lease regarding attorney fees remained
binding on the parties until the month-to-month
tenancy expired on November 30, 1981. At that
time, defendant had the duty to vacate, and when it
failed to do so, the provision for the payment of
attorney fees became operative. As will be noted,
that provision specifically covers actions by the
lessor to secure possession of the premises at the
expiration of the lessee's term, which under the rule
stated above includes the holdover period.
Consequently, the trial court erred in denying any
award of attorney fees to plaintiff.
The judgment is affirmed, and the case is
remanded to the trial court to determine and fix the
amount of attorney fees and trial and appeal costs to
which plaintiff is entitled under paragraph 33 of the
written lease.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, DURHAM and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
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court, and new parties are added, who enter their
appearance, the latter court does not lose jurisdiction
of the case by dismissing as to the only party in the
justice's court.

Supreme Court of Utah.
HAMNER
v.
B. K. BLOCH & CO.
April 2, 1898.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Where an appeal has been taken from a
justice's court to the district court, and new parties
are added, who enter their appearance, the latter
court does not lose jurisdiction of the case by
dismissing as to the only party in the justice's court.
2. When a judgment has been obtained against a
firm in the firm name, an execution against the
property of an individual member of the firm is
void, although an officer who executed it in good
faith might be protected from a suit for the tort.
3. It was competent for the plaintiff to offer in
evidence the judgment roll in the action against the
firm in order to prove that the judgment was against
the firm, and not against the party whose property
was seized upon a writ of execution issued on the
judgment.
Appeal from district court, Weber county; H. H.
Rolapp, Judge.

Partnership <@^220(2)
289 —
289IV Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons
289IV(D) Actions by or Against Firms or
Partners
289k220 Execution and Enforcement of
Judgment in General
289k220(2) Application of Individual Assets.
When a judgment has been obtained against a firm
in the firm name, an execution against the property
of an individual member of the firm is void.
Sheriffs and Constables <§=> 138(2)
353 —
353III Powers, Duties, and Liabilities
353kl26
Actions Against
Officers
and
Indemnitors
353kl38 Evidence
353kl38(2) Admissibility.
The judgment roll is admissible to prove that the
judgment was against a firm, and not against the
party individually whose property was seized upon a
writ of execution issued on the judgment.
John W. Judd, for appellant.
G. F. Boreman and Evans & Rogers,
respondent.

for

ZANE, C. J.
Action by John H. Hamner against Thomas H.
Ballantyne. By amendment, B. K. Bloch & Co., a
corporation, was made defendant, the action against
the other being, upon plaintiff's motion, dismissed.
Plaintiff had judgment, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
Justices of the Peace <S=> 141(2)
231 —
231V Review of Proceedings
231V(A) Appeal and Error
231kl41 Appellate Jurisdiction
231kl41(2)
Jurisdiction
Dependent
on
Jurisdiction of Lower Court in
General.
Where an appeal has been taken to the district

It appears from the evidence in this record that the
defendant obtained a judgment in the district court
against the firm of Blackburn & Co. for $366.28;
that an execution issued thereon, reciting a judgment
against the individual members of the partnership, of
which the plaintiff was one, as well as against the
company by its firm name; that Thomas H.
Ballantyne, a deputy United States marshal, by
virtue thereof seized and levied upon the $242.85 in
dispute, the individual property of the plaintiff,
Hamner, and paid it to the attorney of the defendant
B. K. Bloch; that the plaintiff instituted this action
against the officer for the trespass, before a justice
of the peace, who rendered judgment against him for
the amount so seized; that upon appeal to the district
court a similar judgment was rendered by it, and
upon appeal to this court it was reversed and
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remanded, because the writ was against the plaintiff
as well as the company, and was fair on its face,
and therefore protected him from damages in
consequence of the wrong. It further appears that
the complaint was amended by the plaintiff, by leave
of the district court, before another trial, by making
B. K. Block & Co., the plaintiff in the first suit,
defendant, and afterwards on the trial the suit was
dismissed, on motion of the plaintiff, as to
Ballantyne, and thereupon B. K. Bloch & Co., by
their counsel, entered a motion to dismiss the suit,
upon the ground that the voluntary dismissal as to
the only defendant in the justice's court deprived the
court of jurisdiction to try the case. Counsel for the
defendant concedes that the district court had
authority to grant the amendment, and admits the
new defendant voluntarily appeared, but insists that
the jurisdiction of the district court depended upon
the jurisdiction of the justice. This position would
have been correct had there been a want of
jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suit in the
justice's court. When the subject-matter of the suit
is not within the jurisdiction of the justice, it is not
within the jurisdiction of the district court on appeal.
The appellate court gets jurisdiction by appeal, and,
if the justice could have no jurisdiction of the
subject-matter, none could be given to the district
court by the appeal. Undoubtedly, the justice would
have had jurisdiction of B. K. Bloch & Co. had the
company been made defendant, and, as the justice's
court would have had jurisdiction in that case, the
appellate court had jurisdiction when the company
was brought in by the amendment, and appearance
was entered. The trial of the cause upon the appeal
was but a continuation of the litigation commenced
in the lower court.
The justice's court had
jurisdiction of the parties to the case before it, and
of its subject-matter, and the appeal gave the
appellate court jurisdiction of both, and it acquired
jurisdiction of B. K. Bloch & Co. by the amendment
and appearance, and the dismissal of the suit as
against Ballantyne did not deprive it of jurisdiction
of the case or of the party brought in.
With respect to another point raised, the plaintiff,
Hamner, and two other individuals, were associated
together and doing business by the common name of
Blackburn & Co., and the defendant, B. K. Bloch &
Co., sued them by that name, and by that name
obtained judgment against the firm.
But the
execution purported to be upon a judgment against
the individuals composing the firm as well. The
firm had a legal existence, and a *770 name by
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which it was capable of doing business and of being
sued, and to that extent it had, in law, a separate and
distinct existence from natural persons. In law there
were four persons; the one was artificial, and with a
more limited capacity. Section 3191, Comp. Laws
Utah 1888, subjects to suit and judgment such
artificial person, but the judgment binds only the
joint property of the natural persons associated
together under the common name. Levally v. Ellis,
13 Iowa, 544; Davidson v. Knox, 67 Cal. 143, 7
Pac. 413. The execution upon the judgment against
the firm, so far as it purported to be against the
individual property of its members, was absolutely
void; but it protected the officer who, in good faith,
executed it, but not the plaintiff who, in person or
by his attorney, caused it to be issued and delivered
to him. The levy did not pass the legal title to the
money seized to the officer. He could not have held
it, had suit been brought against him while it was in
his hands, without showing a judgment against the
person whose individual *771. property it was. But
the writ, being against the owner, though void, so
far as it could give any right to the money seized, its
command executed in good faith excused the
trespass or wrong or tort, as termed in law, as to the
officer, and protected him from the consequences of
the injury to the owner of the property, and from
damages to the owner resulting from that injury.
But the command of the writ did not protect B. K.
Block & Co., or their attorney, for wrongfully
causing the writ to issue, and for placing it in the
hands of the officer, and in that way causing the writ
to issue, and for placing it in the hands of the
officer, and in that way causing the plaintiff's
money to be seized, and for wrongfully taking the
proceeds of such levy. They did not act under the
writ, and it could not protect them for the part they
took in the trespass or tort. The law required them
to know the judgment was not against the owner of
the money, the plaintiff in this case, and therefore it
could not shield them from the consequences of the
unlawful act. Day v. Bach, 87 N. Y. 56; 9 Bac.
Abr. 494; Kerr v. Mount, 28 N. Y. 658; Foster v.
Wiley, 27 Mich. 244; Thomas v. Hinsdale, 78 111.
259; Cooley, Torts (2d Ed.) p. 148.
On the trial of this case the plaintiff offered in
evidence the judgment roll in the case of B. K.
Bloch & Co. against Blackburn & Co., showing a
complaint and judgment against the firm only, and
an execution thereon against the plaintiff and the
other two members of the firm, as well as against
the firm, and a return on the execution showing the
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levy on the money in question as the property of the
plaintiff, and the payment of it to the attorney of B.
K. Bloch & Co. The defendant objected to its
introduction on the ground that it was incompetent,
irrelevant, and immaterial.
It was sufficiently
authenticated, and it showed that the judgment was
against the firm, not against the plaintiff; an
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execution against the defendant, who was not a party
to the judgment; a seizure of his money, and the
payment of it to the attorney of the defendant in this
case.
It was clearly competent, relevant, and
material, and we are of the opinion that the court did
not err in overruling defendant's objection to it.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
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187N.W.2d47.
(Cite as: 187 N.W.2d 47)
Supreme Court of North Dakota.
Clifford P. HANSON, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
John ZOLLER and Martha Zoller, husband and wife
et al., Defendants,
and
James P. Zoller and Alice R. Zoller, husband and
wife et al., Defendants
andRespondents.
James P. ZOLLER and Alice R. Zoller, Third-Party
Plaintiffs,
and
Gate City Savings and Loan Association, a
corporation, Third-Party Plaintiffand
Appellant,
v.
NORTH DAKOTA GUARANTY & TITLE CO.,
Third-Party Defendant and Respondent.
Eugene V. BINDER and Gloria A. Binder, husband
and wife; and The DakotaNational
Bank of Bismarck, a corporation, Third-Party
Plaintiffs andAppellants,
v.
NORTH DAKOTA GUARANTY & TITLE CO.,
Third-Party Defendant and Respondent.
Civ. No. 8511.
April 20, 1971.
Rehearing Denied June 7, 1971.
Action to foreclose mortgage. The District Court
of Burleigh County, W. C. Lynch, J., rendered
judgment in favor of certain subsequent purchasers
and encumbrancers, and mortgagee appealed. The
Supreme Court, Adam Gefreh, District Judge, held
that it was duty of mortgagee to protect his interest
against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers by
making certain that the instrument conveying his
interest was properly recorded, that recordation did
not constitute substantial compliance to recording
statutes where the instrument was not indexed under
the correct tract description in the tract index, and
that subsequent purchasers and encombrancers could
only be charged with notice of instruments correctly
indexed in the tract index.
Affirmed.
Knudson and Paulson, JJ., dissented.

See also N.D., 174 N.W.2d 354.
West Headnotes
[1] Records <@=> 19
326kl9
In order for instrument to impart constructive notice
to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers, it is
not necessary that all sections of the statutes
pertaining to the duties of the register of deeds in
recording instruments be complied with, but there
must be substantial compliance with those sections
of the recording statutes that pertain to the matter of
notice. NDCC 11-18- 01, 11-18-07 to 11-18-12,
47-19-08, 47-19-19, 47-19-45.
[2] Records <@=>19
326kl9
In order for instrument to impart constructive notice
to the public it must actually be recorded;
instrument deposited with the register of deeds for
recording gives only temporary constructive notice
from the time of deposit until recording has been
completed, and after recording the actual record
made constitutes constructive notice.
NDCC
47-19-08, 47-19-19, 47-19-45.
[3] Records <@=>8
326k8
Since the tract index maintained by the register of
deeds is the only practical index through which
instruments on record can be located, instrument
recorded but not indexed under the correct tract
description in the tract index does not constitute
substantial compliance with the recording statutes.
NDCC 11-18- 01, 11-18-07 to 11-18-12, 47-19-08,
47-19-19, 47-19-45.
[4] Records <@=>8
326k8
Prospective purchaser or encumbrancer has right to
presume that register of deeds has performed his
duties correctly and has indexed every instrument
correcdy in the tract index. NDCC 11-18-07,
47-19-08, 47-19-19, 47-19-45.
[5] Records <®=>8
326k8
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Prospective purchaser or encumbrancer can only be
charged with notice of instruments that are indexed
in the tract index, and so far as constructive notice is
concerned is not obliged to consult the grantorgrantee indexes or the reception book beyond the
extent of determining whether there are any
unrecorded instruments in the hands of the register
of deeds that may not yet have been recorded and
indexed. NDCC 11-18-07, 11-18-08, 11-18-10,
47-19-08, 474949, 474945.

compliance with those sections of the recording
statutes that pertain to the matter of notice,
3 The tract index maintained by the register of
deeds, which index readily discloses all conveyances
pertaining to any specific tract of real estate, is the
only practical index through which instruments on
record can be located.

[6] Principal and Agent <©=> 177(1)
308kl77(l)

4. An instrument recorded but not indexed under
the correct tract description in the tract index does
not constitute substantial compliance with the
recording statutes.

Relationship between abstracter and persons that
come into possession of abstract prepared by
abstracter is not agency type of relationship so as to
impute knowledge of the abstracter to such persons.

5. A prospective purchaser or encumbrancer has a
right to assume that the register of deeds has
performed his duties correctly and has indexed every
instrument correctly in the tract index.

[7] Principal and Agent <®» 177(1)
308kl77(l)

6. A prospective purchaser or encumbrancer can
only be charged with notice of instruments that are
indexed in the tract index, and any information
appearing in the grantor-grantee indexes or in the
reception book is not sufficient to put a prospective
purchaser or encumbrancer upon inquiry.

In absence of evidence to support principal-agency
relationship between purchasers and encumbrancers
of property and the abstracter, any knowledge
acquired by employees of the abstracter during the
course of their employment was not imputable to
such purchasers and encumbrancers because of their
possession of the abstract.
[8] Vendor and Purchaser <®=>231(17)
400k231(17)
Mortgagee had duty to protect his interest against
subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers by making
certain that the instrument conveying his interest
was properly recorded and, therefore, as between
him and subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers,
the consequences of the failure of the register of
deeds to correctly record or index such instrument
fell upon such mortgagee.
*48 Syllabus by the Court
I
An instrument deposited with the
deeds for recording gives only
constructive notice from the time *49
until recording has been completed,
recording the actual record made
constructive notice.

register of
temporary
of deposit
and after
constitutes

2. In order for an instrument to impart constructive
notice to third persons there must be substantial

7. The relationship between an abstracter and
persons who come into possession of an abstract
prepared by an abstracter is not an agency type
relationship so as to impute knowledge of the
abstracter to persons who come into possession of
abstracts prepared by the abstracter.
8.
Iii the absence of evidence to support a
principal-agency relationship between persons in
possession of an abstract and the abstracter, any
knowledge acquired by the employees of the
abstracting firm during the course of their
employment is not imputable to the persons in
possession of the abstract.
9. The beneficiary of any interest in any real estate
conveyance has a duty to protect his interest against
subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers by making
certain that the instrument conveying his interest is
properly recorded and, therefore, as between the
beneficiary of the interest and subsequent purchasers
and encumbrancers, the consequences of the failure
of the register of deeds to correcdy record or index
an instrument falls upon the person who had the duty
to record.
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Vogel, Bair & Graff, Mandan, for plaintiff and
appellant.
Conmy, Conmy, Rosenberg & Lucas, Bismarck,
for Gate City Savings and Loan Association, a
corporation, third-party plaintiff and appellant, and
for James P. Zoller and Alice R. Zoller, third-party
plaintiffs.
Frederick E. Saefke, Jr., Bismarck, for Eugene V.
Binder and Gloria A. Binder, husband and wife, and
The Dakota National Bank of Bismarck, a
corporation, third-party plaintiffs and appellants.
Thompson, Lundberg & Nodland, Bismau
Paul M. Breene, defendant and respondent.
H. G. Ruemmele, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Grand
Forks, for State of North Dakota, defendant and
respondent.
Zuger, Bucklin, Kelsch & Zuger, Bismarck, for
North Dakota Guaranty & Title Co., third-party
defendant and respondent.
ADAM GEFREH, District Judge.
In this action the plaint in ^:ck< ?r< i-reciose .>.
certain mortgage given by K)hn /<-u:- ,md M;inh.t
Zoller, husband and wife, pertaining to the South
Half of the Northeast Quarter (s 1/2 NEl/4) of
Section Twenty-six (26), Township One Hundred
Thirty-nine (139), Range Eighty (80), Burleigh
County, North Dakota, and other land not involved
in this action.
*50 In addition to John Zoller and Martha Zoller,
other subsequent purchasers, encumbrancers and
lienholders were made defendants to the foreclosure
action.
The defendants, James P. Zoller and Alice R.
Zoller, husband and wife; Eugene V. Binder and
Gloria A. Binder, husband and wife; Paul M.
Breene and the State of North Dakota, are
purchasers subsequent to the mortgage in question,
and The Dakota National Bank of Bismarck, and
Gate City Savings and Loan Association, are holders
of mortgages subsequent to the plaintiff's mortgage.
Defendants James P. and Alice R. Zoller, and Gate
City Savings and Loan Association; Eugene V. and
Gloria A. Binder and The Dakota National Bank of

Bismarck, as third-party plaintiffs in separate actions
impleaded The North Dakota Guaranty and Title
Company as third-party defendant.
In the District Court, judgment was granted in
favor of the plaintiff as against John and Martha
Zoller, the Credit Bureau, Inc., of Bismarck, Max
D
Rosenberg, trustee of State Acceptance
Corporation, a bankrupt, and Atlas, Inc., who did
not answer the complaint and were in default, and in
favor of all the named defendants and against the
plaintiff. Since judgment was granted in favor of
defendants and third-party plaintiffs in the
foreclosure action, the third-party complaint against
The North Dakota Guaranty and Title Company was
dismissed. After the plaintiff, Clifford P. Hanson,
had filed his notice of appeal the defendants and
third-party plaintiffs filed appeals from the orders
dismissing their third-party complaints against the
third-party defendant. All the parties demanded a
Trial De Novo in the Supreme Court.
The mortgage being foreclosed is dated May 16,
1962, and was filed for record in the office of the
Register of Deeds of Burleigh County, North
Dakota, on March 6, 1963, at 10:30 A M., and was
subsequently recorded in Book 358 of Mortgages on
Page 108.
The record shows that in July of 1964, John Zoller
and Martha Zoller, the mortgagors, caused part of
the land described in the mortgage to be subdivided
into Tracts A, B, and C, and other parcels which
subdivision plat was filed on November 5, 1964, in
Plat File Z with the Register of Deeds. Subsequent
to the date and recording of plaintiff's mortgage,
James P. and Alice R. Zoller acquired title to Tract
A, Eugene V. and Gloria Binder acquired title to
Tract B, and Paul M. Breene acquired title to Tract
C and also other lands, all by warranty deeds from
John and Martha Zoller. Thereafter, James P. and
Alice R. Zoller mortgaged their tract to Gate City
Savings and Loan Association, and Eugene V. and
Gloria A. Binder mortgaged their tract to The
Dakota National Bank of Bismarck, which
mortgages were filed for record subsequent to the
recording of the plaintiff's mortgage.
Additionally, the State of North Dakota acquired by
condemnation part of the property in the South Half
oi the Northeast Quarter (Sl/2 NEl.~n oi Sc,:\o\.
'\\w\vv--.i\
(26), described in ?r;-:,.:;ir.*": -
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mortgage subsequent to the recording of plaintiff's
mortgage.
The record further shows that abstracts of title were
obtained from the North Dakota Guaranty and Title
Company for Tracts A, B, and C, and the State of
North Dakota and obtained a Title Certificate from a
title insurance company. The abstracts of title
pertaining to Tracts A, B, and C, did not show the
mortgage from John and Martha Zoller to the
plaintiff. The Title Insurance Certificate to the State
of North Dakota also did not make reference to the
plaintiff's mortgage. It is undisputed that all of the
defendants named had no actual knowledge of the
existence of plaintiff's mortgage from John and
Martha Zoller
At the trial of the action, James Horner and
Mildred Benesh, employees of the North Dakota
Guaranty and Title Company, the firm that prepared
the abstracts *51 to Tracts A, B, and C, testified
that the abstracts they prepared were prepared from
the information derived from the tract index
pertaining to the land in question and at the time the
abstracts were prepared plaintiff's mortgage was not
indexed under the South Half of the Northeast
Quarter (Sl/2 NE1/4) of Section Twenty-six (26),
Township One Hundred Thirty-nine (139), Range
Eighty (80). James Horner, further testified that
sometime during September of 1966, he found the
plaintiff's mortgage indexed in the tract index
against either the northwest or southwest quarter of
the northwest quarter. Mildred Benesh, also testified
that on March 29, 1967, when she prepared the
abstract of title for plaintiff pertaining to land
embraced in his mortgage, the tract index showed
the mortgage indexed against the South Half of the
Northeast Quarter of Section 26, but subsequent to
March 29, 1967, when she had an occasion to check
the grantor-grantee and grantee-grantor indexes they
still showed the property indexed as part of the
Northwest Quarter. During the course of the trial
all of the records from the register of deeds office,
the reception book, tract index, grantor and grantee
indexes and Page 108 of Book 358 of Mortgages
were introduced as evidence.
The District Court, upon conclusion of the trial,
found that the Hanson mortgage was originally
indexed insofar as the property in question was
r
concerned as >as
the Northwest Quarter of
Section 26, rathei r-av- me Northeast Quarter; that
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alterations in the records in the register of deeds
office wer made subsequent to the recording of the
conveyances to the defendants, and held that the
recording of the plaintiff's mortgage in the manner it
was recorded did not comply with our recording
statute and therefore it did not constitute constructive
notice to third persons, and that the defendants were
purchasers or encumbrancers for value without any
notice, actual or constructive.
An examination of Page 108 of Book 358 of
Mortgages, being Defendant's Exhibit 'V--1,' shows
that when the mortgage was copied the portion
pertaining to the description in question read: 'The
South one-half of the North one- quarter of Section
26, Township 139, Range 80 County of Burleigh,
State of North Dakota.' A correction with different
type was made by inserting the word 'east' below
the word 'one' in the phrase 'North one-quarter.' In
the original instrument which was introduced in
evidence, a similar correction appears, but the
correction is made in ink and the word 'east' is
above the 'one' in the "North one-quarter' phrase.
Defendant's Exhibit "I J', being a photocopy of the
reception book page on which the mortgage
instrument was entered shows under the description
of the property other descriptions and 'Part of Sec.
26-139—80."
Preceding the quoted, description
appeared an abbreviated description that has been
crossed out and is not legible.
Defendant's Exhibits 'R--1' 'R--2', the original
pages from the Granto Index to Mortgages, shows
the entry with a description in reference to the
description of the property in question as appearing
to read 'sl/2 N1/4-26- 139-80' with the first part
being not very legible.
Defendant's Exhibits 'S—1 and 'S—2', are pages
from the Grantee Book to Mortgages which contain
the entry in question. Again the description is
difficult to make out and the only part of the
description that is legible is 'S 1/2 26-139-80'.
The writing after S l / 2 has been written over and
apparently is intended to read 'Sl/2 NE1/4', but
unless one knows that this is what is meant he would
not be able to read it easily as such.
Defendant's Exhib- 1 . :> Uie pasje :aken :oir ;he
Tract Index 'Ah;., h contains the eiiir fii -...-r \- *.
The instrumern n question appears :iue>.t\.' .Ms:
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the SW and SE quarter of the NE1/4, but there also
appear erasures in the SW and SE quarters of the
NW1/4 of Section 26.
These records clearly show that alterations in the
records were made at some *52 time, and that some
of the altered descriptions are not legible now.
We have examined all of the exhibits relevant to the
issues and have reviewed the transcript of the
testimony adduced at the trial and agree with the
finding of the trial court, that the original records in
the office of the register of deeds incorrectly
described the property in question, in the reception
book, tract index, grantor and grantee indexes, and
that certain corrections and alterations were
subsequently made, and that these correctins and
alterations were made subsequent to the conveyances
of the defendants in this action.
The trial court concluded that proper indexing is an
essential part of the recording process and unless the
indexes correctly reflect the existence and contents
of an instrument, the instrument will not impart
constructive notice to subsequent purchasers and
encumbrancers.
The issues presented in this appeal as they relate to
the action between the plaintiff and defendants are:
(1) Does an instrument that is errooneously indexed
under the wrong description in the tract index
constitute constructive notice of its execution and
contents
to
subsequent
purchasers
and
encumbrancers?
(2) Does a prospective purchaser or encumbrancer
ordinarily have a duty to consult the reception book,
grantor and grantee indexes, that if consulted would
contain sufficient information to put a prudent
person upon inquiry?
(3) If both questions are answered in the negative,
should the consequence of the failure of the register
of deeds to correctly index the mortgage in the tract
index fall upon the plaintiff or the defendant?
The plaintiff argues that his mortgage was deposited
with the register of deeds for recording and that the
mortgage was subsequently accurately copied in the
book of mortgages, and therefore pursuant to
Sections 47-19-45, 47-19-08 and 47-19-19 of the

N. D.C. C. this constituted constructive notice to
subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers.
The sections referred to read as follows:
The depositing with the proper officer for record
of any instrument shall be constructive notice of
the execution of such instrument to all purchasers
and encumbrances subsequent to such depositing,
if such instrument is subsequently recorded. All
instruments entitled to record, the record of all
instruments, or a duly certified copy of such
record, shall be admissible in evidence in all the
courts of this state and may be read in evidence in
all of the courts of this state without further proof.
Sec. 47--19--45, N.D.C.C.
An instrument is deemed to be recorded when,
whether entitled to record or not, it is deposited
with the proper officer for record, if such
instrument is subsequently recorded.
Sec. 47 19-08, N.D.C.C
The record of any instrument shall be notice of the
contents of the instrument, as it appears of record,
as to all persons.
Sec 47-19-19, N D.C.C
The plaintiff further contends that an instrument is
recorded within the meaning of these sections quoted
when it is transcribed in the proper book in the
register of deeds' office.
The defendants argue that an instrument cannot be
deemed recorded so as to constitute constructive
notice to third persons until all the steps required by
the statutes pertaining to the register of deeds have
been completed, and that would include correct
indexing in the tract index book.
*53 The following sections pertain to the duties of
the register of deeds:
The register of deeds shall:
1. Keep a full and true record, in proper books
provided for that purpose, of each patent, deed,
mortgage, bill of sale, security agreement,
judgment, decree, lien, certificate of sale, and
other instrument required to be filed or admitted to
record, if the person offering such instrument for
filing or recording shall first pa> to him the fees
provided by law for such filing or recording;
2. Endorse upon each instrument filed with him
for record or otherwise the date and the hour and
minute of the day of such filing;
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3. Endorse upon each instrument, when the same
is recorded, in addition to the data specified in
subsection 2 of this section, the number or letter
designating the book of records in which the
record of the instrument is made and the page
upon which it is recorded;
4. When the instrument is recorded, endorse
thereon, In a note at the foot of the recorded
instrument, the date and the hour and minute of
the date when it was filed with him and the book
of records in which the record thereof is made and
the page upon which it is recorded; * * *
Sec. 11-18-01, N.D.C.C.
The register of deeds shall keep a separate tract
index of the deeds, contracts, and other instruments
which are not merely liens and a separate tract index
of the mortgages and other liens effecting or relating
to the title to real property. Such indexes shall be in
substantially the following forms: * * * (Forms
omitted)
Sec, I'
The register of deeds shall keep separate grantor
and grantee indexes of the deeds, contracts, and
other instruments not merely liens and separate
grantor and grantee indexes of the mortgages and
other instruments which are liens affecting or
relating to the title to real property. Such indexes
shall show:
1. The names of the grantors and of the grantees;
2. The dates of the several instruments filed for
record;
3. The dates upon whu.li llir several uisinniiciii1are filed; and
I The descriptions of real property affected by
such instruments.
Sec. 11-18-08, N.D.C.C.
The register of deeds, when any deed, patent,
mortgage, receiver's receipt, contract, notice of lis
pendens, copy of decree, or other instrument
affecting the title to, or creating a lien upon, any
real estate within his county is filed in his office,
shall write or stamp thereon immediately a
document number.
Document numbers shall
commence with the number one in each county
and shall follow consecutively in the order of filing
of the various documents. Priority of the document
number on an instrument shall be prima facie
evidence of the priority of the filing thereof.
When the register of deeds receives by mail or
other like enclosure more than one instrument at a
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time he shall affix document numbers thereon in
the order in which such instruments actually come
to his hand on opening such enclosure save that
when more than one instrument is recorded from
the same source at the same time, he may follow
such directions, if any, as the sender may give in
such numbering.
Sec. 11-18-09, N.D.C.C.
The register of deeds shall keep a book known as
'The Reception Book.' *54 Such book shall be
ruled in parallel columns showing:
1. In the first column at the left side of the page,
the document number;
2. In the second column, the date of filing;
3. In the third column, the name of the grantor;
4. In the fourth column, the name of the grantee;
5. In the fifth column, the character of the
instrument;
6. In the sixth column, the book in which and
page upon which the instrument is recorded;
7. In the seventh column, the name of the person
to whom the instrument was delivered; and
8. In the eighth column, a brief description of the
property, if any, described in the instrument.
Immediately after any document or paper of a kind
mentioned in sectin 1 1 - 18-09 is numbered, it
shall be entered in the reception book. The
reception book shall be part of the public records
of the office and open to public inspection during
office hours.
Sec. 11-18-10, N.D.C.C.
When an instrument affecting the title to or
creating a lien upon real estate within the county is
numbered and entered in the reception book and
indexed, it shall be recorded or filed as provided
by law. The register of deeds shall write or
stamp, or cause to be written or stamped, at the
beginning of a recorded instrument the words
'document number' and shall add thereto the
number stamped or written on the document. He
shall add, immediately after the record of such
instrument, a certificate reciting that the
instrument was filed in his office and giving the
date and hour of filing. He shall authenticate the
certificate with his official signature, but he need
not affix his official seal thereto.
Sec. 11-18-11, N.D.C.C.
The affixing of the signature of the register of
deeds to a recorded instrument shall complete the
record thereof.
Any person who thereafter
willfully erases, adds to, interlines, mutilates,
conceals, destroys, or in any manner changes the

Copr. © West 2001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt, Works
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

187 N.W.2d 47.
(Cite as: 187 N.W.2d 47, *54)
record is guilty of a felony and shall be punished
by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less
than one year nor more than five years, and, if an
officer, in addition thereto, shall forfeit his office.
Sec: 11 18-12, N.D.C.C.
[1] Ilie defendants, accordingly argue that an
instrument deposited with the register of deeds does
not impart constructive notice to subsequent
purchasers and encumbrancers until all of the steps
required by the register of deeds in recording
instruments have been complied with. We do not
believe that all of the sections pertaining to the
duties of the register of deeds in recording
instruments have to be complied with in order for an
instrument to impart constructive notice to
subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers.
We
believe only those sections or steps that pertain to
the aspect of notice must be substantially complied
with.
The fundamental purpose of the recording statutes
is to protect potential purchasers of real property
against the risk that they may be paying out good
money to someone who does not actually own the
property that he is purporting to sell. The recording
acts operate by making the history of the title
involved in a real estate transaction readily available
to a prospective purchaser, and by providing that the
history so disclosed by the record is binding upon a
prospective purchaser whether he consults the record
or not.
At the time North Dakota adopted its recording
acts, many states were still *55 utilizing only
grantor-grantee indexes as the chief aids in title
search. This is a cumbersome way of digging out
the history of the title to a given tract of land.
Our recording acts date back to the territorial code
of 1877, which in turn were adopted from the
California Civil Code of 1875. Several of the
midwestern and western states adopted similar
statutes patterned after the California statutes.
The territorial code of 1877 provided for a more
modern recording procedure and provided for a
numerical tract index in lieu of the grantor-grantee
index
Chapter 21, Counties and County Officers, Sec. 58,
Rev ..Code Dakota 1877, reads as follows:
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The registers of deeds shall prepare from the
records of their offices respectively, and shall
hereafter keep a numerical index of the deeds,
mortgages, and other instruments of record in their
respective offices affecting or relating to the title
to real property, in lieu of the indexes by names of
grantors and grantees, as now kept.
Apparently it was the intention of the Territorial
Legislature to only require the register of deeds to
keep a tract index. However, for whatever the
reason may have been, the provision for also
requiring grantor-grantee indexes was added in
1887, and both provisions became a part of our law
from the time of statehood. Since the original
adoption of these recording acts by the several
states, all have undergone some changes in order to
make them more applicable to the specific needs of
each state.
Although this court over the years has had to
interpret several sections of our recordings laws, the
precise question that is now before us as to what
constitutes sufficient compliance with the recording
statutes so as to give constructive notice has never
been decided.
We believe, however, that some of our prior
decisions are relevant to the issue before us and do
provide a direction in what we believe to be the
correct interpretation of our recording statutes
[2] This court in Northwestern Improvement
Company v. Norris, 74 N.W.2d 497, answered the
argument that the mere depositing of an instrument
with the register of deeds for recording would
thereafter constitute notice to subsequent purchasers,
by holding that Section 47-19-08 and Section
47—19-45, quoted earlier, must be construed
together, and stated:
Their proper construction is that an instrument
gives only temporary constructive notice of its
contents when deposited in the office of the
register of deeds and that when the instrument is
recorded the record for purposes of constructive
notice relates back to the date of deposit and as of
that time is constructive notice of the contents
actually and correctly recorded.
The same principal was reaffirmed in Northern
Pacific Railway Co., v Advance Realty, 78
N.W.2d705.
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There can no longer be any doubt that in order for
an instrument to impart constructive notice to the
public it must actually be recorded in the books
required to be kept by the register of deeds. Must an
instrument be also indexed?

P. } - \ \ .1WM. Rice v. Taylor, 220 Cal. 629, 32
P.2d 381 (1934); Fleck v. Iowa Employment
Security Commission, 233 Iowa 67, 8 N.W.2d 703
(1943), and other cases found in the Annotation in
63 A.I R 1057,

[3] The existence of a tract index, which not only
makes all instruments equally accessible to
reasonable search, but which has its primary focus
upon tracts of land rather than upon grantors and
grantees, makes the concept of 'chain of title' as
developed in relation to the old grantor and grantee
type index inapplicable. The fact that in our state we
have developed a recording system by counties, and
which consequently results in many thousands of
instruments being recorded annually in some
counties, makes it totally impractical for anyone to
make a title search by means of grantor-grantee
indexes.

We have also noted cases that are holding contrary
to the cases cited above, such as Deming v. Miles,
35 Neb. 739, 53 N.W. 665 (1892); Crook v.
Chilvers, 99 Neb. 684, 157 N.W. 617 (1916), and
Boyer v. Pahvant Mercantile & Investment Co., 76
Utah 1, 287 P. 188 (1930). However, in analyzing
these cases we are inclined to believe that the rule or
principle that they asserted was more applicable to
the old grantor-grantee type recording systems than
to the tract index system that we have in our state.

*56 In our state, today, the tract index is the only
practical index through which instruments on record
can be located. It would be a prohibitive burden to
locate instruments on record without a tract index.
It would certainly be a travesty of justice to hold that
prospective purchasers are bound by the record, if
for all practical purposes the record cannot be
located.
rhe practice today by abstracters, attorneys, and
others making title searches is to use the tract index
rather than by the old means of the grantor-grantee
indexes. Although the register of deeds still has to
keep all the indexes, the grantor-grantee index is
actually a carry over from the old system, and is
only an additional tool available to title searchers for
other purposes.
Under the tract index system the title is traced by
searching the tract index for instruments pertaining
to the tract to be searched. The names of the grantor
and grantee are not material to this search.
We have considered several decisions from other
jurisdictions that appear to have recording statutes
similai to ours and which have held that an
instrument will not give constructive notice of its
contents unless it has been recorded in substantial
compliance with their recording statutes, and that
failure to properly index an instrument does not
constitute substantial compliance with the recording
statutes. See Ritchie v. Griffiths, 1 Wash. 429, 25

After considering all the statutes and all of the
authorities cited in this opinion, and considering the
practice in use by lawyers, lending agencies and
abstracters, we conclude that a prospective
purchaser cannot be deemed to have constructive
notice of instruments that are not indexed in the tract
index under the specific tract of real estate to which
they pertain. We conclude that there must be
substantial compliance with those sections of the
recording laws that pertain to the matter of notice in
order to give constructive notice. Failure to index
an instrument in the tract index does not constitute
such compliance.
The appellant also argues that if the error by the
register of deeds in indexing the instrument under
the wrong description deprives the instrument of
giving constructive notice, the entries in the
reception book, and in the grantor-grantee index
books, would constitute sufficient notice to put a
prudent person upon inquiry. The plain fact is that
the reception book and grantor and grantee indexes
only serve very limited purposes. The reception
book would only be consulted for the purpose of
determining whether thre are any instruments on
deposit with the register of deeds that have not yet
been fully recorded, or to determine priorities
between instruments if priority becomes an issue.
[4] Under the statute and oui holdings in
Northwestern Improvement Co \ Norris, Supra,
the actual instrument deposited with the register of
deeds accords constructive notice of its execution
only from the time of its deposit until the recording
has been completed. After recording, the actual
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record made constitutes constructive notice. The
reception book, therefore, is primarily being
consulted by a title searcher for the limited purpose
of determining whether there are any unrecorded
instruments in the hands of the register of deeds.
The tract *57 index which contains a record of every
instrument that has ever been filed pertaining to any
tract of land in the county is the composite index
that directs a title searcher to all the instruments on
record that affect each specific tract of land. A
prospective purchaser or encumbrancer searching
the records has a right to assume that the register of
deeds has performed his duties correctly and has
indexed every instrument correctly in the tract
index. The ordinary prudent person searching the
record to determine the title status to a specific tract
of land would have no need to consult the grantorgrantee indexes, because the tract index discloses the
names of the grantors and grantees of the
instruments that pertain to a certain tract of land
We see no material difference between the principle
of substantial compliance with the recording sections
pertaining to notice to constitute constructive notice,
and the principle of sufficient information in the
records to cause or require a person to make inquiry
so as to be considered having actual notice of the
instruments on record. The same standard should
apply, since it is immaterial whether a subsequent
purchaser looks at the record or not, he is bound by
the record which he has a duty to search, and if such
record is such that a person searching it should find
the instrument, then the record is also such that it
uill give constructive notice.
Statutes should
receive a reasonable interpretation that is consonant
with what the actual practice is among those to
whom the statute has application.
C5J We therefore conclude that under our modern
practice of recording real estate transactions, there is
no duty upon a prospective purchaser in so far as
constructive notice is concerned to consult the
grantorgrantee indexes or the reception book beyond
the extent of determining whether there are any
unrecorded instruments in the hands of the register
of deeds that may not yet have been recorded and
indexed.
To require a person to check the
grantorgrantee indexes and go through the entire
reception book to determine whether all the
instruments on record have been properly recorded
and indexed would be to completely nullify the use
of the tract index which is the modern tool used by
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anyone making a title search. Therefore, the
defendants cannot be charged with information that
may have been obtained from consulting the
reception book or grantorgrantee indexes.
The plaintiff also contends that the abstracter had
knowledge of the erroneous indexing within a couple
of months after the mortgage was recorded, which
knowledge of the abstracter must be imputed to the
defendants, and therefore they cannot be considered
encumbrancers without notice.
[6] [7] We can not agree with this contention. The
relationship between an abstracter and persons who
come into possession of an abstract prepared by an
abstracter is not an agency type relationship. The
liability of an abstracter is contractual in nature, in
addition to the statutory liability imposed upon him.
There is no evidence in this case to support a
principal- agency relationship, and consequently any
knowledge that employees of the abstracting firm
may have acquired during the course of their work
is not imputable to the defendants in this case.
Having concluded that appellants"" mortgage as
recorded did not give constructive notice, or any
other notice of the execution of the instrument to the
defendants, upon whom should the consequences of
the failure of the register of deeds to properly index
the instrument fall?
[8] In Northwestern Improvement Co, \ Nonis,
Supra, this court held that it was the duty of the
grantor in a conveyance to protect his interest
against any subsequent purchaser in good faith by
making certain that the reservation and exception of
minerals therein was properly recorded. The
holding in effect is that the beneficiary of any
interest in any real estate conveyance has a duty to
protect his interest *58 against subsequent
purchasers by making certain that the instrument
conveying his interest is properly recorded, because
he is the only person that by exercising some
diligence can discover errors in the recording which
a subsequent purchaser even by the exercise of the
greatest diligence could not possibly do.
It is well recognized that every major lending
agency operating in the state today will require an
abstract of title continued to include all the
instruments necessary to give it good title to the
interest conveyed before it will release any money.
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:*.u. the appellant followed this well established
practice he would have promptly discovered :w
error of i:he register of deeds and could, have h*i w
'•or reeled.
Plaintiff has cited Atlas Lumber Company v.
Canadian-American Mortgage and Trust Company,
36 N.D 39, 161 N.W. 604, in support of his
contention that errors of the register of deeds should
not be visited upon the persons leaving an
instrument for recording. The facts in the present:
case are materially different from the facts in, that
case. In that case the clerk, of court, erroneously
showed the wrong lien as having been satisfied,,
There was no question but that the lien so
erroneously satisfied had been properly filed and
recorded. The principle of law stated in that case
has no application to the case under consideration.
The facts in Northwestern Improvement Co. \ •
Norris, Supra, are more analogous to the present
case and the principle established in that case has
application here. The principle is fully in accord
with the general principle of law which, appears to
prevail in the majority of jurisdictions and stated in
Section 64, Vol 1, Patton on Titles, P. 218:
However, the majority rule is that, except as the
existence of error is apparent on the face of the
record, a subsequent purchaser is bound by what
appears upon,, the record, only, regardless of the
contents of the original, instrument. This rule
places the loss upon the beneficiary in the
instrument in the transcribing of which the error
was made. As between him and, the subsequent
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See aisi. :x. . i-*, Records and Recording Laws,
t> Am.Jur. P. 485, and for a fairly recent holding
to the same effect, see, Commonwealth oi Pa to
Use of Orris v. Roberts, 3l>2 P- " ~
393, 71, A.L.R.2d 1,1,24
For the reasons stated we affirm the decision of the
trial court and the judgments entered by the trial
court..
Since AL -:<i\' airiimec ::.L.
ww».. .a the
principal action the issues raised ;n ihe appeal
between the third party plaintiffs o d ' •: ! party
defendant have hernmr miv\t

TEIGEN ;
concur.

.. ,d v. ~v KhLSCH. district Judge,

KNUDSONMndPAULSO^ IT div.rni
•
S;-RIT/.. i J. and RALPH J.
ERICKSTAD :i deeming themselves disqualified
did not participate; ADAM GEFREH, District Judge
of the Third Judicial District, and C. F. KELSCH,
District Judge of the Sixth Judicial District, sitting in
their stead.
A:-VIN
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92 B.R. 501
(Cite as: 92 B.R. 501)
United States Bankruptcy Court,
D. Utah.
In re GRANADA, INC., Debtor.
Peter W. BILLINGS, Jr., Trustee, Plaintiff,
v.
CINNAMON RIDGE, LTD., a Utah Limited
Partnership, Defendant.
Civ. No. 87PC-0812.
Bankruptcy No. 87C-00693.
Oct. 28, 1988.
Chapter 11 trustee brought action to quiet title in
real property.
The Bankruptcy Court, Glen E.
Clark, Chief Judge, held that under Utah law,
Chapter 11 trustee took title to real property free of
any unrecorded equitable interest in property of
limited partnership for which debtor was general
partner, where debtor was record fee title holder on
petition date, and no representative or fiduciary
capacity was indicated on title.
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[3] Bankruptcy <@==>2543
51k2543
Real property in which debtor held legal but not
equitable interest was property of the estate, such
that trustee could obtain title to property through
"strong-arm" provision of Bankruptcy Code.
Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 541, 544.
*501 Peter W. Billings, Jr., pro se.
Gary E. Jubber, Fabian & Clendenin, Salt Lake
City, Utah, for plaintiff.
N. George Daines, Daines & Kane, Logan, Utah,
for defendant.
David E. Leta, Hansen & Anderson, Salt Lake
City, Utah, for Unsecured Creditors* Committee.
Vernon L. Hopkinson, Watkiss & Campbell, Salt
Lake City, Utah, for intervenor.
*502 MEMORANDUM OPINION

Motion granted.
GLEN E. CLARK, Chief Judge.
West Headnotes
[1] Bankruptcy <®=>2576
51k2576
Under Utah law, Chapter 11 trustee took title to real
property free of any unrecorded equitable interest in
property of limited partnership for which debtor was
general partner, where debtor was record fee title
holder on petition date, no representative or
fiduciary capacity was indicated on title, and there
was no evidence at site that limited partnership
owned property. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. §
544(a)(3); U.C.A. 1953, 57-3-2.
[2] Bankruptcy <®=>2515
51k2515
For purpose of trustee exercising strong-arm
provision of Bankruptcy Code, it is irrelevant that
debtor would violate its fiduciary duty by
transferring partnership property to third-party
purchaser;
only issue is whether bona fide
purchaser could obtain title free and clear of any
equitable interest which partnership might claim.
Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(a)(3).

This civil proceeding comes before the court on the
trustee's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Oral
arguments on the motion were heard by the court on
June 2, 1988. At the hearing, Peter W. Billings,
Jr., and Gary E. Jubber, of Fabian & Clendenin,
Salt Lake City, Utah, appeared on behalf of the
trustee; N. George Daines, of Daines & Kane,
Logan, Utah, represented the defendant, Cinnamon
Ridge, Ltd.;
and David E. Leta, of Hansen &
Anderson, Salt Lake City, Utah, appeared on behalf
of the Unsecured Creditors' Committee.
At the
hearing, the court granted a motion by the John E.
Keiter Defined Benefit Plan & Trust ("Keiter") to
intervene herein as a party defendant; and Vernon
L. Hopkinson, of Watkiss & Campbell, Salt Lake
City, Utah, entered an appearance on its behalf. At
the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the
trustee's motion under advisement and allowed the
parties five days to file supplemental affidavits.
Subsequent to the hearing, the parties informed the
court that they had agreed among themselves that
they would conduct four depositions and submit the
transcripts to the court in lieu of the supplemental
affidavits which the court had requested.
The
court, having now received those depositions and
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having considered the respective arguments of
counsel, as well as the pleadings and memoranda on
file, issues the following Memorandum Opinion.
For the reasons set forth herein, the trustee's Motion
for Summary Judgment is granted.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This action concerns title to a mobile home park,
commonly known as the Cinnamon Ridge Mobile
Home Park, as well as ten acres of adjacent
unimproved real property, located in Cache County,
Utah.
Defendant, Cinnamon Ridge, Ltd. (the
"Partnership"), is a Utah limited partnership which
was organized in November 1984. Granada, Inc.,
the debtor in this Chapter 11 case, was one of
defendant Partnership's general partners and its sole
general partner as of the commencement of this
bankruptcy case.
Prior to the organization of the Partnership,
Granada purchased the real property for the mobile
home park from Gary E. and Dorothy W. Bodrero
and executed a trust deed in their favor.
The
mobile home park was platted under the name
"Cinnamon
Ridge Mobile
Home Park."
Subsequent to the organization of the Partnership,
Granada applied for and was given consent to use
the name Cinnamon Ridge, Ltd., as an assumed
name. The Certificate and Agreement of Limited
Partnership was filed with the Salt Lake County and
Cache County Clerk's Offices but was never filed
with the Cache County Recorder's Office.
On or about July 23, 1985, "Granada, as trustor,"
executed a trust deed in favor of Scherer & Horn,
M.D. Defined Benefit Plan Trust ("Scherer &
Horn"), as beneficiary, which pledged the mobile
home park as security. On or about August 15,
1985, "Cinnamon Ridge, Ltd., by its general partner
Granada, Inc., as Trustor," executed a trust deed in
favor of Keiter, also pledging the mobile home park
as security.
Granada filed its Chapter 11 petition on February
13, 1987. Peter W. Billings, Jr., was appointed
trustee of the Granada estate on June 22, 1987. On
the date of petition, the records of the Cache County
Recorder's Office showed Granada as the fee owner
of the mobile home park; the Partnership did not
have any recorded interest in the property as of that
date. Moreover, it is undisputed that, as of the
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petition date, the following facts and circumstances
were indicated:
(1) The sign at the entrance to the mobile home
park read "Cinnamon Ridge Mobile Home
Community";
(2) There was no sign on the property making
reference to Cinnamon Ridge, Ltd., or to the
Cinnamon Ridge Limited Partnership;
(3) Lots in the mobile home park were rented to
tenants;
(4) None of the Cinnamon Ridge limited partners
were residing at the property;
*503 (5) Granada managed the mobile home park
until December 1986, at which time Capital Hill
Equities assumed management on behalf of
Granada; and
(6) Advertising for the mobile home park was
done in the name of Cinnamon Ridge Mobile
Home Community.
When Granada filed bankruptcy, it listed the
property at issue herein in its statement of affairs as
"property held for another person."
The trustee filed the present action pursuant to §
544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code to quiet title to the
mobile home park and the adjacent unimproved
property. The Partnership asserts that the property
was Partnership property and that Granada held only
"bare legal title," which was held in its name to
facilitate development of the property. Since the
equitable title to the property assertedly resided in
the Partnership, the Partnership argues that the
property never became property of the estate
pursuant to § 541(d) and, therefore, the trustee
cannot set aside the Partnership's unrecorded
interest under § 544(a)(3).
Moreover, the
Partnership argues that the trustee cannot become a
bona fide purchaser under § 544 because at the time
of the filing of the petition the Partnership was in
actual, open, and unambiguous possession of the
mobile home park, which would put a purchaser on
inquiry notice of the Partnership's interest in the
property.
DISCUSSION
Section 544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the
commencement of the case, and without regard to
any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor,
the rights and powers of, or may avoid any
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transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation
incurred by the debtor that is voidable by(3) a bona fide purchaser of real property, other
than fixtures, from the debtor, against whom
applicable law permits such transfer to be
perfected, that obtains the status of a bona fide
purchaser and has perfected such transfer at the
time of the commencement of the case, whether or
not such a purchaser exists.
By virtue of this so-called strong-arm power, the
trustee is given, by force of law, the rights and
powers of a perfected bona fide purchaser of real
property as of the bankruptcy petition date.
[1] In this case, the critical inquiry under §
544(a)(3) concerns the rights of the parties under
Utah law had the debtor transferred the mobile home
park and the unimproved real property to a bona
fide purchaser on the petition date, and had the
transfer been perfected on that date. It is clear that
under Utah law (aside from principles of inquiry
notice and partnership law which shall be discussed
below), a bona fide purchaser would obtain title to
the property free and clear of any unrecorded
equitable interest which the Partnership may have
had in the property. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-3
provides:
Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made,
which shall not be recorded as provided in this
title, shall be void as against any subsequent
purchaser in good faith and for a valuable
consideration of the same real estate, or any
portion thereof, where his own conveyance shall
be first duly recorded.
As indicated in § 57-3-3, the rights of a bona fide
purchaser may be cut off through the proper
imparting of constructive notice by the recording of
a competing interest "as provided in this title."
Those requirements are set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-3-2(1):
Every conveyance, or instrument in writing
affecting real estate, executed, acknowledged, or
proved, and certified, in the manner prescribed by
this title ... shall, from the time of filing the same
with the [county] recorder for record, impart
notice to all persons of their contents. Subsequent
purchasers, mortgagees, and lien holders are
deemed to purchase and take with notice.
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(emphasis added).
By virtue of these statutes, a bona fide purchaser
who perfects his interest takes *504 free of any prior
unrecorded interest in the real property.
It is
undisputed in this case that as of the petition date,
there was nothing recorded with the Cache County
Recorder which would have given constructive
notice of the Partnership's claim to an equitable
interest in the property. Granada was the record fee
title owner of the property on the petition date. No
representative or fiduciary capacity was there
indicated.
The defendants mount several challenges to the
application of this straight- forward analysis,
contending that (1) the filing of the Certificate and
Agreement of Limited Partnership imparted
constructive notice of the Partnership's interest; (2)
there could be no transfer of property of the debtor
to a bona fide purchaser, since Granada, as general
partner, held the property in trust for the
Partnership, and Granada never had an equitable
interest in the property; (3) a bona fide purchaser
could not prevail under Utah law because the
Partnership was in possession of the property, and
any potential purchaser would be on inquiry notice
of the Partnership's equitable or beneficial interest;
(4) Granada could not have transferred the property
because of its fiduciary duties as a general partner
under Utah partnership law and would have been
liable for criminal sanctions had it done so; (5) the
trustee's avoiding powers under § 544 are restricted
by trust principles, duties and obligations,
incorporated into the Bankruptcy Code by § 541(d);
and (6) it would be inequitable to allow the trustee to
avoid the Partnership's interest and create a
beneficial interest in Granada which never existed
and which Granada did not assert.
Constructive Notice.
The defendants assert that constructive notice of the
Partnership's equitable interest is effectively
imparted since the Certificate and Agreement of
Limited Partnership was filed with Cache and Salt
Lake Counties.
That documentation allegedly
contemplates the development of the mobile home
park and authorizes Granada to hold title to the
property in its own name. However, the Certificate
and Agreement was not filed with the Cache County
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Recorder's Office.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-2
expressly requires the filing to be made with the
county recorder in order to impart constructive
notice. Filing with the county clerk is not sufficient
to put potential purchasers on constructive notice.
Record title was indisputably in the name of
Granada in its own capacity. Title could have been
held in the name of "Granada, General Partner" or
"Granada, General Partner of the Cinnamon Ridge
Limited Partnership" or "Granada, in trust for the
Cinnamon Ridge Limited Partnership." However,
that was not done. Title, as it was held in this case,
imparted no constructive notice of the Partnership's
interest.
Transfer of Property of the Debtor.
The defendants next argue that the trustee's rights
and powers under § 544(a)(3) are limited to that of a
bona fide purchaser of "property of the debtor."
Since under the defendants' analysis Granada never
possessed any equitable interest in the property, the
trustee may not utilize § 544(a)(3) to set aside the
Partnership's equitable interest.
As support for
their position, defendants point to the debtor's
statement of affairs in which the debtor indicated
that it held title to the property for another person.
[FN1]
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any transfer of property of the debtor or any
obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable by
... (3) a bona fide purchaser...." (emphasis added).
This § 544(a)(3) power to avoid any transfer of
property of the debtor that is voidable by a bona fide
purchaser is in addition to the trustee's § 544(a)(3)
position of having the "rights and powers" of a bona
fide purchaser, as discussed above. Furthermore,
the parties to this action concede that Granada held
at least bare legal title of record on the petition date.
Under Utah law, Granada had sufficient interest in
the property to enable it to transfer fee title to a
bona fide purchaser free and clear of any unrecorded
equitable interest. The Partnership may well have
had cognizable claims against Granada for having
done so, but the bona fide purchaser would still have
taken title free and clear of those equitable claims
under the recording statutes. [FN2]
FN2. Counsel for Keiter apparently recognized this
analysis in argument before the court at which time the
following interchange with the court is noted:
MR. HOPKINSON: The Court inquired under
Utah Law, had a B.F.P. come in and acquired this
property from Granada, who would prevail in this
action if this were a state court. Obviously, if this
were a state court and that were the factual
situation, Cinnamon Ridge would have a very
uphill battle winning that case.

***
FN1. This argument is closely tied to defendant's
defense under § 541(d) which is discussed infra.
A close reading of § 544(a), however, reveals no
such restriction on the trustee's powers.
The
language of § 544(a) provides that "[t]he trustee
shall have ... the rights and powers of ... (3) a bona
fide purchaser of real property ... from the debtor."
(emphasis added). The legal fiction created by the
statute assumes a transfer from the debtor to a bona
fide purchaser on the date of filing. The trustee is
then clothed with whatever legal rights the bona fide
purchaser would possess. There is no requirement
in that language that the property transferred be
property oj the debtor.
Of course, the debtor's
interest in the property (or lack thereof) may well
limit the bona fide purchaser's "rights and powers."
*505 In further support of their contention that
avoidable property under § 544(a)(3) must be that
of the debtor, defendants rely on other language in §
544(a), which provides: "The trustee ... may avoid

THE COURT: Would you argue that if I put my
home in your name, you record and, to go further,
I let you live there.
You sell that home to
someone for value, that I can assert my rights in
that property?
MR. HOPKINSON: Did I have an express trust
agreement with you?
THE COURT: I don't know. I'll let you come to
the conclusion. It's my home. You recognize
that, and you say, "You can get it back any time
you want. I'll take good care of it." That's our
agreement.
MR. HOPKINSON: Am I in bankruptcy or out of
bankruptcy?
THE COURT: You're out of bankruptcy.
MR. HOPKINSON: I'm out of bankruptcy, a
B.F.P. would prevail. In bankruptcy, a 544(a)(3)
fictitious B.F.P. would not prevail because of
541(d). THE COURT: It appears to me you don't
believe in fictions.
MR. HOPKINSON: It's probably how you read
the book.
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Keiter's position is that although a bona fide
purchaser would prevail under Utah law outside of
bankruptcy, the trustee with hypothetical bona fide
purchaser status may not prevail under the
Bankruptcy Code because of § 541(d).
That
argument is considered below.

Inquiry Notice.
The defendants also take the position that a bona
fide purchaser could not prevail against the
Partnership because the Partnership was in open,
actual, and unambiguous possession of the mobile
home park on the petition date.
Since the
Partnership was in possession, the defendants argue
that any potential purchaser would be put on
"inquiry notice" of the Partnership's ownership
claims. This issue is complicated by the fact that
the only way the Partnership could have been in
possession would have been through its general
partner, Granada, which, of course, in its nonrepresentative capacity was the record title holder.
Although § 544(a)(3) specifically provides that the
trustee shall have the rights and powers of a bona
fide purchaser "without regard to any knowledge of
the trustee or of any creditor," courts have held that
that restriction applies only to actual knowledge and
not to inquiry notice, construed to be a form of
constructive notice. See In re Probasco, 839 F.2d
1352 (9th Cir.1988); McCannon v. Marston, 679
F.2d 13, 16 (3d Cir.1982); see also In re
Richardson, 23 B.R. 434 (Bankr.D.Utah 1982).
The doctrine of inquiry notice under Utah law was
set forth by the Utah Supreme court in Johnson v.
Bell 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah 1983):
[Notice] required by § 57-1-6 [is] satisfied if a
party dealing with the land had information of
facts which would put a prudent man on inquiry
and which, if pursued, would lead to actual
knowledge as to the state of the title.
In that case, the court found no evidence that there
was any activity on the property which would have
reasonably alerted the *506 trustee under a trust
deed to adverse claims or which would have
required the trustee's further investigation. Id.; see
also Meagher v. Dean, 97 Utah 173, 91 P.2d 454,
456 (Utah 1939) ("[Exclusive possession of real
estate under an apparent claim of ownership is
constructive notice to all the world of whatever
claim the possessor asserts."); Toland v. Corey, 6
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Utah 392, 24 P. 190 (1890); Stumph v. Church, 740
P.2d 820 (Utah Ct.App.1987).
In the view of this court, the doctrine of
constructive inquiry notice under Utah law involves
a two-step analysis: First, the court must determine
whether the purchaser is in possession of facts, or
whether inspection of the property would have
brought to the purchaser's attention activity on the
property, which would have reasonably alerted the
purchaser to potential claims of any party other than
the grantor or record title holder. If the purchaser
has such facts, or if there is activity on the property
reasonably alerting the purchaser to adverse claims,
the purchaser is placed on inquiry notice; and,
under the second step, the purchaser is charged with
all knowledge that a reasonable due diligence
investigation would have revealed. A purchaser's
duty to investigate arises only when the purchaser is
placed on inquiry notice under the first prong of the
analysis.
In this proceeding, the court must first analyze what
a proper inspection of the property would have
brought to a purchaser's attention, if such an
inspection had been conducted on the petition date.
[FN3] The undisputed facts now before the court
are that such a purchaser would have found a mobile
home park being rented to tenants and being
managed by an on- site manager under the direction
of Granada.
The sign at the entrance read
"Cinnamon Ridge Mobile Home Community."
There was no sign on the property making reference
to Cinnamon Ridge, Ltd., or the Cinnamon Ridge
Limited Partnership. Advertising for the mobile
home park was done in the name of Cinnamon
Ridge Mobile Home Community.
Since
"Cinnamon Ridge" was an authorized d/b/a for
Granada, there is nothing that an inspection would
have produced which was inconsistent with record
title. The defendants argue that had the purchaser
inquired of the tenants or the property manager
about the identity of the landlord, it would have
been told about the Partnership's interest. That
argument confuses the first prong of the testdetermining whether the purchaser has a duty to
investigate and inquire after inspection of the
property-with the duty of inquiry itself which the
purchaser must discharge once it is put on inquiry
notice.
Unless there is activity apparent upon
inspection "which would have reasonably alerted" a
purchaser of the claims of the Partnership requiring
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the purchaser's further investigation, no inquiry
need be made. Here, a bona fide purchaser would
not have been so alerted.
FN3. Under § 544(a)(3) analysis, any actual
knowledge which the trustee or the debtor as
debtor in possession may have had on the petition
date is irrelevant, whether or not such facts would
have put the trustee or debtor on inquiry notice.

The defendants contend that where property is in
the possession of tenants, a purchaser must inquire
about the identity of the landlord.
They cite
Meagher v. Dean, 97 Utah 173, 91 P.2d 454 (Utah
1939), in support of that proposition. It may well
be that possession by a tenant in 1939 was sufficient
to alert a purchaser of potential adverse claims to
residential property. However, we are unable to
conclude that in 1988 tenants in possession of a
mobile home park developed for that express
purpose is sufficiently alarming so as to put a
purchaser on constructive inquiry notice.
See
Stumph v. Church, 740 P.2d 820 (Utah
Ct.App.1987) (Mortgagee's appraiser had no duty to
inquire as to the identity of the landlord or to ask to
see a copy of the lease or rental agreement when
inspecting the property.).
Trust and Fiduciary Duties.
The defendants next argue that pursuant to Utah
partnership law there existed an express trust
between Granada, as general partner, and the
Partnership. Therefore, defendants conclude that
Granada never had an interest in the property,
Granada could not transfer the property out of *507
trust, and Granada would have gone to jail if it had
attempted to do so. Defendants further contend that
whatever Granada could have done, it did as an
agent for the Partnership; thus, if Granada had
transferred the property, the Partnership could have
gotten it back. In support of their argument, the
defendants call the court's attention to Utah Code
Ann. §§ 48-1-18, 48-2- 9(4), 48-1-7.
Those
sections provide in pertinent part:
48-1-18. Partner accountable as a fiduciary.
Every partner must account to the partnership for
any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits,
derived by him without the consent of the other
partners from any transaction connected with the
formation, conduct or liquidation of the
partnership or from any use by him of its
property.
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48-2-9. Rights, powers and liabilities of a general
partner.
A general partner shall have all the
rights and powers, and be subject to all the
restrictions and liabilities, of a partner in a
partnership without limited partners, except that
without the written consent or ratification of the
specific act by all the limited partners, a general
partner or all of the general partners have no
authority to:
(4) Possess partnership property, or assign their
rights in specific partnership property, for other
than a partnership purpose.
48-1-7.
Conveyance of real property of
partnership.

Where the title to real property is in the name of
one or more or all of the partners, or in a third
person in trust for the partnership, a conveyance
executed by a partner in the partnership name, or
in his own name, passes the equitable interest of
the partnership, provided the act is one within the
authority of the partner under the provisions of
section 48-1-6(1).
[2] Initially, it can be observed that for purposes of
§ 544(a)(3), it is irrelevant that the debtor would
violate its fiduciary duty by transferring partnership
property to a third-party purchaser. Section 544 is
designed to set aside unrecorded interests and secret
liens. The question is not what liability, criminal
or civil, the debtor might incur by transferring the
property.
The issue is whether a bona fide
purchaser could obtain title free and clear of any
equitable interest which the Partnership might claim.
That question in this case is expressly answered by
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-409. Subsection (1) of that
section mandates that trusts affecting real property
be made of public record:
75-7-409. Recitals when title to real property is in
trustee-Failure.
(1) When title to real property is granted to a
person as trustee, the terms of the trust may be
given either:
(a) in the deed of transfer; or
(b) in an instrument signed by the grantor and
recorded in the same office as the grant to the
trustee.
Since the defendants argue that the property was
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expressly held in trust by Granada for the benefit of
the Partnership, that trust must be made of record
"in the same office as the grant to the trustee "-the
Cache County Recorder's Office. As noted, that
was not accomplished. Although the Partnership
agreement was filed with the county clerk, that
filing did not meet the requirements of this section.
Subsection (2) of § 75-7-409 prescribes the effect of
failing to make the trust of public record:
(2) If the terms of the trust are not made public as
required in Subsection (1), a conveyance from the
trustee is absolute in favor of purchasers for value
who take the property without notice of the terms
of the trust.
Therefore, a bona fide purchaser from Granada
would take free and clear of the equitable *508
interests of the Partnership as beneficiary of the
express trust.
Moreover, the statutory provisions relied upon by
the defendants may not provide a valid defense even
by their own terms.
For instance, § 48-1-7
provides that, where property is held in the name of
the general partner, the general partner may convey
the equitable interest of the Partnership if that act is
within the authority of the partner. Paragraph 7.1(a)
of the Certificate and Agreement of Limited
Partnership authorizes the general partner to
"acquire, hold or dispose of any real property ...
and may sell such properties ... as the General
Partner, in its absolute discretion, deems to be in the
best interests of the Partnership." Therefore, even
ignoring the effect of the recording statutes, a bona
fide purchaser could take title free and clear of the
equitable interests of the Partnership under Utah
trust and partnership law.
Had that transfer
actually taken place, the Partnership may have had a
cause of action against Granada for breach of
fiduciary duties, but that would not affect the rights
of a bona fide purchaser who would take title free
and clear of the Partnership's equitable interests.
Interplay Between §§ 544 and 541 (d).
[3] The court now comes to the crux of the
defendants' argument—that the trustee may not quiet
title in the property by virtue of § 544(a)(3) because
of the operation of § 541(d). Defendants' argument
seems to be that, in addition to the rights of the
Partnership under state law, the Partnership may
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preserve its equitable interest in the property
because § 541(d) operates independently to limit the
trustee's avoiding powers and mandates that the
equitable interest which the debtor did not possess
prepetition cannot now become "property of the
estate."
Section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code defines and
governs what is "property of the estate." That
section provides in relevant portion:
(a) The commencement of a case under section
301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate.
Such estate is comprised of all the following
property, wherever located and by whomever
held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and
(c)(2) of this section, all legal or equitable interests
of the debtor in property as of the commencement
of the case.

(3) Any interest in property that the trustee
recovers under section 329(b), 363(n), 543, 550,
553, or 723 of this title.
(4) Any interest in property preserved for the
benefit of or ordered transferred to the estate
under section 510(c) or 551 of this title.
The concept of "property of the estate" includes not
only rights to property which the debtor had
prepetition (§ 541(a)(1)), but also additional rights
which the trustee is given by virtue of the
Bankruptcy Code (§ 541(a)(3), (4)). Section 541(d)
expressly operates to limit the scope of the former,
not the latter:
(d) Property in which the debtor holds, as of the
commencement of the case, only legal title and not
an equitable interest ... becomes property of the
estate under subsection (a)(1) or (2) of this section
only to the extent of the debtor's legal title to such
property, but not to the extent of any equitable
interest in such property that the debtor does not
hold.
(emphasis added). Thus, had the trust arrangement
between Granada and the Partnership been a matter
of public record on the petition date, it is clear that
only a legal interest and not an equitable interest in
the property would have become property of the
estate. However, the trustee is arguing that title to
the property should be quieted in the estate not
under § 541(a)(1) or (2), but pursuant to § 541(a)(3)
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or (4).
Section 541(a)(4) includes as property of the estate
"[a]ny interest in property preserved for the benefit
of ... the estate under section ... 551 of this title."
Section 551, in turn, provides that "[a]ny transfer
avoided under section ... 544 ... is preserved for the
benefit of the estate but *509 only with respect to
property of the estate."
Likewise, § 541(a)(3)
includes as property of the estate "[a]ny interest in
property that the trustee recovers under section ...
550." Section 550 provides that the trustee may
recover interests in property to the extent that they
are avoided under § 544. Therefore, even if the
defendants' argument that § 541(d) is an express
limitation on the trustee's avoiding powers is
correct, § 541(d) by its express terms would not
apply to this case.
Finally, the court turns to the defendants' argument
itself to consider the relative roles of § 544(a)(3) and
§ 541(d).
In support of their position, the
defendants rely on dicta of two cases. In United
States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 103
S.Ct. 2309, 2313, n. 8, 10, 76 L.Ed.2d 515 (1983)
(emphasis added), the Supreme Court stated:
The legislative history indicates that Congress
intended to exclude from the estate property of
others in which the debtor had some minor interest
such as a lien or bare legal title.

We do not now decide the outer boundaries of the
bankruptcy estate. We note only that Congress
plainly excluded property of others held by the
debtor in trust at the time of the filing of the
petition.
The Supreme Court was not dealing with the
interplay between § 544 and § 541; and there is no
indication in Whiting Pools that the Court had in
mind an unrecorded interest held in trust. In the
present case, had the trust interest been of public
record, the foregoing statement of the Court would
accurately describe the operation of § 541(d).
The other dictum relied on by the defendants is
found in In re Quality Hoistein Leasing, 752 F.2d
1009, 1013-14 (5th Cir.1985), wherein the court
stated:
As a general rule, it must be held that section
541(d) prevails over the trustee's strong-arm
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powers. Although those powers allow a trustee to
assert rights that the debtor itself could not claim
to property, Congress did not mean to authorize a
bankruptcy estate to benefit from property that the
debtor did not own. Where state law impresses
property that a debtor holds with a constructive
trust in favor of another, and the trust attaches
prior to the petition date, the trust beneficiary
normally may recover its equitable interest in the
property through bankruptcy court proceedings.
(footnotes omitted). The court in that case dealt
with a version of § 541(d) prior to its amendment in
1984. At that time, the scope of § 541(d) arguably
extended to all of § 541(a). In response to cases
like Quality Holstein, Congress in 1984 amended the
language of § 541(d), limiting its scope to §
541(a)(1) and (2), as noted above. Therefore, the
analysis of Quality Holstein is no longer consistent
with the language of the Bankruptcy Code.
The court believes the proper analysis concerning §
541(d) and § 544 is set forth in In re Great Plains
Western Ranch
Co.,
38
B.R.
899
(Bankr.C.D.Cal.1984). The court there noted that
to limit property of the estate to the prepetition
property rights of the debtor is "only a partial
analysis." Id. at 903. The court correctly observed
that the concept of property of the estate has been
expanded to include rights of creditors and the rights
and powers of a bona fide purchaser:
The strong-arm clause may be read as relying on
the principle of ostensible ownership-the principle
that, other things being equal, what the creditor
sees ought to be what the creditor gets. There
seem to be at least two important reasons why the
idea of ostensible ownership bulks so large in
bankruptcy law. First, it helps to police against
fraud on the part of debtors-fraud that may occur
with or without the collusion of creditors.
Secondly, quite apart from any imputation of
fraud, it helps to permit the kind of reliance said to
be essential to a dynamic commercial economy.
And that is why Section 541 does not end the
inquiry in this case.
Even conceding that the
property rights of the estate are derivative from
the property *510 rights of the debtor, still the
trustee enjoys additional powers quite independent
of his powers under Section 541, and in no way
derivative from the debtor's rights at state law.
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92 B.R. 501
(Cite as: 92 B.R. 501, *510)
Failure to consider Section 544 together with
Section 541 may lead to misleading generalizations
and sometimes to unsound results....
Id. at 904-05 (citations omitted).
The defendants argue that to so construe § 541(d)
makes it surplusage. The court cannot agree. Had
the Partnership's interest been of public record, §
541(d) would operate to limit property of the estate
to bare legal title. Since it was not, § 544(a)(3)
operates to cut off the Partnership's unrecorded
equitable interest.
Principles of Equity.
Finally, the Partnership argues that it would be
inequitable to allow the trustee to avoid the
Partnership's interest and create a beneficial interest
in Granada which never existed and which Granada
did not assert. Although the result may seem
inequitable from the Partnership's standpoint and
that of Keiter which took a conveyance from the
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Partnership, it is not inequitable as a legal policy
and to creditors generally.
As noted in Great
Plains, 38 B.R. at 904-05, the strong-arm powers
are designed to avoid fraud and to allow creditors to
rely on record title. Creditors who extend credit to
the debtor in reliance on record title would be
unwilling to do so if their position could be eroded
by secret liens and unrecorded equitable interests.
The fact that Granada is willing to acknowledge the
existence of an unrecorded interest is unavailing.
Even in this case, there is an allegation that the
Bodreros and Scherer & Horn relied on Granada's
ownership in lending money to Granada. The court
does not believe that its construction of § 544(a)(3)
and § 541(d) is unfair or inequitable. Rather the
court believes that such a construction is necessary
to effectuate the stated policies of bankruptcy
administration.
For the reasons set forth herein, the trustee's
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
END OF DOCUMENT
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*796 286P.2d796
4 Utah 2d 47
Supreme Court of Utah.
In the Matter of the ESTATE of Harry OSTLER,
deceased.
Allie S OSTLER and Harry R. Ostler, executors,
Respondents,
v.
S I \ FE I AX COMMISSION of Utah, Appellant,
No. 8269.
July 23, 1955.
In the matter of a decedent's estate. From a
decree of the Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, David T. Lewis, J., fixing the inheritance
tax as contended for by the executors under
decedent's will, the State Tax Commission and
decedent's son, as a residuary beneficiary under the
will, appealed. The Supreme Court, McDonough,
C. J., held that a claim of decedent's widow,
renouncing will, to distributive share of one-third of
all of realty possessed by decedent during marriage,
should be allowed, if decedent, at any time during
marriage, was seized of real property held in his
own right or conveyed to partnership of husband and
wife without release of wife's interest therein, so as
to require exclusion of one-third of value of
decedent's interest in such property from gross
estate for inheritance tax purposes, as contended by
executors, but that such property, if brought into
firm by wife as her contribution thereto, became
partnership property and was converted to
personalty, to which her interest as wife would not
attach, on husband's death.
Decree reversed and case remanded for further
proceedings.
West Headnotes
[1] Partnership <®^68(2)
289 —
289II The Firm, Its Name, Powers, and Property
289k68 Partnership Real Estate
289k68(2) Real Estate Considered as Personal
Property.
Both English rule of "out and out conversion" of
partnership's real property to personalty on a
partner's death and American rule of "equitable
conversion pro tanto" are generally interpreted to
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grant equitable right of survivorship for purpose of
winding up partnership's affairs and subjecting its
real or personal property to its creditors' claims
before division and distribution to surviving partner
and deceased partner's heirs, so that real property,
for such limited purpose, is considered as
personalty, but after payment of firm debts, realty
resumes its historical incidents, including dower and
curtesy rights, for distribution under American rule,
whereas English rule distributes same property as
personalty.
[2] Partnership <®=>68(2)
289
289II The Firm, Its Name, Powers, and Property
289k68 Partnership Real Estate
289k68(2) Real Estate Considered as Personal
Property.
[See headnote text below]
[2] Taxation <®==>895(6)
371
371XIII Inheritance and Gift Taxes
371XIII(A) Legacy, Inheritance and Transfer
Taxes
371k894 Appraisement or Other Valuation
371k895 In General
371k895(6) Deductions in General.
A claim of testator's widow, renouncing will, to
distributive share of third of all real property
possessed by testator during marriage, should be
allowed under statute, so as to require exclusion of
fair value of testator's interest in realty used in
spouses' partnership business from gross estate for
inheritance tax purposes, if testator was seized or
real property held in his own right at any time
during marriage or conveyed to partnership without
release of wife's interest therein, but if property was
brought into firm by wife as her contribution
thereto, it became partnership property and was
converted to personalty, to which her interest as
wife would not attach, on husband's death, so as to
require inclusion of third of value of such interest in
estate for tax purposes. U.C.A.1953, 48-1-5,
48-1-22, 48-1-23, 48-1-39, 74-4-3.
*797 [4 Utah 2d 48] Harley W. Gustin, Pugsley,
Hayes & Rampton, C. Preston Allen, Salt Lake
City, for appellant.
McCullough, Boyce & McCulloiijJi, Sail Like
City, for respondents.
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McDONOUGH, Chief Justice.
The widow of Harry Ostler, Allie S. Ostler, and a
son, Harry R. Ostler, were named as his executors
in his will. Since Mrs. Ostler elected to renounce
her husband's will and take instead the distributive
share of one-third of all real property possessed by
him during the marriage under U.C.A.1953, 74-4-3,
the executors excluded from their computation for
the Utah State Inheritance Tax an item of $13,600,
representing one-third of the value of the deceased's
interest in real property used in the business of
Ostler Candy Company. The State Tax Commission
gave notice that this amount must be included in the
gross estate for tax purposes and the executors filed
a petition in the lower court for the purpose of fixing
the inheritance tax. A hearing was had and the
court entered a decree fixing the tax as contended
for by the executors.
The Tax Commission appealed from this decree
and was joined by the son, Harry R. Ostler, in his
individual capacity, as a residuary beneficiary under
the will.
We have no transcript of the proceedings below
and the entire record consists of the pleadings of the
executors only and the findings of the trial court.
Many pertinent facts must be gleaned from
statements, to which no objections were taken, in
the appeal briefs of the parties.
The property with which we are here concerned is
recorded in the name of Allie S. Ostler, respondent,
the widow of Harry [4 Utah 2d 49] Ostler. The
record title has so appeared for a number of years,
but in 1949 Mrs. Ostler and her husband executed
an instrument entitled 'Agreement and Declaration
of Interest,' which described the premises and stated
that 'the interest of Harry Ostler in the whole of said
business, including the aforesaid real property, is an
undivided fifty percent (50%) thereof and that the
interest of Allie S. Ostler in the whole of said
business, including the aforesaid real property, is an
undivided
fifty
percent
(50%)
thereof.'
Respondents' petition to the lower court alleged that
since the date of that instrument the property has
been listed as a partnership asset and the business
has been conducted as a partnership and the lower
court so found.
[1] The character of partnership property upon the
death of a partner at the common law is a question
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which has occasioned much litigation, the courts
taking two views, the English rule of 'out and out
conversion' of realty to personalty, and the
American rule of 'equitable conversion pro tanto.'
Despite their denomination, both rules have been
used by different courts at different times in both
countries. Both rules are generally interpreted to
grant an equitable right of survivorship for the
purpose of winding up the affairs of the partnership
and subjecting the property, real or personal, to the
claims of creditors of the firm, before division and
distribution to the surviving partner and the heirs of
the deceased partner. Thus, real property, for that
limited purpose, is considered as personalty; but,
after firm debts have been paid, realty resumes its
historical incidents, including dower and curtesy
rights, for distribution under the American rule,
whereas, the English rule distributes the same
property as personalty. See 25 A.L.R. annotations,
page 389 ff.
Proponents of each view have claimed for their
theory simplicity of administration, *798 Darrow
v. Calkins, 154 N.Y. 503, 49 N.E. 61, 48 L.R.A.
299; cf. Darby v. Darby, 3 Drew 495, 61
Eng.Reprint 992, and a closer adherence to the
intention of the partners, Lenow v. Fones, 48 Ark.
557, 4 S.W. 56; cf. Pierce's Adm'r v. Trigg's
Heirs, 10 Leigh, Va., 406.
In 1890, England enacted the Partnership Act
1890, 53 and 54 Vict. Chap. 39, declaring the rule,
in accordance with the majority of her reported
cases to be:
'* * * where land or any heritable interest therein
has become partnership property, it shall, unless
the contrary intention appears, be treated as
between the partners (including the representative
of a deceased partner), and also as between the
heirs of a deceased partner and his executors or
administrators as personal or movable, and not real
or heritable, estate.'
This statute clearly settled the debate in England,
but the American courts continued to split their
decisions along the two lines, finding it necessary to
engraft upon [4 Utah 2d 50] each rule many
exceptions to reach an equitable result in hard cases.
In 1914, the Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform
Partnership Act, which was adopted by Pennsylvania
and Wisconsin in 1915. At present, the laws of 33
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states and Alaska contain this act.
Section 25 of the Act, our U.C.A.1953, 48-1-22,
sets forth with particularity the incidents of a new
tenancy, 'a tenant in partnership.'
The
Commissioners' note to that section, 7 U.L.A.,
Uniform Partnership Act, p. 144, delineates their
reasons for this description, explaining that the
courts had attempted to apply the ancient concepts of
co-tenancy as joint tenancy or tenancy in common
even where they were inapplicable to the partnership
relation:
'The Commissioners, however, believe that the
proper way to end the confusion which has arisen
out of the attempt to treat partners as joint tenants,
is to recognize the fact that the rights of a partner
as co-owner with his partners of specific
partnership property should depend on the
necessities of the partnership relation. In short,
that the legal incidents of the tenancy in
partnership are not necessarily those of any other
co-ownership.
In the clauses of this section these incidents of
tenancy in partnership are stated with several
practical results of value. In the first place the law
is greatly simplified in expression. In the second
place the danger of the courts reaching an
inequitable conclusion by refusing to modify the
results of applying the legal incidents of joint
tenancy to the partnership relation is done away
with. Finally, ground is laid for the simplification
of a procedure in those cases where the separate
creditor desires to secure satisfaction of his
debtor's interest in the partnership.'
By U.C.A.1953, 48-1-22, the incidents of a
tenancy in partnership are thus described:
'(1) A partner is coowner with his partners of
specific partnership property holding as a tenant in
partnership.
'(2) The incidents of this tenancy are such that:
'(a) A partner, subject to the provisions of this
chapter and to any agreement between the
partners, has an equal right with his partners to
possess specific partnership property for
partnership purposes; but he has no right to
possess such property for any other purpose
without the consent of his partners.

'(b) A partner's right in specific partnership
property is not assignable, except in connection
with the assignment of rights of all the partners in
the same property.
'(c) A partner's right in specific partnership
property is not subject [4 Utah 2d 51] to
attachment or execution, except on a claim against
the partnership. When partnership property is
attached for a partnership debt, the partners, or
any *799 of them, or the representative of a
deceased partner, can not claim any right under the
homestead or exemption laws.
'(d) On the death of a partner his right in specific
partnership property vests in the surviving partner
or partners, except where the deceased was the last
surviving partner, when his right in such property
vests in his legal representatives. Such surviving
partner or partners, or the legal representatives of
the last surviving partner, has no right to possess
the partnership property for any but a partnership
purpose.
'(e) A partner's right in specific partnership
property is not subject to dower, curtesy, or
allowances to widows, heirs or next of kin.'
(Emphasis added.)
Ordinarily, the last quoted portion of this section
would appear clearly to exclude the widow's rights
in partnership realty, but respondent argues that
dower and curtesy were abolished in this state in
1888, U.C.A.1953, 74-4-9, and that U.C.A.1953,
74-4-3, granting a wife's distributive share in one
third of her husband's real property is unaffected by
the Uniform Partnership Act. It is for this reason
that we must consider whether by the Uniform
Partnership Act the legislature intended to adopt the
English rule of conversion of real property into
personalty when it is partnership property. If so,
then Mr. Ostler owned no real property in the firm
to which his wife's interest could attach. Certainly,
the above section would indicate such an intention
and this view is buttressed by other sections from
the Act:
'48-1-23. A partner's interest in the partnership is
his share of the profits and surplus, and the same
is personal property.'
'48-1-39. When any partner retires or dies and the
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business is continued * * * he or his legal
representatives as against such persons or
partnership may have the value of his interest at
the date of dissolution ascertained, and shall
receive as an ordinary creditor an amount equal to
the value of his interest in the dissolved
partnership * * *.'
Courts which have considered the changes brought
about by the aodption of the Uniform Partnership
Act have concluded that the legislative intention was
to enact the English rule. Cultra v. Cultra, 188
Tenn. 506, 221 S.W.2d 533; Wharf v. Wharf, 306
111. 79, 137 N.E. 446. And, with the exception of
one state, the courts have unanimously held that
marital rights in specific partnership property have
been excluded by the Act, In re Dumarest's Estate,
146 Misc. 442, 262 N.Y.S. 450; State v. Elsbury,
63 Nev. 463, 175 P.2d 430, 169 A.L.R. 364. The
single case cited to us taking [4 Utah 2d 52] a
contrary view under the Act is Hannold v. Hannold,
4 N.J.Super. 381, 67 A.2d 352, which followed
cases determined in New Jersey prior to the
statutory enactment and merely considered one
section of the Act.
The reasoning that the
legislature attempted to give some attributes of legal
entity to a partnership and thus stabilize joint
business ventures by making its property less subject
to individual claims is far more compelling.
[2] The scant record before us limits our view of
this case, but respondent now argues that the
property involved was never partnership property
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but rather real estate which her husband held in his
own name for use of the partnership. It appears
undisputed that a partnership existed, but we have
no means of determining whether the agreement
between husband and wife initiated it in 1949 or
whether the conveyance of the property to Harry
Ostler preceded the formation of the firm. This
property was not acquired with partnership funds so
as to bring it within the second paragraph of
U.C.A.1953, 48-1-5, defining partnership property,
and whether or not it was originally brought into the
partnership stock or acquired on account of the
partnership must depend upon facts not properly
before us in this proceeding. If Harry Ostler was at
any time during this marriage seized of real property
held in his own right, or conveyed to the partnership
*800. without a release of Mrs. Ostler's interest,
her claim should be allowed under U.C.A.1953,
74-4-3. If the property was brought into the firm by
Mrs. Ostler as her contribution, then, of course, it
became partnership property and was converted to
personalty, to which her interest as a wife would not
attach.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Each party to bear his own costs.
CROCKETT, WADE and WORTHEN, JJ., and
NORSETH, District Judge, concur.
HENRIOD, J., having disqualified himself, did not
participate herein.
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*868 791 P.2d 868
Supreme Court of Utah.
Robert B. KLINGER and Karol J. Klinger,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
Eugene E. KIGHTLY, Helen L. Kightly, Harry D.
Kreis, Peggy
R. Kreis Barnett, United Farm Agency, Inc., and
Gerald W. Wilkerson, Defendants and Appellants.
Eugene E. KIGHTLY, Helen L. Kightly, Harry D.
Kreis, Peggy
R. Kreis Barnett, Third-Party Plaintiffs,
v.
Glen H. CALDER and John Doe Wilson,
individually and dba
Wilson & Calder, Third-Party Defendants and
Appellees.
No. 880003.
March 22, 1990.
After they were sued for rescission based on
mutual mistake, property vendors asserted thirdparty claim against surveyor for negligence. The
Seventh District Court, Salt Lake County, Dennis L.
Draney, J., dismissed third-party complaint, and
vendors appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J.,
held that "discovery rule" applied to surveyor
negligence statute of limitations.
Reversed and remanded.
Howe, Associate C.J.,
opinion.

concurred and filed

Stewart, J., concurred in result.
West Headnotes
[1] Judgment <©=> 181(2)
228 —
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228kl81 Grounds for Summary Judgment
228kl81(2) Absence of Issue of Fact.
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Summary judgment is appropriate only when no
genuine issues of material fact exist and moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
[2] Limitation of Actions <@=>95(1)
241 —
24III Compulation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of
Action
241k95 Ignorance of Cause of Action
241k95(l) In General;
What Constitutes
Discovery.
Under "discovery rule," cause of action does not
accrue and statute of limitations does not begin to
run until plaintiff learns of, or, in exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have learned of, facts
which give rise to cause of action; rule functions as
exception to normal application of statute of
limitations.
[3] Limitation of Actions <@==> 199(1)
241 —
241V Pleading, Evidence, Trial, and Review
241kl99 Questions for Jury
241kl99(l) In General.
Whether discovery rule applies to cause of action
and its statute of limitations is "question of law" and
not of fact.
[4] Judgment <§===> 181(2)
228 —
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228kl81 Grounds for Summary Judgment
228kl81(2) Absence of Issue of Fact.
Questions of law may be disposed of through
summary judgment if there are no outstanding
questions of material fact to be discerned by the trier
of fact. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c).
[5] Limitation of Actions <@=>96(2)
241 —
24III Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of
Action
241k96 Mistake as Ground for Relief
241k96(2) Discovery of Mistake.

[See headnote text below]
[See headnote texi below|
[1] Judgment <®^ 181(3)
228 —228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228kl81 Grounds for Summary Judgment
228kl81(3) Presence of Question of Law.

[5] Limitation of Actions <S==> 100(1)
241 —
24III Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and

Copyright (c) West Group 2001 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

791 P.2d 868, Klinger v. Kightly, (Utah 1990)
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of
Action
241k98 Fraud as Ground for Relief
241kl00 Discovery of Fraud
241kl00(l) In General.
Statute under which limitations period governing
actions for relief on grounds of fraud or mistake
does not accrue until discovery of facts constituting
fraud or mistake did not apply to property vendors'
negligence cause of action against surveyor.
U.C.A. 1953, 78-12-26(3).
[6] Limitation of Actions <@=>95(3)
241 —
24III Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of
Action
241k95 Ignorance of Cause of Action
241k95(3) Nature of Harm or Damage, in
General.
"Discovery rule" applied to statute of limitations
governing property vendors' negligence cause of
action against surveyor; action would be completely
barred if rule was not applied, and evidence
pertaining to performance of survey was not so stale
as to preclude proper defense.
Ephraim H. Frankhauser, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and appellants.
Rick J. Sutherland, Robert F. Babcock, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiffs and appellees.
HALL, Chief Justice:
This case is on appeal from the Seventh District
Court, Duchesne County. The trial court found for
plaintiffs and rescinded a land purchase contract
based upon mutual mistake. Defendants were
allowed to bring a third-party complaint against the
surveyor of the property, Glen H. Calder, John Doe
Wilson, and Wilson & Calder (hereinafter
"Calder"), who were eventually granted a summary
judgment dismissal on the basis that the statute of
limitation *869 had run for a claim against the
surveyor of the land pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-12-25(2) (1987). We reverse the trial court's
ruling of summary judgment with regard to the
Kightlys' third-party complaint against Calder.
FACTS

Page 2
In June 1971, defendants purchased a parcel of
unimproved real property located in Duchesne
County, Utah, from Strawberry River Estates
(hereinafter "Strawberry") by uniform real estate
contract. After the purchase, defendants hired
Wilson & Calder to survey the property, and on
May 15, 1972, defendants received a certificate of
survey signed by Glen H. Calder, certifying the
location and dimensions of the property and that
there were no encroachments on it.
Defendants used the property for camping and
other recreational purposes between 1971 and 1983.
On July 23, 1983, they sold the property to the
Klingers by a warranty deed containing the
description in the warranty deed from Strawberry to
defendants and confirmed in the certificate of survey
obtained from Calder.
In February 1985, the Klingers discovered a
discrepancy in the boundaries of the property. The
Klingers brought suit against defendants for fraud
and misrepresentation but later amended their
complaint to a cause of action for mutual mistake.
Defendants were granted leave from the trial court
to file a third-party complaint against Calder for
negligence in conducting the survey.
The trial court granted a rescission of the sale
contract from defendants to the Klingers and a
summary judgment dismissal to Calder on the basis
that the statute of limitation had run against
defendants' third-party cause of action pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(2) (1987). Defendants
obtained a settlement with the Klingers subsequent
to trial and before appeal; therefore, the only issues
on appeal are (1) whether the trial court properly
used summary judgment to dismiss the third-party
claim, and (2) whether the trial court should have
applied the discovery rule to toll the statute of
limitation with regard to defendants' third-party
claim against Calder.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[1] Defendants' first contention is that the trial
court erroneously granted summary judgment to
Calder because defendants' reliance upon the
"discovery rule" raised an issue of fact that could
not properly be disposed of through summary
judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate only
when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
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law. (FN1) The issue is whether the application of
the discovery rule is a question of law or of fact.
[2] [3] The discovery rule determines when a cause
of action accrues in certain actions. Under the
discovery rule, a cause of action does not accrue and
the statute of limitation does not begin to run until
the plaintiff learns of or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have learned of the facts
which give rise to the cause of action. (FN2) The
discovery rule functions as an exception to the
normal application of a statute of limitation. (FN3)
Whether the discovery rule applies to a cause of
action is, like the statute of limitation, a question of
law, not of fact.
[4] Questions of law may be disposed of through
summary judgment if there are no outstanding
questions of material fact to *870 be discerned by
the trier of fact. (FN4) Defendants' assertion that
questions of fact existed with regard to whether the
discovery rule should be applied to toll the
applicable statute of limitation is erroneous. The
trial court was therefore correct in ruling as a matter
of law on the issue of whether the discovery rule
should be applied to the applicable statute of
limitation.
APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATION
[5] Defendants' third-party complaint states a
cause of action for "negligence and failure of thirdparty defendants to properly survey and locate the
subject property for survey."
Defendants assert
that their complaint states a cause of action in
negligence, and yet they cite Utah Code Ann. §
78-12-26(3) (1987), which states, "Within three
years: ... (3) an action for relief on the ground of
fraud or mistake; except that the cause of action in
such case does not accrue until the discovery by the
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or
mistake."
Section 78-12-26(3) and actions alleging fraud or
mistake are usually based on a contract, not a
negligence, cause of action. Indeed, Utah case law
reveals that this section has been applied only to the
reformation of contracts, (FN5) not to actions in
negligence. We hold that section 78-12-26(3) is
inapplicable to defendants' cause of action.
We note that Utah recognizes the theory of
"negligent misrepresentation" with regard to
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surveyors. (FN6) No matter how the cause of
action is characterized, whether in tort or contract,
it would lapse under any other Utah statute of
limitation without application of the discovery rule.
DISCOVERY RULE
[6] Defendants' second contention is that the trial
court erred in refusing to apply the discovery rule to
the statute of limitation applicable to their cause of
action for surveyor negligence. (FN7) Because the
issue of whether the discovery rule applies to toll the
statute of limitation is a question of law, we need
show no deference to the trial court's ruling on
appeal, but we review it for correctness. (FN8)
Observing how the discovery rule is applied
nationally to the issue of surveyor negligence or
breach of contract does not indicate any dispositive
national trend. A number of jurisdictions have
applied the discovery rule to surveyor negligence,
(FN9) *871 while others have rejected it. (FN10)
Legislative enactments are even more widespread.
(FN11)
Some arguments in favor of applying the discovery
rule to cases of surveyor negligence include the
following: (1) an innocent reliant party should not
carry the burden of a surveyor's professional
mistakes; (FN12) (2) "recovery ... by a reliant user
whose ultimate use was foreseeable will promote
cautionary techiques [sic] among surveyors"; (FN 13
) (3) "[t]he passage of time does not entail the
danger of a fraudulent, false, frivolous, speculative
or uncertain claim.... Further, under the said facts
it does not appear possible that by reason of the
passage of time [the] defendant's testimonial proof
of a defense would be made more difficult"; (FN14)
(4) it is illogical to require the plaintiff to hire two
or three surveyors to assure that the first survey is
correct; (FN 15) (5) strict application of the statute
of limitation would be unjust; (FN16) and (6) the
plaintiff lacks the means or ability to ascertain that a
wrong has been committed. (FN17)
Arguments in opposition to application of the
discovery rule in surveyor negligence cases include
(1) "the onerousness of potential liability continuing
throughout one's professional life, the prejudice
wrought by the passage of time not only in terms of
defending against claims but also in factually
ascertaining the true cause or causes of injuries";
(FN 18) and (2) "mere ignorance of the existence of
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a cause of action does not prevent the running of the
statute of limitations." (FN19)
*872 Because compelling arguments exist on both
sides regarding the applicability or inapplicability of
the discovery rule, we must seek a way to balance
the interests of each party. In Myers, we listed
three circumstances under which the discovery rule
should be applied and we adopted a balancing test
for application of the rule. The three circumstances
set out in Myers whereby this Court will apply the
discovery rule are where (1) the legislature has
adopted the discovery rule by statute; (2) there is
proof of concealment or misleading by the
defendant; and (3) application of the general statute
of limitation rule would be irrational or unjust.
(FN20) Defendants do not assert either of the first
two parts of the test, but they do seek an equitable
ruling as to whether the application of the discovery
rule would prevent an irrational or unjust result.
In Myers, we applied the balancing test to evaluate
whether the application of the discovery rule would
be irrational or unjust. The plaintiffs in Myers were
guardians of a minor who was killed in an
automobile accident. However, they were unable to
discover that the victim was their ward until after
the statute of limitation for wrongful death had run.
We held that the discovery rule should be applied
where "[t]he hardship the statute of limitations
would impose on the plaintiff in the circumstances
of [the] case outweighed any prejudice to the
defendant from difficulties of proof caused by the
passage of time." (FN21) This balancing test is a
question of law. (FN22)
Applying the balancing test to the present case, we
find the obvious prejudice to defendants is that
without application of the discovery rule, their cause
of action is completely barred regardless of whether
their complaint is in contract or in tort. This is so
despite the fact that there are no equities that weigh
against them. They had no reason to suspect that
the survey was inaccurate, nor did they refrain from
doing anything that might reasonably have been
expected of them that could have disclosed the error.
On the other hand, the prejudice to defendants is
that the record reflects that no survey records or
notes are available after fourteen years and,
presumably, the memories of the members of the
survey party have dimmed. The only existing
record of the survey is the survey certificate signed
by third-party defendant Glen H. Calder that
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specifies the boundaries of the property. While the
record reflects that Calder himself may not have
been a member of the survey party, as signor on the
survey certificate he is responsible for its content, is
still actively engaged in the practice of surveying,
and is available for testimony.
Utilizing the balancing test and being conscious of
the purposes of statutes of limitation, we hold that
under the facts of this case the evidence is not so
stale or remote as to outweigh the prejudice to
defendants of having their claim barred by the
statute of limitation. The discovery rule should be
applied to the statute of limitation for surveyor
negligence under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(2).
I he ruling of the trial court in favor of summary
judgment for third-party defendants is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with our decision.
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: (concurring)
1 concur but write to observe that the application of
the discovery rule here is consistent with the
application of the discovery rule in a case of alleged
medical malpractice, Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah
2d 199, 436 P.2d 435 (1968) (broken surgical needle
left in body). Since that decision, the legislature has
enacted Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4, shortening the
period in which a *873. malpractice action may be
brought against a health care provider to two years
(subject to exceptions) after the patient discovers, or
should discover, his injury, but not to exceed four
years after the date of the alleged act, omission,
neglect, or occurrence. No similar enactment has
been made by the legislature with regard to alleged
surveyor malpractice such as we are confronted with
in the instant case. Thus the discovery rule adopted
in Christiansen v. Rees would seem to be applicable
here. Our action is also consistent with the
application of the discovery rule in a legal
malpractice action decided recently by our Court of
Appeals, Merkley v. Beaslin, 778 P.2d 16 (Utah
Ct.App.1989).
STEWART, J., concurs in the result.
(FN1.) Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens v.
Utah Power & Light Co., 776 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah
1989); Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co., 714
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P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986).
(FN2.) Bngham Young University v. Paulsen
Construction Co., 744 P.2d 1370, 1373-74 (Utah
1987);
Hudesman v. Meriwether Leachman
Associates, Inc., 35 Wash.App. 318, 321, 666
P.2d 937, 940 (1983);
Metropolitan Services,
Inc. v. Spokane, 32 Wash.App. 714, 720, 649
P.2d 642, 646 (1982).
(FN3.) See generally Becton Dickinson & Co. v.
Reese, 668 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983); Myers v.
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981).
(FN4.) Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c).
(FN5.) See Bench v. Pace, 538 P.2d 180 (Utah
1975); Reese Howell Co. v. Brown, 48 Utah 142,
158 P. 684 (1916).
(FN6.) Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins,
Brown and Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 59-60
(Utah 1986).
(FN7.) The trial court applied Utah Code Ann. §
78-12-25(2), which states, "Within four years: ...
(2) an action for relief not otherwise provided for
by law." The trial court found that a cause of
action for surveyor negligence did not fall
specifically under any existing Utah statute. We
note that subsequent to the filing of this action, the
Utah legislature amended Utah Code Ann. §
78-12-25.5 (Supp.1989) and created subsection
(l)(b), which states:
"In an action regarding
property boundary surveys, the seven-year time
period commences when the property survey is
either recorded in the county recorder's office or
filed in the county surveyor's office under Section
17-23-17."
(FN8.) Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v.
Blomquist, 713 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).
(FN9.) See Cristich v. Allen Engineering, Inc., 458
So.2d 76 (Fla.App.1984) (discovery rule implied
where court did not apply the statute of limitation
for surveyor negligence until the error had been
discovered as directed by the statute); Rozny v.
Marnul, 43 I11.2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969)
(where the facts and statute are essentially on point
with the present case, the court found that the
discovery rule applied) (as modified on denial of
rehearing); Raffel v. Perley, 14 Mass.App. 242,
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437 N.E.2d 1082 (1982) (trial court's dismissal
reversed on grounds that plaintiff should have been
able to present evidence that claims for relief did
not accrue until plaintiff discovered error in
survey);
E.A. Williams, Inc. v. Russo
Development Corp., 82 N.J. 160, 411 A.2d 697
(1980) (where survey was performed in 1954,
cause of action did not accrue until plaintiff
discovered error in 1972); New Market Poultry
Farms, Inc. v. Fellows, 51 N.J. 419, 241 A.2d
633 (1968) (court held that discovery rule applied
where surveyor conducted an erroneous survey in
1952 that was not discovered until 1963);
Hudesman v. Meriwether Leachman Associates,
Inc., 35 Wash.App. 318, 666 P.2d 937 (1983)
(confirming discovery rule for surveyor negligence
established in Kundahl ); Kundahl v. Barnett, 5
Wash.App. 227, 486 P.2d 1164 (1971) (action
against land surveyor for negligence in making
survey did not accrue until injured party
discovered or had reasonable grounds to discover
error in survey).
(FN10.) See Lembert v. Gilmore, 312 A.2d 335
(Del.Super. 1973) (court viewed cause of action as
one in contract and held that cause accrued when
contract was breached, i.e., when the stakes were
erroneously placed by the surveyor); Howell v.
Betts, 211 Tenn. 134, 362 S.W.2d 924 (1962)
(where survey was performed in 1934 and error
was discovered in 1958, court found time too
remote to hold a surveyor liable).
*873_ (FN11.) See Ark.Stat.Ann. § 16-56-112
(1987) (five-year statute of limitation from
substantial
completion
of
the
project);
Cal.Civ.P.Code §§ 337.1(a), 337.15(a) (West
1982) (section 337.1(a)—four-year patent survey
defect; section 337.15(a)~ten-year latent survey
defect);
Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-105 (1987)
(within three years after discovery, ten-year statute
of repose); Del.Code Ann. tit. 10 § 8122 (1974)
(to mark and bound lands, seven years from the
date of return of commissions); 111.Rev.Stat. ch.
110, t 13-222 (1984) (four years from the date
plaintiff knew or should have known of the
erroneous survey); Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code
Ann. § 5-112 (1989) (three years after discovery
or twenty-year statute of repose, whichever occurs
first);
Mich.Comp.Laws § 600.5838 (1987)
(accrues when professional relationship ends or
must be brought within six months of discovery);
Minn.Stat. § 541.052 (1988) (two years after
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discovery or ten-year statute of repose, whichever
occurs first); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.098 (1986) (five
years after date of discovery of surveyor
negligence); Mont.Code Ann. § 27-2-208 (1988)
(ten years after completion of the project but may
be applicable only to projects for construction or
improvements); Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.135 (1987) (ten
years after completion but may be applicable to
projects for construction or improvements only);
Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 42, § 5537 (Purdon 1981 &
Supp.1989) (four years from date of discovery but
in no event later than twenty-one years);
Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-114 (1980) (four years
from the date survey is recorded on plat);
Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.011
(Vernon Supp.1990) (ten years after the date
survey is complete); Wash.Rev.Code § 4.16.310
(1989) (six years after completion but may be
limited to improvements and construction);
W.Va.Code § 55-2-6a (1981 & Supp.1989) (ten
years after owner accepts or occupies, but may be
limited to improvements and construction only);
Wis.Stat. § 893.37 (1987-1988) (six years after
completion of the survey).
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636.
(FN15.) Kundahl, 486 P.2d at 1167.
(FN16.) Id.;
see also E.A. Williams, Inc., 411
A.2d at 700; Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84,
87 (Utah 1981).
(FN17.) Hudesman, 666 P.2d at 940 (citing U.S.
Oil & Refining Co. v. Department of Ecology, 96
Wash.2d 85, 92, 633 P.2d 1329, 1334 (1981));
see also Myers, 635 P.2d at 87.
(FN18.) E.A. Williams, Inc., 411 A.2d at 701; see
also Howell, 362 S.W.2d at 926 (citing Ultramares
Corp. v. louche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441
(1931)); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668
P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983) (quoting Order of
Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49, 64 S.Ct. 582, 586, 88
L.Ed. 788 (1944)); Myers, 635 P.2d at 87.
(FN19.) Myers, 635 P.2d at 86 (citing Baker v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 39 Cal.App.3d 315, 114
Cal.Rptr. 171 (1974)).

(FN12.) Rozny, 250 N.E.2d at 663.

(FN20.) Id. at 86.

(FN13.) Id.

*873_ (FN21.) Id. at 87.

(FN14.) New Market Poultry Farms, 241 A.2d at

(FN22.) Id.
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Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4,
California.
Reginald and June NORONHA, Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
v.
Richard and Mattie Mae STEWART, Defendants
and Appellants.
No. B020539.
March 10, 1988.
Review Denied May 26, 1988.
Landowners brought action as result of neighbors'
refusing to remove encroaching wall. The Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, Florence T. Pickard,
J., entered judgment for landowners, and neighbors
appealed.
The Court of Appeal, Rothman, J.,
assigned, held that neighbors obtained irrevocable
license in property, though predecessor owner of
property did not have title when he granted
neighbors permission to build wall, where neighbors
believed that predecessor was owner of property and
predecessor subsequently became owner of property.
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Reliance on license was not rendered unreasonable
by licensees' making only one attempt to perfect
easement in real property subject to license, such as
would preclude license from becoming irrevocable.
[4] Licenses <@=>59
238k59
Landowners' lack of knowledge of license in their
property, granted by their predecessor, did not
preclude license from becoming irrevocable as result
of licensees' expending substantial effort in
execution of license before predecessor acquired
property.
[5] Licenses <£=>58(1)
238k58(l)
Licensees obtained irrevocable license in real
property, though landowners' predecessor did not
own property at time he granted licensees
permission to construct wall, where licensees
erroneously believed that predecessor was owner
and predecessor acquired title to property after wall
was built.

Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
West Headnotes

[6] Adjoining Landowners <®=>10(1)
15kl0(l)

[1] Estoppel <®^>47
156k47

[6] Easements <©==> 12(1)
141kl2(l)

Fact that grantor did not own property at time he
attempted to grant easement did not prevent grantees
from asserting interest in property, where grantor
subsequently became owner of property; under
doctrine of after-acquired title, once grantor became
owner of property, he and his successors were
estopped from contesting passage of easement to
grantees. West's Ann.Cal.Civ.Code § 1106.

[6] Easements <®=>19
141kl9

[7] Licenses <£=>51
238k51

[2] Licenses <S==>59
238k59
License acts, for all purposes, as easement,
estopping grantor and his successor from revoking
it, where grantee has made substantial expenditures
in reliance on license.
[3] Licenses <®=>59
238k59

Generally, landowner has no natural right to
unobstructed view and law is reluctant to imply such
right, although right may be created by express
easement between parties.

Landowners did not have right to unobstructed view
of harbor, such as would require licensees to
remove structures and foliage placed on encroached
property, where no conditions were expressed
limiting use that could be made of encroached
property, other than height of wall.
[8] Appeal and Error <®=> 1056.1(10)
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30kl056.1(10)
Landowners, asserting cross complaint for trespass,
injury to timber, and conversion out of alleged
cutting of their trees by surveyors employed by
owners of adjacent lot, suffered no prejudice
resulting from exclusion of evidence relating to trees
landowners planted on different adjacent lot, where
surveyor allegedly responsible for cutting trees had
previously testified that only trees cut were on first
adjacent lot.
*487 **95 Frye & Spencer, and Richard C.
Spencer, Los Angeles, for defendants and
appellants.
Brown, Baron & Gailen, and Scott Gailen, Los
Angeles, for plaintiffs and respondents.
ROTHMAN, Associate Justice, assigned. [FN*]
FN* Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial
Council.

Defendants appeal a judgment pertaining to an
encroaching wall that defendants built on plaintiffs'
property. We reverse in part.
In 1978, defendants Richard and Mattie Stewart
purchased a house in a newly constructed residential
subdivision in San Pedro, the Terragona Homes.
Defendants' lot, Lot No. 11, was adjacent to and
down a slight slope from Lot No. 12 which would
eventually be purchased by the plaintiffs. Shortly
after moving in, defendants contacted the apparent
owner of the *488 adjacent Lot No. 12--at that time,
Lawrence Jett-about building a wall between their
properties.
Jett, along with two partners, had
previously owned all the land in the undeveloped
subdivision, but sold it to the developer who
constructed the houses. As part of the sale, Jett
was to get title to Lot 12 after a house was built on
the property. At the time defendants approached
him about constructing a wall, however, Jett was not
the legal owner of Lot 12, but was merely entitled to
it under contract.
As plaintiffs admit in their brief, this fact was
unknown to defendants who erroneously believed
that Jett was the legal owner of the property. Jett,
who was guaranteed Lot 12, was permitted to
exercise complete control over the property and
willingly agreed to allow defendants to build a wall.

The point of contention in this case is the slope
between Lots 11 and 12. Lot 11, belonging to the
defendants, is slightly lower than Lot 12, with a
tapering slope between the two which reaches three
to four feet in height at the rear of the lots. This
slope lies entirely within Lot 12 as the boundary
between the properties runs along the bottom of the
slope.
Neither Jett nor the defendants wished to build a
wall following the properties' actual boundaries
along the bottom of the slope, however, as this
would provide no privacy to either lot. Anyone
standing on Lot 12 could look down into Lot 11 and
anything more than two or three feet high on Lot 12
would be visible over the wall. Jett, therefore,
agreed to allow defendants to construct the wall
along the top of the slope, thus leaving the slope on
defendants' side of the wall and encroaching on Lot
12 from about four inches in the front to eight feet
in the back.
Jett testified that he intended to grant defendants a
written easement on the encroachment property and
invited them to come around to his office to obtain
the proper form. No written easement was given,
and, in fact, Jett was not the legal owner of the
property at the time he gave his permission to build
the wall on Lot 12.
Defendants thereafter
constructed a specially reinforced wall along the top
of the slope, paying the entire $8,000 cost
themselves.
After the wall was constructed, Jett obtained legal
title to the property, but held the lot only five days
before selling it to plaintiffs. Eight months after
moving in, plaintiffs demanded that defendants tear
down the wall at their own expense and restore the
slope to them. Defendants refused and this case
ensued.
Upon hearing the evidence, the trial court ruled that
defendants had no easement or license to construct
the wall as Jett was not the legal owner of *489 the
property at the time he gave his permission.
Balancing the relative hardships, the court permitted
the wall to remain standing until defendants sell the
property, at which time it appears defendants must
pay for the wall's removal. The defendants were
also ordered to pay $5,680 to plaintiffs as damages
for the use of the property and to **96 remove a
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gazebo constructed on the encroached property.
I
[1] In rendering its decision, the trial court relied
on the time honored doctrine that no grantee can
have better title than the grantor. Since Jett had no
present interest in the property at the time he gave
his permission to construct the wall, the court
reasoned then that no interest in the property could
have passed to the defendants.
It has long been recognized, however, that if a
grantor purports to convey an interest in land which
the grantor does not own, but afterwards acquires,
the interest passes to the grantee at the time the
grantor obtains it. "The general rule is that if the
grantor in a conveyance of real property has no title,
a defective title, or an estate less than that which he
assumed to grant, but subsequently he acquires the
title or estate he purported to convey or perfects his
title, the after-acquired or perfected title will inure
to the grantee or his successors by way of estoppel,
i.e., the grantor is estopped to deny that the afteracquired title passed by his conveyance."
(1
Ogden's Revised California Real Property Law
(Cont.Ed.Bar 1974) § 4.20, p. 142.) The effect "is
the same as if it were written upon the face [or the
instrument] that the grantor conveyed all the estate
which he then possessed or which he might at any
time thereafter acquire. [Citations.]" (Younger v.
Moore (1909) 155 Cal. 767, 773, 103 P. 221;
accord Warburton v. Kieferle (1955) 135
Cal.App.2d 278, 284, 287 P.2d 1.)
This doctrine of "after-acquired title" is recognized
in California and has been partially codified into
Civil Code section 1106, which provides: "Where a
person purports by proper instrument to grant real
property in fee simple, and subsequently acquires
any title, or claim of title thereto, the same passes
by operation of law to the grantee, or his
successors."
This statutory rule is limited to grants of fee simple
and is therefore not applicable to the case at hand.
[FN1] The common-law rule, however, survived
*490 the enactment of the statute (1 Ogden's
Revised
California
Real
Property
Law
(Cont.Ed.Bar. 1974) § 420, p. 143), and is
considerably broader: "[T]he common-law rule of
after-acquired title is based upon the doctrine of
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estoppel, that is, that the grantor has led the grantee
to believe that a certain estate or title was being
conveyed. When the grantor subsequently acquires
the title or estate he purported to transfer, he is
estopped to deny its passage to the grantee.
Therefore, the common-law rule is not limited to fee
simple conveyances but applies to the transfer of any
estate when the grantee initially receives a lesser
interest than he was induced to believe he had
received." (2 Miller & Starr, Current Law of
California Real Estate (1977) Deeds, § 14:56, p.
588; emphasis in original; fn. omitted.)
FN1. Most of the California cases that have
addressed this issue have also done so in the
context of interests conveyed by deeds for an estate
in fee simple and, therefore, are not relevant to the
fact pattern presented here. (See, e.g., Schwenn v.
Kaye (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 949, 202 Cal.Rptr.
374; Klamath Land & Cattle Co. v. Roemer
(1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 613, 91 Cal.Rptr. 112;
Leggio v. Haggerty (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 873,
881, 42 Cal.Rptr. 400.)
Contrary to the trial court's finding, therefore, the
fact that Jett did not own the property at the time he
attempted to grant the easement does not prevent the
defendants from asserting an interest in the land.
Under the doctrine of after-acquired title, once Jett
became the owner of the property, he and his
successors were estopped from contesting the
passage of the easement to the defendants. (6A
Powell, The Law of Real Property (1982) % 921, p.
84- 113;
1 Ogden's Revised California Real
Property Law (Cont.Ed.Bar. 1974) § 13.21, pp.
552-553.)
[2] The plaintiffs argue that no easement exists that
can pass to the defendants as Jett's permission to
build the wall was never reduced to writing. While
Jett's oral promise may have lacked the formal
requirements necessary to create an easement, **97
it undeniably constituted a license. [FN2] And
where a party has made substantial expenditures in
reliance on a license, the license acts, for all
purposes, as an easement, estopping the grantor and
his successor from revoking it.
As the court
observed in Cooke v. Ramponi (1952) 38 Cal.2d
282, 286, 239 P.2d 638: "it is well settled in this
state that 'where a licensee has entered under a parol
license and has expended money, or its equivalent in
labor, in the execution of the license, the license
becomes irrevocable, the licensee will have a right
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of entry upon the lands of the licensor for the
purpose of maintaining his structures, or, in general,
his rights under his license, and the license will
continue for so long a time as the nature of it calls
for.' "
FN2. Arguably, this oral promise could have
constituted an easement if executed and based upon
a valuable consideration—in this case, defendants'
promise to bear the entire cost of building the wall
themselves. {Cooke v. Ramponi, supra, 38 Cal.2d
at p. 289, 239 P.2d 638; Wilkes v. Brady (1927)
84 Cal.App. 365, 369, 258 P. 108.)
[3][4] While recognizing this, plaintiffs argue that
defendants' reliance on the license was not
reasonable since they made only one attempt to
perfect an easement, and that plaintiffs should not be
estopped from revoking the license as they had no
notice that the license existed. Neither argument is
*491 meritorious. First, there is nothing inherently
unreasonable in a party's reliance on a promise or
the failure to insist on a writing.
Indeed,
defendants made a far greater effort to perfect their
interest here than is evidenced in other cases
granting irrevocable licenses.
(See Cooke v.
Ramponi, supra, 38 Cal.2d 282, 239 P.2d 638;
Stoner v. Zucker (1906) 148 Cal. 516, 83 P. 808.)
Secondly, as to plaintiffs' claim that they were
unaware that the wall was on their property,
Lawrence Jett repeatedly testified that he informed
plaintiffs of this fact and showed them the location
of the actual boundary.
Nor is plaintiffs'
knowledge required for the license to become
irrevocable.
Once defendants have expended
substantial effort in execution of the license, "the
license will continue for so long a time as the nature
of it calls for." (Cooke v. Ramponi, supra, 38
Cal.2d at p. 286, 239 P.2d 638.)
Defendants
accomplished this before Jett became the owner of
the property. Once Jett acquired the property, the
license was binding on him and his successors in
interest, the plaintiffs.
[5] Plaintiffs finally argue that no estoppel should
apply as defendants had notice that Jett was not the
true owner of the property. "When the grantee has
knowledge or notice that his grantor does not have
full title to the land conveyed, he is not misled to his
prejudice and the general rule of estoppel is not
applied."
(1 Ogden's Revised California Real
Property Law (Cont.Ed.Bar 1974) § 422(b), p.
145.) "Because the common-law rule is based upon
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estoppel, it does not apply in favor of a grantee who
has notice or knowledge that the grantor does not
have the full title which he purportedly conveyed."
(2 Miller & Starr, Current Law of California Real
Estate (1977) Deeds, § 14:56, p. 588; fh. omitted.)
The plaintiffs admit in their brief, however, that the
defendants erroneously believed that Jett was the
owner of Lot 12. Moreover, defendant stated as
much when asked who he believed the owner of Lot
12 was.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred
in determining that no irrevocable license existed.
II
In addition to those portions of its judgment relating
to the wall and the use of the encroached land, the
trial court also ordered defendants to remove a
gazebo partially constructed on the disputed slope.
The court stated: "Defendants not only built the
wall, but a gazebo which as stated above also
encroached on a portion of lot 12. They further
wilfully and intentionally embellished the gazebo
with trellises, large slats and heavy foliage. This
appears to the court to be an effort to totally block
the view the plaintiff would have of the harbor **98
area. The court determines that there was in fact a
*492 view from lot 12 which was sought to be
protected.
This determination is based on Mr.
Jett's testimony wherein he indicated to the
Stewarts, defendants herein, that they should not
build the wall, the height of which would block his
view from lot 12." The court then concluded that
the removal of the gazebo would not constitute a
disproportionate hardship to defendants and ordered
the structure taken down.
[6] [7] As a general rule, a landowner has no natural
right to an unobstructed view and the law is
reluctant to imply such a right (Pacifica
Homeowners' Assn. v. Wesley Palms Retirement
Community (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1147, 1152, 224
Cal.Rptr. 380), although this right may be created
by an express easement between the parties. (
Petersen v. Friedman (1958) 162 Cal.App.2d 245,
247-248, 328 P.2d 264.) The record in the instant
case, however, does not support such a condition in
the easement. Lawrence Jett testified that: "Part of
my understanding with Mr. Stewart [the defendant]
was I did not want the wall to reach a particular
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height that would interfere from being in the house
looking out...." But Jett also testified that the
defendants had done what they had agreed to do and
that the wall was not an obstruction.
As to the
encroached land, Jett stated that he had granted
defendants a right to make use of it, and that there
were no other restrictions in their agreement. No
conditions were expressed limiting the use that could
be made of the encroached property, other than the
height of the wall. In light of this, a height limit on
the trellises and bushes that defendants may place on
the slope is not supported by substantial evidence.
No restrictions were made on the landscaping of the
slope and the agreement as to the height of the wall
is insufficient to impose a limitation on the
structures or foliage that may be placed on the
encroached property. [FN3]
FN3. It should also be noted that ordering the
gazebo removed from the slope is not likely to be
effective in restoring the plaintiffs' view. The
defendants need only move the gazebo a few feet
onto their own property where it can be just as
much an obstruction. The same result will no
doubt occur as the trees on defendants' property
mature.
Ill
[8] Defendants further contend that the trial court
erred in excluding evidence on their cross-complaint
for trespass, injury to timber and conversion. This
cross-complaint arises out of the alleged cutting of
defendants' trees by surveyors employed by the
plaintiffs. In addition to planting trees on their own
property, defendants had also planted them on a
portion of the property behind their lot belonging to
a third party. This encroachment was settled before
trial. The defendants cross-complained against the
plaintiffs, however, seeking treble damages for
injury to timber, alleging that surveyors employed
by the plaintiffs had entered this other lot and cut the
trees defendants had planted there. The defendants
point out that although the *493 property was not
theirs and they may have had few rights against the
true owner, this does not affect their rights against
the plaintiffs who had no claim to the property
whatsoever. The defendants protest that when they
questioned the surveyor specifically about the trees
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on the adjacent lot, the trial court sustained an
objection that this matter pertained only to the
settled suit and had no relevance to the case at hand.
We see no conceivable prejudice resulting from the
exclusion of the evidence relating to the trees
defendants planted on the adjacent lot.
The
surveyor allegedly responsible for cutting the trees
had previously testified that the only trees cut were
on plaintiffs' lot on plaintiffs' side of the wall.
Considerable effort was devoted to this inquiry, in
which the surveyor simply reiterated his statement.
We can find no harm, therefore, arising from the
trial court's ruling, limiting further questioning on
this matter.
As we are reversing the judgment except as it
relates to defendants' cross- complaint, we need not
address defendants' other alleged **99 errors.
[FN4]
FN4. Defendants contend that the trial court
abused its discretion by allowing this case to go to
trial after the expiration of the five-year statute in
Code of Civil Procedure section 583,
subdivision (a).
We see no abuse of
discretion here as this case was set for trial
one month prior to the expiration of the
statute and had been trailing during that time
while waiting for a courtroom to open up.
Congestion of the court calendar is a valid
exception to the mandatory dismissal rule. (
Goers v. Superior Court (1976) 57
Cal.App.3d 72, 74-75, 129 Cal.Rptr. 29.)
Plaintiffs informed the clerk of the court that
the five-year rule was set to expire and acted
with reasonable diligence in trying to bring
the case to trial prior to that time.
That portion of the judgment denying defendants'
cross-complaint is affirmed. In all other respects,
the judgment is reversed.
Appellants to recover
costs.
McCLOSKY, Acting P.J., and GEORGE, J.,
concur.
END OF DOCUMENT
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In interpreting contract, court looks first to four
corners of agreement to determine intent of parties.

Court of Appeals of Utah.
Ward PERKINS, Personal Representative of the
Estate of Norma
Perkins, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
GREAT-WEST LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY
and Lincoln National Life
Insurance Company, Defendants and Appellants,
GREAT-WEST LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY,
Third-Party Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
SOUTHWEST HEALTH MANAGEMENT
COMPANY, INC., a California
corporation, and Lincoln National Life Insurance
Company, an Indiana corporation,
Third-Party Defendants and Appellees.
Nos. 890732-CA, 890733-CA.
June 21, 1991.
Personal representative of estate of deceased
employee brought action to recover benefits under
employer's group life policy. The Sixth District
Court, Kane County, Don V. Tibbs, J., denied
insurer's motion for summary judgment and granted
summary judgment in favor of representative and
insurer appealed. The Court of Appeals, Russon,
J., held that insurer which had paid medical benefits
in reliance on representations in employee's
application that she was full-time active employee
was not estopped from denying claim for life
insurance proceeds; insurer reasonably relied on
employee's misrepresentation, employee's reliance
on insurer's conduct in paying medical claims was
not reasonable in light of express provisions
contained in booklet given employer for distribution
to employees, and effect of estoppel would be to
extend coverage to risks not covered by express
terms of policy.
Reversed and remanded.

[2] Insurance <®^2422
217 —
217XIX Coverage-Life Insurance
217k2422 Groups Covered.
(Formerly 217kl69(2))
[See headnote text below]
[2] Insurance <®=>2460
217 —
217XX Coverage-Health and Accident Insurance
217XX(B) Medical Insurance
217k2458 Persons Covered
217k2460 Group Insurance.
(Formerly 217kl69(2))
Where employee was disabled and unable to work
when group medical and life policy underwritten by
defendant went into effect, and by terms of policy
eligible employees must work full time, employee
was not eligible even though employer considered
her a full-time employee throughout her absence.
[3] Estoppel <®^52(3)
156 —
156III Equitable Estoppel
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General
156k52 Nature and Application of Estoppel in
Pais
156k52(3) Estoppel by Conduct.
"Equitable estoppel" is conduct by one party which
leads another party in reliance thereon, to adopt
course of action resulting in detriment or damage if
first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct.
[4] Insurance <@=>2958
217 —
217XXIV Avoidance
217XXIV(A) In General
217k2953 Representations
217k2958 Materiality.

West Headnotes
(Formerly 217k255)
[1] Contracts <@=> 147(3)
95 —
9511 Construction and Operation
9511(A) General Rules of Construction
95kl47 Intention of Parties
95kl47(3)
Construing
Whole
Together.

[See headnote text below]

Contract

[4] Insurance <®=>2966
217 —
217XXIV Avoidance
217XXIV(A) In General
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217k2961 Concealment or Failure to Disclose
217k2966 Reliance.
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Defenses
217k3087 Reliance or Prejudice, Necessity Of.

(Formerly 217k258)
Misrepresentation by insurance applicant of
material fact that is relied on by insurer permits
insurer to void policy unless it is established that
there should have been no actual reliance on
applicant's misrepresentation, concealment, or
omission.

(Formerly 217k377(l))
Employee, who could have easily learned from
booklets given to employer for distribution to its
employees that she was not eligible for coverage
under group life policy, did not reasonably rely on
coverage so as to estop insurer from denying
coverage.

[5] Insurance <®=>3001
217 —
217XXIV Avoidance
217XXIV(B) Particular Kinds of Insurance
217k3000 Life and Health Insurance
217k3001 In General.

[8] Insurance <®=>3093
217 —
217XXVI Estoppel and Waiver of Insurer's
Defenses
217k3093 Acts and Conduct of Insurer or Agents
in General.

(Formerly 217k256.2)
[See headnote text below]
[5] Insurance <@=>3114
217 —
217XXVI Estoppel and Waiver of Insurer's
Defenses
217k3105 Claims Process and Settlement
217k3114 Payment of Loss.
(Formerly 217k399)
Insurer which entered into contract with employer
to provide group health and life insurance for
employees reasonably relied on representations in
employee's application regarding her status as fulltime employee and was not estopped from denying
claim for life benefits by virtue of having paid
previous health benefit claims in reliance on false
information.
[6] Estoppel <S==>54
156 —
156III Equitable Estoppel
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General
156k54 Knowledge of Facts.
Party claiming estoppel cannot rely on
representations or acts if they are contrary to his
knowledge of truth or if he had means by which
with reasonable diligence he could ascertain the
truth.
[7] Insurance <®=>3087
217 —
217XXVI Estoppel and Waiver of Insurer's

(Formerly 217k388(3))
Insurer which contracted with employer to extend
insurance coverage to active employees only, and
which took steps to ensure that employer and its
employees were aware of terms of policy by
publishing and distributing booklet limiting coverage
to active employees, was not estopped from denying
life coverage for employee who was not full-time
active employee at time policy went into effect;
allowing estoppel would unjustifiably extend
coverage to risk insurer did not contract to cover.
[9] Insurance <@=>3114
217 —
217XXVI Estoppel and Waiver of Insurer's
Defenses
217k3105 Claims Process and Settlement
217k3114 Payment of Loss.
(Formerly 217k399)
Insurer which underwrote group medical and life
coverage for full-time active employees was not
estopped from denying life coverage for disabled
employee who was not eligible to be insured merely
because insurer had mistakenly paid medical claims
submitted by the employee; it would be patently
unfair to permit employer to unilaterally determine
which employees were active or full-time merely by
keeping them on the payroll.
*1127 Clark W. Sessions (argued), Cynthia K.
Cassell, Campbell, Maack & Sessions, Salt Lake
City, for defendant and appellant Great-West Life
Assur. Co.
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James M. Park (argued), Michael W. Park, Park,
Braithwaite & Eves, Cedar City, for plaintiff and
appellee Ward Perkins.
Jathan W. Janove (argued), Robert K. Heineman,
Van Wagoner & Stevens, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant Lincoln Nat.
Before BENCH, GARFF and RUSSON, JJ.
OPINION
RUSSON, Judge:
Great-West Life Assurance Company (GreatWest), appeals from an order denying its motion for
summary judgment and granting summary judgment
in favor of Mr. Perkins. Great-West also appeals
the dismissal of its cross-claim against Lincoln
National Life Insurance Company (Lincoln
National).
FACTS
The material facts in the case between Mr. Perkins
and Great-West are undisputed. Mr. Perkins' wife
was employed as a nurse for Southwest Health
Management, Inc. (Southwest) for approximately
sixteen and a half years, beginning on January 1,
1970. On June 4, 1986, she became disabled and
was unable to work for an indefinite period of time.
While away from work, she was paid sick leave and
accrued vacation time. Throughout her absence,
Southwest considered her a full-time employee, and
she was kept on their records as such until her death
in April 1987.
Prior to July 1, 1986, Southwest provided group
medical and life insurance to its employees through
Lincoln National. Effective July 1, 1986, GreatWest underwrote the group health and life insurance
policy for Southwest. (FN1) Great-West published
a booklet, entitled EDGE Booklet, which contained a
description of eligibility requirements, benefits, and
exclusions under the policy. According to the
uncontroverted affidavit of John Kingsbury, an
associate manager of life benefits at Great-West,
copies of the booklet were given to Southwest to
distribute to its employees. (FN2)
Mrs. Perkins submitted a standard application card
to Great-West and applied for group health and life
insurance coverage. The card was dated June 30,
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1986. The application provided a space for the
employer to enter the date of full-time employment,
which was recorded as January 1, 1970. During the
next nine months, Mr. and Mrs. Perkins submitted
seven health insurance benefit claim forms to GreatWest. The claims were paid in the total amount of
$8,703.40.
Shortly after Mrs. Perkins* death in April 1987,
Southwest submitted a life claim report *1128 to
Great-West on behalf of Mr. Perkins, who was the
beneficiary of the policy. On the life claim report,
Southwest reported that Mrs. Perkins' last day
actively at work was June 3, 1986. Great-West
subsequently denied Mr. Perkins' claim on the basis
that his wife was never eligible for its insurance
coverage.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Perkins brought suit against Great-West and
Lincoln National to recover the insurance proceeds
on his wife's life insurance policy. Great-West filed
a counterclaim and a cross-claim for the medical
benefits paid to Mrs. Perkins. Mr. Perkins and
Great-West each filed a motion for summary
judgment.
Great-West also filed a motion for
summary judgment on its cross-claim against
Lincoln National.
The trial court granted Mr. Perkins' motion for
summary judgment against Great-West, and he was
awarded the face amount of the insurance policy
plus interest from the date of Mrs. Perkins' death.
The trial court also: (1) denied Great-West's motion
for summary judgment against Mr. Perkins; (2)
dismissed Great-West's cross-claim against Lincoln
National as moot, since Mrs. Perkins was insured by
Great-West; and (3) determined that Great-West's
failure to pay Mr. Perkins' life insurance claim was
an act of bad faith.
ISSUES
Great-West claims that the trial court erred in: (1)
granting Mr. Perkins' motion for summary
judgment; (2) denying Great-West's motion for
summary judgment on its counterclaim;
(3)
dismissing Great-West's cross-claim and motion for
summary judgment against Lincoln National; and
(4) finding that Great-West's denial of life insurance
benefits to Mr. Perkins was in bad faith. (FN3)
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT
"Summary judgment is proper only when no
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power
and Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990).
"Because summary judgment by definition does not
resolve factual issues, a challenge to summary
judgment presents for review only questions of law.
We review those conclusions for correctness,
according no particular deference to the trial court."
Id. The appellate court considers the evidence in the
light most favorable to the losing party and affirms "
'only where it appears that there is no genuine issue
as to any material issues of fact, or where, even
according to the facts as contended by the losing
party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.' " D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775
P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989) (quoting Themy v.
Seagull Enter., Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah
1979)).
COVERAGE UNDER THE INSURANCE POLICY
Great-West contends that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment to Mr. Perkins because
the insurance policy was clear and unambiguous in
limiting coverage to active, full-time employees, and
that since Mrs. Perkins was not an active, full-time
employee at any time from the effective date of the
policy, July 1, 1986, to the date of her death, she
was not covered.
[1] "[I]n interpreting a contract, we first look to
the four corners of the agreement to determine the
intent of the parties." Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt
Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 113 P.2d 1382, 1385
(Utah 1989). " 'If a policy of insurance is clear and
unambiguous, the words are to be taken and
understood in their plain, ordinary and popular
sense, as an average or reasonable person with
ordinary understanding would construe them.' "
Draughon v. CUNA Mutual Ins. Soc'y, 111 P.2d
*1129 1105, 1108 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting Clark
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 204 Kan. 487, 464 P.2d 253,
257 (1970)). "[I]f an insurance policy is ambiguous
or uncertain, so that it is fairly susceptible to
different interpretations, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of insurance coverage." American
Casualty Co. v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., Ltd., 568 P.2d
731, 734 (Utah 1977) (citations omitted); see also
Chacon v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d
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748 (Colo. 1990). We must, therefore, determine if
the trial court was correct in ruling as a matter of
law that Mrs. Perkins was insured by Great-West.
The group policy provisions pertaining to coverage
and benefits are set forth in Great-West's EDGE
Booklet. This booklet serves as the Certificate of
Insurance for those individual employees who are
enrolled in the group policy, but only if: (1) the
employee is eligible to be insured; (2) becomes
insured; (3) stays insured; and (4) a coverage
validation insert bearing the employee's name is
included in the pocket at the front of the booklet.
(FN4)
The EDGE Booklet states that employees are
eligible for coverage if they: (1) are residents of the
United States or Canada; (2) are permanent, fulltime and full pay employees; and (3) work the
minimum number of hours per week. (FN5) An
employee must work a minimum of 32 hours per
week to qualify as a permanent, full-time and full
pay employee, and the work must be performed at a
location other than the employee's home. (FN6)
Under the policy, an "employee" is defined as "a
person in the service of an employer." (FN7)
"Service" for an active employee is defined as
"employment, on an active, permanent, full-time
and full pay basis, for the minimum number of
hours at a place other than the employee's
residence." (FN8)
The EDGE Booklet further states that the effective
date of the group policy is July 1, 1986, and that an
active employee's coverage will begin on the
effective date if the employee has completed more
than 90 days continuous service. However, if an
employee is not at work on the effective date,
coverage begins on the date the employee returns to
work. (FN9)
Shortly after Mrs. Perkins' death, Southwest
submitted a Life Claim Report to Great-West which
stated that her last day of active employment was
June 3, 1986. Great-West immediately denied the
claim stating that Mrs. Perkins was not eligible for
coverage according to the terms of the group
insurance policy contained in the EDGE Booklet.
[2] The uncontroverted evidence indicates that,
according to the terms of Great-West's policy, Mrs.
Perkins terminated active employment before the
policy became effective and she never returned to
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work at any time thereafter.
The contractual
provisions in Great-West's policy clearly and
unambiguously limit coverage to active employees,
who are at work on or after the effective date of the
policy. The fact that she was considered a full-time
employee by Southwest does not bring her within
the definition of employee contained in the insurance
policy. Since Mrs. Perkins was not an active
employee on the effective date of the Great-West
policy, or any time thereafter, she was not insured
under that policy.
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
Alternatively, Mr. Perkins claims that since GreatWest accepted and retained premiums paid on his
wife's behalf, and continued paying health benefits,
it should be estopped from denying his claim for life
insurance proceeds.
[3] Equitable estoppel is defined as "conduct by
one party which leads another party in reliance
thereon, to adopt a course of action resulting in
detriment or damage if the first party is permitted to
repudiate *1130 his conduct." United Am. Life
Ins. Co. v. Zion's First Nat'l Bank, 641 P.2d 158,
161 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted). We must
therefore decide whether Great-West's conduct was
such that it should be estopped from denying Mr.
Perkins' claim for life insurance proceeds.
Great-West argues that estoppel does not apply
because: (1) when it paid the health benefits, it was
relying on the misrepresentation that Mrs. Perkins
was an eligible employee;
(2) Mrs. Perkins'
reliance on Great-West's conduct was not reasonable
in light of the express provisions contained in the
EDGE Booklet; and (3) estoppel cannot be used to
extend coverage to risks not covered by the express
terms of the policy. As to all three arguments, we
agree.
Great-West's Reliance on Representations that Mrs.
Perkins
was an Eligible Employee
[4] A misrepresentation by an insurance applicant
of a material fact which is relied on by the insurer
permits the insurer to void the policy. Major Oil
Corp. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 457 F.2d
596, 602 (10th Cir.1972) (applying Utah law).
However, "[a]n insurance company cannot escape
liability on a policy if it is established that there
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should have been no actual reliance on the
applicant's misrepresentation, concealment, or
omission." Hardy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 763 P.2d
761, 770 (Utah 1988) (citing Major Oil Corp., 457
F.2d at 602).
[5] Effective July 1, 1986, Southwest entered into
an insurance contract with Great-West to provide
group health and life insurance for Southwest's
employees. In order to be insured, each individual
employee was required to submit an application.
Mrs. Perkins' application stated that her date of fulltime employment was January 1, 1970, and that she
was a full-time employee.
Relying on this
information, Great-West paid seven health benefit
claims submitted by the Perkins. According to the
terms of the Great-West's policy, however, Mrs.
Perkins would not have been classified as an
"employee," and should not have been enrolled,
inasmuch as she was not a full-time, full pay
employee working a minimum of 32 hours per
week. Great-West discovered that Mrs. Perkins was
not eligible to be insured when Southwest submitted
a Life Claim Form, which stated that Mrs. Perkins'
last day of active employment was June 3, 1986.
After learning of Mrs. Perkins' employment status,
Great-West immediately denied the life insurance
claims and refunded all premiums previously paid
on Mrs. Perkins' behalf.
"It would be unjust to both the employee and the
insurance carrier if the law were that when the
insurance carrier once undertakes to provide medical
or other care for an injured workman it has lost all
right to afterwards defend against what it believes to
be an unjust or illegal claim." Larson v. Wycoff
Co., 624 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Utah 1981) (quoting
Harding v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 83 Utah
376, 381, 28 P.2d 182, 184 (1934)). Great-West
has a right to deny claims it deems to be illegal or
unjust, even after paying them. There is nothing to
indicate that Great-West was unreasonable in relying
on the representations regarding Mrs. Perkins'
employment status, and it should not be estopped
from denying Mr. Perkins' life insurance claim
simply because it paid previous health benefit claims
in reliance on false information.
Lack of Reasonable Reliance
[6] [7] "A party claiming an estoppel cannot rely on
representations or acts if they are contrary to his
knowledge of the truth or if he had the means by

Copyright (c) West Group 2001 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

814 P.2d 1125, Perkins v. Great-West Life Assur. Co., (Utah App. 1991)
which with reasonable diligence he could ascertain
the truth." Larson v. Wycqff Co., 624 P.2d 1151,
1155 (Utah 1981) (citing Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24
Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 356 (1970)). Mrs. Perkins
had the means by which she could have ascertained
the contents of Great-West's policy. Southwest had
received booklets which clearly delineated the terms
of the policy. The booklets were given to Southwest
for distribution to its employees. With reasonable
diligence, Mrs. Perkins could have easily learned
that she was not eligible for coverage under *1131.
Great-West's insurance policy. Given Mrs. Perkins'
failure to learn the terms of her insurance policy,
her reliance thereon was not reasonable.
Extension of Coverage
[8] The great majority of states dealing with the
doctrine of estoppel have held that it cannot be used
to bring risks which were not covered by the terms
of the policy within coverage of the policy. See,
e.g., Farmers Ins. Co. v. Zumstein, 138 Ariz. 469,
675 P.2d 729 (Ariz.App. 1983); Topeka Tent and
Awning Co. v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 13 Kan.App.2d
553, 774 P.2d 984 (1989); Boyer Metal Fab, Inc.
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 90 Or.App. 103, 750
P.2d 1195, review denied, 305 Or. 672, 757 P.2d
422 (1988); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v.
Albany County Dist. No. I, 763 P.2d 1255
(Wyo.1988).
Under group insurance plans,
insurance companies rely heavily on the assumption
that active employees are insurable risks, and for
this reason limiting provisions are included in their
policies. See 1 Appleman, Insurance Law and
Practice § 44 (1981). The terms of Great-West's
policy expressly limited coverage to active
employees, and "[i]t does not seem unreasonable
that there be some rules as to eligibility so that
coverage would be only upon the regular employees
of the work force...." Marriot v. Pacific Nat'I Life
Assurance Co., 24 Utah 2d 182, 467 P.2d 981, 983
(1970). Great-West's policy clearly did not extend
coverage to disabled employees.
Great-West
contracted with Southwest to extend insurance
coverage to active employees only, and it took steps
to ensure that Southwest and its employees were
aware of the terms of the policy by publishing and
distributing a booklet which described the rules and
benefits of the policy. Allowing estoppel in this
case would unjustifiably extend coverage to risks
which Great-West did not contract to cover.
Express Eligibility Limitation Language
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[9] Additionally, if we estop Great-West from
denying coverage, we would encourage companies
to enroll all employees without regard to their
eligibility or to the express terms included in
insurance policies. The actual terms of the policies
which limit coverage to active employees would be
meaningless. Here, Southwest could unilaterally
determine which employees were active or full-time,
merely by keeping them on the payroll. Endorsing
such an approach would be patently unfair, and we
decline to do so.
For the above reasons Great-West cannot be
estopped from denying coverage simply because
they mistakenly paid claims submitted by an
ineligible employee.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's order granting Mr. Perkins'
motion for summary judgment and denying GreatWest's motion for summary judgment was in error,
and the same is reversed and remanded with
instructions to enter summary judgment for GreatWest. The trial court's finding that Great-West
acted in bad faith is likewise reversed.
Furthermore, the dismissal of Great-West's crossclaim against Lincoln National and its corresponding
motion for summary judgment was also in error and
is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Additionally, Mr. Perkins' action against Lincoln
National, which was not addressed in the trial
court's order, must also be considered on remand.
BENCH and GARFF, JJ., concur.
(FN1.) The parties dispute who actually paid the
premiums. Mr. Perkins alleges that his wife paid
the premiums to Great-West, however, there is no
evidence in the record to support this allegation.
To the contrary, the uncontroverted evidence
shows that Great-West's policy was noncontributory, meaning that the employer paid the
entire premium. An affidavit submitted by GreatWest also indicates that the premiums paid by
Southwest on Mrs. Perkins' behalf were returned
to Southwest. This is not a material dispute
because the relevant provisions in the written
policy remain the same no matter who pays the
premiums.
(FN2.) Great-West thereby fulfilled its duty as to
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delivery of the booklets to Southwest's employees.
When a policy of group insurance has been issued
and the insurer has provided the employer with
certificates of insurance and copies of the
insurance policy for distribution to employees, the
insurer does not have a duty to personally see that
each employee actually receives his or her copy.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-311(l)(c) (1991) states:
The certificate shall be provided in a manner
reasonably calculated to bring it to the attention of
the certificate holder. The insurer ... may deliver
or mail them in bulk to the policyholder to transmit
to the certificate holders. An affidavit by the
insurer that it has mailed the certificate in the usual
course of business creates a rebuttable presumption
that it has done so.
Since neither Mr. Perkins nor Lincoln National has
offered any evidence to oppose Great-West's
affidavit, we must assume that the booklets were

Page 7

delivered as required.
*1131_ (FN3.) All parties conceded at oral
argument that the trial court erred in finding that
Great-West's actions were in bad faith. Since we
reverse the trial court's ruling herein, it is readily
apparent that Great-West's denial of benefits was
not in bad faith. Therefore, we also reverse the
trial court's ruling that Great-West's actions were
in bad faith.
(FM.) EDGE Booklet at I.
(FN5.) Id. at 17.
(FN6.)/d. a t l .
(FN7.) Id. at 12.
(FN8.) Id.
(FN9.) Id. a t l .
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*266 909P.2d266
Court of Appeals of Utah.
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS
REHABILITATION, INC., fka
Professional Therapy, Inc., Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS
MEDICINE, a Utah general
partnership; Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C., a Utah
professional corporation; and Thomas D.
Rosenberg, M.D.,
P.C., a Utah professional corporation, general
partners,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 940417-CA.
Dec. 21, 1995.
Physical therapy corporation brought action against
defendant partnership of physicians for failure to pay
amounts allegedly due upon subsequent "sale" of
sports medicine business, as provided for in
agreement
terminating
professional
services
contract.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Homer F. Wilkinson, J., granted summary
judgment for defendant, and denied plaintiff's
"motion to reconsider."
Plaintiff appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Davis, Associate P.J., held that:
(1) plaintiff's substantive motion for new trial tolled
period for filing appeal; (2) new joint venture
which acquired business was "third party" for
purposes of agreement; and (3) defendant obtained
consideration for sale of business' assets.
Reversed and remanded.
Bench, J., concurred and dissented, and filed
opinion.
West Headnotes
[1] Appeal and Error <s^>934(l)
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(G) Presumptions
30k934 Judgment
30k934(l) In General.
In determining propriety of grant of summary
judgment, facts are viewed in light most favorable to
position of losing party. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
56(c), 28 U.S.C.A.

[2] Appeal and Error <®^842(2)
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(2) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.
Trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed for
correctness.
[3] Motions <@=>39
267 —
267k39 Reargument or Rehearing.
Rules of civil procedure do not provide for
"motion for reconsideration" of trial court's ruling;
however, motions so entitled could be considered if
they could have properly been brought under some
rule and were merely incorrectly titled.
[4] Appeal and Error <®^345.1
30 —
30VII Transfer of Cause
30VII(A) Time of Taking Proceedings
30k343 Commencement of Period of Limitation
30k345.1 Motion for New Trial.
[See headnote text below]
[4] New Trial <S^ 124(1)
275 —
275III Proceedings to Procure New Trial
275k 124 Requisites of Motion in General
275kl24(l) In General.
Although plaintiff in breach of contract action
improperly entitled motion as "motion for
reconsideration," after adverse decision on summary
judgment, motion was in essence motion for new
trial, and therefore filing motion tolled period for
filing appeal; trial judge ruled on the motion as if it
were motion for new trial. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
59(a).
[5] Joint Adventures <&* i. i
224 —
224kl.l Nature of Relation in General.
Like partnerships, joint ventures are distinct and
separate legal entities. U.C.A.1953, 48-1-3.1(1, 2).
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[6] Contracts <@=^202(1)
95 —
9511 Construction and Operation
9511(C) Subject-Matter
95k202 Trade and Business
95k202(l) In General.
Even though defendant partnership was member of
new joint venture, new joint venture was separate
legal entity and as such was "third party" for
purposes of defendant partnership's obligation to pay
upon subsequent sale of sports medicine business to
"third party," under agreement terminating
professional services contract between plaintiff
physical therapy corporation and defendant
partnership of physicians.
[7] Contracts <@^202(1)
95 —
9511 Construction and Operation
9511(C) Subject-Matter
95k202 Trade and Business
95k202(l) In General.
Defendant partnership of physicians received
consideration for sale of assets of sports medicine
business, for purposes of obligation to pay former
business associate upon subsequent sale of business,
where defendant partnership was paid for one half of
assets and received one half interest in new joint
venture which assumed complete management
control of business.
*267 John C. Green and Kim M. Luhn, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant.
Mark O. Morris and Jeffrey T. Sivertsen, Salt
Lake City, for Appellees.
Before DAVIS, BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ.
DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Appellant, Salt Lake Knee & Sports
Rehabilitation, Inc. (Rehabilitation) challenges the
trial court's order granting summary judgment to
appellees, Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine
(Physicians), a general partnership; and its general
partners, Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C., a Utah
professional corporation (Paulos); and Thomas D.
Rosenberg, M.D., P.C., a Utah professional
corporation (Rosenberg). We reverse and remand.
FACTS

v. Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine,
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Rehabilitation and Physicians formerly worked
together providing medical and physical therapy
services at the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center
(Center) located at 670 East 3900 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah, under the terms of a professional
services agreement. On May 22, 1989, these parties
entered into a termination agreement and purchase
agreement (Agreement) which terminated the
parties' professional services contract. Paragraph
eleven of this Agreement stated:
Purchase of Center. It is agreed that if within two
(2) years from the date of this Agreement,
Physicians sells the Center to any third party,
Rehabilitation shall be entitled to one-third ( 1/3)
of that portion of the purchase price which is
attributed to good will. 'Sale' shall be defined as a
transfer wherein the purchaser acquires and pays
consideration for all of the following:
The
Center's lease on the Leased Premises, ownership
of the name 'Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center,'
all of the equipment and other assets located at the
Center, the Center's patients and accounts
receivable, and whereby the purchaser assumes
complete operational control of the business of the
Center and continues operating under the same
name at the same location.
On May 24, 1990, Physicians entered into an asset
purchase agreement with IHC Hospitals (IHC)
pursuant to which Physicians sold IHC an undivided
one-half interest in the Center. Physicians and IHC
then formed a joint venture called "Sports Medicine
West" and transferred their respective one-half
interests thereto.
The joint venture continued to do business at the
Center's location and it temporarily retained
Physicians as its agent to manage and operate the
business. At some point in time, Sports Medicine
West changed the Center's name from "Salt Lake
Sports Medicine Center" to "Sports Medicine
West." The parties dispute precisely when Sports
Medicine West changed the Center's name, however
it is undisputed that the name was not changed until
at least one year before the action in this case was
filed, approximately October 1990.
On October 4, 1991, Rehabilitation filed a
complaint for declaratory relief, alleging that the
transactions between IHC and Physicians constituted
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a "sale" under paragraph eleven of the Agreement.
Physicians filed a motion for summary judgment on
June 15, 1993, and Rehabilitation filed a countermotion for summary judgment shortly thereafter.
After hearing oral argument on the motions, the
trial court permitted further briefing on the parties'
interpretations of the meaning of "sale" as defined
by the Agreement. On November 15, 1993, the
court heard additional oral argument on the subject
and ruled that to constitute a sale, the transaction
"must include all of the following ... items [from
paragraph eleven]. And from those items, it must
... [include] all of the equipment and assets, and
they [the purchaser] must have complete operational
control." The court ruled that the transfer of onehalf of the interest in the Center to IHC *268 was
not a sale and rejected Rehabilitation's argument that
the transfer of all assets to the joint venture was a
"sale."
Therefore, the court granted summary
judgment in favor of Physicians on November 15,
1993.
Rehabilitation filed a "motion for reconsideration"
of the trial court's ruling on November 29, 1993.
The trial court heard the motion on January 28,
1994, and again ruled in favor of Physicians. An
order to this effect was entered on March 14, 1994.
On April 11, 1994, Rehabilitation filed this appeal.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1][2] There are essentially two issues presented on
appeal. The first issue concerns the timeliness of
Rehabilitation's appeal. "[I]t is axiomatic in this
jurisdiction that failure to timely perfect an appeal is
a jurisdictional failure requiring dismissal of the
appeal." Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply
Co., 676 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah 1984). The second
issue presented is whether the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment to Physicians based
upon its conclusion that the transaction between IHC
and Physicians was not a "sale" within the meaning
of paragraph eleven of the Agreement. Summary
judgment is appropriate in a case where the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with any affidavits,
show there is no genuine issue of material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Warburton v.
Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 899 P.2d
779, 781 (Utah App. 1995). In determining the
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propriety of a grant of summary judgment, we view
the facts in the light most favorable to the position of
the losing party. Warburton, 899 P.2d at 781. We
review the trial court's legal conclusions for
correctness. Id.
ANALYSIS
1. Timeliness of the Appeal
[3] Physicians argues that Rehabilitation's motion
for reconsideration did not toll the running of the
time in which to appeal, and hence Rehabilitation's
appeal was untimely. (FN1) It is by now well
established that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
do not provide for a "motion for reconsideration" of
a trial court's ruling. Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v.
Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653 n. 4 (Utah 1994);
accord Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d
1061, 1064 (Utah 1991). Nonetheless, we have
"reviewed motions so entitled if they could have
properly been brought under some rule and were
merely incorrectly titled." Shields, 882 P.2d at 653
n. 4; see also Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884
P.2d 1306, 1310 n. 2 (Utah App. 1994) (noting that
"the substance, not caption, of a motion is
dispositive in determining the character of the
motion").
[4] In this case, Rehabilitation captioned its motion
as a motion for reconsideration. However, our
review indicates that the substance of the motion
was essentially identical to a motion for new trial
under Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Specifically, Rehabilitation argued that
the trial court made several errors of law which are
grounds for relief under Rule 59(a)(7). In addition,
by conducting a hearing and reaffirming its legal
conclusions, the trial court ruled upon the motion as
if it were a motion for a new trial. Therefore, as in
Watkiss & Campbell,
[u]nder the facts of this case, the incorrect title
placed upon the pleading was not a bar to
defendant's case. Indeed, the record reflects that
the judge ruled on the motion as if it were a
motion for a new trial. Because the court treated
the motion to reconsider as a motion for a new
trial, we conclude that the filing of the motion
tolled the time in which to file an appeal.
Id. at 1064-65 (footnotes omitted).
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We conclude that Rehabilitation's motion to
reconsider is substantively a motion for a *269
new trial, and as such it tolled the time for filing an
appeal. Rehabilitation's appeal was thus timely.
(FN2)
2. Summary Judgment
The trial court granted Physicians's motion for
summary judgment on the basis that a "sale" to a
"third" party within the meaning of paragraph
eleven of the Agreement had not occurred. The
court stated it was "unpersuaded" by Rehabilitation's
argument that all of the assets were transferred to
the new joint venture, Sports Medicine West. Thus,
the only transfer considered by the court was the
transfer of one-half of the interest in the Center to
IHC. Because a transfer of less than "all" of the
interest in the Center does not trigger the "sale"
definition in paragraph eleven, the court granted
summary judgment to Physicians.
The trial court's rationale for rejecting
Rehabilitation's argument that all of the assets were
transferred to the joint venture, Sports Medicine
West, is unclear. Physicians claims, however, that
because it is a co-owner of Sports Medicine West,
the joint venture cannot be a "third party" within the
meaning of paragraph eleven. We disagree.
[5] A joint venture is defined as "an association of
two or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a
single business enterprise." Utah Code Ann. §
48-1-3.1(1) (1994). Joint ventures are subject to the
same rules as partnerships. Id. § 48-1-3.1(2);
Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 759 n. 1 (Utah
1984); Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 218 (Utah
App. 1990). Based upon the statutes governing
partnerships, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that
partnerships are distinct and separate legal entities.
See Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 161 P.2d 499,
501 (Utah 1988) (noting several sections of the
Uniform Partnership Act treating partnership as a
separate legal entity); Walllnv. Co. v. Garden Gate
Distrib., Inc., 593 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah 1979)
(noting partnership is legal entity distinct from
partners). Because these statutes apply equally to
joint ventures, it follows that joint ventures are also
distinct and separate legal entities. See Sine, 767
P.2d at 501 (concluding that joint ventures have
capacity to sue in their own names, relying on
authority treating partnerships as distinct entities).
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[6] We therefore conclude that, under Utah law,
joint ventures are separate legal entities. Our
conclusion is consistent with rulings in several other
jurisdictions. See Fairbanks N. Star Borough v.
Kandik Constr., Inc., 795 P.2d 793, 802 (Alaska
1990) (inferentially holding that joint venture is a
separate legal entity), vacated in part on other
grounds, 823 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1991); First State
Serv. Corp. v. Hector's Concrete Constr., Inc., 168
Ariz. 442, 814 P.2d 783, 783 (App. 1991) (joint
venture is a separate legal entity); C.H. Leavell &
Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 450 P.2d 211, 214 (Okla.1968)
(same); Lawler v. Dallas Statler-Hilton Joint
Venture, 793 S.W.2d 27, 33 (Tex.Ct.App. 1990)
(same). (FN3) But see Lewis v. Gardner Eng'g
Corp., 254 Ark. 17, 491 S.W.2d 778, 779 (1973)
(joint venture not a separate legal entity); Elting
Ctr. Corp. v. Diversified Title Corp., 306 So.2d
542, 543 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App. 1974) (same), cert,
denied, 321 So.2d 554 (Fla.1975). As a separate
legal entity, Sports Medicine West is a "third party"
within the meaning of paragraph eleven.
[7] In addition, Physicians was paid by IHC for an
undivided one-half interest in its assets, and it
received a one-half interest in the joint venture for
the other one-half of the assets. Therefore, the
paragraph eleven requirement that consideration be
paid for the assets was also satisfied. Sports
Medicine West also has complete operational control
of the Center as evidenced by the terms of the
*270. Management Agreement stating that Sports
Medicine West had complete "day-to day"
operational control of the rehabilitation business.
Finally, according to the parties, the only
remaining issue is whether the joint venture
continued operating the business under the name
"Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center."
The trial
court did not reach this issue, (FN4) notwithstanding
disputed, material facts, having resolved the matter
on the issue of sale of assets. Because of the
existence of disputed material facts, the issue of
whether the joint venture continued to operate the
business under the same name is remanded to the
trial court for determination.
CONCLUSION
The joint venture Sports Medicine West is a
distinct and separate legal entity from Physicians,
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and from Paulos and Rosenberg, the general
partners of Physicians. As such, it is a "third
person" within the meaning of paragraph eleven. In
addition, consideration was paid for the assets and
Sports Medicine West assumed full operational
control of the Center. Thus, we reverse the trial
court's grant of summary judgment to Physicians
based upon the finding that only one-half of the
assets were transferred to IHC. It appears that
material issues of fact exist regarding the question of
whether Sports Medicine West continued to operate
the Center under the same name. We therefore
remand the matter for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
BILLINGS, J., concurs.
BENCH, Judge (concurring and dissenting):
I concur in holding that this appeal was timely
filed. I dissent, however, from the reversal of the
summary judgment.
As to the timeliness of the appeal, I agree that
Rehabilitation's "motion for reconsideration" was
essentially a Rule 59 motion for a new trial. See
State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah App.)
(holding substance of post-judgment motion
controls, not caption), cert, denied 883 P.2d 1359
(Utah 1994). We have previously held that a motion
for a new trial may properly be filed following entry
of a summary judgment. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n,
Inc. v. Ultrasystems W. Constrs., Inc., 767 P.2d
125, 127 (Utah App. 1988). Our rules explicitly
provide that "the time for appeal for all parties shall
run from the entry of the order denying a new trial."
Utah R.App.P. 4(b). The filing of a motion under
Rule 59 therefore tolls the time for filing a notice of
appeal.
On the merits, I disagree with the main opinion's
analysis and result.
The contract between the
parties provides that Physicians will share the sale
proceeds attributable to "good will" only when
Physicians sell the entire Center to a third party. In
the transaction involving IHC, Physicians clearly
retained an ownership interest in the Center.
The fact that the Center is now operated as a joint
venture does not lead to the result reached by the
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main opinion. The joint venture statute provides
that the only way Physicians can participate in a
joint venture is if it is a co-owner. See Utah Code
Ann. § 48-1-3.1(1) (1995) ("[a] joint venture is an
association of two or more persons to carry on as
co-owners of a single business enterprise.")
(emphasis added). Since Physicians indisputably
remains a co-owner of the Center, it has not sold it
as contemplated by paragraph eleven of the parties'
agreement.
I would therefore affirm the summary judgment.
(FN1.) We have considered Physicians's other
arguments on this issue, including the contentions
that Rehabilitation simply filed a motion for
clarification and that there is some significance to
be attached to the timing of the entry of the
summary judgment order, and reject them as being
without merit. See State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291,
303 (Utah 1992); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886,
888-89 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 858,
116 S.Ct. 163, 133 L.Ed.2d 105 (1995).
(FN2.) Notwithstanding our conclusion, we are not
approving the use of pleadings identified as
something not provided for in the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Such a practice could seriously
compromise the position of a litigant where a
"motion for reconsideration," for example, was
not substantively a motion enumerated under Rule
4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, or
where other litigants or third parties acted or failed
to act in reliance only on the name of the pleading
possibly obtained from a docket entry.
*270_
(FN3.) Louisiana has not adopted the
Uniform Partnership Act, but also considers joint
ventures to be separate legal entities.
West
Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd. v. Gulf States Utils.
Co., 486 So.2d 808, 811 (La.Ct.App. 1986).
(FN4.) The trial court also did not reach the
subsidiary issue of whether to strike the affidavits
submitted by Rehabilitation. We note however,
that even if the trial court had struck
Rehabilitation's affidavits, the affidavit submitted
by Physicians establishes nonetheless that the name
of the business remained unchanged for several
months.
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902 P.2d 629, Sevy v. Security Title Co. of Southern
*629 902P.2d629
Supreme Court of Utah.
Harold SEVY and Winona Sevy, Plaintiffs and
Petitioners,
v.
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY OF SOUTHERN
UTAH, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 930484.
Sept. 6, 1995.
Vendors brought action alleging that title company
was negligent in not protecting their security interest
in water stock. The Sixth District Court, Garfield
County, Don V. Tibbs, J., entered judgment for
vendors, and title company appealed. The Court of
Appeals, 857 P.2d 958, reversed. Certiorari was
granted, 870 P.2d 957.
The Supreme Court,
Howe, J., held that: (1) doctrine of issue preclusion
was applicable to require parties to abide by Court
of Appeals' decision in prior case that vendors had
to take possession of water stock certificate to
perfect their security interest; (2) trial court's
conclusion that vendors neither knew nor should
have known of title company's negligence until after
limitations period had run was not contrary to great
weight of evidence; (3) exceptional circumstances
allowed discovery rule to toll statute of limitations
for bringing negligence claim against title company
until after purchasers' creditor brought action
against vendors for declaration that creditor held
perfected security interest in water stock free from
any claims of vendors; and (4) issue as to whether
vendors were entitled to attorney fees under
Consumer Sales Practices Act was not properly
before Court.
Court of Appeals vacated in part.
Zimmerman, C.J., and Stewart, Associate C.J.,
concurred in the result.
West Headnotes
[1] Judgment <®=>540
228 —
228XIII Merger and Bar of Causes of Action and
Defenses
228XIII(A) Judgments Operative as Bar
228k540 Nature and Requisites of Former
Recovery as Bar in General.
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[See headnote text below]
[1] Judgment <@=>634
228 —
228XIV Conclusiveness of Adjudication
228XIV(A) Judgments Conclusive in General
228k634 Nature and Requisites of Former
Adjudication as Ground of Estoppel in
General.
Doctrine of res judicata embodies two separate
theories called issue preclusion and claim
preclusion.
[2] Judgment <®^>634
228 —
228XIV Conclusiveness of Adjudication
228XIV(A) Judgments Conclusive in General
228k634 Nature and Requisites of Former
Adjudication as Ground of Estoppel in
General.
Issue preclusion, sometimes referred to as
collateral estoppel, prevents parties from relitigating
issues resolved in prior related action.
[3] Judgment <@^>634
228 —
228XIV Conclusiveness of Adjudication
228XIV(A) Judgments Conclusive in General
228k634 Nature and Requisites of Former
Adjudication as Ground of Estoppel in
General.
Party seeking to invoke doctrine of issue
preclusion must satisfy four requirements: party
must show that issue challenged in case at hand is
identical to issue decided in previous action; issue
in previous action must have been decided in final
judgment on merits; issue in previous action must
have been competently, fully, and fairly litigated;
and opposing party in action at hand must have been
either party or privy to previous action.
[4] Judgment <@=>642
228 —
228XIV Conclusiveness of Adjudication
228XIV(A) Judgments Conclusive in General
228k635 Courts or Other Tribunals Rendering
Judgment
228k642 Appellate Courts.
Prior decision of Court of Appeals, that vendors
had to take possession of water stock certificate to
perfect their security interest, was applicable, under
doctrine of issue preclusion, in vendors' subsequent
action alleging that title company was negligent in
claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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not protecting security interest in stock, despite
subsequent Supreme Court decision in another case
finding that recordation of trust deed is sufficient to
perfect security interest in water stock, where issues
in prior case and present case were identical, Court
of Appeals' decision was final judgment on merits,
parties adequately litigated issue in prior case, and
vendors and title company were both losing parties
in prior case.
[5] Judgment <S=>715(1)
228 —
228XIV Conclusiveness of Adjudication
228XIV(C) Matters Concluded
228k715 Identity of Issues, in General
228k715(l) In General.
Issue preclusion prevents relitigation of same issue
even if same claims for relief in two actions are
different.
[6] Judgment <®=>642
228 —
228XIV Conclusiveness of Adjudication
228XIV(A) Judgments Conclusive in General
228k635 Courts or Other Tribunals Rendering
Judgment
228k642 Appellate Courts.
Court of Appeals' decision was final judgment on
merits, for purpose of doctrine of issue preclusion,
where judgment was not further appealed or
remanded, nor was it determined on basis of
unrelated procedural issue, but, rather, Court
examined substantive arguments and based its
decision on related case law.
[7] Judgment <®=>652
228 —
228XIV Conclusiveness of Adjudication
228XIV(A) Judgments Conclusive in General
228k652 Judgment by Default.
Issue was properly litigated in prior case, for
purposes of doctrine of issue preclusion, even
though defendant allowed default to be entered in
action and other parties did not demand that
defendant appear and defend action.
[8] Limitation of Actions <S=>43
241 —
24III Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(A) Accrual of Right of Action or Defense
241k43 Causes of Action in General.
General rule regarding statutes of limitations is
that limitations period begins to run when last event
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necessary to complete cause of action occurs.
[9] Appeal and Error <©=> 1008.1(8.1)
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and
Findings
30XVI(I)3 Findings of Court
30kl008 Conclusiveness in General
30kl008.1 In General
30kl008.1(8) Particular Cases and Questions
30kl008.1(8.1) In General.
[See headnote text below]
[9] Limitation of Actions <S=> 199(1)
241 —
241V Pleading, Evidence, Trial, and Review
241kl99 Questions for Jury
241kl99(l) In General.
Issue of when claimant discovered or should have
discovered facts forming basis of cause of action is
question of fact in determining applicability of
discovery rule for tolling commencement of
limitations period, and fact finder's conclusion
cannot be overturned on appeal unless it is clearly
erroneous.
[10] Limitation of Actions <©=* 199(1)
241 —
241V Pleading, Evidence, Trial, and Review
241kl99 Questions for Jury
241kl99(l) In General.
Whether discovery rule tolled limitations period
for vendors to bring action alleging that title
company was negligent in not protecting security
interest in water stock did not become issue of law
simply because some "undisputed facts" indicated
that vendors should have become aware of their
injury at closing, given vendors' factual
presentations to the contrary and parties' serious
dispute in the matter; rather, case involved "classic
factual dispute" that should be resolved by finder of
fact.
[11] Appeal and Error <©=> 1094(5)
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(L) Decisions of *629 Intermediate
Courts
30kl093 Review of Questions of Fact
30kl094 In General
30kl094(5) Review on Appeal from Decision
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Reversing Trial Court or Referee.
Supreme Court could find that Court of Appeals
correctly decided that trial court clearly erred in
ruling on applicability of discovery rule to toll
statute of limitations only if that ruling contradicted
great weight of evidence or if Supreme Court was
left with definite and firm conviction that mistake
had been made.
[12] Limitation of Actions <@=>197(2)
241 —
241V Pleading, Evidence, Trial, and Review
241kl94 Evidence
241kl97 Weight and Sufficiency
241kl97(2) Ignorance, Trust, Fraud, and
Concealment of Cause of Action.
Trial court's conclusion that vendors should not
have known of title company's negligence in not
protecting their security interest in water stock at
time of closing was not contrary to great weight of
evidence, for purpose of determining whether
limitations period for bringing negligence action had
been tolled under discovery rule. U.C.A.1953,
78-12-25(3).
[13] Limitation of Actions <®=>95(1)
241 —
24III Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of
Action
241k95 Ignorance of Cause of Action
241k95(l) In General;
What Constitutes
Discovery.
[See headnote text below]
[13] Limitation of Actions <©=> 104(1)
241 —
24III Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of
Action
241kl04 Concealment of Cause of Action
241kl04(l) In General.
Discovery rule for tolling limitations period applies
in three situations: (1) where it is mandated by
statute; (2) where defendant concealed facts or
misled claimant, and as result, claimant did not
become aware of cause of action until after
limitation period had run; and (3) exceptional
circumstances where application of general rule
would be irrational or unjust.
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[14] Limitation of Actions <®=>95(1)
241 —
24III Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of
Action
241k95 Ignorance of Cause of Action
241k95(l) In General;
What Constitutes
Discovery.
Balancing test for determining whether exceptional
circumstances exist that warrant application of
discovery rule to toll limitations period weighs
hardship imposed on claimant by application of
statute of limitations against any prejudice to
defendant resulting from passage of time.
[15] Limitation of Actions <@=>95(1)
241 —
24III Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of
Action
24lk95 Ignorance of Cause of Action
241k95(l) In General;
What Constitutes
Discovery.
Some factors that Supreme Court considers in
applying balancing test for determining whether
exceptional circumstances exist so as to trigger
discovery rule for tolling limitations period include
whether defendant's problems caused by passage of
time are greater than plaintiff's problems, whether
defendant performed technical service that plaintiff
cannot reasonably have been expected to evaluate,
and whether claimant has aged to point that
witnesses cannot be located, evidence cannot be
found, and parties cannot remember basic events.
[16] Limitation of Actions <@=*95(8)
241 —
24III Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of
Action
241k95 Ignorance of Cause of Action
241k95(8) Title to or Interest in Property.
Exceptional circumstances allowed discovery rule
to toll statute of limitations for vendors to bring
action, which alleged that title company was
negligent in not protecting their security interest in
water stock, until purchasers' creditor brought
action against vendors for declaration that creditor
had perfected security interest in water stock free
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from claims by vendors. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25(3).
[17] Certiorari <@=>42(1)
73 —
7311 Proceedings and Determination
73k42 Petition or Other Application
73k42(l) Formal Requisites and Necessity in
General.
Issue as to whether vendors were entitled to
attorney fees against title company under Consumer
Sales Practices Act was not properly before
Supreme Court, where vendors failed to request
review of Court of Appeals' decision overturning
trial court's award of fees in their petition for writ
of certiorari; rather, questions presented in petition
all dealt strictly with application of discovery rule
for tolling limitations period. U.C.A.1953, 13-11-1
to 13-11-23; Rules App. Proc, Rule 49.
[18] Certiorari <@^42(1)
73 —
7311 Proceedings and Determination
73k42 Petition or Other Application
73k42(l) Formal Requisites and Necessity in
General.
Appellate procedural rule stating that although
statement of issues presented in petition for writ of
certiorari will be deemed to comprise every
subsidiary question fairly included therein, only
questions set forth in petition or fairly included
therein will be considered by Supreme Court, should
be construed broadly to avoid rigid exclusion of
reviewable issues, however peripheral.
Rules
App.Proc, Rule 49.
*631 Robert F. Orton and Mark F. Bell, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiffs.
Bruce A. Maak, Jeffrey J. Hunt, Salt Lake City,
and J. Bryan Jackson, Cedar City, for defendant.
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
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v. Security Title Co., 857 P.2d 958, 963 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993).
In 1981, the Sevys sold Kyle and Cindy Stewart
approximately thirteen acres of farmland in Garfield
County, Utah, along with thirty-nine shares of Long
Canal Company stock that provided irrigation water
to the land. The purchase price was $25,000 for the
land and the water shares, with a down payment of
$5,000 and the balance payable in annual
installments. Both parties intended that the Sevys
would convey title to the land and the water shares
to the Stewarts and the Stewarts would give the
Sevys a lien on the land and the water shares to
secure the balance of the unpaid purchase price.
The parties engaged Security Title to prepare the
documents of sale, transfer, and security. It
prepared a warranty deed to convey the land and the
water shares from the Sevys to the Stewarts, a
promissory note in the amount of $20,000 from the
Stewarts to the Sevys, and a deed of trust with
assignment of rents (the trust deed) against the land
and the water shares to secure the promissory note.
According to industry practice at the time, it should
have perfected the security interest in the water
shares by recording the trust deed at the county
recorder's office and delivering a certificate for
thirty-nine shares of water stock to the Sevys.
Although it recorded the trust deed, it mistakenly
delivered the certificate to the Stewarts rather than
to the Sevys.
After it closed the transaction, the Stewarts
borrowed money from the Lockhart Company and
delivered the certificate to it to secure the loan.
Lockhart accepted the certificate and filed a
financing statement to secure its interest in the water
shares with the Utah State Division of Corporations
and Commercial Code. The Stewarts eventually
defaulted on their loan, and Lockhart assigned all of
its rights against the Stewarts to Associates Financial
Services of Utah, Inc.

HOWE, Justice:
We granted certiorari to review the court of
appeals' decision that the statute of limitations bars
plaintiffs Harold and Winona Sevy's negligence
action against defendant Security Title Company of
Southern Utah. The decision reversed the trial
court's judgment awarding the Sevys damages
against Security Title for negligently failing to
protect their security interest in water shares. Sevy

After defaulting, the Stewarts petitioned for
bankruptcy, and the trustee abandoned any interest
in the thirty-nine shares of water stock. Seeking to
foreclose on its security interest in the shares,
Associates filed a lawsuit against the Sevys and
Security Title in district court, asking the court to
declare it the holder of a valid, perfected security
interest in the shares, free from any claims by the
Sevys or Security Title. Security Title made no
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appearance in the action, and the court entered a
default judgment against it. The court also granted
Associates' motion for *632 summary judgment
against the Sevys. The Sevys appealed, and we
poured the case over to the court of appeals. That
court affirmed the judgment, holding that water
stock is a "certified security" under Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-9-105(l)(i) and that the Sevys must have
taken possession of the stock certificate to perfect
their security interest. Associates Fin. Servs. v.
Sevy, 776 P.2d 650, 652 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
Meanwhile, the Stewarts defaulted on their
promissory note to the Sevys. The Sevys took
possession of the farm and brought this action
against Security Title for negligently failing to
protect their security interest in the water shares.
The district court, noting that the statute of
limitations for negligence actions is only four years,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3), found that more
than eight years had passed since Security Title had
closed the transaction between the Sevys and the
Stewarts.
However, the court held that the
discovery rule applied to toll the statute of
limitations until the Sevys discovered that Associates
claimed a security interest in the shares. The court
further held that Security Title had breached its duty
to the Sevys and awarded them damages. Security
Title appealed to the court of appeals, which
reversed the judgment. We granted the Sevys'
petition for a writ of certiorari. Sevy v. Security
Title, 870 P.2d 957 (Utah 1994).
About three months before hearing oral arguments
for this case, we decided Salt Lake City Corp. v.
Cahoon & Maxfield Irrigation Co., 879 P.2d 248
(Utah 1994). In Cahoon, this court disavowed
Associates Financial and held that water stock is not
a certified security but an interest in real property.
Id. at 252. Therefore, recording a trust deed is
sufficient to perfect a security interest, and Security
Title arguably could not be liable to the Sevys for
negligence because it had properly recorded that
document. After hearing oral arguments, we asked
the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing
the issue of whether Cahoon or Associates Financial
should govern this case.
I. RES JUDICATA
[1] The Sevys contend that this court is precluded
from applying the decision in Cahoon to this case
because the doctrine of res judicata requires the
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parties to abide by the court of appeals' decision in
Associates Financial. The doctrine of res judicata
embodies two separate theories called issue
preclusion and claim preclusion.
Madsen v.
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). We will
begin by analyzing the relationship between this case
and Associates Financial under the theory of issue
preclusion.
[2] [3] Issue preclusion, sometimes referred to as
collateral estoppel, prevents the parties from
relitigating issues resolved in a prior related action.
Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Utah
1993). The party seeking to invoke this doctrine
must satisfy four requirements. First, the party
must show that the issue challenged in the case at
hand is identical to the issue decided in the previous
action. Second, the issue in the previous action
must have been decided in a final judgment on the
merits. Third, the issue in the previous action must
have been competently, fully, and fairly litigated.
Fourth, the opposing party in the action at hand
must have been either a party or privy to the
previous action. Id.
[4] We find that the first requirement is met
because the issues in this case and in Associates
Financial are identical. The issue which the district
court and the court of appeals addressed in
Associates Financial was whether the Sevys had a
perfected security interest in the water stock that
was superior to that of Stewarts' creditors.
Associates Fin. Servs., 776 P.2d at 651. The issue
presented here, which is whether in this action this
court should apply the court of appeals' resolution of
that issue or the resolution advanced in Cahoon, is
essentially the same.
[5] Security Title argues that the first requirement
is not met because the remedy sought in Associates
Financial is different from the remedy sought in this
case. It points out that in Associates Financial,
Associates pleaded for authorization to foreclose on
the water shares without interference from the Sevys
or from Security Title. In this case, the Sevys are
pleading for damages *633 from Security Title for
negligently failing to perfect their security interest.
Although we acknowledge this difference, it does
not prevent the application of issue preclusion. It is
well settled that issue preclusion prevents relitigation
of the same issue even if the claims for relief in the
two actions are different. Penrod v. Nu Creation
Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983). In
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support of its assertion to the contrary, Security
Title cites Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah
1983), in which this court referred to the theory of
claim preclusion under the general term of res
judicata and explained that the relitigation of claims
is precluded only when both suits involve the same
cause of action. Id. at 1340 (citing Searle Bros. v.
Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978)). Security
Title fails to notice, however, that we later clarified
that the separate theory of issue preclusion, or
collateral estoppel, often "arises from a [different
cause of action and prevents parties or their privies
from relitigating facts and issues in the second suit
that were fully litigated in the first suit." Id.
Therefore, Schaer does not support Security Title's
argument.
[6] In examining the second requirement of issue
preclusion, we find that the court of appeals'
decision in Associates Financial was a final
judgment on the merits. The judgment was not
further appealed or remanded, nor was it determined
on the basis of an unrelated procedural issue. See
Robinson v. Myers, 599 P.2d 513, 515 (Utah 1979)
(explaining that a judgment based on a procedural
issue does not constitute a judgment on the merits).
Rather, the court of appeals examined the
substantive arguments and based its decision on
related case law.
[7] Third, the issue of whether the Sevys had a
superior security interest in the water shares was
competently, fully, and fairly litigated in Associates
Financial. Security Title argues that the issue was
not properly litigated because it allowed its default
to be entered in the action and the Sevys did not
demand that it appear and defend the action.
However, Security Title's failure to defend its
position in Associates Financial bears no relationship
to whether the issue was competently, fully, and
fairly litigated by the Sevys and Associates
Financial. We find nothing in the record or in the
Associates Financial decision which indicates that
the parties did not adequately litigate the issue.
Thus, we reject Security Title's argument.
Finally, we find that the fourth requirement is met
because the Sevys and Security Title were both
losing parties in Associates Financial.
See
Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah
1983) (implying that issue preclusion is applicable
only if it is being evoked against a party who lost in
the prior action).
Because the Sevys have
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demonstrated that all four elements of issue
preclusion are met in this case, we find that the
ruling of Associates Financial, not Cahoon, applies
to this case. Thus, we need not examine whether
the elements of claim preclusion are met.
Security Title argues that this court should apply
Cahoon rather than Associates Financial to this case
because judicial decisions are generally applied both
prospectively and retrospectively. Heslop v. Bank
of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 835 (Utah 1992); Malan v.
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 676 (Utah 1984). It points out
that the only exception to this rule is if "there has
been justifiable reliance on the prior state of the law
or ... retroactive operation of the new law may
otherwise create an undue burden." Van Dyke v.
Chappell, 818 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Utah 1991).
However, we need not examine whether Cahoon
applies under the general rules of retroactive
application because, as we have just explained, the
theory of issue preclusion applies to bind these
parties to the decision of Associates Financial.
Having determined that this case is governed by
the court of appeals' decision in Associates
Financial, we turn to the issues originally presented
for review. The first issue is whether the discovery
rule tolls the statute of limitations to the time when
the Sevys first learned of Associates' claim of a
security interest in the water shares. The second is
whether the Sevys are entitled to attorney fees under
the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act.
We
address each of these issues separately.
*634 II. DISCOVERY RULE
The Sevys contend that the court of appeals erred
in overturning the trial court's conclusion that the
discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations until
Associates brought its action against them and
Security Title. Security Title counters that the
discovery rule should not apply because the Sevys
should have known of its failure to perfect their
security interest in the water shares. It further
asserts that by the time the Sevys filed this action,
key witnesses no longer recalled critical facts of the
transaction and essential documents, including the
Stewarts' loan file, were lost.
[8] As Security Title points out, "[Statutes of
limitations 'are designed to promote justice by
preventing surprises through the revival of claims
that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has
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been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared.' " Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84,
86 (Utah 1981) (quoting Order ofR.R. Telegraphers
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342,
348-49, 64 S.Ct. 582, 586, 88 L.Ed. 788, 792
(1944)). The general rule regarding statutes of
limitations is that the limitation period begins to run
when the last event necessary to complete the cause
of action occurs. Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese,
668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983). Under that rule,
" 'mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of
action does not prevent the running of the statute of
limitations.' " Id. (quoting Myers, 635 P.2d at 86).
The discovery rule is an exception to the general
rule, and it delays the running of the limitation
period " 'until the discovery of facts forming the
basis for the cause of action.' " Warren v. Provo
City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992)
(quoting Myers, 635 P.2d at 86).
A. Knowledge of Negligence
The first step in determining whether the discovery
rule applies is to examine whether the Sevys made
the threshold showing that they did not know, nor
should have known, of Security Title's negligence at
the time of the closing. See id. ("[A]n initial
showing must be made that plaintiff did not know of
and could not reasonably have known of the
existence of the cause of action in time to file a
claim within the limitation period."). The Sevys
assert that this issue is a question of fact and that the
court of appeals failed to meet the "clearly
erroneous" standard in overturning the trial court's
conclusion that they neither knew nor should have
known of the negligence. See Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a).
Security Title counters that the court of appeals did
not need to meet the clearly erroneous standard
because this issue could have been decided as a
question of law. It points out that it presented some
pertinent facts that were undisputed by the Sevys
and argues that because these facts clearly show that
the Sevys discovered or reasonably should have
discovered the negligent conduct at closing, the issue
may be decided as a matter of law. In support of
this argument, Security Title cites Love v. Fire
Insurance Exchange, 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1142,
271 Cal.Rptr. 246, 248 (1990); Reider v. Dawson,
856 P.2d 31, 33 (Colo.Ct.App. 1992), aff'd, 872
P.2d 212 (1994); Reis v. Cox, 104 Idaho 434, 438,
660 P.2d 46, 50 (1982); Witherspoon v. Guilford,
203 Mich.App. 240, 243, 511 N.W.2d 720, 722,
appeal denied, 525 N.W.2d 451 (1994); Holman v.
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Hansen, 237 Mont. 198, 773 P.2d 1200, 1203
(1989); Grubb Properties, Inc. v. Simms Investment
Co., 101 N.C.App. 498, 501, 400 S.E.2d 85, 88
(1991); Warren, 838 P.2d at 1129; and Klinger v.
Rightly, 791 P.2d 868, 869 (Utah 1990).
[9][10] We hold that the issue of when a claimant
discovered or should have discovered the facts
forming the basis of a cause of action is a question
of fact, and the fact finder's conclusion cannot be
overturned on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous.
Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah
1993); Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah 2d 199, 202,
436 P.2d 435, 437 (1968). We cannot accept
Security Title's assertion that this issue becomes an
issue of law simply because some "undisputed facts"
indicate that the Sevys should have become aware of
their injury at closing, despite the Sevys' factual
presentations to the contrary and the parties' serious
dispute in the matter. As this court stated in
Andreini, 860 P.2d at 919, "This is a classic factual
dispute that should be resolved by the finder of
fact."
*635 Further, we are not persuaded by the cases
cited by Security Title in support of its argument.
We acknowledge that two Utah cases support the
principle that trial courts may, as a matter of law,
determine whether particular actions or omissions
are crucial to the application of the discovery rule to
particular causes of action. See Warren, 838 P.2d at
1129 (requiring one injured in airplane crash to take
reasonable steps to determine whether municipality
was complying with its flying regulations); Klinger,
791 P.2d at 872 (explaining that the requirement that
claimants use due diligence to discover facts
underlying the cause of action does not require
property owners to assume that survey is
inaccurate). However, we are not asked to make
such a determination in this case, and this principle
is irrelevant to the issue at hand. Most of the other
cases cited by Security Title hold that the question of
when a plaintiff should have discovered a cause of
action is a question of law only when no issues of
material fact exist. Love, 111 Cal.Rptr. at 248;
Reis, 660 P.2d at 50; Witherspoon, 511 N.W.2d at
722; Grubb, 400 S.E.2d at 88. However, in the
instant case, issues of material fact exist. Both
parties made extensive presentations of facts tending
to support their respective conclusions about when
the Sevys should have discovered Security Title's
negligence, and we cannot say that these parties do
not dispute this issue.
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[11] Next, we examine whether the court of
appeals correctly decided that the trial court's ruling
on this issue was clearly erroneous. We can make
this finding only if the ruling contradicts the great
weight of evidence or if court reviewing the
evidence is left with "a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made." State v. Walker,
143 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). Although the court
of appeals appears to have used the clearly
erroneous standard in its review, we cannot agree
with its reversal of the trial court's conclusion.
[12] The court of appeals held that although the
Sevys did not have actual knowledge of Security
Title's negligence until Associates commenced its
action, they should have known of the negligence at
the time of the closing. Sevy, 857 P.2d at 963.
The court ruled that the trial court's conclusion to
the contrary was clearly erroneous. Id. In support
of its holding, the court of appeals cited the
following facts:
Mr. Sevy knew the water stock had been
transferred to the Stewarts' name.... Mr. Sevy
knew or should have known there was no ongoing
escrow at Security Title because there was no
document reflecting any ongoing escrow given to
him at closing.... Mr. Sevy testified that he knew
he did not receive the certificate representing the
39 shares of water stock, which had been
transferred into the Stewarts' name. Nothing
prevented the Sevys from asking Security Title
about the 39 share water stock certificate and how
Security Title was protecting their interest in those
water shares. In addition, as an officer of the
Long Canal Company for more than forty years,
Mr. Sevy knew the water stock certificate was
valuable and transferable. In fact, Mr. Sevy kept
his own certificate in a safe deposit box.
Id.
We conclude that these facts do not support the
holding that the trial court's conclusion is contrary
to the great weight of evidence. The trial court
relied upon a body of facts equal in weight to those
relied upon by the court of appeals. The trial court
cited those facts as follows:
Members of the general public rely generally on
title insurance companies to properly prepare
documents and conduct real estate transactions and
closings and further rely on what they are told by
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title companies with respect to real estate
transactions....
[Harold] Sevy relied on Security Title to protect
him by providing in said transaction a good and
valid first lien in his favor against the real property
and shares of water stock being sold and
transferred to Stewart....
Harold Sevy[ ] is a farmer, does not have a
formal education, and relied on Security Title to
prepare proper documents and secure his first lien
against the real property and water stock. Said
Plaintiff had, prior to said transaction, been an
*636 officer of The Long Canal Company, but
had no knowledge regarding how to transfer shares
and how to perfect security interests therein....
Winona Sevy[ ] did nothing more in this
transaction than sign documents as requested by
her husband, Harold Sevy.
Moreover, the trust deed indicated that both the
land and the water shares were secured, and Mr.
Sevy testified that he thought the recording secured
them. Further, he had successfully relied upon the
expertise of Russell Dalton, Manager of Security
Title, in the past. We cannot find that these facts
are so insignificant that they give rise to a "definite
and firm conviction" of error. See Walker, 743
P.2d at 193. Therefore, we vacate the court of
appeals' ruling on this issue and affirm the trial
court's conclusion that the Sevys neither knew nor
should have known of Security Title's negligence
until after the limitation period had run.
B. Exceptional Circumstances
[13] Having made this determination, we must
examine whether the circumstances of this case
trigger the application of the discovery rule. The
discovery rule applies in three situations: (1) where
it is mandated by statute, (2) where the defendant
concealed the facts or misled the claimant and, as a
result, the claimant did not become aware of the
cause of action until after the limitation period had
run, and (3) exceptional circumstances where the
application of the general rule would be "irrational
or unjust." Warren, 838 P.2d at 1129.
[14] [15] The Sevys argue that exceptional
circumstances exist in this case. "The ultimate
determination of whether a case presents exceptional
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circumstances that render the application of a statute
of limitations irrational or unjust" is a balancing test.
Id. The balancing test weighs the hardship imposed
on the claimant by the application of the statute of
limitations against any prejudice to the defendant
resulting from the passage of time. Myers, 635
P.2d at 87. Some factors this court considers in
applying this test include whether the defendant's
problems caused by the passage of time are greater
than the plaintiff's, whether the defendant performed
a technical service that the plaintiff cannot
reasonably have been expected to evaluate, and
whether the claim has aged to the point that
witnesses cannot be located, evidence cannot be
found, and the parties cannot remember basic
events. See Klinger, 791 P.2d at 872; Myers, 635
P.2d at 87.
[16] We hold that exceptional circumstances in this
case support the application of the discovery rule.
As the Sevys point out, the task of perfecting a
security interest requires technical knowledge not
possessed by people in general, and the nature of
this task is such that a negligent failure to perform it
properly may not be discovered until years later. In
Klinger, 791 P.2d at 872, we relied in part upon a
similar argument to allow the discovery rule to toll
the statute of limitations. In that case, buyers of
real property brought an action against a surveyor
who had negligently surveyed their property. We
noted that because surveying requires technical
knowledge and yields intangible results, the buyers
had "no reason to suspect that the survey was
inaccurate." Id. We also noted that the surveyor's
difficulties in litigating the action were that "no
survey records or notes [were] available after
fourteen years and, presumably, the memories of the
members of the survey party [had] dimmed....
[However, the] signor on the survey certificate
[was] responsible for its content, [was] still actively
engaged in the practice of surveying, and [was]
available for testimony." Id. After contrasting the
prejudice to the buyers with the hardship to the
surveyor, we concluded that the evidence was "not
so stale or remote as to outweigh the prejudice to"
the vendors in having their claim barred by the
statute of limitations. Id.
Security Title's difficulties in litigating this action
are not greater than those of the surveyors in
Klinger. Security Title asserts that records and
files have been lost and that Russell Dalton,
manager of Security Title, has no recollection of the
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transaction. However, the critical documents are
still available, *637 (FN1) and Dalton is still with
the company and available for testimony.
Therefore, Security Title's difficulties in litigating
this action do not outweigh the prejudice inflicted on
the Sevys by the statute of limitations, which would
credit them with the ability to detect latent flaws in a
technical procedure of which they had no basis of
understanding.
Security Title argues that the same facts relied
upon by the court of appeals in ruling that the Sevys
knew or should have known of Security Title's
negligence also support a finding that exceptional
circumstances do not exist in this case. However,
those facts do not undermine the reasoning outlined
above. They do not reveal any additional difficulties
faced by Security Title, nor do they show that the
Sevys had technical knowledge of how to perfect
security interests, either by virtue of Harold Sevy's
position as an officer of the Long Canal Company or
by virtue of his experience as a farmer. Thus, we
vacate the court of appeals' ruling and affirm the
trial court's ruling that exceptional circumstances in
this case allowed the discovery rule to toll the statute
of limitations until Associates brought their action
against the Sevys. (FN2)
III. ATTORNEY FEES
[17] The Sevys contend that the court of appeals
erred in overturning the trial court's ruling that they
were entitled to attorney fees under the Utah
Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. §§
13-11-1 to -23, for bringing this action. Security
Title counters that this issue is not properly before
this court because the Sevys failed to request review
of this ruling in their petition for a writ of certiorari.
We agree.
[18] Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure states that although the statement of issues
presented in a petition for a writ of certiorari "will
be deemed to comprise every subsidiary question
fairly included therein [,] [o]nly the questions set
forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be
considered by the Supreme Court." We believe
that this rule should be construed broadly to avoid
the rigid exclusion of reviewable issues, however
peripheral. However, in this case, this rule cannot
be stretched to include the issue of attorney fees.
The Sevys presented the following four questions
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for review in their petition:
1. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the trial court and concluding, as a
matter of law, that Petitioners' claim is timebarred because they could and should have
reasonably discovered, before 1987, that the
Respondent had failed to protect their security
interest;
2. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in
failing and refusing to apply the discovery rule to
toll the four year statute of limitations where
Petitioners did not know and should not reasonably
have known of Respondent's professional
negligence and misconduct and suffered no
damages until a time which was less than four
years before they filed suit;
3. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in
concluding that the trial court's findings were
clearly erroneous and/or in failing to remand this
case to the trial court for a determination of when
Petitioners should have discovered Respondents'
professional negligence and misconduct;
4. Whether the issues presented are sufficient to
invoke this Court's judicial discretion and justify
review by writ of certiorari under Rule 46 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

These four questions all deal strictly with the
application of the discovery rule. Therefore, the
issue of attorney fees is not before us.
The court of appeals* decision is vacated, except
for the denial of attorney fees as discussed above.
The judgment of the trial court is reinstated except
for the award of attorney fees in bringing this
action.
*638. RUSSON, J., and WILLIAM
BOHLING, District Judge, concur.

B.

ZIMMERMAN, C.J., and STEWART, Associate
C.J., concur in the result.
DURHAM, J., having disqualified herself, does
not participate herein; WILLIAM B. BOHLING,
District Judge, sat.
(FN1.) The documents still available include the
trust deed, the warranty deed, the note secured by
the trust deed, and the water stock certificate.
(FN2.) The Sevys filed this action on December 27,
1989, about two and a half years after Associates
filed suit against them. Thus, the action was
commenced within the four-year statute of
limitations once it began to run.
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747 P.2d 1044, Sharp v. Riekhof, (Utah 1987)
*1044 747 P.2d 1044
Supreme Court of Utah.
Howard C. SHARP, Max W. Steele and Steven W.
Bergstedt,
Trustees of the Bryner Clinic Employees Profit
Sharing and Pension Trust, Plaintiffs
and Respondents,
v.
F. Tempel RIEKHOF, AFCO Development
Corporation, Frank K.
Stuart, Trustee, David S. Taylor, McKean
Construction
Company, Max A. Barnett, Elsie J. Barnett, Vernon
O.
Anderson, Maxine D. Anderson, Troy Auer Kehl,
Edward F.
Kehl, Sally Ann Kehl, Executone Mountainwest,
Inc., United
Bank, John Does I through X, and Any And All
Other Persons
Who May Claim Any Interest in the Subject of This
Action,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 20117.
Dec. 7, 1987.
Trustees of trusts to which real property was
purportedly deeded brought quiet title action to
remove potential cloud on title against, inter alia,
creditor which had obtained judgment against
transferor of property. The Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., granted
summary judgment for trustees, and creditor
appealed. The Supreme Court held that: (1) trusts
were property interests which could not hold
property, and (2) deed to named grantee, combined
trusts, named nonentity as grantee, and accordingly
conveyed no interest whatever.
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capable of taking and holding title to property, and if
no such person exists, attempted conveyances are
deemed mere nullities.
[2] Trusts <S=> 134
390 -—
390II Construction and Operation
39011(B) Estate or Interest of Trustee and of
Cestui Que Trust
390kl33 Extent of Estate or Interest of Trustee
390kl34 In General.
Trusts are property interests which cannot hold
property.
[3] Deeds <©=> 13
120 —
1201 Requisites and Validity
1201(A) Nature and Essentials of Conveyances in
General
120kl0 Parties
120kl3 Capacity to Take.
Attempted conveyance of land to nonexisting entity
is void.
[4]Deeds<@^13
120 —
1201 Requisites and Validity
1201(A) Nature and Essentials of Conveyances in
General
120kl0 Parties
120kl3 Capacity to Take.
Real property deed to named grantee, combined
trusts, named nonentity as grantee, and accordingly
conveyed no interest whatever; naming of nonentity
as grantee was material defect in deed.
*1045 Richard D. Lamborn, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and appellants.
Bruce J. Nelson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and
respondents.

Summary judgment vacated; case remanded.
PER CURIAM:
West Headnotes
[1] Deeds <@=>13
120 —
1201 Requisites and Validity
1201(A) Nature and Essentials of Conveyances in
General
120kl0 Parties
120kl3 Capacity to Take.
Grantee of deed must be natural or artificial person

This is an appeal from a summary judgment and
order quieting title to real property in respondents.
The underlying facts of this case are undisputed.
On October 2, 1979, AFCO Development
Corporation deeded real property in Salt Lake
County to the "Bryner Clinic Employees' Profit
Sharing and Pension Trusts." As consideration for
the deed, respondents paid AFCO $100,000. The
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deed was recorded on October 4, 1979. On
December 18, 1981, appellant obtained a judgment
against AFCO. To remove the potential cloud on
their title, respondents initiated this action in 1983.
(FN1) Appellant answered alleging, inter alia, that
the 1979 deed is a nullity since a trust was named as
grantee and a trust is not capable of taking and
holding title to property.
Respondents filed a motion for summary
judgment, urging that they were entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Based upon various documents
(including an affidavit) and memoranda on file, the
trial court found as follows: the "Bryner Clinic
Employees Profit Sharing Plan" was organized in
1968, and the "Bryner Clinic, Inc. Employees
Pension Trust" was organized in 1977; Howard C.
Sharp, Max W. Steele, and Steven W. Bergstedt are
the trustees for both entities; and the deed to
"Bryner Clinic Employees' Profit Sharing and
Pension Trusts" was considered by respondents to be
jointly owned by the two entities for which they
served as trustees. The court concluded that the
actual name of the grantee, if incorrect, was not a
material defect as to invalidate the deed since
"[sufficient extrinsic evidence exists to allow proper
identification of the intended grantee." The court
thereupon granted respondents' motion for summary
judgment, quieting title to "Howard C. Sharp, Max
W. Steele and Steven W. Bergstedt, Trustees of the
Bryner Clinic Employees Profit Sharing Plan" and
"Howard C. Sharp, Max W. Steele and Steven W.
Bergstedt, Trustees of the Bryner Clinic, Inc.
Employees Pension Trust" as tenants in common.
Appellant's judgment was held not to have attached
to the property since the deed was recorded more
than two years prior to the date of judgment and
because at the time the judgment was entered,
AFCO had no interest in the property. On appeal,
appellant *1046. requests that this Court reverse
and hold that the 1979 deed is a nullity conveying no
priority to respondents.
[1][2] Appellant argues that the grantee of a deed
must be a natural or artificial person capable of
taking and holding title to property, Burns v.
Grable, 138 Cal.App.2d 280, 291 P.2d 969 (1956),
and that if no such person exists, attempted
conveyances are deemed "mere nullities." Nilson v.
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Hamilton, 53 Utah 594, 174 P. 624 (1918). He
claims that trusts are property interests which cannot
hold property. We agree and vacate the summary
judgment.
[3] [4] An attempted conveyance of land to a
nonexisting entity is void. See Nilson v. Hamilton,
53 Utah at 600, 174 P. at 626, where we held that a
deed which named a deceased person or his estate as
a grantee was void because neither the estate nor the
deceased person was a legal entity. See also Rixford
v. Zeigler, 150 Cal. 435, 88 P. 1092, 1093 (1907),
where it is said:
[A] deed of conveyance is void unless the grantee
named is capable of taking and holding the
property named in the deed; and the general rule
also is that to make a deed effective the grantee
must be a person, either natural or artificial,
capable of taking and holding the property.
Since the deed here named a nonentity as the
grantee, we cannot agree with the trial court that the
deed did not contain "a material defect." The deed
conveyed no interest whatever.
Respondents, in their amended complaint, sought
as alternative relief reformation of the deed so as to
substitute the trustees as the grantees of the deed.
However, the trial court did not reach the claim for
reformation or make any ruling thereon since it
incorrectly concluded that the naming of the trust as
the grantee was not a material defect. Because the
grantee was a nonentity, the defect was material.
The summary judgment quieting title in
respondents is vacated, and the case is remanded to
the trial court for a determination of respondents'
claim for reformation, subject to any defenses
appellant may raise thereto.
DURHAM, J., having disqualified herself, does
not participate herein.
(FN1.) Other judgment creditors of AFCO were
also joined as party-defendants. All of the other
defendants have either executed a disclaimer of
interest in the property or have defaulted by failing
to answer the complaint.
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*542 593 P.2d 542
26 UCC Rep.Serv. 230
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It is burden of party asserting invalidity of
recorded financial statement to perfect security
interest to prove insufficiency of address as a matter
of fact.

Supreme Court of Utah.
WALL INVESTMENT COMPANY, a limited
partnership, with Gordon
Goodsell, general partner, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
GARDEN GATE DISTRIBUTING, INC., Dennis
Vanderlinden, and
Steven Vanderlinden, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 15766.
March 26, 1979.
General partnership brought action for conversion
when judgment creditor, having obtained money
judgment against mortgagor, proceeded under writ
of execution to seize mortgagor's inventory which
was then subject of a "chattel mortgage" in favor of
mortgagee. The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Dean E. Conder, J., entered judgment in
favor of plaintiff, and judgment creditor and others
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, J., held that:
(1) judgment creditor failed to meet burden of
showing invalidity of recorded financial statement
due to insufficient address; (2) limited partnership
could bring suit; (3) partnership's early failure to
comply with assumed name statute did not disqualify
it as plaintiff in suit, and (4) evidence supported
findings that seized inventory had value equal to
award.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Secured Transactions <®=>93
349A —
349AII Perfection of Security Interest
349Ak92 Financing Statement
349Ak93 Addresses.
Fact that chattel mortgage in favor of general
partnership was a post office box did not mean that
mortgage was defective as a financing statement as a
matter of law so that it would not perfect a security
interest.
[2] Secured Transactions <@==>101
349A —
349AII Perfection of Security Interest
349Akl01 Evidence.

[3] Secured Transactions <@^101
349A —
349All Perfection of Security Interest
349Akl01 Evidence.
Judgment creditor claiming invalidity of chattel
mortgage on inventory which creditor seized did not
satisfy its burden of proving that mortgage was
defective due to insufficient address for mortgagee
as judgment creditor failed even to attempt
communication with mortgagee by mail.
[4] Secured Transactions <®^93
349A —
349All Perfection of Security Interest
349Ak92 Financing Statement
349Ak93 Addresses.
An address on chattel mortgage is sufficient if it
would enable a prudent person using reasonable care
to locate the secured party.
[5] Partnership <®=>375
289 —
289VIII Limited Partnership
289k375 Actions by or Against Firms or
Partners.
A limited partnership, as an entity distinct from its
partners, can bring suit in its own name without
identifying its partners. U.C.A.1953, 48-2-26.
[6] Partnership <@=>375
289 —
289VIII Limited Partnership
289k375 Actions by or Against Firms or
Partners.
Limited partnership's early failure to comply with
assumed name statute would not disqualify it as a
plaintiff in action for conversion where partnership
had filed shortly after seizure complained of and
before complaint in matter was filed. U.C.A.1953,
42-2-5.
[7] Secured Transactions <@=* 171
349A —
349AIV Rights and Liabilities of Parties
349Akl71 Actions.
Evidence, in action for conversion, supported
finding that inventory wrongfully seized had value in
excess of $13,914.62, which amount would be
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awarded to plaintiff.
*543 Rodney S. Page of Hess, Palmer, Van
Wagenen & Page, Clearfield, for defendants and
appellants.
Barrie G. McKay, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
respondent.
HALL, Justice:
This action for conversion arose when appellant
Garden Gate Distributing, Inc. ("Garden"), having
obtained a money judgment against one Donald L.
Zimmerman, a dealer in floor coverings and other
home furnishings, proceeded under writ of execution
on February 6, 1976, to seize Zimmerman's floor
covering inventory. The seized inventory was then
the subject of a "chattel mortgage" in favor of
respondent Wall Investment Company ("Wallco").
The mortgage had been filed with the Secretary of
State in compliance with the Uniform Commercial
Code. ([FN1])
On the date of the mortgage and until after the
inventory seizure, Wallco was a general partnership
which had failed to file an assumed name certificate
as our statute ([FN2]) requires. Shortly after the
seizure and before the complaint in this matter was
filed, Wallco became a limited partnership by filing
a Certificate of Limited Partnership with the Utah
County Clerk. Thereafter, Wallco filed an assumed
name certificate with the Secretary of State.
When Wallco sued Garden for wrongful taking of
the Zimmerman inventory, Garden raised as
primary defenses (1) that the mortgage was defective
as a financing statement and therefore failed to
perfect a security interest in that it gave an
insufficient address for Wallco, and (2) that the
plaintiffs, identified in the complaint as "Wall
Investment Company, a limited partnership, with
Gordon Goodsell, general partner," was without
standing to maintain the suit. After non-jury trial,
the trial court resolved the issues associated with
those defenses in favor of Wallco, found the seized
inventory to have had a value in excess of
$13,914.62 (the amount remaining to be paid under
the notes secured by the mortgage) and entered
judgment for Wallco in that amount.
On appeal, Garden asserts that the trial court ruled
erroneously on the primary defense issues and
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further asserts that the evidence does not support the
finding that *544 the seized inventory had a value
as high as the damage award.
[1][2][3][4] The claimed defect in the mortgage is
that it provided an insufficient address for Wallco.
The address on the mortgage instrument is a post
office box. It is not disputed that the identified box
was, at all relevant times, maintained by a general
partner of Wallco. A post office box address is not
insufficient as a matter of law, ([FN3]) and it was
Garden's burden, as the party asserting the invalidity
of the recorded financial statement, to prove the
insufficiency of the address as a matter of fact.
Garden, having failed even to attempt
communication with Wallco by mail, could not
satisfy that burden. An address is sufficient if it
would enable a prudent person using reasonable care
to locate the secured party.
In challenging Wallco's standing to sue, Garden
raises no issue about the limited partnership's
ownership of the property interest which was
originally conveyed by the chattel mortgage to
Wallco as a general partnership.
Garden's
contention is that a partnership, general or limited,
is not a legal entity distinct from its partners and
cannot maintain an action in its own name.
At common law, a partnership was not recognized
as a distinct legal entity. The, partners were
required to join as plaintiffs in actions to enforce
partnership rights.
([FN4])
In Hamner v.
Ballantyne, ([FN5]) this Court concluded that a
partnership was a legal entity distinct from its
partners and affirmed an award against a partnership
in its partnership name. The common law rule has
been criticized as a "useless relic of strict procedural
rules with nothing, apparently, to justify its
continued existence," ([FN6]) and modern tendency
is to depart from it. ([FN7])
[5] We need not decide, for the purposes of this
appeal, whether a general partnership can sue in its
own name.
The plaintiff here is a limited
partnership, not a general one. Limited partnerships
were unknown to the common law and are, like
corporations, creatures of statute. ([FN8]) The
quasi-corporate aspects of a limited partnership and
the quasi-shareholder status of a limited partner are
obvious.
The same reasoning and policy
considerations which justify recognition of
corporations as proper parties plaintiff apply as well
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to limited partnerships. ([FN9]) Moreover, there is
a specific legislative recognition that a limited
partnership, as an entity distinct from its partners,
can bring suit. By statute ([FN10]) it is provided
that "a contributor . . . is not a proper party to
proceedings by . . . a partnership." A limited
partnership may sue in its own name without
identifying its partners; their names and addresses
are a matter of public record or the partnership has
not been validly constituted.
[6] Wallco's early failure to comply with the
assumed name statute does not disqualify it as a
plaintiff in this suit. The only sanction associated
with non-compliance is denial of the non-complying
entity's access to the courts, and that sanction is
removed on compliance. ([FN 11])
[7] Appellant contends that the evidence will not
support the findings that the seized inventory had
value equal to the award. While there were
conflicting value *545. opinions and conflicting
testimony about the quantity of property seized,
there is certainly credible and competent evidence
which supports the finding. We do not, in such
circumstances, substitute our judgment for that of
the trial court. ([FN12])
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(FN1.) U.C.A., 1953, 70A-9-401.
(FN2.)U.C.A., 1953,42-2-5.
(FN3.) Silver v. Gulf City Body and Trailer
Works, 432 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1972).
(FN4.) 60 Am.Jur.2d Partnership, Sec. 322 et seq.
(FN5.) 16 Utah 436, 52 P. 770 (1898).
(FN6.) Eleventh Annual Report of New York
Judicial Council, 1945.
(FN7.) Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat. Bank, 76
N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966).
(FN8.) Ruzicka v. Rager, 305 N.Y. 191, 111
N.E.2d 878 (1953); See 39 A.L.R.2d 288.
(FN9.) Ibid, and see 60 Am.Jur.2d Partnership,
Sec. 390. No. 15766.
(FN10.) U.C.A., 1953, 48-2-26.

Costs to

(FN11.) Piatt v. Locke, 11 Utah 2d 273, 358 P.2d
95 (1961).

CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, WILKINS
and STEWART, JJ., concur.

(FN12.) Fisher v. Taylor, Utah, 572 P.2d 393
(1977); Griffeth v. Zumbrennen, Utah, 577 P.2d
129 (1978).

The judgment is therefore affirmed.
Wallco.
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§13

DEEDS

23 Am J u r 2d

to land.71 However, except where the statutory mode is declared to be
exclusive,72 the efficacy of common-law conveyances and deeds operating by
force of the Statute of Uses is not destroyed. 73
§ 14. Quitclaim; release.
The modern quitclaim deed 74 is lineally descended from a release, 75 the
styling, whether "quitclaim" or "release," being derived from the operative
words, "remise, release and forever quitclaim." 76 But while formerly a release
was appropriate and effective to convey title only where the release was in
rightful occupation of the land,77 this restriction no longer holds good, 78
especially in view of statutes enacted to facilitate the transfer of title to lands. 79
§15. Confirmation deed.
A confirmation deed is somewhat similar to a release in that it confirms the
grantee in his estate free from any claim by the grantor, and thus may operate
to enlarge the grantee's estate or interest. 80 A mistake in describing the land
may be corrected by a confirming deed in which the land intended to be
conveyed is correctly described. 81 A mistake in the omission of parties may also
be corrected by a deed of correction to effectuate the intention of the parties. 82
Thus, the purpose of a correction deed is to admit mutual error and change
the original instrument to conform to the true intent of the parties. 83 O n the
71. Chalker v Chalker, 1 Conn 79; Doe ex 77. Where a quitclaim recited a lease, it was
dem. McConnel v Reed, 5 III 117; Seeck v held that when the quitclaim had become an
ancient deed the existence of the lease would
Jakel, 71 Or 35, 141 P 211.
be presumed. Crane v Lessee of Morris, 31 US
72. Morris v Lessee of Harmer's Heirs, 32 US 598, 8 L Ed 514.
554, 8 L Ed 781 (referring to Ohio statutes).
In some jurisdictions a mere release has
73. Evenson v Webster, 3 SD 382, 53 NW been construed as a conveyance of the releasor's right, title, and interest in order to avoid
747.
invalidity by reason of the ancient rule that a
release was operative only where the releasee
74. § 338.
had an estate or interest in possession. Thorn75. Smith v Pendell, 19 Conn 107; Snow v ton v Mulquinne, 12 Iowa 549; Hunt v Hunt,
Lake's Admr., 20 Fla 656; Doe ex dem. Mc- 31 Mass 374; Pray v Pierce, 7 Mass 381.
Connel v Reed, 5 111 117; Rowe v Beckett, 30
Ind 154; Thornton v Mulquinne, 12 Iowa 549;
78. Jackson ex dem. Bradstreet v Huntington,
Hunt v Hunt, 31 Mass 374; McQuiddv Printing 30 US 402, 8 L Ed 170 (holding that a release
Co. v Hirsig, 23 Tenn App 434, 134 SW2d
to the disseisor by the disseisee is as good a
197; Cook v Smith, 107 T e x 119, 174 SW conveyance as can be executed); Thornton v
1094.
Mulquinne, 12 Iowa 549; Pray v Pierce, 7 Mass
381.
As to what passes by quitclaim, see § 339.
As to after-acquired title passing under quit79. Doe ex dem. McConnel v Reed, 5 111 117.
claim, see §§ 352 et seq.
80. Knight v Dyer, 57 Me 174; Chess v Chess
Practice
Aids.—Quitclaim
deed executed (Pa) 1 Penr & W 32.
pursuant to arbitration award. 3 AM JUR LEGAL
Practice
Aids.—Confirmation
deed—ratificaFORMS 2d, BOUNDARIES § 44:122.
tion of prior deed executed by agent. 7 AM JUR
Release and quitclaim by heir of interest in
cemetery lot. 4 AM J U R LEGAL FORMS 2d, CEME-

TERIES § 54:102.

LEGAL FORMS 2d, DEEDS § 87:42.

—ratification of deed executed under possible

disability.

7

AM J U R LEGAL

FORMS

2d,

76. Van Rensselaer v Kearney, 52 US 297, 13
L Ed 703; Smith v Pendell, 19 Conn 107; Doe
ex dem. McConnel v Reed, 5 111 117; Rowe v
Beckett, 30 Ind 154; Rolette County Bank v
Hanlyn, 48 ND 72, 183 NW 260.

DEEDS §87:43.

Practice

LEGAL FORMS 2d, DEEDS, §§ 87:31 et seq.

83. Neblett v Placid Oil Co. (La App) 257 So
2d 167, cert den 260 La 1121, 258 So 2d 376.

As to statutory and commonly used quitclaim
deeds in particular jurisdictions, see 7 AM JUR

Practice
Aids.—Confirmation
deed—correction of mistakes in prior deed. 7 AM JUR LEGAL

LEGAL FORMS 2d, DEEDS §§ 87:51 et seq.

FORMS 2d, DEEDS § 87:44.

Aids.—Quitclaim deeds. 7 AM JUR

81. § 333.
82. Cox v Tanner, 229 SC 568, 93 SE2d 905.

88
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23AmJur2d

DEEDS

§17

other hand, a deed which does not of itself purport to convey the land will not
operate to confirm the estate of a grantee who has no estate or whose deed is
void.84
§ 16. Endorsement of a previous deed.
The endorsement over of a deed, while sometimes given effect as a conveyance, at least where it otherwise satisfied the minimum requirements for a
deed,85 appears to have generally fallen into disuse as a method of conveying
land.86
HI. FORMAL REQUISITES AS TO CONTENT AND WORDING [§§ 17-25]
§ 17. Generally.
A deed must be drawn in such language as to indicate who is granting the
property, to whom it is granted, and what the property is,87 and it is usual for
the conveyancer to set forth what the deed is intended to express in some
formal manner.88
Generally speaking, when it is agreed between two parties that a deed shall
be given, nothing more can be exacted than an instrument sufficient to pass
the estate of the party who is to give the deed.89 It is not, however, essential to
the validity of an instrument as a deed, or to make it operative to pass title to
land, that it follow any exact or prescribed form of words, provided the
intention to convey is expressed.90 An instrument is sufficient as a deed if it
makes known the transaction between the parties and is executed according to
the statutory requirements of the law where the land is situated.91 No matter
how ungrammatical and untechnical the words of a deed may be, it is
operative to pass title if it sufficiently and legally declares the grantor's
intention92 and contains some apt words importing a grant.93 The tendency has
84. Chess v Chess (Pa) 1 Penr 8c W 32. But
see Boyd Lumber Co. v Mills, 146 Ga 794, 92
SE 534, stating that a void deed may be ratified
by a subsequent writing.

Practice
Aids.—Form
drafting guides and
checklists of matters to be considered in draft-

85. See, for example, New H o m e Bldg. Supply Co. v Nations, 259 N C 6 8 1 , 131 SE2d 425,
wherein a dated, signed and sealed endorsement on the back of a deed to the effect that
"I, A. E. Lundy do hereby transfer this deed in
its entirety to New Home Building Supply
Company Incorporated, with the exception of
pulp wood," was held to be a valid deed.

88. Deslauriers v Senesac, 331 111 437, 163 NE
327 (superseded by statute on another matter
as stated in Minonk State Bank v Grassman,
103 III App 3d 1106, 59 111 Dec 802, 432 NE2d
386), Duffield v Duffield, 268 111 29, 108 NE
673.
As to the form of deed to which the purchaser is entitled under his contract, see 77 Am

86. In strict law an endorsement of words
purporting only to assign rights in and to "the
within d e e d " is inoperative for want of words
to convey the property. Bentley's Heirs v Deforest, 2 Ohio 221.
87. Duffield v Duffield, 268 111 29, 108 NE
673.
"A deed consists of the names of the parties,
the consideration for which the land was sold,
the description of the subject granted, the
quantity of interest conveyed, and lastly, the
conditions, reservations, and covenants, if there
be any." Evenson v Webster, 3 SD 382, 53 NW
747.
As to designation of parties, see §§ 33 et seq.

ing a d e e d . 7 AM JUR LEGAL FORMS 2d, DEEDS,

§§87:13,87:14.

J u r 2d, VENDOR AND PURCHASER § 276.

89. Ketchum v Evertson, 13 Johns (NY) 359.
90. Cross v Weare Com. Co., 153 III 499, 38
NE 1038; Meairs v Kruckenberg, 171 Kan 450,
233 P2d 472, 31 ALR2d 525.
T h e words "bargain and sale" are not necessary to constitute a deed of bargain and sale, in
order to pass a fee simple. Riggs v New Castle,
229 Pa 490, 78 A 1037.
As to endorsement as a deed or method of
conveyancing, see § 16.
9 1 . Sterling v Park, 129 Ga 309, 58 SE 828.
92. Sprague v Edwards, 48 Cal 239; Doe ex
dem. Cobb v Hines, 44 NC 343.
93. Webb v Mullins, 78 Ala 111.
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PARTNERSHIP

59AAmJur2d

14 Am Jur Legal Forms 2d, Partnership §§ 194:228, 194:261, 194:262, 194:263,
194:264, 194:691-194:713, 194:851, 194:875-194:883, 194:911-194:919, 194:931,
194:932
Am Jur Legal Forms 2d, Federal Tax Guide, H1f 161-D-5 et seq., 161-D-31, 161-D-32,
161-D-35, 161-D-36, 162-E-5, 162-E-6, 162-E-15 to 162-E-19, 162-E-21, 162-E-22,
162-E-31 to 162-E-33, 162-E-37, 170-C-25, 171-C-131

1. IN GENERAL [§§ 383,

§383-

384]

Generally

T h e Uniform Partnership Act15 provides that the property rights of a partner
are: (1) his right in specific partnership property; (2) his interest in the
partnership; and (3) his right to participate in the management. 16 These rights
constitute three distinct interests arising from a partnership. 17
§ 384.

Tenancy in partnership

T h e Uniform Partnership Act18 creates a form of property co-ownership
called a tenancy in partnership. 19 This estate is an intangible interest in the
nature of personal property, even if land is one of the partnership's assets. 20 It
is not equivalent to a tenancy in common but converts to that form once the
partnership winds up or terminates. 21 In contrast to the full possessory rights
of a tenant in common, the rights of a tenant in partnership are quite limited
and dependent on the consent of all partners. 22
Under a tenancy in partnership, the partnership, rather than the partners,
owns the firm property, as is apparent from the Act's recognition that all
property brought into the partnership, and property acquired with partnership
funds, is partnership property. 23 It removes the necessity of holding title in the
name of the several partners, as required for a joint tenancy or a tenancy in
common, and their attendant limitations. 24
T h e tenancy created by the Uniform Act has been described as a drastic
change in the law of partnership, 25 but prior law long held that the joint effects
of a partnership belong to the firm, not to the partners, 28 and that a partner
has no individual property in any specific assets of the firm.27
15. UPA § 24.
16. Backowski v Solecki, 112 Mich App 401,
316 NW2d 434; Wilzig v Sisselman, 182 NJ
Super 519, 442 A2d 1021, later proceeding
209 NJ Super 25, 506 A2d 1238, certif den 104
NJ 417, 517 A2d 415 (right to participate in
management as fundamental and a part of
partner's property); Simmons v Quick-Stop
Food Mart, Inc., 307 NC 33, 296 SE2d 275.
17. Stilgenbaur v United States (CA9 Cal) 115
F2d 283, 40-2 USTC 1f 9771, 25 AFTR 966.
18. UPA § 25.
19. Nationwide Resources Corp. v Massabni
(App) 134 Ariz 557, 658 P2d 210, later proceeding (App) 143 Ariz 460, 694 P2d 290;
Omnicon, Inc. v King (Tenn) 688 SW2d 818.
20. § 385.

434

21. Re Minton Group, Inc. (SD NY) 46 BR
222, 12 BCD 811, 11 CBC2d 1442, CCH
Bankr L Rptr H 70*236.
22. Re Minton Group, Inc. (SD NY) 46 BR
222, 12 BCD 811, 11 CBC2d 1442, CCH
Bankr L Rptr f 70236.
23. UPA § 8(1), discussed in § 329.
24. Kentucky Block Cannel Coal Co. v Seweli
(CA6 Ky) 249 F 840, 1 ALR 556; Lueth v
Goodknecht, 345 111 197, 177 NE 690, 79 ALR
780; Curtis v Reilly, 188 Iowa 1217, 177 NW
535.
25. Williams v Dovell, 202 Md 351, 96 A2d
484.
26. Commissioner v Shapiro (CA6) 125 F2d
532, 42-1 USTC 119260, 28 AFTR 1079, 144
ALR 349; State v Elsbury, 63 Nev 463, 175 P2d
430, 169 ALR 364; Egan v American State
Bank (Tex Civ App) 67 SW2d 1081, writ ref.
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A deed ordinarily states the consideration,1 Research References
and the expression of a valuable consideration West's Key Number Digest: Deeds <3=*36
is essential to a deed of bargain and sale. 2
It is, as a general rule, necessary that a
However, a conveyance may be operative and
deed
contain operative words of grant, 1 which
of binding effect even though the consideration
2
is not expressed therein, 3 and a bargain and may be in either the past or the present tense.
therein,
sale deed is good, although it does not express In the absence of words of conveyance
3
4
the
deed
does
not
pass
title.
The
thing
and
that the consideration money has been paid.
the estate granted may be granted either by
The amount of the consideration of the
words contained in the premises or in the
conveyance need not be stated in the conveyhabendum and tenendum, 4 and, although
ance in order to make it a valid one and pass
the title; 5 nor does a false statement of the there are no words of grant in the premises,
consideration operate as a nullification,6 and yet if from the other operative words of the
pass title is manifest, the
this is also true of an intentional concealment deed the intent to
5
7
deed
is
sufficient.
or misrepresentation of the consideration.
While technical words need not be used,6
certain technical words are generally used to
§ 42 Operative w o r d s
pass the interest intended to be conveyed, alA conveyance must contain operative
though other equivalent words may be sufwords of grant, but such words need not be
in any particular clause, nor need technical
words be used.
[Section 41]
1
I1L—Leonard v. Springer, 98 111. App. 530, 1900 WL
3966 (1st Dist. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 197 111. 532,
64 N.E. 299 (1902).
Not voluntary conveyance
Conveyance expressing as consideration money or
thing of value, no matter how small, cannot be held as
matter of law to be voluntary conveyance.
Ga.—Hollomon v. Board of Ed. of Stewart County,
168 Ga. 359, 147 S.E. 882 (1929).
2
Ala.—Crosby v. Baldwin County, 227 Ala. 122, 148
So. 814 (1933).
Recital of five dollars consideration sufficient
Mo.—Key v. Kilburn, 228 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. 1950).
3
Cal.—Pomper v. Behnke, 97 Cal. App. 628, 276 P.
122 (3d Dist. 1929).
S.C.—Knighton v. Des Portes Mercantile Co., 119
S.C. 340, 112 S.E. 343 (1922).
Tenn.—Thornton v. Thornton, 39 Tenn. App. 225,
282 S.W.2d 361 (1955).
Executory contract
Rule of necessity to express some consideration in
conveyance of real estate applies only to executory
contracts.
Ohio—Vale v. Stephens, 25 Ohio App. 523, 5 Ohio L.
Abs. 578, 159 N.E. 114 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1927).
4
N.C—Brocket v. Foscue, 8 N.C. 64, 1 Hawks 64,
1820 WL 157 (1820).
5
U.S.—McLellan v. Penick, 289 F. 366 (CCA. 5th Cir.
1923).
6
Pa.—Dohan v. Yearicks, 253 Pa. 403, 98 A. 611 (1916).

W.Va.—Stephenson v. Kuntz, 131 W. Va. 599, 49
S.E.2d 235 (1948).
7
S.C—Knighton v. Des Portes Mercantile Co., 119
S.C. 340, 112 S.E. 343 (1922).
[Section 42]
1
Ark.—Davis v. Griffin, 298 Ark. 633, 770 S.W.2d 137
(1989).
Va.—Lim v. Choi, 256 Va. 167, 501 S.E.2d 141 (1998).
Intent disclosed by language
In order to pass title to an estate by deed, there must
be operative words which manifest intent to transfer the
property described in the instrument, and the intent must
be disclosed by language of the deed and not by the mere
act of the parties.
W.Va.—Erwin v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 134 W. Va.
900, 62 S.E.2d 337 (1950).
Proper and sufficient words
To enable a deed to operate as an effectual conveyance, there should be proper and sufficient words manifesting an intention to transfer an estate.
W.Va.—Erwin v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 134 W. Va.
900, 62 S.E.2d 337 (1950).
2
Iowa—Pierson v. Armstrong, 1 Iowa 282, 1 Clarke
282, 1855 WL 177 (1855).
Mich.—Stamp v. Steele, 209 Mich. 205, 176 N.W. 464
(1920).
3
Ala.—Lilly v. Earl, 463 So. 2d 143 (Ala. 1984).
4
Ind.—Kenworthy v. Tullis, 3 Ind. 96, 1851 WL 2920
(1851).
5
Mass.—Bridge v. Wellington, 1 Mass. 219, 1804 WL
698 (1804).
6
Va.—Lim v. Choi, 256 Va. 167, 501 S.E.2d 141 (1998).
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ficient.7 As long as creditors and bona fide
purchasers are not defrauded, any words
signifying an intention to sell or give land will
pass the title.8 If a specific purpose is intended,
comprehending a beneficial use and enjoyment; words which describe that purpose will
be sufficient.9 The word "sell," while it is more
apt to describe the passing of the title to personalty than to realty, may be used to indicate
an intent to convey the property named
whether it is real or personal. 10 Where the
purpose of the transaction is stated, the word
will ordinarily have no more effect on the title
than is necessary to accomplish the purpose.11
§ 43

Correction of d e e d b y
subsequent instrument

Except where the grantor has divested
himself or herself of title, a deed may be corrected by a subsequent instrument in the
absence of fraud or the intervention of the
7

Cal.—Olson v. Cornwell, 134 Cal. App. 419, 25 P.2d
879 (1st Dist. 1933).
Use of either "grant" or "convey"
Either the word "grant" or the word "convey" is sufficient as operative word in deed to pass title to present
estate.
Okla.—Higgins v. Oklahoma City, 1937 OK 721, 191
Okla. 16, 127 P.2d 845 (1937).
Omission of "grant"
The word "grant" may be omitted, and other words
plainly manifesting the intent of the grantor that his
estate should pass by the deed may be substituted.
U.S.—Kaleialii v. Sullivan, 242 F. 446 ( C C A . 9th
Cir. 1917).
Quitclaim deeds
(1) The mere declaration of the grantor that he or she
makes a quitclaim deed to the grantee, accompanied by a
description of the land, is not enough.
111.—Legout v. Price, 318 111. 425, 149 N.E. 427 (1925).
(2) A quitclaim deed reciting that for and in consideration of one dollar cash in hand paid, receipt of which
was acknowledged, and other valuable considerations, not
mentioned, grantors quitclaimed to grantees their right,
title, and interest in realty, was not insuiRcient because it
did not contain the words "grant, bargain and sell."
Ark.—Penney v. Long, 210 Ark. 702, 197 S.W.2d 470
(1946).
8
Colo.—Scott v. Brown, 71 Colo. 275, 206 P. 572 (1922).
IU.—Legout v. Price, 318 111. 425,149 N.E. 427 (1925).
Mo.—Monroe v. Lyons, 339 Mo. 515, 98 S.W.2d 544
(1936).
9
Mass.—Johnson v. Rayner, 72 Mass. 107, 6 Gray 107,
1856 WL 5616 (1856).

rights of third persons, where t h e first
instrument could have been reformed in
equity.

Research References
West's Key Number Digest: Deeds <§»43

Where there is no fraud and the rights of
third persons have not intervened, and equity
could have reformed the deed, it may be
amended by a subsequent instrument so as to
effectuate the intention of the parties. 1 This
rule applies to a mistake in the description,2
or to omission of conditions by mutual mistake, 3 or to a deed executed and antedated to
replace a destroyed instrument, even though
done without the grantee's knowledge.4 The
grantor may be compelled to execute the new
deed,5 and the grantee may be compelled to

10

U.S.—Taylor v. Burns, 203 U.S. 120, 27 S. Ct. 40, 51
L. Ed. 116 (1906).
11
U.S.—Taylor v. Burns, 203 U.S. 120, 27 S. Ct. 40, 51
L. Ed. 116 (1906).
[Section 43]
1
Vt.—Lakeview Farm, Inc. v. Enman, 166 Vt. 158, 689
A.2d 1089 (1997).
Purpose of reformation deed
A "correction deed," or "reformation deed" does now
perfectly what was formerly done imperfectly.
Ark.—Mason v. Jarrett, 218 Ark. 147, 234 S.W.2d
771 (1950).
2
Ark.—Lathrop v. Sandlin, 223 Ark. 774, 268 S.W.2d
606 (1954).
Colo.—Munro v. Eshe, 113 Colo. 19, 156 P.2d 700
(1944).
N.J.—Joffe v. Gliksman, 139 N.J. Eq. 369, 51 A.2d
467 (Ch. 1947).
Blanket deed
Even if specific deed contained insufficient description of land conveyed, blanket deed conveying all land
within state belonging to grantor would suffice to cure
any uncertainty of description in the specific deed.
Tex.—Chandler v. Kountze, 130 S.W.2d 327 (Tex.
Civ. App. Galveston 1939), writ refused.
3
Cal.—Cornbleth v. Allen, 80 Cal. App. 459, 251 P. 87
(1st Dist. 1926).
4
Mass.—Marsh v. Austin, 83 Mass. 235, 1 Allen 235,
1861 WL 4441 (1861).
5
Tenn.—Dykes v. Hamilton County, 183 Tenn. 71, 191
S.W.2d 155 (1945).
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receive it.6 The subsequent deed will operate
as a confirmation7 or as a deed of bargain and
sale. 8 New consideration is not necessary as
against the vendor.9 However, the instrument
must be a present conveyance of the property
involved, sufficient of itself to convey title.10
Such new deed may constitute a single
instrument and operate as a destruction of
the original conveyance by consent. 11 As
against third persons an alleged defective
deed can be cured only by a bill in equity, and
not by a confirmation assuming to relate back
to the original deed.12 If, however, a corrected
deed is made pursuant to a decree, and no new
rights are thereby affected, it relates back to
6

Ind.—Leslie v. Slusher, 15 Ind. 166, 1860 WL 4212
(1860).
7
Minn.—Greve v. Coffin, 14 Minn. 345, 14 Gil. 263,
1869 WL 2319 (1869).
8
Ky.—Fauntleroy's Heirs v. Dunn, 42 Ky. 594, 3 B.
Mon. 594, 1843 WL 3496 (1843).
9
Ala.—Hyatt v. Ogletree, 31 Ala. App. 8, 12 So. 2d 397
(1942).
Ky.—East Jellico Coal Co. v. Jones, 141 Ky. 306, 132
S.W. 411 (1910).
Failure of consideration
A conveyance to grantors administratrix was not
required to be set aside because agreement in accordance
with and in consideration of which conveyance was allegedly executed was void, where grantee and his wife who
joined in conveyance did not own property conveyed, but
simply executed deed to clear the record, by deeding to
the grantor's estate the same property they had conveyed
to grantor during his lifetime.
Wash.—Findley v. Findley, 193 Wash. 41, 74 P.2d
490 (1937).
10
Tex.—Blankenship v. Mott, 104 S.W.2d 607 (Tex.
Civ. App. Beaumont 1937), writ dismissed.
11
Ky.—Reid v. Reid, 230 Ky. 835, 20 S.W.2d 1015
(1929).
Mo.—City of St. Joseph ex rel. Forsee v. Baker, 86
Mo. App. 310, 1900 WL 3082 (1900).
Conclusiveness
Where grantee obtains deed of correction, placing
limits to grant which had previously been omitted, last
description is conclusive.
N.Y.—People v. Tompkins- Kiel Marble Co., 269 N.Y.
77, 199 N.E. 10 (1935).
12
U.S.—Johnston v. Jones, 66 U.S. 209, 17 L. Ed. 117
(1861).
Kan.—Kirkpatrick v. Ault, 177 Kan. 552, 280 P.2d
637 (1955).

the date of the first conveyance.13 Where the
grantor has divested himself or herself of title,
although by mistake he or she has not conveyed the title in the way in which he or she
intended, he or she may not by a subsequent
conveyance correct the mistake, there being
no title remaining to convey.14 Also, where
title to the land passes under an instrument,
the subsequent execution of an additional
conveyance does not preclude the grantee from
asserting rights under the original instrument.15
A void deed cannot be confirmed by a subsequent conveyance so as to give it an operative
Ky.—Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hoskins, 273 Ky.
563, 117 S.W.2d 180 (1937).
Construction
Where purchaser's deed to tract which was fully
described purported to except land subsequently in
dispute in purchaser's proceeding against grantor's successor, to settle disputed boundary, but the disputed land
was not in fact excepted because its description was insufficient, and the purchaser claimed the disputed land for
more than ten years under adverse possession, a deed of
correction executed to the purchaser soon after the
purchase which, strictly construed, might not embrace
the land, would be construed in a manner which would
not deprive the purchaser of the disputed land which was
located between the purchaser's dwelling and the public
road.
Ala.—Lauderdale v. Bailey, 236 Ala. 487, 183 So. 648
(1938).
13
Ind.—Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Beck, 152
Ind. 421, 53 N.E. 439 (1899).
14
Kan.—Kirkpatrick v. Ault, 177 Kan. 552, 280 P.2d
637 (1955).
Ky.—Reid v. Reid, 230 Ky. 835, 20 S.W.2d 1015
(1929).
Miss.—Herod v. Robinson, 149 Miss. 354, 115 So. 40
(1927).
Additional servitudes
Where the grantors have previously parted with their
title, they cannot impose additional servitudes by a correction deed.
Mass.—Regan v. Boston Gaslight Co., 137 Mass. 37,
1884 WL 10534 (1884).
15
Ala.—Bethea v. McCullough, 195 Ala. 480, 70 So. 680
(1915).
No new or after-acquired title
Ark.—Mason v. Jarrett, 218 Ark. 147, 234 S.W.2d
771 (1950).
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effect of its own,16 but an intended confirmation may operate as a new conveyance.17 Thus,
a subsequent deed will not operate as a
confirmation of a deed which is void for uncertainty, 18 or for want of delivery,19 or through
mistake in reciting the grantee's name.20 Even
where the first deed is absolutely void for
defective description, a second deed to one who
has acquired an equitable title by payment of
a consideration, containing a sufficient description of the land, perfects the equitable
title into a legal title, and is binding on the
grantor and all holding under the grantor with
notice of the equity.21
Redelivery.
Where a deed has been returned to the
grantor for the purpose of correction of a
mistake in the description, it must be redelivered after correction.22

16

Mass.—Scaplen v. Blanchard, 187 Mass. 73, 72 N.E.
346 (1904).
17
Cal.—Barr v. Schroeder, 32 Cal. 609, 1867 WL 914
(1867).
Tex.—Montgomery v. Hornberger, 16 Tex. Civ. App.
28, 40 S.W. 628 (1897), writ refused.
18
Md.—Blessing v. House's Lessee, 3 G. & J. 290, 1831
WL 2009 (Md. 1831).
19
Cal.—Barr v. Schroeder, 32 Cal. 609, 1867 WL 914
(1867).
20
Cal.—Barr v. Schroeder, 32 Cal. 609, 1867 WL 914
(1867).
21
Ala.—Gantt v. Phillips, 262 Ala. 184, 77 So. 2d 916
(1954).
Tex.—Polk v. Carey, 247 S.W. 568 (Tex. Civ. App.
Beaumont 1922), writ dismissed w.o.j., (Mar. 28, 1923).
22
Mo.—Williams v. Husky, 192 Mo. 533, 90 S.W. 425
(1905).
[Section 44]
1
Ga.—Milner v. Bivens, 255 Ga. 49, 335 S.E.2d 288
(1985).
2
Ky.—Shaver v. EUis, 226 Ky. 806, 11 S.W.2d 949
(1928).
W.Va.—Blake v. Hedrick, 94 W. Va. 761, 120 S.E.
906 (1923).
Disclaimer
i .
A disclaimer under seal, attached to a deed, suf* ficiently indicates that the person so disclaiming joins in
.> the conveyance.
9

2.

Designation
of Parties
a.

§44

and

Description

Grantors

Generally

A conveyance must sufficiently identify
the grantor, although not necessarily by
name or in any particular clause.

Research References
West's Key Number Digest: Deeds <3=>30, 31

It is essential that the deed sufficiently designate the grantor. 1 If, however, the identity
of the grantor is certain from a consideration
of the entire instrument, it is sufficient,2 although he or she is not named in the premises,3 or in the granting clause.4 For example, the identity of the grantor may be
rendered certain by the manner in which the
deed is executed, although the name does not
appear in the body of the instrument. 5
Where the naming of a grantor in a deed is
ambiguous, the execution may evidence the
real intention.6 Further, it is not essential that
Ga.—Caraker v. Brown, 152 Ga. 677, 111 S.E. 51
(1922).
3
Ky.—Shaver v. Ellis, 226 Ky. 806, 11 S.W.2d 949
(1928).
Ohio—Carr's Lessee v. LeHugh, 2 West. L.J. 68, 1
Ohio Dec. Rep. 84, 1844 WL 3183 (Ohio 1844).
4
Ky.—Shaver v. Ellis, 226 Ky. 806, 11 S.W.2d 949
(1928).
N.C.—Berry v. Richmond Cedar Works, 184 N.C.
187, 113 S.E. 772 (1922).
W.Va.—Blake v. Hedrick, 94 W. Va. 761, 120 S.E.
906 (1923).
Conveyance by attorney for owner
A deed, signed in name of owner of land conveyed as
grantor by his or her attorney in fact is properly executed, but granting clause reciting that such attorney in
fact, not owner acting by such attorney, grants and
conveys, does not pass legal title, but equitable title.
Ala.—Jones v. Mitchell, 258 Ala. 651, 64 So. 2d 816
(1953).
5
Ala.—Sherrod v. King, 226 Ala. 522, 147 So. 600
(1933).
Use of pronoun
Use of pronoun "we" in a deed is sufficient as to each
grantor whose name is appended to the deed.
Ala.—St. Clair Springs Hotel Co. v. Balcomb, 215
Ala. 12, 108 So. 858 (1926).
6
Minn.—Shillock v. Gilbert, 23 Minn. 386, 1877 WL
3878 (1877).

f,
*'>

i
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§ 9 ESTOPPEL AND WAIVER

31 C>

former case, but also from litigating what might
have been litigated therein.72
A party is not estopped to deny any fact which
may be recited in a legislative act.73

issue raised in the second suit, on which the ev»
tial force of the former judgment is to be dire
must be identical with the issue, or one off
issues, raised and determined in the first ac'

Identity of issues.
It is essential to an estoppel by record that there
be identity of issues, and this requires that the
III. ESTOPPEL BY DEED
A. IN GENERAL
Estoppel by deed is a bar which precludes:

§ 10. Definition, Nature, and Essentials
Estoppel by deed is a bar which precludes a party from
denying the truth of his deed. It may be invoked only in a suit on

P a ^ V *> * ^ f
^ d } ^ P 1 ™ fr°m
asserting*
a g a i n s t t h e O t h e r a n d his p r i v i e s a n y r i g h t Or tiflg

the deed or concerning a right arising out of it.

in derogation of the deed, or from denying * '
truth of anv material fact asserted in it.75 In or

Library References

.i

Estoppel e=»i2,20-22,22(2,3), 26.
WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following Preface.

Fia.—City of Anna Maria v. Miller, 91 So.2d 333.
Kan.—Woods v. Duval, 99 P.2d 804, 151 Kan. 472.
N.C.—Hardy v. Mayo, 31 S.E.2d 748, 224 N.C 558.
72. Wis.—Great Lakes Trucking Co., Inc. v. Black, App., 477 N.W.2d
65, 165 Wis.2d 162.
73. Ga.—Thornton v. Lane, 11 Ga. 459.
74. Va.—Gilmer v. Brown, 44 S.E.2d 16, 186 Va. 630.
Wis.—Great Lakes Trucking Co., Inc. v. Black, App., 477 N.W.2d 65,
165 Wis.2d 162.
Matters concluded by judgment under doctrine of res judicata see
C.J.S. Judgments § 719.
75. U.S.—Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., D.C.Pa.,
499 F.Supp. 53.
Fla.—Leffler v. Smith, App., 388 So.2d 261, review denied 397 So.2d
778.
Ky.—Hunts Branch Coal Co., Inc. v. Canada, 599 S.W.2d 154.
Mass.—Frawley v. Forrest, 38 N.E.2d 631, 310 Mass. 446, 38 A.L.R.
999.
Mich.—Haab v. Moorman, 50 N.W.2d 856, 332 Mich. 126.
Minn.—Raines v. Village of Alden, 90 N.W.2d 906, 252 Minn. 530.
Mont.—Norman v. State, 597 P.2d 715, 182 Mont. 439.
N.Y.—Kraker v. Roll, 2 Dept., 474 N.Y.S.2d 527, 100 A.D.2d 424.
Ohio—37 Robinwood Associates v. Health Industries, Inc., 547 N.E.2d
1019, 47 Ohio AppJd 156, jurisdictional motion overruled 534
N.E.2d 89, 39 Ohio St.3d 706.
Okl.—Wood v. Sympson, 833 P.2d 1239.
S.C.—Hipps v. Hipps, App., 343 S.E.2d 669, 288 S.C 564.
Tenn.—Denny v. Wilson County, 281 S.W.2d 671, 198 Tenn. 677.
Tex.—Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., App.-Corpus Christi, 769
S.W.2d 625, affirmed 813 S.W.2d 483, rehearing overruled.
W.Va.—Wellman v. Tomblin, 84 S.E.2d 617, 140 W.Va. 342.
Wyo.—Body v. McDonald, 334 P.2d 513, 79 Wyo. 371.

*
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that a deed may give rise to an estoppel, it mu
contain representations or covenants.76 In adcfe
tion, an estoppel by deed may be invoked only in IL
^eed o r concerning a right arising out of
sujt on ^
the deed;

77

t h e r e c a n b e n o e s t o p p e l b y deed

Factors considered
N.D.—McLaughlin v. Lambourn, 359 N.W.2d 370.
Necessity for interest in land
-Si*.
(1) Estoppel by deed presupposes that some interest in land edssT
by sanction of law.
**"^
Ohio—Cleveland Boat Service v. City of Cleveland, 130 N.E.2d 42I/<',
102 Ohio App. 255, 73 Ohio Law Abs. 557, 2 0.0.2d 292, affirmed;
136 N.E.2d 274, 165 Ohio St. 429, 6 O.O. 85.
(2) Void deed as basis of estoppel see infra § 43.
Title cannot be created or acquired by estoppel
U.S.—Butler v. Bazemore, C.A.La., 303 F.2d 188, on remand 227.
F.Supp. 221.
La.—Gibson v. Pickens, 175 So. 600, 187 La. 860.
Necessity for factual assertion or admission
(1) To constitute estoppel by deed, a distinct and precise assertioft
or admission of fact is necessary, so that such estoppel can arise onlf r
where parry has conveyed precise or definite legal estate or right hj[
solemn assurance which he will not be permitted to vary or deaj^
Miss.—Cook v. Farley, 15 So.2d 352, 195 Miss. 638.
(2) Estoppel to deny truth of recitals in deeds see infra § 31-40
76. U.S.—Matter of Ellison Associates, Bkrtcy.N.Y., 13 B.R. 661.1J
affirmed 63 B.R. 756.
N.Y.—Petition of Testan, 281 N.Y.S. 96, 156 Misc. 449.
Okl.—Equitable Royalty Corp. v. Hullet, 243 P.2d 986, 206 Okl. 233.
77. Del.—John Deere Plow Co. of Baltimore v. Pierce Hardware C<*+
36 A.2d 369, 3 Terry 479, 42 Del. 479.
Ga.—Hughes v. Cobb, 23 S.E.2d 701, 195 Ga. 213.
Mass.—Robert v. O'Connell, 169 N.E. 487, 269 Mass. 532.
Ohio—Cleveland Boat Service v. City of Cleveland, 130 N.E.2d 42U
102 Ohio App. 255, 73 Ohio Law Abs. 557, 2 0.0.2d 292, affirmed,.
136 N.E.2d 274, 165 Ohio St. 429, 6 O.O. 85.
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I C . J-P^
ere there is no deed;78 and it cannot be invoked
an action or proceeding in which the form.of the
iment is immaterial and the true nature of the
action can be shown by parol.79
Estoppel by deed promotes the judicious policy
^making certain formal documents final and connive evidence of their contents,80 and is applied
order to avoid circuity of action,81 and to compel
/parties to fulfill their contracts.82
While the doctrine has been held to stem from
e common-law rule of implied warranties,83 it has
|o been held that, fundamentally, the doctrine is
"table in nature,84 and that it was engrafted on
- law for the purpose of preventing wrongs rathJthan to promote them.85 Estoppel by deed
tects an unwitting grantee who takes a conveyce in reliance upon the good title of the grantor
!
en in fact the grantor does not possess legal title
the property purportedly being conveyed.86
wledge.
Where the true state of title to realty is a matter
public record, the requirement that the party
—Equitable Royalty Corp. v. Hullet, 243 P.2d 986, 206 Okl. 233.
I in deed as not working estoppel in collateral action see infra
Mass.—Ecclesiastes 3:1, Inc. v. Cambridge Sav. Bank, 407 N.E.2d
18,10 MassApp.Ct. 377.
Or.—Kohler v. Gilbert, 339 P.2d 1102, 216 Or. 483.
T
N.D.—McLaughlin v. Lambourn, 359 N.W.2d 370.
N.Y.—Petition of Testan, 281 N.Y.S. 96, 156 Misc. 449.
%-McLaughIin v. Lambourn, 359 N.W.2d 370.
>7-Body v. McDonald, 334 P.2d 513, 79 Wyo. 371.
_ Md.—Potomac Dredging Co. v. Smoot, 69 A. 507, 108 Md. 54.
\—Body v. McDonald, 334 P.2d 513, 79 Wyo. 371.
Tr U.S.—Robben v. Obering, C.A.I11., 279 F.2d 381.
'Wyo.—Sharpies Corp. v. Sinclair Wyoming Oil Co., 168 P.2d 565,
;Wyo.341.
Wyo.—Sharpies Corp. v. Sinclair Wyoming Oil Co., 168 P.2d 565,
Wyo. 341.
- Cal.—Schwenn v. Kaye, 2 Dist., 202 Cal.Rptr. 374, 155 C.A.3d

§ 10

seeking estoppel must not only lack knowledge
regarding true state of title, but be destitute of
means of acquiring such knowledge, is not applicable.87
Inducing reliance.
Estoppel by deed requires words or conduct
which induce another to act in reliance thereon88
and to change position.89
Change of position necessary.
It has been held that an estoppel by deed is not
created or enforceable unless there has been a
change in the situation of one of the parties, in
reliance on the deed,90 and that the party asserting
the estoppel must show that he was induced to
change his course or position by reason of statements or representations in the deed so that he will
suffer damage or disadvantage if such statements
or representations are altered.91
Estoppel in pais distinguished.
Estoppel by deed is distinguishable from estoppel in pais,92 in that it appears from the face of the

Ability to induce reliance not shown
Estoppel by deed was inapplicable to prevent grantor from claiming
southern boundary to her property which was different from that
described in 1961 deed to state where grantor was not in position to
induce reliance by subsequent purchaser of adjoining property on
description in deed by which grantor conveyed strip of land to state.
N.H.—Kirkpatrick v. Jones, 446 A.2d 80, 122 N.H. 438.
89. N.H.—Kirkpatrick v. Jones, 446 A.2d 80,122 N.H. 438.
90. Okl.—Skelly Oil Co. v. Butner, 205 P.2d 1153, 201 Okl. 372.
Wyo.—Sharpies Corp. v. Sinclair Wyoming Oil Co., 168 P.2d 565, 62
Wyo. 341.
91. Ala.—Dominex, Inc. v. Key, 456 So.2d 1047.
La.—Funderburk v. Magnolia Sugar Co-op., App., 8 So.2d 374.
Detrimental reliance
U.S.—Shell Oil Co. v. Trailer & Truck Repair Co., Inc., C.A.3(NJ.),
828 F.2d 205.
Reliance shown
Vendee's acceptance of deed and his concurrent promise to pay for
property constitute a reliance on statements in deed which is sufficient
to form basis to estop vendor to claim against vendee or his privies
anything contradictory to any material fact which he has either stated
or failed to declare in document.

McLaughlin v. Lambourn, 359 N.W.2d 370.
Public record as means
•rOflbertson v. Charlson, 301 N.W.2d 144.
Wyo.—Hollabaugh v. Kolbet, 604 P.2d 1359.

La.—Hodges v. Longbell Petroleum Co., 121 So.2d 831, 240 La. 198.

lof words
grantor's 1961 deed conveyed strip of land, but did not
to set southern boundary on grantor's property, words used
"Jpt have "induced" subsequent purchaser of adjoining property
^reliance on them and did not estop grantor from asserting
^thern boundary of her property was different from that dell? 1961 deed.
Patrick v. Jones, 446 A.2d 80, 122 N.H. 438.

92. U.S.—Territory of Alaska ex rel. Commissioner of Veterans'
Affairs v. Guerin, D.C., 140 F.Supp. 440,16 Alaska 238.
La.—Harper v. Learned, 6 So.2d 326,199 La. 398.
N.Y.—Kraker v. Roll, 2 Dept., 474 N.Y.S.2d 527, 100 A.D.2d 424.
Ohio—Hempy v. Brooke, 184 N.E.2d 686, 115 Ohio App. 246, 20
0.0.2d 321.
Okl.—Born v. Bentley, 246 P.2d 738, 207 Okl. 21.
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deed,93 and it does not require all of the elements of
an estoppel in pais.94
The operation of an estoppel by deed is different
in scope from the operation of an estoppel in pais,95
and, unlike estoppels in pais, a technical estoppel
by deed may conclude a party without reference to
the moral qualities of his conduct.96
"Estoppel by warranty."
"Estoppel by warranty" is a species of estoppel
by deed.97 It is an estoppel based on the principle
of giving effect to the manifest intention of the
grantor appearing on the deed, as to the lands or
estate to be conveyed, and of preventing the grantor from derogating from or destroying his own
grant by any subsequent act.98
Mutuality.
It is usual to say that an estoppel by deed must
be mutual, otherwise it will not operate as a bar,
and that unless both parties are bound neither will
be concluded;99 but exceptions and limitations to
this statement will appear in succeeding sections.
Tex.—Rutherford v. McGee, Civ.App., 241 S.W. 629.
Utah—Dowse v. Kammerman, 246 P.2d 881, 122 Utah 85.
"Estoppel in pais" defined see infra § 58.
93. Okl.—Equitable Royalty Corp. v. Hullet, 243 P.2d 986, 206 Okl.
233.
Tex.—Rutherford v. McGee, Civ.App., 241 S.W. 629.
94. U.S.—Territory of Alaska ex rel. Commissioner of Veterans'
Affairs v. Guerin, D.C., 140 F.Supp. 440, 16 Alaska 238.
Ohio—Hempy v. Brooke, 184 N.E.2d 686, 115 Ohio App. 246, 2
0.0.2d321.
Okl.—Born v. Bentley, 246 P.2d 738, 207 Okl. 21.
95. Ohio—Hempy v. Brooke, 184 N.E.2d 686, 115 Ohio App. 246, 2
0.0.2d 321.
96. Ind.—McAdams v. Bailey, 82 N.E. 1057, 169 Ind. 518.
Okl.—Equitable Royalty Corp. v. Hullet, 243 P.2d 986, 206 Okl. 233.
97. U.S.—Jordan v. Marks, D.C.La., 55 RSupp. 204, affirmed 147
F.2d 800.
La.—Lewis v. King, 103 So. 19, 157 La. 718.
98. U.S.—Jordan v. Marks, D.C.La., 55 F.Supp. 204, affirmed 147
F.2d 800.
La.—Gaines v. Crichton, 174 So. 666, 187 La. 345.
N.J.—Condit v. Bigalow, 54 A. 160, 64 N.J.Eq. 504.
Tenn.—Denny v. Wilson County, 281 S.W.2d 671, 198 Tenn. 677.
Tex.—Lowry v. Carter, 102 S.W. 930, 46 Tex.Civ.App. 488, error
refused.
99. Ga.—Cook v. Flanders, 138 S.E. 218, 164 Ga. 279.
Neb.—Department of Banking v. McMullen, 278 N.W. 551, 134 Neb.
338.
N.Y.—Liberty Bank of Buffalo v. High Park Development Co., 236
N.Y.S. 194, 134 Misc. 733, affirmed 234 N.Y.S. 832, 227 A.D. 647.
Tex.—Cone v. Cone, Civ.App., 266 S.W.2d 480, error denied 266
S.W.2d 860, 153 Tex. 149.
Vt.—Smith v. Vermont Marble Co., 133 A. 355, 99 Vt. 384.

§ 11. Estoppel against Estoppel
An estoppel against an estoppel sets the matter at la.
so, the setting up of an estoppel by deed may be prevented'
offset by another such estoppel, or a different form of estopa
against the party seeking to set it up.
Library References
Estoppel <s=>33.

An estoppel against an estoppel sets the matter*
at large,1 the two estoppels destroying or neutralize
ing each other.2 Thus no one can set up an estop?
pel by deed against the estoppel arising from his
own grant; 3 and if both parties claim under the
same person and one is estopped by one deed and
the other is estopped by another deed, both made
by that person, one estoppel offsets the other, and
the rights of the parties are to be adjusted withou
regard to any estoppel.4
The setting up of an estoppel by deed may be
prevented by an estoppel in pais5 or by an estopp
by contract,6 as against the grantee; and an estoppel by the covenants of a deed is overcome by the
Persons for and against whom estoppel by deed arises see infra §§ 4S4
54.
1. Ark.—Jennings v. Russell, 189 S.W.2d 656, 209 Ark. 71.
Cal.—Yuba River Sand Co. v. City of MarysviUe, 177 P.2d 642.
C.A.2d421.
Kan.—Linville v. Nance Development Co., 304 P.2d 453, 180 Kan. 379.^
W.Va.—Rust v. Commercial Coal & Coke Co., 115 S.E. 406, 92 W.VJL
457.
2. Mich.—Shean v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 248 N.W. 892,'
Mich. 535.
*"'
Minn.—Hampshire Arms Hotel Co. v. St. Paul Mercurv & Indemnij
Co., 9 N.W.2d 413, 215 Minn. 60.
Miss.—Hopkins v. Hopkins, 165 So. 414, 278 Miss. 643.
Neb.—Lippincott v. Lippincott, 3 N.W.2d 207, 141 Neb. 186,
A.L.R. 901.
3. U.S.—City of Hoboken v. Pennsylvania R. Co., N.J., 8 S.O.
124 U.S. 656, 31 L.Ed. 543.
Matter of Ellison Associates, Bkrtcy.N.Y., 13 B.R. 661,
63 B.R. 756.
4. N.H.—Carpenter v. Thompson, 3 N.H. 204.
Wash.—Schmidt v. Olympia Light & Power Co., 90 P. 212, 46 Wc
360.
Wyo.—Sharpies Corp. v. Sinclair Wyoming Oil Co., 168 P.2d 5d£
Wyo. 341.
5. Ark.—Jennings v. Russell, 189 S.W.2d 656, 209 Ark. 71.
La.—Gaines v. Tidwell, 2 La.App. 12.
Pa.—Grange Trust Co. v. Shade, 156 A. 620, 102 Pa.Super. 122.
Estoppel in pais or equitable estoppel generally see infra § 58 c^
6. La.—Hodges v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co., 121 So.2d 831, 240,
198.
Estoppel by simple contract generally see infra § 55-57.
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EXHIBIT 4
Statutes of Central Importance to This Appeal
Utah Code Annotated § 17-21-3 (1998)
Utah Code Annotated § 17-21-3 (1999)
Utah Code Annotated §17-21-6(1998)
Utah Code Annotated § 48-1-1 et seq. (1998)
Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-10 (1994)
Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-2 (1994)
Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-102 (1998)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17-20-5

COUNTIES

(5) take charge of and safely keep the seal of the county
clerk, and keep such other records and perform such other
duties as may be prescribed by law.
1993
17-20-5. Report of election and appointment of officers.
Every county clerk shall within ten days after the issuance
by him 0? any certificate of election of elective county officers,
excepting justices of the peace and constables, and after the
issuance by him of any certificate of appointment made to fill
vacancies in elective county offices, excepting justices of the
peace and constables, prepare and forward to the lieutenant
governor a certified report on forms furnished by the lieutenant governor of every such certificate issued as aforesaid.
Every such report shall show the name of the county, the name
of the county office to which the person was elected or
appointed, the date of the election or appointment of such
person, the date of the expiration of the term for which the
person was elected or appointed, the date of the certificate of
election or appointment, and the date of the qualification of
the person so elected or appointed.
i9S4
CHAPTER 21
RECORDER

P:

l.\

•:

1* •

I* •

Section
17-21-1.
Recorder — Document custody responsibility.
17-21-2.
Seal.
17-21-3.
Methods of recordation authorized.
17-21-4.
Certified copies.
17-21-5.
Receipts for documents received for record.
17-21-6.
General duties — Records and indexes.
17-21-7, 17-21-8. Repealed.
17-21-9.
Indexing of deeds and other instruments.
17-21-10. Judgments affecting real estate.
17-21-11.
Notice imparted by recording.
17-21-12. Endorsements required on documents — Appendages in documents to be recorded.
17-21-13. Endorsement of book and page and entry number
in which recorded — Return of instrument,
paper or notice.
17-21-14. Military records — Evidence.
17-21-15. Repealed.
17-21-16. Acknowledgments and administrations of oaths.
17-21-17. Prohibited acts.
17-21-18. Fees must be paid in advance.
17-21-19. Records open to inspection — Copies.
17-21-20. Filing requires recordation — Exception.
17-21-21.
Ownership plats.
17-21-22. Annual revision — Reporting changes in ownership to county assessors — Costs, how borne.
17-21-23. Assessor to return for revision.
17-21-24. Repealed.
17-21-25.
Names of persons signing to be typed or printed
on instruments presented for filing.
17-21-1. Recorder — Document custody responsibility.
The recorder has custody of, and must keep, all books,
records, maps, and papers required by law to be kept or
recorded in the office.
1993
17-21-2. Seal.
The county recorder shall have a seal, to be furnished by the
county legislative body, the impression of which shall contain
the following words: "State of Utah, County Recorder," together with the name of the county in which the same is to be
used.

1993

17-21-3. Methods of recordation authorized.
The recorder must, on the payment of the fees for the 1
record in books provided for the purpose in a fair hand orl
means of a typewriter, camera, microfilm, computer or otl
methods all papers, documents, records and other writj
required or permitted by law to be recorded.
17-21-4. Certified copies.
The county recorder is authorized to make and furnish^
interested persons certified photographic copies of any oft
records in his office upon payment of fees and charges 1
vided therefor. Certified copies of such records may be j
plied to officers of the county for their official use without t
payment of any fee.
17-21-5. Receipts for documents received for recordT|
On the filing of any instrument in writing for record in t
recorder's office the recorder shall when requested givetot
person leaving the same to be recorded a receipt therefor.
17-21-6. General duties — Records and indexes.
Every recorder must keep:
(1) An entry record, in which the recorder shall ii
diately upon receipt of any instrument to be recordecL|
enter in the order of its reception or entry, as the case may j
be, the names of the parties thereto, its date, the hour, thei
day of the month and the year offilingany such statement
and a brief description of the premises, endorsing upon
each instrument a number corresponding with the nuib^
ber of such entry.
>-•-*»&
(2) A grantors' index, in which shall be indexed afll
deeds and final judgments or decrees partitioning or |
affecting the title to or possession of real property, which j
shall show the number of the instrument, the name \
each grantor in alphabetical order, the name of thei
grantee, date of instrument, time of filing, kind of instru-j
ment, consideration, the book and page and entry number^
in which it is recorded, and a brief description of the!
premises.
(3) A grantees' index, in which shall be indexed all]
deeds and final judgments or decrees partitioning or^s
affecting the title to or possession of real property, which *
shall show the number of the instrument, the name of,
each grantee in alphabetical order, the name of the J
grantor, date of the instrument, time of filing, kind .of
instrument, consideration, the book and page and entr/|
number in which it is recorded, and a brief description <"
the premises.
<?2
(4) A mortgagors' index, in which shall be entered allj
mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, and all other instruments 1
in the nature of an encumbrance upon real estate, which 1
shall show the number of the instrument, name of each j
mortgagor, debtor or person charged with the encuin-j
brance in alphabetical order, the name of the mortgagee^ J
lien holder, creditor or claimant, date of instrument, time j
of filing, nature of instrument, consideration, the book ;
and page and entry number in which it is recorded, and a j
brief description of the property charged.
(5) A mortgagees' index, in which shall be entered allj
mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, and all other instruments <
in the nature of an encumbrance upon real estate, which J
shall show the number of the instrument, name of eachl
mortgagee, lien holder, creditor or claimant, in alphabets}
cal order, the name of the mortgagor or person chargedj
with the encumbrance, date of instrument, time of filing^
nature of instrument, consideration, the book and page '^
and entry number in which it is recorded, and a brief j
description of the property charged.
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17-21-1
Section
17-21-12.
17-21-13.
17-21-14.
17-21-15.
17-21-16.
17-21-17.
17-21-18.
17-21-19.
17-21-20.
17-21-21.
17-21-22.

17-21-23.
17-21-24.
17-21-25.

COUNTIES
Recording procedures — Endorsements of entry
number required on documents.
Endorsement of book and page — Return of
instrument.
Military records — Evidence.
Repealed.
Acknowledgments and administrations of oaths.
Prohibited acts.
Fees must be paid in advance.
Records open to inspection — Copies.
Recording required — Recorder may require tax
serial number.
Ownership plats — Use of geographic information systems or computer systems.
Annual revision — Reporting changes in ownership to county assessors — Use of geographic
information systems or computer systems —
Return of plat books.
Assessor to return for revision:
Repealed.
Names of persons signing to be typed or printed
on instruments presented for recording.

17-21-1. Recorder — Document custody responsibility.
The recorder h a s custody of, and shall keep, all books,
records, maps, and papers required by law.
1999
17-21-2. S e a l .
The county recorder shall have a seal, to be furnished by the
county legislative body, the impression of which shall contain
the following words: "State of U t a h , County Recorder," together with the name of the county in which the same is to be
Used.

1993

17-21-3. Original documents or copies of original
documents to be kept by the county.
After accepting a document for recording, receiving the fees
for recording it, and completing recording procedures, the
recorder shall, only if required by statute, keep the original
document or a copy of the original document as a public record
in a form sufficient to meet the requirements of this chapter.
1999

17-21-4. Certified copies.
(1) The county recorder may make and furnish certified
photographic copies of any of the records in the office to an
interested person who pays the applicable fees and charges.
(2) The county recorder shall supply certified copies of any
of the records to the county officer for the officer's official use
without the payment of any fee.
1999
17-21-5. R e c e i p t s for r e c o r d i n g of i n s t r u m e n t s .
Upon recording an instrument, the recorder shall, if requested, give a receipt to a person presenting a n instrument
for recording.
1999
17-21-6. General d u t i e s — R e c o r d s a n d i n d e x e s .
(1) Every recorder shall:

(a) keep an entry record, in which the recorder shall,
upon acceptance of any instrument, enter the instrument
.•: in the order of its reception, the names of the parties to
the instrument, its date, the hour, the day of the month
and the year of recording, and a brief description, and
endorse upon each instrument a number corresponding
with the number of the entry;
(b) keep a grantors' index, in which the recorder shall
index deeds and final judgments or decrees partitioning or
affecting the title to or possession of real property, which
shall show the entry n u m b e r of the instrument, the name
of each grantor in alphabetical order, the name of the

658

grantee, the date of the instrument, the time of recording,
t h e kind of instrument, the book and page, and a brief
description;
'
•••''•'* • >;

(c) keep a grantees' index, in which the recorder shall
index deeds and final judgments or decrees partitioning or
affecting the title to or possession of real property, which
shall show the entry number of the instrument, the name
of each grantee in alphabetical order, the name of the
grantor, the date of the instrument, the time of recording,
the kind of instrument, the book and page, and a brief
description;
i
(d) keep a mortgagors' index, in which the recorder
' shall enter all mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, and other
instruments in the nature of an encumbrance upon real
estate, which shall show the entry number of the instrument, the name of each mortgagor, debtor, or person
charged with the encumbrance in alphabetical order, the
name of the mortgagee, lien holder, creditor, or claimant,
the date of the instrument, the time of recording, the
instrument, consideration, the book and page, and a brief
description;
(e) keep a mortgagees' index, in which the recorder
shall enter all mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, and other
instruments in the nature of an encumbrance upon real
estate, which shall show the entry number of the instrument, the name of each mortgagee, lien holder, creditor, or
claimant, in alphabetical order, the name of the mortgagor or person charged with the encumbrance, the date
of the instrument, the time of recording, the kind of
instrument, the consideration, the book and page, and a
brief description;
(f) keep a tract index, which shall show by description
every instrument recorded, the date and the kind of
instrument, the time of recording, and the book and page
and entry number;
(g) keep an index of recorded maps, plats, and subdivisions;
(h) keep an index of powers of attorney, labeled "powers
of attorney," showing: "the date of recording," "the book,"
"the page," and "the entry number";
(i) keep a miscellaneous index, in which the recorder
shall enter all instruments of a miscellaneous character
not otherwise provided for in this section, showing: "the
date of recording," "the book," "the page," "the entry
number," "the kind of instrument," "from," "to," and "the
parties";
(j) keep an index of judgments, labeled " judgments,"
each page divided into columns headed, respectively,
"judgment debtors," "judgment creditors," "amount of
judgment," "when recorded," and "when satisfied"; and
(k) keep a general recording index in which the recorder shall index all executions and writs of attachment,
and any other instruments not required by law to be
spread upon the records, and in separate columns the
recorder shall enter the names of the plaintiffs in the
execution and the names of the defendants in the execu* tion.
(2) The recorder shall alphabetically arrange the indexes
required by this section and keep a reverse index.
(3) The tract index required by Subsection (l)(f) shall be
kept so that it shows a true chain of title to each tract or
parcel, together with their encumbrances, according to the
records of the office.
(4) Nothing in this section prevents the recorder from using
a single name index if that index includes all of the indexes
required by this section.
199*
s
17-21-7,17-21-8. Repealed.

1963,1997

17-21-9. Indexing of deeds and other instruments.
Deeds and other instruments affecting real estate made by
a United States marshal, a sheriff, master in chancery, special
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17-20-5

(5) take charge of and safely keep the seal of the county
clerk, and keep such other records and perform such other
duties as may be prescribed by law.
1993
17-20-5. Report of election and appointment of officers.
Every county clerk shall within ten days after the issuance
by him oifany certificate of election of elective county officers,
excepting justices of the peace and constables, and after the
issuance by him of any certificate of appointment made to fill
vacancies in elective county offices, excepting justices of the
peace and constables, prepare and forward to the lieutenant
governor a certified report on forms furnished by the lieutenant governor of every such certificate issued as aforesaid.
Every such report shall show the name of the county, the name
of the county office to which the person was elected or
appointed, the date of the election or appointment of such
person, the date of the expiration of the term for which the
person was elected or appointed, the date of the certificate of
election or appointment, and the date of the qualification of
the person so elected or appointed.
1984
CHAPTER 21
RECORDER
Section
17-21-1.
Recorder — Document custody responsibility.
17-21-2.
Seal.
17-21-3.
Methods of recordation authorized.
17-21-4.
Certified copies.
17-21-5.
Receipts for documents received for record.
17-21-6.
General duties — Records and indexes.
17-21-7, 17-21-8. Repealed.
17-21-9.
Indexing of deeds and other instruments.
17-21-10. Judgments affecting real estate.
17-21-11.
Notice imparted by recording.
17-21-12. Endorsements required on documents — Appendages in documents to be recorded.
17-21-13. Endorsement of book and page and entry number
in which recorded — Return of instrument,
paper or notice.
17-21-14. Military records — Evidence.
17-21-15.
Repealed.
17-21-16. Acknowledgments and administrations of oaths.
17-21-17. Prohibited acts.
17-21-18. Fees must be paid in advance.
17-21-19. Records open to inspection — Copies.
17-21-20. Filing requires recordation — Exception.
17-21-21.
Ownership plats.
17-21-22. Annual revision — Reporting changes in ownership to county assessors — Costs, how borne.
17-21-23. Assessor to return for revision.
17-21-24.
Repealed.
17-21-25. Names of persons signing to be typed or printed
on instruments presented for filing.
17-21-1. Recorder — Document custody responsibility.
The recorder h a s custody of, and must keep, all books,
records, maps, and papers required by law to be kept or
recorded in the office.
1993
17-21-2. Seal.
The county recorder shall have a seal, to be furnished by the
county legislative body, the impression of which shall contain
the following words: "State of Utah, County Recorder," together with the name of the county in which the same is to be
used.

1993

17-21-3. Methods of recordation authorized.
. vf§
The recorder must, on the payment of the fees for the sairil?
record in books provided for the purpose in a fair hand orW
means of a typewriter, camera, microfilm, computer or othZ
methods all papers, documents, records and other writim*
required or permitted by law to be recorded.
l9^
17-21-4. Certified copies.
**i'
The county recorder is authorized to make and furnish to
interested persons certified photographic copies of any of th*:
records in his office upon payment of fees and charges provided therefor. Certified copies of such records may be sup.
plied to officers of the county for their official use without the*'
payment of any fee.
1^
17-21-5. Receipts for documents received for record. "
On the filing of any instrument in writing for record in the
recorder's office the recorder shall when requested give to the
person leaving the same to be recorded a receipt therefor. S
195J

-r
17-21-6. General duties — Records and indexes.
Every recorder must keep:
(1) An entry record, in which the recorder shall immediately upon receipt of any instrument to be recorded,
enter in the order of its reception or entry, as the case may
be, the names of the parties thereto, its date, the hour, the?
day of the month and the year offilingany such statement
and a brief description of the premises, endorsing upon
each instrument a number corresponding with the number of such entry.
(2) A grantors' index, in which shall be indexed all
deeds and final judgments or decrees partitioning or
affecting the title to or possession of real property, which
shall show the number of the instrument, the name of
each grantor in alphabetical order, the name of the
grantee, date of instrument, time of filing, kind of instrument, consideration, the book and page and entry number
in which it is recorded, and a brief description of the
premises.
(3) A grantees' index, in which shall be indexed all
deeds and final judgments or decrees partitioning or
affecting the title to or possession of real property, which
shall show the number of the instrument, the name of
each grantee in alphabetical order, the name of the
grantor, date of the instrument, time of filing, kind of
instrument, consideration, the book and page and entry
number in which it is recorded, and a brief description of
the premises.
(4) A mortgagors' index, in which shall be entered all ,
mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, and all other instruments
in the nature of an encumbrance upon real estate, which
shall show the number of the instrument, name of each '
mortgagor, debtor or person charged with the encumbrance in alphabetical order, the name of the mortgagee,
lien holder, creditor or claimant, date of instrument, time ;
of filing, nature of instrument, consideration, the book ,
and page and entry number in which it is recorded, and a
brief description of the property charged.
(5) A mortgagees' index, in which shall be entered all
mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, and all other instruments
in the nature of an encumbrance upon real estate, which shall show the number of the instrument, name of each
mortgagee, lien holder, creditor or claimant, in alphabetical order, the name of the mortgagor or person charged *»,
with the encumbrance, date of instrument, time of filing*
nature of instrument, consideration, the book and page ,
and entry number in which it is recorded, and a brief >
description of the property charged.
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(6) An abstract record, which shall show by tracts or
parcels every conveyance or encumbrance, or other instrument recorded, the date and character of the instrument, time of filing the same, and the book and page and
i entry number where the same is recorded, which record
shall be so kept as to show a true chain of title to each
tract or parcel and the encumbrances thereon as shown by
the records of the office.
.:
(7) An index to recorded maps, plats, and subdivisions.
(8) An index of powers of attorney, labeled "powers of
attorney,* each page divided into seven columns, namely:
Mate of filing," *l>ook," "page,* and "entry number," "from,"
"to," "revoked."
(9) A miscellaneous index, in which shall be entered all
instruments of a miscellaneous character not otherwise
provided for in this section, each page divided into eight
columns, namely: "date of filing," "book," "page," and
"entry number," "instrument," "from," "to," "remarks."
(10) An index of transcripts of judgments, labeled
"transcripts of judgments," each page divided into seven
columns headed, respectively, "judgment debtors," "judgment creditors," "amount ofjudgment," "where recovered,"
"when recovered," "when transcript filed," "when judgment satisfied."
(11) A general filing index in which shall be indexed all
executions and writs of attachment, and any other instruments not required by law to be spread upon the records,
and in separate columns he must enter the names of the
plaintiffs in the execution, the defendants in the execution, the purchaser at the sale and the date of the sale,
and the filing number of the documents.
The indexes provided for in Subdivisions (8) to (11) shall
be alphabetically arranged, and in each case a reverse
index shall be kept.

™

. v I.

(12) Nothing in this section shall preclude t h e use of a
single n a m e index by the recorder if such index includes
. and references all of the above indexes.
1983

17-21-7,17-21-8.

Repealed.

1963,1997

17-21-9. Indexing of deeds and other instruments.
fc Deeds and other instruments affecting real estate made by
a United States marshal, a sheriff, master in chancery, special
commissioner, executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, or
other person acting in behalf of another, shall be indexed in
the name of the person whose land is sold or affected as
grantor, and a note shall be made in the index indicating in
what capacity t h e deed was made.

:

1953

17-21-10. J u d g m e n t s affecting real e s t a t e .
i* The recorder must, when filed with him for t h a t purpose,
h record in t h e record of deeds certified copies of final judgments
^ or decrees partitioning or affecting the title or possession of
real property any p a r t of which is situate in t h e county of
which h e is recorder.
1953

17-21-11. Notice imparted by recording.
**» Every such certified copy from the time of filing the same
with the recorder for record imparts notice to all persons of the
contents thereof, and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and
lien holders purchase and take with the same notice and effect
as if such copy were a duly recorded deed, grant or transfer.
.*
: 17-21-12.
:

c

'

':*-':::

1953

Endorsements required on documents — Ap\. ,
pendages in documents to be recorded.
•*" When any instrument, paper or notice authorized by law to
be filed o r recorded is deposited in the recorder's office for
j ^ .record the recorder must endorse upon the same its proper
number, the time when it was received, noting the year,
month, day, hour and minute of its reception and the amount

17-21-21

of fees for recording, and must record the same without delay,
together with the acknowledgments, proofs and certificates
written upon or annexed to the same, with the plats, surveys,
schedules and other papers thereto annexed, in the order
received, and must note on the instrument for record the exact
time of its reception.
1967
17-21-13. Endorsement of book and page and entry
number in which recorded — Return of instrument, paper or notice.
The recorder must also endorse upon each instrument,
paper or notice the book and page and entry number in which
it is recorded, and must thereafter return it.
1982
17-21-14. Military records — Evidence.
The county recorder upon presentation shall record in a
book kept for that purpose, free of charge, honorable discharges from the military, naval or marine service of the
United States, and any and all orders, citations and decorations of honor relating to any person while he was in the
military, naval or marine service of the United States, and
shall furnish, free of charge, certified copies of any of the same
to the person to whom any of them relate and to the father,
mother, brothers, sisters or any lineal descendant of such
person. Such certified copies may be read in evidence with the
same effect as the original in any action or proceeding before
any court, commission or other tribunal in this state.
1953
17-21-15. Repealed.

1987

17-21-16. Acknowledgments and administrations of
oaths.
County recorders m a y take and certify acknowledgments
and administer oaths.
1953
17-21-17. P r o h i b i t e d a c t s .
No recorder to whom any instrument, paper, or notice
entitled to be recorded is delivered for record may:

(1) neglect or refuse to record the instrument, paper, or
notice within a reasonable time after receiving it;
(2) willfully or negligently record any instrument, paper, or notice falsely or in any manner other than the
manner required by this chapter;
(3) neglect or refuse to keep the indices required by this
chapter in the recorder's office;
(4) neglect or refuse to make the proper entries in the
indices required by this chapter; or
(5) alter, change, obliterate, or insert any new m a t t e r
in any instrument, paper, or notice deposited in t h e
recorder's office.
1987

17-21-18. Fees must be paid in advance.
The recorder shall not record any instrument, or file any
paper or notice, or furnish any copies, or render any service
connected with h i s office, until the fees for t h e same as
prescribed by law a r e paid or tendered.
1953

•17-21-19. Records open to inspection — Copies.
(1) All books of record, maps, charts, surveys, and other
papers on file in the recorder's office must be open to public
inspection free of charge during office hours.
(2) Any person copying or taking notes from information on
file in t h e recorder's office may do so only by pencil, typewriter,
photocopy, microfilm, or electronic printout.
1987
17-21-20. F i l i n g r e q u i r e s r e c o r d a t i o n — E x c e p t i o n .
All papers, notices and instruments of writing required by
law to be filed in t h e office of the county recorder shall be
recorded unless otherwise provided.
1953

17-21-21. Ownership plats.
In all counties the county recorder shall prepare and keep
present-ownership maps and plats drawn to a convenient
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intention to make a drive, as provided in this chapter, may
within 30 days after the posting or the first publication of the
notice mentioned in Section 47-2-4 file with the county executive a description of such horses claimed by him, giving the
marks and brands, if any, which appear thereon, and, if the
county executive shall take into its possession any horses so
claimed, it shall by registered letter addressed to the owner or
claimant of such horses notify him that the same may be
claimed within ten days from the mailing of such notice; and
such owner or claimant shall be permitted upon application to
the county legislative body to take possession of such horses
upon payment of the expense of caring for the same from the
date of capture. If any horses are killed by order of the county
executive under the provisions of this chapter, a description of
which has been reported by the owner thereof to the county
legislative body, and ownership of such animals can be satisfactorily established, such owner shall receive as damage
therefor a sum not exceeding $10 for each animal; provided,
that he has paid all taxes assessed against said animal;
provided further, that payment of such claims may be made
only from proceeds of sales of captured horses.
1994
47-2-7. Elimination from private property on request.
Abandoned horses may be eliminated from privately owned
land by the county executive in the same manner as from the
open range when requested so to do by the owner of such land.
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(ii) does not substantially and adversely affect
public health or safety; or
• • ' •>>(b) t h e range:
(i) is in compliance with any noise control laws,
ordinances, rules, or regulations t h a t applied to the
range and its operation a t the time of establishment,
construction, or initial operation of t h e range; and
(ii) does not substantially and adversely affect
public health or safety.

(3) For the purposes of this section, noise generated by a
shooting range that is operated in accordance with nationally
recognized standards and operating practices is not a public
health nuisance.
(4) For any new subdivision development located in whole
or in part within 1,000 feet of t h e boundary of any shooting
range that was established, constructed, or operated prior to
t h e development of the subdivision, the owner of t h e developm e n t shall provide on any plat filed with t h e county recorder
t h e following notice:
"Shooting Range Area
This property is located in t h e vicinity of a n established
shooting range. It can be anticipated t h a t customary uses and
activities at this shooting range will be conducted now and in
t h e future. The use and enjoyment of this property is expressly
conditioned on acceptance of any annoyance or inconvenience
which may result from these uses and activities."
1998

1993
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CHAPTER 3
SHOOTING RANGES
Section
47-3-1.
47-3-2.
47-3-3.

Definition.
Assumption of risk.
When nuisance action permitted.

Chapter
1. General and Limited Liability Partnerships.
2. Limited Partnership [Repealed].
2a. Utah Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act.
2b. Utah Limited Liability Company Act.

47-3-1. Definition.
As used in this chapter, "shooting range" or "range" means
an area designed and continuously operated u n d e r nationally
recognized standards and operating practices for t h e use of
rifles, shotguns, pistols, silhouettes, skeet, t r a p , black powder,
archery, or any other similar shooting activities.
1998
47-3-2. A s s u m p t i o n of risk.
Each person who participates in shooting a t a shooting
range accepts t h e associated risks to the extent t h e risks are
obvious and inherent. Those risks include injuries t h a t may
result from noise, discharge of projectile or shot, malfunction
of shooting equipment not owned by t h e shooting range,
natural variations in t e r r a i n , surface or subsurface snow or ice
conditions, bare spots, rocks, trees, and other forms of n a t u r a l
growth or debris.
1998

47-3-3. When nuisance action permitted.
(1) Each state agency or political subdivision shall ensure
that any of its rules or ordinances that define or prohibit a
public nuisance exclude from the definition or prohibition any
shooting range that was established, constructed, or operated
prior to the implementation of the rule or ordinance regarding
public nuisance unless that activity or operation substantially
and adversely affects public health or safety.
(2) A person who operates or uses a shooting range in this
state is not subject to civil liability or criminal prosecution for
noise or noise pollution resulting from the operation or use of
the range if:
(a) the range:
(i) was established, constructed, or operated prior
to the implementation of any noise ordinances, rules,
or regulations; and

CHAPTER 1
GENERAL AND LIMITED LIABILITY
PARTNERSHIPS
Parti
General Partnership
Section
48-1-1.
48-1-2.
48-1-3.
48-1-3.1.
48-1-4.
48rl-5.
48-1-6.
48-1-7.
48-1-8.
48-1-9.
48-1-10.
48-1-11.
48-1-12.
48-1-13.
48-1-14.
48-1-15.
48-1-16.
48-1-17.
48-1-18.
48-1-19.

Definition of terms.
Interpretation of knowledge and notice.
"Partnership" defined.
Joint venture defined — Application of chapter.
Rules for determining the existence of a partnership.
Partnership property.
Partner agent of partnership as to partnership
business.
Conveyance of real property of partnership.
Partnership bound by admission of partner.
Partnership charged with knowledge of or notice
to partner.
Partnership bound by partner's wrongful act. *
Partnership bound by partner's breach of trust.
Nature of partner's liability.
Partner by estoppel.
Liability of incoming partner.
Rules determining rights and duties of partners.
Partnership books.
Duty of partners to render information.
Partner accountable as a fiduciary.
Right to an account.
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Section
48-1-20.
48-1-21.
48-1-22.
48-1-23.
48-1-24.
48-1-25.
48-1-26.
48T1-27.
48-1-28.
48^1-29.
48-1-30.
48-1-31.
48-1-32.
48-1-33.
48-1-34.
48-1-35.
48-1-36.
48-1-37.
48-1-38.
48-1-39.
48-1-40.

48-1-41.
48-1-42.
48-1-43.
48-1-44.
48-1-45.
48-1-46.
48-1-47.
48-1-48.

;

Continuation of partnership beyond fixed term.
Extent of property rights of a partner.
Nature of a partner's right in specific partnership
property.
Nature of partner's interest in the partnership.
Assignment of partner's interest.
Partner's interest subject to charging order.
"Dissolution" defined.
Partnership not.terminated by dissolution.
Causes of dissolution.
Dissolution by decree of court.
General effect of dissolution on authority of partner.
Right of partner to contribution from copartners
after dissolution. ,
Power of partner to bind partnership to third
persons after dissolution.
Effect of dissolution on partner's existing liability. •
Right to wind up.
Rights of partners to application of partnership
property.
Rights where partnership is dissolved for fraud
or misrepresentation.
Rules for distribution.
Liability of persons continuing the business in
certain cases.
Rights of retiring or estate of deceased partner
when the business is continued.
Accrual of actions.
Part 2
Utah Limited Liability
Partnership Act
Title.
Registration of limited liability partnerships.
Scope of chapter — Choice of law.
Foreign limited liability partnerships.
Name of registered limited liability partnership.
Professional relationship — Personal liability.
Regulatory agency or board authority — Prohibitions on individuals apply.
Limited liability partnerships providing professional services.
PARTI
GENERAL PARTNERSHIP

48-1-1. Definition of terms.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Bankrupt" includes "bankrupt" under the federal
:
bankruptcy laws or "insolvent" under any state insolvency
law.
(2) "Business" includes every trade, occupation, or profession.
'•"
(3) "Conveyance" includes every assignment, lease,
mortgage, or encumbrance.
(4) "Court" includes every court and judge having jurisdiction in the case.
(5) "Limited liability partnership" means a general
:
partnership registered under Section 48-1-42 and complying with Section 48-1-43.
(6) "Person" includes an individual, partnership, limited liability company, limited liability partnership, corporation, or other association.
(7) "Real property" includes land and any interest or
estate in land.
1994

48-1-5

48-1-2. Interpretation of knowledge and notice.
(1) Within the meaning of this chapter, a person is deemed
to have knowledge of a fact not only when he has actual
knowledge thereof, but also when he has knowledge of such:
other facts that to act in disregard of them shows bad faith.
(2) A person has notice of a fact within the meaning of this
chapter when the person who claims the benefit of the notice:
(a) states the fact to such person; or
(b) delivers through the mail, or by other means of
communication, a written statement of the fact to such ••"'
person, or to a proper person at his place of business or 'l
residence.
'•
1953
48-1-3. "Partnership" denned.
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2), a partnership
is an association of two or more persons to carry on as
f
coowners a business for profit.
^
(b) "Partnership" when used in a statute of the state, •
includes a limited liability partnership registered under k
Section 48-1-42, unless the context requires otherwise.
(2) An association formed under any other statute of this
state, or any statute adopted by authority other than the
authority of this state, is not a "partnership under this chapter,
unless such association would have been a partnership in this
state prior to the adoption of this chapter.
(3) This chapter shall apply to limited partnerships except'
in so far as the statutes relating to such partnerships are
inconsistent herewith.
1994
48-1-3.1. Joint venture denned — Application of chapter.
*
(1) A joint venture is an association of two or more persons
to carry on as co-owners of a single business enterprise.
(2) This chapter governs the property and transfer rights of '
joint ventures.
1985
48-1-4. Rules for determining the existence of a partnership.
In determining whether a partnership exists these rules
shall apply:
(1) Except as provided by Section 48-1-13, persons who
are not partners as to each other are not partners as to
third persons.
(2) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by entireties, joint property, common property, or part ownership does not of itself establish a partnership, whether
such co-owners do or do not share any profits made by the •<
use of the property. .
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself,
establish a partnership, whether or not the persons shar- :
ing them have a joint or common right or interest in any
. property from which the returns are derived.
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a •
business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the
business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such
profits were received in payment:
•
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise.
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord.
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a
deceased partner.
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amounts of
payment vary with the profits of the business.
(e) As the consideration for the sale of the good will
of a business or other property by installments or
otherwise.
• • 1953 48-1-5. Partnership property.
All property originally brought into the partnership stock,
or subsequently acquired by purchase or otherwise on account
of the partnership, is partnership property.
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Unless the contrary intention appears, property acquired
with partnership funds is partnership property.
Any estate in real property may be acquired in the partnership name. Title so acquired can be conveyed only in t h e
partnership name.
A conveyance to a partnership in t h e partnership name,
though without words of inheritance, passes t h e entire estate
of the grantor, unless a contrary intent appears.
1953
48-1-6. Partner agent of partnership as to partnership
business.
(1) Every partner is a n agent of t h e partnership for t h e
purpose of its business, and the act of every partner, including
t h e execution in t h e partnership n a m e of any instrument for
apparently carrying on in t h e usual way t h e business of the
partnership of which h e is a member, binds t h e partnership,
unless the partner so acting h a s in fact no authority to act for
t h e partnership in t h e particular matter and t h e person with
whom he is dealing h a s knowledge of the fact t h a t he h a s no
such authority.
(2) An act of a partner which is not apparently for the
carrying on of the business of the partnership in the usual way
does not bind the partnership, unless authorized by the other
partners.
(3) Unless authorized by t h e other partners or unless they
have abandoned t h e business, one or more b u t less t h a n all of
the partners have no authority to:
(a) Assign t h e partnership property in t r u s t for creditors or on t h e assignee's promise to pay t h e debts of t h e
partnership.
(b) Dispose of the good will of the business.
(c) Do any other act which would make it impossible to
carry on t h e ordinary business of the partnership.
(d) Confess a judgment.
(e) Submit a partnership claim or liability to arbitration or reference.
(4) No act of a partner in contravention of a restriction on
authority shall bind the partnership to persons having knowledge of the restriction.
1953
48-1-7. Conveyance of real property of partnership.
Where title to real property is in the partnership name, any
partner may convey title to such property by a conveyance
executed in the partnership name; but the partnership may
recover such property, unless the partner's act binds the
partnership under the provisions of Section 48-1-6(1), or
unless such property has been conveyed by the grantee or a
person claiming through such grantee to a holder for value
without knowledge that the partner in making the conveyance
h a s exceeded his authority.
Where title to real property is in the name of the partnership a conveyance executed by a partner in his own name
passes the equitable interest of the partnership, provided the
act is one within the authority of the p a r t n e r under the
provisions of Section 48-1-6(1).
Where title to real property is in the name of one or more but
not all of the partners, and the record does not disclose the
right of the partnership, the partners in whose name the title
stands may convey title to such property, b u t the partnership
may recover such property, if the partners' act does not bind
the partnership under the provisions of Section 48-1-6(1),
unless the purchaser or his assignee is a holder for value
without knowledge.
Where the title to real property is in the n a m e of one or more
or all of the partners, or in a third person in trust for the
partnership, a conveyance executed by a partner in t h e
partnership name, or in his own name, passes the equitable
interest of the partnership, provided the act is one within the
authority of the partner under the provisions of Section
48-1-6(1).

890

Where the title to real property is in the names of all the
partners a conveyance executed by all the partners passes all
their rights in such property.
1953

48-1-8. Partnership bound by admission of partner.
An admission or representation made by any partner concerning partnership affairs within the scope of his authority as
conferred by this chapter is evidence against the partnership.
1953

48-1-9. Partnership charged with knowledge of or notice to partner.
Notice to any partner of any matter relating to partnership
affairs, and the knowledge of the partner acting in the
particular matter, acquired while a partner or then present to
his mind, and t h e knowledge of any other partner who
reasonably could and should have communicated it to the
acting partner, operates as notice to or knowledge of the
partnership, except in the case of a fraud on the partnership
committed by or with the consent of t h a t partner.
1953

48-1-10. Partnership bound by partner's wrongful act.
Where by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting
in t h e ordinary course of t h e business of the partnership or
with t h e authority of his copartners loss or injury is caused to
any person, not being a partner in t h e partnership, or any
penalty is incurred, t h e partnership is liable therefor to t h e
same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act. 1953
48-1-11. Partnership bound by partner's breach of
trust.
The partnership is bound to m a k e good the loss:
(1) where one p a r t n e r acting within t h e scope of his
apparent authority receives money or property of a third
person a n d misapplies it; and,
(2) where t h e partnership in t h e course of its business
receives money or property of a third person a n d t h e
money or property so received is misapplied by any
p a r t n e r while it is in t h e custody of the partnership.
1953

48-1-12. Nature of partner's liability.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), all partners are
liable:
(a) jointly a n d severally for everything chargeable to
t h e partnership under Sections 48-1-10 and 48-1-11.
(b) jointly for all other debts and obligations of t h e
partnership, except a p a r t n e r may enter into a separate
obligation to perform a partnership contract.
(2) (a) A partner in a limited liability partnership is not
liable, directly or indirectly, including by way of indemnification, contribution or otherwise, for a debt, obligation,
or liability chargeable to the partnership arising from
negligence, wrongful acts, or misconduct committed while
the partnership is registered as a limited liability partnership and in the course of the partnership business by
another partner, or an employee, agent, or representative
of the limited liability partnership.
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), a partner in a
limited liability partnership is liable for his own negligence, wrongful acts, or misconduct.
19S4
48-1-13. Partner by estoppel.
(1) When a person by words spoken or written or by conduct
represents himself, or consents to another's representing him,
to anyone as a partner, in an existing partnership or with one
or more persons not actual partners, he is liable to any such
person to whom such representation has been made who has
on the faith of such representation given credit to the actual or
apparent partnership, and, if he has made such representation or consented to its being made in a public manner, he is
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liable to such person, whether t h e representation has or has
not been made or communicated to such person so giving
credit by, or with t h e knowledge of, the apparent partner
making t h e representation or consenting to its being made.
(a) When a partnership liability results, h e is liable as
if h e were a n actual member of the partnership.
(b) When no partnership liability results, he is liable
jointly with t h e other persons, if any, so consenting to the
contract or representation as to incur liability; otherwise,
separately.
(2) W h e n a person h a s been thus represented to be a
partner in a n existing partnership, or with one or more
persons not actual partners, h e is an agent of the persons
consenting to such representation to bind them to t h e same
extent a n d in the same m a n n e r as though he were a partner in
fact, with respect to persons who rely upon the representation.
Where all t h e members of an existing partnership consent to
the representation, a partnership act or obligation results; but
in all other cases it is t h e joint act or obligation of the person
acting a n d t h e persons consenting to the representation. 1953
48-1-14. Liability of i n c o m i n g partner.
A person admitted as a p a r t n e r into an existing partnership
is liable for all the obligations of t h e partnership arising before
his admission as if he h a d been a partner when such obligations were incurred, except t h a t his liability shall be satisfied
only out of partnership property.
1953

48-1-15. Rules determining rights and duties of partners.
The rights and duties of t h e partners in relation to the
partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement
between them, by t h e following rules:
(1) Each p a r t n e r shall be repaid his contributions,
w h e t h e r by way of capital or advances to the partnership
property, and share equally in the profits and surplus
remaining after all liabilities, including those to partners,
a r e satisfied; and, except a s provided in Subsection 48-112(2), m u s t contribute towards the losses, whether of
capital or otherwise, sustained by the partnership according to his share in t h e profits.
(2) The partnership m u s t indemnify every partner in
respect of payments made and personal liabilities reasonably incurred by him in t h e ordinary and proper conduct
of its business, or for t h e preservation of its business or
property.
(3) A p a r t n e r who in aid of the partnership makes any
p a y m e n t or advance beyond the amount of capital which
h e agreed to contribute shall be paid interest from the
d a t e of the payment or advance.
(4) A p a r t n e r shall receive interest on the capital contributed by him only from the date when repayment
should be made.
(5) All partners have equal rights in the management
a n d conduct of t h e partnership business.
(6) No p a r t n e r is entitled to remuneration for acting in
t h e partnership business, except that a surviving partner
is entitled to reasonable compensation for his services in
winding up t h e partnership affairs.
~ (7) No person can become a member of a partnership
without t h e consent of all t h e partners.
(8) Any difference arising as to ordinary matters con_ nected with t h e partnership business may be decided by a
majority of t h e partners; but no act in contravention of
a n y agreement between t h e partners may be done rightfully without t h e consent of all the partners.
1994
48-1-16. P a r t n e r s h i p b o o k s .
T h e p a r t n e r s h i p books shall be kept, subject to any agreement between t h e p a r t n e r s , a t the principal place of business
of t h e partnership, and every partner shall at all times have
access to and may inspect and copy any of them.
1953

48-1-22

48-1-17. D u t y of partners t o r e n d e r information.
P a r t n e r s shall render on demand true and full information
of all things affecting the partnership to any partner, or the
legal representatives of any deceased partner, or partner
u n d e r legal disability.
1953
48-1-18. P a r t n e r accountable a s a fiduciary.
Every p a r t n e r must account to the partnership for any
benefit, a n d hold as trustee for it any profits, derived by him
without t h e consent of the other partners from any transaction
connected with the formation, conduct or liquidation of t h e
p a r t n e r s h i p or from any use by him of its property.
This section applies also to the representatives of a deceased
p a r t n e r engaged in the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership as the personal representatives of the last surviving

partner.

1953

48-1-19. Right to an account.
Any partner shall have the right to a formal account as to
partnership affairs:
(1) If he is wrongfully excluded from the partnership
business or possession of its property by his copartners.
(2) If the right exists under the terms of any agreement.
(3) As provided by Section 48-1-18.
(4) Whenever other circumstances render it just and
reasonable.
1953
48-1-20.

C o n t i n u a t i o n of p a r t n e r s h i p b e y o n d fixed
term.
When a partnership for a fixed term or particular undertaking is continued after the termination of such term or particular u n d e r t a k i n g without any express agreement, the rights
and duties of the partners remain the same as they were at
such termination so far as is consistent with a partnership a t
will.
A continuation of the business by the partners, or such of
t h e m as habitually acted therein during the term, without any
settlement or liquidation of the partnership affairs, is prima
facie evidence of a continuation of the partnership.
1953
48-1-21. E x t e n t of property r i g h t s of a partner.
The property rights of a partner are (1) his rights in specific
p a r t n e r s h i p property, (2) his interest in the partnership and
(3) his right to participate in the management.
1953
48-1-22.

N a t u r e of a partner's r i g h t i n specific partners h i p property.
(1) A p a r t n e r is co-owner with his partners of specific
p a r t n e r s h i p property holding as a t e n a n t in partnership.
(2) T h e incidents of this tenancy are such that:
(a) A partner, subject to the provisions of this chapter
a n d to any agreement between the partners, has an equal
right with his partners to possess specific partnership
property for partnership purposes; b u t he has no right to
possess such property for any other purpose without the
consent of his partners.
(b) A partner's right in specific partnership property is
not assignable, except in connection with the assignment
of rights of all the partners in t h e same property.
(c) A partner's right in specific partnership property is
not subject to attachment or execution, except on a claim
against the partnership. When partnership property is
attached for a partnership debt, t h e partners, or any of
t h e m , or the representative of a deceased partner, cannot
claim any right under the homestead or exemption laws.
(d) On the death of a partner his right in specific
partnership property vests in t h e surviving partner or
p a r t n e r s , except where the deceased was the last surviving partner, when his right in such property vests in his
legal representatives. Such surviving partner or partners,
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or t h e legal representatives of the last surviving partner,
has no right to possess t h e partnership property for any
: but a partnership purpose.
(e) A partner's right in specific partnership property is
, not subject to dower, curtesy, or allowances to widows,
heirs or next of kin.
1953
48-1-23. Nature of partner's interest in the partnership.
A partner's interest in the partnership is his share of the
profits and surplus, and the same is personal property.
1953
48-1-24. Assignment of partner's interest..
A conveyance by a partner of his interest in the partnership
does not of itself dissolve the partnership, or, as against the
other partners in the absence of agreement, entitle the assignee during the continuance of the partnership to interfere
in the management or administration of the partnership
business or affairs, or to require any information or account of
partnership transactions, or to inspect the partnership books;
but it merely entitles the assignee to receive in accordance
with his contract the profits to which the assigning partner
would otherwise be entitled.
In case of a dissolution of a partnership, the assignee is
entitled to receive his assignor's interest, and may require an
account from the date only of the last account agreed to by all
the partners.
1953
48-1-25. Partner's interest subject to charging order.
(1) On due application to a competent court by any judgment creditor of a partner the court which entered the
judgment, order or decree, or any other court, may charge the
interest of the debtor partner with payment of the unsatisfied
amount of such judgment debt with interest thereon and may
then or later appoint a receiver of his share of the profits and
of any other money due or to fall due to him in respect of the
partnership, and make all other orders, directions, accounts
and inquiries which the debtor partner might have made or
which the circumstances of the case may require.
(2) The interest charged may be redeemed at any time
before foreclosure, or, in case of a sale being directed by the
court, may be purchased without thereby causing a dissolution:
(a) with separate property, by any one or more of the
partners; or,
(b) with partnership property, by any one or more of the
partners with the consent of all the partners whose
interests are not so charged or sold.
(3) Nothing in this chapter shall be held to deprive a
partner of his right, if any, under the exemption laws as
regards h i s interest in t h e partnership. .
1953
48-1-26. "Dissolution" denned.
The dissolution of a partnership is the change in the relation
of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated
in t h e carrying on, as distinguished from the winding up, of
the business.
1953
48-1-27. Partnership not terminated by dissolution.
On dissolution a partnership is not terminated, but continues until the winding up of partnership affairs is completed.
1953

48-1-28. Causes of dissolution.
Dissolution is caused:
(1) Without violation of the agreement between the
partners:
(a) By the termination of the definite term or
particular undertaking specified in the agreement.
(b) By the express will of any partner when no
definite term or particular undertaking is specified.
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(c) By the express will of all the partners who have
not assigned their interests, or suffered them to be
charged for their separate debts, either before or after
the termination of any specified term or particular
undertaking.
(d) By the expulsion of any partner from the business bona fide in accordance with such a power
conferred by the agreement between the partners.
(2) In contravention of the agreement between the
partners, where the circumstances do hot permit a dissolution under any other provision of this section, by the
express will of any partner at any time.
(3) By any event which makes it unlawful for the
business of the partnership to be carried on or for the
members to carry it on in partnership.
(4) By the death of any partner.
(5) By the bankruptcy of any partner or the partnership.
(6) By decree of court under Section 48-1-29.
1953
48-1-29. Dissolution by decree of court.
(1) On application by or for a partner the court shall decree
a dissolution whenever:
(a) A partner has been declared a lunatic in any judicial
proceeding or is shown to be of unsound mind.
(b) A partner becomes in any other way incapable of
performing his part of the partnership contract.
(c) A partner has been guilty of such conduct as tends
to affect prejudicially the carrying on of the business.
(d) A partner willfully or persistently commits a breach
of the partnership agreement, or otherwise so conducts
himself in matters relating to the partnership business
that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the
business in partnership with him.
(e) The business of the partnership can only be carried
on at a loss.
(f) Other circumstances render a dissolution equitable.
(2) On the application of the purchaser of a partner's
interest under Section 48-1-24 or 48-1-25:
(a) After the termination of the specified term or particular undertaking.
(b) At any time, if the partnership was a partnership at
will, w h e n the interest was assigned or when the charging
order was issued.
1953
48-1-30. General effect of dissolution on authority of
partner.
Except so far as may be necessary to wind up partnership
affairs or to complete transactions begun but not then finished, dissolution terminates all authority of any partner to
act for the partnership.
(1) With respect to the partners:
(a) when the dissolution is not by the act, bankruptcy or death of a partner; or
(b) when the dissolution is by such act, bankruptcy
-or death of a partner in cases where Section 48-1-31
so requires.
(2) With respect to persons not partners as declared in
Section 48-1-32.
1953
48-1-31. R i g h t of p a r t n e r to contribution from copartners after dissolution.
Where the dissolution is caused by the act, death, or
bankruptcy of a partner each partner is liable to his copartners for his share of any liability created by any partner acting
for the partnership as if the partnership had not been dissolved unless:
(1) the dissolution being by act of any partner, the
partner acting for the partnership had knowledge of the
dissolution;
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(2) the dissolution being by the death or bankruptcy of
a partner, the partner acting for the partnership had
knowledge or notice of the death or bankruptcy; or
(3) the liability is for a debt, obligation, or liability for
which the partner is not liable under Subsection 48-112(2).

1994

48-1-32. Power of partner to bind partnership to third
persons after dissolution.
(1) After dissolution a partner can bind the partnership,
except as provided in paragraph (3):
(a) By any act appropriate for winding up partnership
affairs or completing transactions unfinished at dissolution.
(b) By any transaction which would bind the partnership, if dissolution had not taken place, provided the other
, party to the transaction:
(i) Had extended credit to the partnership prior to
dissolution and had no knowledge or notice of the
dissolution; or
(ii) Though he had not so extended credit, had
nevertheless known of the partnership prior to dissolution, and, having no knowledge or notice of dissolution, the fact of dissolution had not been advertised
in a newspaper of general circulation in the place (or
in each place, if more than one) at which the partnership business was regularly carried on.
(2) The liability of a partner under paragraph (1Kb) shall be
satisfied out of partnership assets alone when such partner
had been prior to dissolution:
(a) unknown as a partner to the person with whom the
contract is made; and,
(b) so far unknown and inactive in partnership affairs
that the business reputation of the partnership could not
be said to have been in any degree due to his connection
with it.
(3) The partnership is in no case bound by any act of a
partner after dissolution:
(a) where the partnership is dissolved because it is
unlawful to carry on the business, unless the act is
appropriate for winding up partnership affairs; or,
(b) where the partner has become bankrupt; or,
.. (c) where the partner has no authority to wind up
partnership affairs; except by a transaction with one who:
(i) Had extended credit to the partnership prior to
dissolution and had no knowledge or notice of his
want of authority; or
• ' (ii) Had not extended credit to the partnership
prior to dissolution, and, having no knowledge or
notice of his want of authority, the fact of his want of
authority has not been advertised in the manner
provided for advertising the fact of dissolution in
paragraph (D(bXii).
(4) Nothing in this section shall affect t h e liability under
Section 48-1-13 of any person who after dissolution represents
himself or consents to another's representing him as a partner
in a partnership engaged in carrying on business.
1953

48-1-33. Effect of dissolution on partner's existing liability.
(1) The dissolution of a partnership does not of itself discharge the existing liability of any partner.
(2) A partner is discharged for any existing liability upon
dissolution of the partnership by an agreement to that effect
between himself, the partnership creditor and the person or
partnership continuing the business; and such agreement may
be inferred from the course of dealing between the creditor
having knowledge of the dissolution and the person or partnership continuing the business.

48-1-35

(3) Where a person agrees to assume the existing obligations of a dissolved partnership, the partners whose obligations have been assumed shall be discharged from any liability
to any creditor of the partnership who, knowing of the agreement, consents to a material alteration in the nature or time
of payment of such obligations.
(4) The individual property of a deceased partner shall be
liable for those obligations of the partnership incurred while
he was a partner and for which the partner was liable under
Section 48-1-12, but subject to the prior payment of his
separate debts.
1994
48-1-34. Right t o w i n d u p .
Unless otherwise agreed, t h e partners who have not wrongfully dissolved the p a r t n e r s h i p or the legal representatives of
the last surviving partner, not bankrupt, has the right to wind
up t h e partnership affairs; provided, however, t h a t a n y partner, his legal representatives or his assignee upon cause
shown may obtain a winding up by the court.
1953

48-1-35. Rights of partners to application of partnership property.
(1) When dissolution is caused in any way, except in contravention of the partnership agreement, each partner, as
against his copartners and all persons claiming through them
in respect of their interests in the partnership, unless otherwise agreed, may have the partnership property applied to
discharge its liabilities, and the surplus applied to pay in cash
the net amount owing to the respective partners. But if
dissolution is caused by expulsion of a partner, bona fide under
the partnership agreement, and if the expelled partner is
discharged from all partnership liabilities either by payment
or agreement under Section 48-1-33(2), he shall receive in
cash only the net amount due him from the partnership.
(2) When dissolution is caused in contravention of the
partnership agreement the rights of the partners shall be as
follows:
(a) Each partner who has not caused dissolution
wrongfully shall have:
(i) All the rights specified in paragraph (1) of this
section; and
(ii) The right as against each partner who has
caused the dissolution wrongfully to damages for
breach of the agreement.
(b) The partners who have not caused the dissolution
wrongfully, if they all desire to continue the business in
the same name, either by themselves or jointly with
others, may do so during the agreed term for the partnership, and for that purpose may possess the partnership
property; provided, they pay to any partner who has;
caused the dissolution wrongfully the value of his interest *
in the partnership at the dissolution, less any damages ;
recoverable under clause (2)(a)(ii) of this section or secure
the payment by bond approved by the court, and in like .
manner indemnify him against all present or future
. partnership liabilities.
(c) A partner who has caused the dissolution wrongfully shall have:
.-:;
v
(i) If the business is not continued under the provisions of paragraph (2Xb), all the rights of a partner :
under paragraph (1), subject to clause (2)(aXii) of this
section.
(ii) If the business is continued under paragraph
(2Kb) of this section, the right as against his copartners, and all claiming through them, in respect of
their interests in the partnership, to have the value of
his interest in the partnership, less any damages
caused to his copartners by the dissolution, ascertained and paid to him in cash, or the payment
secured by bond approved by the court, and to be
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released from all existing liabilities of the partnership; but in ascertaining the value of the partner's
interest t h e value of the good will of the business
shall not be considered.
1953

48-1-36. Rights where partnership is dissolved for
fraud or misrepresentation.
Where a partnership contract is rescinded on the ground of
the fraud or misrepresentation of one of the parties thereto,
the party entitled to rescind is, without prejudice to any other
right, entitled:
(1) to a lien on, or right of retention of, the surplus of
the partnership property, after satisfying the partnership
liabilities to third persons, for any sum of money paid by
him for the purchase of an interest in the partnership and
for any capital or advances contributed by him; and,
(2) to stand, after all liabilities to third persons have
been satisfied, in the place of the creditors of the partnership for any payments made by him in respect of the
partnership liabilities; and,
(3) to be indemnified by the person guilty of the fraud
or making the representation against all debts and liabilities of the partnership.
1953

48-1-37. Rules for distribution.
In settling accounts between the partners after dissolution
the following rules shall be observed, subject to any agreement
to the contrary:
(1) The assets of the partnership are:
(a) partnership property; and
(b) contributions of the partners specified in Subsection (4).
(2) The liabilities of the partnership shall rank in order
of payment, as follows:
(a) those owing to creditors other than partners;
(b) those owing to partners other than for capital
and profits;
(c) those owing to partners in respect of capital;
and
(d) those owing to partners in respect of profits.
(3) The assets shall be applied in the order of their
declaration in Subsection (1) to the satisfaction of the
liabilities.
(4) Except as provided in Subsection 48-1-12(2), the
partners shall contribute as provided by Subsection 48-115(1) the amount necessary to satisfy the liabilities; but if
any, but not all, of the partners are insolvent, or, not being
subject to process, refuse to contribute, the other partners
shall contribute their share of the liabilities, and in the
relative proportions in which they share the profits the
additional amount necessary to pay the liabilities.
(5) An assignee for the benefit of creditors, or any
person appointed by the court, shall have the right to
enforce the contributions specified in Subsection (4).
(6) Any partner or his legal representative shall have
the right to enforce the contributions specified in Subsection (4) to the extent of the amount that he has paid in
excess of his share of the liability.
(7) The individual property of a deceased partner shall
be liable for the contributions specified in Subsection (4).
(8) When partnership property and the individual
properties of the partners are in the possession of a court
for distribution, partnership creditors shall have priority
on partnership property and separate creditors on individual property, saving the rights of lien or secured
creditors as heretofore.
(9) When a partner has become bankrupt or his estate
is insolvent, the claims against his separate property
shall rank in the following order:
(a) those owing to separate creditors;
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(b) those owing to partnership creditors; and
(c) those owing to partners by way of contribution,
1994

48-1-38. Liability of persons continuing the business
in certain cases.
(1) When any new partner is admitted into an existing
partnership, or when any partner retires and assigns (or the
representatives of a deceased partner assign) his rights in
partnership property to two or more of the partners, or to one
or more of the partners and one or more third persons, if the
business is continued without liquidation of the partnership
affairs, creditors of the first, or dissolved, partnership are also
creditors of the partnership so continuing the business.
(2) When all but one partner retire and assign (or the
representatives of a deceased partner assign) their rights in
partnership property to the remaining partner, who continues
the business without liquidation of partnership affairs either
alone or with others, creditors of the dissolved partnership are
also creditors of the person or partnership so continuing the
business.
(3) When any partner retires or dies and the business of the
dissolved partnership is continued, as set forth in paragraphs
(1) and (2) of this section, with the consent of the retired
partner or the representatives of the deceased partner, but
without any assignment of his right in partnership property,
rights of creditors of the dissolved partnership and of creditors
of the person or partnership continuing the business shall be
as if such assignment had been made.
(4) When all the partners or their representatives assign
their rights in partnership property to one or more third
persons who promise to pay the debts and who continue the
business of the dissolved partnership, creditors of the dissolved partnership are also creditors of the person or partnership continuing the business.
(5) When any partner wrongfully causes a dissolution and
the remaining partners continue the business under the
provisions of Section 48-l-35(2)(b), either alone or with others
and without liquidation of the partnership affairs, creditors of
the dissolved partnership are also creditors of the person or
partnership continuing the business.
(6) When a partner is expelled and the remaining partners
continue the business, either alone or with others, without
liquidation of the partnership affairs, creditors of the dissolved partnership are also creditors of the person or partnership continuing the business.
(7) The liability of a third person becoming a partner in the
partnership continuing the business under this section, to the
creditors of the dissolved partnership shall be satisfied out of
partnership property only.
(8) When the business of a partnership after dissolution is
continued under any conditions set forth in this section, the
creditors of the dissolved partnership, as against the separate
creditors of the retiring or deceased partner or the representatives of the deceased partner, have a prior right to any claim
of the retired partner or the representatives of the deceased
partner against the person or partnership continuing the
business on account of the retired or deceased partner's
interest in the dissolved partnership, or on account of any
consideration promised for such interest, or for his right in
partnership property.
(9) Nothing in this section shall be held to modify any right
of creditors to set aside any assignment on the ground of

fraud.
(10) The use by t h e person or partnership continuing the
business of the p a r t n e r s h i p name, or t h e name of a deceased
partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual
property of t h e deceased p a r t n e r liable for any debts contracted by such person or partnership.
1953
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48-1-39. Rights of retiring or estate of deceased partner when the business is continued.
When any partner retires or dies and the business is
continued under any of t h e conditions set forth in Section
48-1-38(1), (2), (3), (5), (6), or Section 48-l-35(2)(b) without any
settlement of accounts as between h i m or his estate and t h e
person or partnership continuing t h e business, unless otherwise agreed, he or his legal representatives as against such
persons or partnership may have t h e value of his interest a t
the date of dissolution ascertained, a n d shall receive as a n
ordinary creditor an amount equal to t h e value of his interest
in the dissolved partnership with interest, or, a t his option or
at the option of his legal representatives, in lieu of interest,
the profits attributable to t h e use of his right in t h e property
of the dissolved partnership; provided, t h a t the creditors of t h e
dissolved partnership as against t h e separate creditors or t h e
representative of the retired or deceased partner shall have
priority on any claim arising u n d e r t h i s section, as provided by
Section 48-1-38(8).
1953
48-1-40. Accrual of a c t i o n s .
The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any
partner or his legal representative a s against the winding-up
partners or the surviving p a r t n e r s or the person or partnership continuing the business, a t t h e d a t e of dissolution in t h e
absence of any agreement to t h e contrary.
1953
PART 2
UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY
P A R T N E R S H I P ACT
48-1-41. Title.
Sections 48-1-41 through 48-1-48 a r e known a s t h e "Utah
Limited Liability Partnership Act."
1994
48-1-42.

48-1-46
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R e g i s t r a t i o n of l i m i t e d liability p a r t n e r s h i p s .

(1) (a) A partnership shall register with the Division of
Corporations and Commercial Code by filing an application or a renewal statement:
(i) to become and to continue as a limited liability
partnership; or
(ii) to do business in this state as a foreign limited
liability partnership,
(b) The application or renewal statement shall include:
(i) the name of the limited liability partnership;
(ii) the address of its principal office;
(iii) if the principal office of the limited liability
partnership is not located in this state, the address of
a registered office and the name and address of a
registered agent for service of process in this state;
(iv) the number of partners;
(v) a brief statement of the business in which the
limited liability partnership engages;
(vi) a brief statement that the partnership is applying for, or seeking to renew its status as a limited
liability partnership; and
(vii) if a foreign limited liability partnership, an
original certificate of fact or good standing from the
office of the secretary of state or other responsible
authority of the state in which the limited liability
partnership is formed.
(2) The application or renewal statement required by Subsection (1) shall be executed by a majority in voting interest of
the partners or by one or more partners authorized by the
partnership to execute an application or renewal statement.
(3) The application or renewal statement shall be accompanied by a filing fee established under Section 63-38-3.2.
(4) The division shall register as a limited liability partnership any partnership that submits a completed application
with the required fee.

(5) (a) The registration expires one year after the date an
application is filed unless the registration is voluntarily
withdrawn by filing with the division a written withdrawal notice executed by a majority in voting interest of
the partners or by one or more partners authorized to
execute a withdrawal notice.
(b) Registration of a partnership as a limited liability
partnership shall be renewed if no earlier than 60 days
before the date the registration expires and no later than
the date of expiration, the limited liability partnership
files with the division a renewal statement.
(c) The division shall renew the registration as a limited liability partnership of any limited liability partnership that timely submits a completed renewal statement
with the required fee.
(d) If a renewal statement is timely filed, the registration is effective for one year after the date the registration
would have expired but for the filing or the renewal
statement.
(6) The status of a partnership as a limited liability partnership is not affected by changes in the information stated in
the application or renewal statement which take place after
the filing of an application or a renewal statement.
(7) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, U t a h Administrative Rulemaking Act, t h e division may issue rules providing for the form content a n d submittal of applications for
registration or of renewal statements.
1996
48-1-43.

S c o p e of c h a p t e r — Choice of law.

(1) A partnership, including a limited liability partnership
may conduct its business, carry on its operations, and exercise
the powers granted by this chapter within and without the
state.
(2) (a) It is the intent of the Legislature that the legal
existence of limited liability partnerships formed in this
state and registered under Section 48-1-42 be recognized
outside the boundaries of this state and that the laws of
this state governing the limited liability partnership
transacting business outside this state be granted the
protection of full faith and credit under the Constitution
of the United States.
(b) It is the intent of the Legislature that the internal
affairs of a limited liability partnerships formed in this
state and registered under Section 48-1-42 be subject to
and governed by the laws of this state, including the
provisions providing for liability of partners for debts,
obligations, and liabilities chargeable to partnerships.
1994

48-1-44. Foreign limited liability partnerships.
(1) Subject to any statute regulating a specific type of
business, a limited liability partnership registered and existing under the laws of another state, may do business in this
state if it registers with the division, in accordance with
Section 48-1-42.
(2) The internal affairs of a limited liability partnership
registered and existing under the laws of another jurisdiction,
including the provisions providing for the liability of partners
for debts, obligations of and liabilities chargeable to partnerships, shall be subject to and governed by the laws of the state
where the partnership is formed.
1996
48-1-45. Name of registered limited liability partnership.
The name of a limited liability partnership shall contain the
words "limited liability partnership" or the abbreviations
"LL.?." or "LLP* as the last words or letters of its name.
1994

48-1-46. Professional relationship — Personal liability.
(1) Sections 48-1-41 through 48-1-48 do not alter any law
applicable to the relationship between a person rendering
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UT Code § 57-1-10, After-acquired title passes
Utah Code § 57-1-10

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE
CHAPTER 1. CONVEYANCES
(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this
document.)

Page 1

same in fee simple absolute, and shall not at the
time of such conveyance have the legal estate in
such real estate, but shall afterwards acquire the
same, the legal estate subsequently acquired
shall immediately pass to the grantee, his heirs,
successors or assigns, and such conveyance
shall be as valid as if such legal estate had been
in the grantor at the time of the conveyance.
WESTS UTAH CODE

Current through End of2000 General Sess.
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE
§57-1-10. After-acquired title passes
CHAPTER 1. CONVEYANCES
If any person shall hereafter convey any real
estate by conveyance purporting to convey the
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Copyright (c) West Group 2001 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RECORDING OF DOCUMENTS

57-3-2

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Disqualification of office taking acknowl-

S S S S ^ ^ o f f l S T S K acknowledgment
Cited.
'
Acknowledgment by mortgagee.
An acknowledgment taken by mortgagee
himself as a notary public is void, and renders
mortgage unrecordable. Norton v. Fuller, 68
Utah 524, 251 P. 29 (1926).

* a S S ^ n t is taken before officer
disqualified to act, certificate is ineffectual.
Crompton v. Jenson, 78 Utah 55, 1 P.2d 242
(19ol).
C i t e d i n G ^ a l G\aSs Corp. v. Mast Constr.
c

?66 p M

429 (Utah a

'

A

198g)

™

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 95, 123.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and
Recording Laws § 77.

C.J.S. — 1A C.J.S. Acknowledgments § 8.
Key Numbers. — Acknowledgment ©=» 1-4.

57-3-2. Record imparts notice — Change in interest rate —
Validity of document — Notice of unnamed interests — Conveyance by grantee.
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner
prescribed by this title, each original document or certified dopy of a document
complying with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a
notice of location complying with Section 40-1-4, and each^financing statement complying with Section 70A-9-402, whether or not acknowledged shall,
from the time of filing with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to
all persons of their contents.
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in^the interest
rate in accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underlying secured obligation does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the
document provided under Subsection (1).
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect to
the parties to the document and all other persons who have notice of the
document.
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a nominal consideration,
names the grantee as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without
naming beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust does not charge any
third person with notice of any interest of the grantor or of the interest of any
other person not named in the document.
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to
him free and clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he
appears as grantee or in any other document recorded in accordance with this
title that sets forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifies the interest
claimed, and describes the real property subject to the interest.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2000;
CL. 1917, § 4900; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
78-3-2; L. 1977, ch. 272, § 54; 1985, ch. 159,
§ 7; 1988, ch. 155, § 14; 1989, ch. 88, § 8.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-

ment designated the existing language as Subsection (1) and divided the formerly undivided
language into two sentences; in Subsection (1),
deleted "the provisions of' before "Section
70A-9-402" in the first sentence and made
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REAL ESTATE

57-3-2

minor phraseology changes throughout the
subsection; and added Subsection (2).
The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988,
added Subsections (3) to (5) and rewrote Subsections (1) and (2), as last amended by Laws
1985, ch. 159, § 7, to such an extent that a
detailed comparison is impracticable.

The 1989 amendment, effective July 1, 1989,
inserted "each copy of a notice of location complying with Section 40-1-4" in Subsection (1)
and made stylistic changes.
Cross-References. — Judgment record, recording of, § 17-21-11.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Actual notice.
—Duty to inquire.
Admissibility of record in evidence.
Effect of failure to record.
Effect of recordation.
—Cancellation on grounds of mistake.
—Contradiction by parol evidence.
—Equities of adverse claimants.
—Evidence of facts therein.
—Presumption of delivery.
—Running of statute of limitations.
Improper or defective recordation.
—Forged deed.
—Lack of constructive notice.
Mortgages.
Necessity for recordation.
—Actual notice.
Obligation of grantor.
Priorities.
—Chronology of recordation.
—Lien for materials.
—Mortgages.
—Overlapping conveyances.
Recordation as notice.
—Time from which notice imparted.
"Recorded."
Cited.
Actual notice.
—Duty to inquire.
Mortgage broker, acting on behalf of a bona
fide purchaser, inquired with sufficient diligence where he had a title search performed
and personally contacted the secured party,
who confirmed what the title search and other
verbal and documentary evidence had told
him. Diversified Equities, Inc. v. American
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 739 P.2d 1133 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987).
Where defendant-lender's appraiser expected
to find, and did find, persons occupying the
premises as tenants, and there was nothing
about the property to alert defendant as to
plaintiffs interest in it, the appraiser did not
have a duty to inquire as to the identity of the
landlord or ask to see a copy of the lease or
rental agreement. Stumph v. Church, 740 P.2d
820 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Admissibility of record in evidence.
Record of patent is admissible in evidence

when record shows that patent was duly executed and verified as provided by law. Tate v.
Rose, 35 Utah 229, 99 P. 1003 (1909).
Effect of failure to record.
Where a prior deed was not recorded until
three years after the purchasers' assignments
of their equitable interests in the property
were executed and recorded, the assignee had
no constructive notice of the deed, and the assignee's lien was therefore superior to a bank's
subsequent trust deed received from the purchasers. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Assoc, v.
Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 904 (Utah 1987).
Effect of recordation.
—Cancellation on grounds of mistake.
In action to cancel recorded one-page warranty deed on grounds of mistake, trial court
properly granted purchasers' motion for summary judgment on counterclaim to quiet title
where circumstances constituting alleged mistake were not pleaded with particularity;
plaintiffs did not allege any conduct by purchasers preventing vendors from ascertaining
contents of deed; and purchasers had been in
actual possession of property in question during entire period of 21 years since conveyance.
McKellar v. McKellar, 23 Utah 2d 106, 458
P.2d 867 (1969).
—Contradiction by parol evidence.
Marginal entry, whereby mortgage was discharged of record and secured indebtedness
was declared "fully paid," was not of such formal and solemn character as to be beyond
power of contradiction by parol evidence on
point that, at time it was made, indebtedness
actually had not been "fully paid." Thompson
v. Avery, 11 Utah 214, 39 P. 829 (1895).
—Equities of adverse claimants.
Where purchasers of real estate had such notice of adverse claims of plaintiffs as would put
reasonable person upon inquiry to ascertain
what interest was, they took subject to any equities or interest that plaintiffs had in premises, though such interest was not recorded as
required by this section. Gappmayer v.
Wilkenson, 53 Utah 236, 177 P. 763 (1919).
—Evidence of facts therein.
The record is only the prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated. Tarpey v. Desert Salt
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UT Code § 57-3-102, Record imparts notice--Change in interest
rate--Validity of document--Notice of unnamed interests--Conveyance
by grantee

Utah Code § 57-3-102
WESTS UTAH CODE
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE
CHAPTER 3. RECORDING OF
DOCUMENTS
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Current through End of 2000 General Sess.

§ 57-3-102. Record imparts notice-Change
in interest rate—Validity of documentNotice of unnamed interests-Conveyance
by grantee
< Text of section effective until July 1,
2001 >
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged,
and certified, in the manner prescribed by this
title, each original document or certified copy of
a document complying with Section 57-4a-3,
whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a
notice of location complying with Section
40-1-4, and each financing statement complying
with Section 70A-9-402, whether or not
acknowledged shall, from the time of recording
with the appropriate county recorder, impart
notice to all persons of their contents.
(2) If a recorded document was given as
security, a change in the interest rate in
accordance with the terms of an agreement

Page 1

pertaining to the underlying secured obligation
does not affect the notice or alter the priority of
the document provided under Subsection (1).
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a
document with respect to the parties to the
document and all other persons who have notice
of the document.
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites
only a nominal consideration, names the grantee
as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust
without naming beneficiaries or stating the
terms of the trust does not charge any third
person with notice of any interest of the grantor
or of the interest of any other person not named
in the document.
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may
convey the interest granted to him free and clear
of all claims not disclosed in the document in
which he appears as grantee or in any other
document recorded in accordance with this title
that sets forth the names of the beneficiaries,
specifies the interest claimed, and describes the
real property subject to the interest.
Amended by Laws 1989, c. 88. Renumberedfrom § 57-3-2
by Laws 1998, c. 61, § 2, effi July 1, 1998. Amended by
Laws 1998, c. 85, § 4, effi May 4, 1998.

< For text of section effective July 1,
2001, see §57-3-102, post >
Search this disc for cases citing this section.
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Utah Code § 57-3-102
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE
CHAPTER 3. RECORDING OF
DOCUMENTS
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Current through End of 2000 General Sess.

§ 57-3-102. Record imparts notice-Change
in interest rate—Validity of documentNotice of unnamed interests-Conveyance
by grantee.

Page 2

does not affect the notice or alter the priority of
the document provided under Subsection (1).
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a
document with respect to the parties to the
document and all other persons who have notice
of the document.
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites
only a nominal consideration, names the grantee
as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust
without naming beneficiaries or stating the
terms of the trust does not charge any third
person with notice of any interest of the grantor
or of the interest of any other person not named
in the document.

< Text of section effective July 1, 2001 >
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged,
and certified, in the manner prescribed by this
title, each original document or certified copy of
a document complying with Section 57-4a-3,
whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a
notice of location complying with Section
40-1-4, and each financing statement complying
with Section 70A-9a-502, whether or not
acknowledged shall, from the time of recording
with the appropriate county recorder, impart
notice to all persons of their contents.
(2) If a recorded document was given as
security, a change in the interest rate in
accordance with the terms of an agreement
pertaining to the underlying secured obligation

(5) The grantee in a recorded document may
convey the interest granted to him free and clear
of all claims not disclosed in the document in
which he appears as grantee or in any other
document recorded in accordance with this title
that sets forth the names of the beneficiaries,
specifies the interest claimed, and describes the
real property subject to the interest.
Amended by Laws 1989, c. 88. Renumbered from § 57-3-2
by Laws 1998, c. 61, § 2, eff July 1, 1998. Amended by
Laws 1998, c. 85, § 4, eff May 4, 1998; Laws 2000, c.
252, §11, eff July 1,2001.

< For text effective until July 1, 2001,
see §57-3-102, ante >
Search this disc for cases citing this section.
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EXHIBIT 5
Orders from the Trial Court
ITEM 1

Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment

ITEM 2

Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

ITEM 3

Order on Motion to Strike

ITEM 4

Final Judgment
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Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

APR 1 3 1999
SALT LAKE CCU

By.

Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Defendants William S. Love
and Irene C. Love
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Post Office Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019
Telephone: (801) 532-7840

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM S. LOVE, IRENE C. LOVE,
CONMART, INC., a Utah corporation,
and JOHN DOES I through X,

ORDER GRANTING LOVES'
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT A N D
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

WILLIAM S. LOVE and IRENE C. LOVE,
Counterclaimants and
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 960906947PR
Judge Judith S. Atherton

vs.
ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; WILLIAM J. LOWENBERG;
WESTERN MANAGEMENT, a
partnership; SMITH HALANDER SMITH
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

AND ASSOCIATES, a partnership;
MINSON-HALANDER, INC., a Utah
corporation; H. FRED SMITH; RONALD
W. SMITH; DALE N. MINSON; ROBERT
S. HALANDER; and JOHN DOES 1-10,
Counterclaim and
Third-Party Defendants.

This matter came before the court for hearing on March 1, 1999 at 3:00 p.m. on
cross motions for partial summary judgment filed by defendants William S. Love and
Irene C. Love ("Loves") and plaintiff Arnold Industries, Inc. ("Arnold"). Arnold was
represented by Sherman C. Young. Loves were represented by Ronald G. Russell. L.
Benson Mabey appeared for third-party defendants Western Management, Smith
Halander Smith and Associates, Minson-Halander, Inc., H. Fred Smith, Ronald W . Smith,
Dale N. Minson, and Robert S. Halander. Kevan F. Smith appeared for Salt Lake County.
The motions for partial summary judgment are directed at the issue of whether an
easement for ingress and egress over plaintiff's property (the "Arnold Property") exists for
the benefit of defendants' property (the "Love Property"). The court concludes that there
are no genuine issues of material fact and defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.

2
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Western Management conveyed the Love Property, including the right-of-way, to
William J. Lowenberg by the Warranty Deed recorded February 3, 1982 as Entry No.
3645188 (the "1982 Warranty Deed"). At the time Western Management granted the
1982 Warranty Deed, title to the Arnold Property was not vested in Western
Management. Later in 1982, the then owners of the Arnold Property, H. Fred Smith,
Ronald W. Smith, Dale N. Minson, and Robert S. Halander, conveyed the Arnold
Property to Western Management by a Quit-Claim Deed recorded October 29, 1982 as
Entry No. 3724987, thereby vesting title to the Arnold Property in Western Management.
On January 23, 1991, a Corrective Warranty Deed describing the Love Property,
including the easement over the Arnold Property, was recorded as Entry No. 5015202
(the "Corrective Warranty Deed"). Among other things, the Corrective Warranty Deed
states that it was entered to correct certain mistakes in the legal description contained in
the 1982 Warranty Deed including to limit the easement over the Arnold Property in
favor of the Love Property "to appropriate ingress and egress over the access ways as the
same existed or may be improved or modified." All of the parties holding an interest of
record in both the Arnold Property and the Love Property as of January 23, 1991
executed the Corrective Warranty Deed. A Quiet Title Decree recorded February 21,
1991 as Entry No. 5030026 recognizes William J. Lowenberg as the owner of the Love
Property together with easements over the Arnold Property. All of the owners of record
of both the Arnold Property and the Love Property were parties in the action in which
3
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the Quiet Title Decree was entered. William J. Lowenberg conveyed the Love Property
and easements over the Arnold Property to William S. Love and Irene C. Love pursuant
to the Warranty Deed recorded January 19, 1995 as Entry No. 6006715.
Based on the record, the court concludes that the easement was created by the
1982 Warranty Deed as corrected by the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed. Although
Western Management was not the owner of the Arnold Property at the time that the
1982 Warranty Deed was recorded, the after-acquired title doctrine or estoppel by deed
apply in this case because both Western Management and the individual partners of
Western Management subsequently came into title to the Arnold Property. The court
rejects plaintiff's argument that a "counter-estoppel" would apply for the reasons argued
by Loves.
In addition, the court concludes that the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed would
be effective to create the easement as of 1991. Title to the Arnold Property was vested
in the partners of Western Management and each of those partners executed the 1991
Corrective Warranty Deed. Under Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-7, "where title to real
property is in the names of all the partners, a conveyance executed by all the partners
passes all their rights in such property." The effect of the 1991 Corrective Warranty
Deed is confirmed and judicially recognized by the contemporaneous Quiet Title Decree
that was entered in an action in which the Western Management partners were all party
defendants.
4
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The court also rejects Arnold's contention that it was a bona fide purchaser
without actual or constructive notice of the easement. The 1982 Warranty Deed, the
1991 Corrective Warranty Deed, and the 1991 Quiet Title Decree were properly
recorded and were indexed in the tract index of the Salt Lake County Recorder's office.
Those documents were indexed to the correct quarter of Section 21, Township 1 South,
Range 1 East, where these properties are located. The record is sufficient to impart
notice where the recorder indicated the metes and bounds description of the Love
Property and "See Document for Additional Description" on the index.
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons set forth in the memoranda filed by
Loves, the court concludes that Loves are entitled to the entry of a judgment declaring
that the Love Property is benefitted by and the Arnold Property is burdened by a
right-of-way for ingress and egress as described in the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Loves' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is
GRANTED and Arnold's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.
DATED this

/3

day of

fj

S>AA

$

1999.

BY THE COU&^
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Sherma/i C. Young, Esq. of
IVIE'&YOUNG
Attorneys for Plaif

RonafdyG. Russell, Esq.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Defendants William S. Love
and Irene C. Love
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the
I o "day of March, 1999 a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER GRANTING LOVES' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
L. Benson Mabey, Esq.
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Sherman C. Young, Esq.
IVIE & YOUNG
48 North University Avenue
Post Office Box 657
Provo, Utah 84603-0657
Blake T. Heiner, Esq.
330 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Kevan F. Smith, Esq.
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEYS OFFICE
2001 South State Street, No. S
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190

Ronald C. Russell, Esq.
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ITEM 2

Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
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Third Judicial District
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

*

•

-

*

/

•

»

ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC.,
a Utah Corporation
Plaintiff,

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS MOTION
TO DISMISS

vs.
CASE NO. 960906947
WILLIAM S. LOVE, et al.,
JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD
Defendant.

On June 30,2000, defendant's Motion to Dismiss came before the above entitled Court, the
Honorable Stephen L. Henriod presiding. Defendants were represented by Ronald Russell and
Kevan Smith and plaintiffs were represented by Sherman Young. Following the conclusion of the
hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement.
At the hearing and in its supporting memorandum, defendants argue that plaintiff failed to
comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and its notice of claim provisions, UCA
§63-30-11 and §63-30-13, which operate as a one year statute of limitation in cases brought against
a governmental entity. Specifically, a party must file a notice of claim within one yearfromthe date
on which the claim arose. In response, plaintiff contends that the discovery rule applies because
exceptional circumstances existed which made discovery of the claim before the expiration of the
limitation period impossible.
In order to prove exceptional circumstances, a party must first prove that" the plaintiff did
not know of and could not reasonably have known of the existence of the cause of action in time to
file a claim within the limitation period." Warren vProvo City Corporation, 838 P.2d 1125, 1129
(1992). In this case plaintiff failed to meet its initial burden.
The corrective warranty deed on plaintiffs property was recorded and indexed, but not
abstracted, on January 23,1991. Plaintiffs purchased the property on July 15,1993. On April 12,
1996, defendants claimed an easement over plaintiffs property. Consequently, on May 23, 1996
plaintiffs counsel conducted an evaluation of the claimed easement and of the corrective warranty
deed which purported to create the easement. On July 2, 1997 plaintiff conducted a detailed
examination of the records at which time plaintiff claims it first discovered the County's failure to
properly abstract the corrective warranty deed. Accordingly, plaintiff sent notice of claim, which
was received by the County on August 4,1997.
Plaintiff argues that because it did not know of its claim against the County until July 2,
1997, its August 4, 1997 notice of claim is timely. Defendant, on the other hand, asserts that
plaintiff either knew of or reasonably should have known of the warranty deed on April 12,1996 or,
at the latest, on May 23,1996.
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The Courtfindsplaintiffs arguments unpersuasive. On April 12,1996 defendants claimed
an easement over plaintiffs property. Upon learning of this claim, plaintiffs counsel evaluated the
claim and the corrective warranty deed as reflected in a May 23, 1996 correspondence between
counsel. The combination of these two events, indicates to this Court that at that time plaintiff had
reasonable grounds to question the existence of an easement and either should have, or did,
investigate the matter further. Consequently, plaintiffs notice of claim filed on August 4,1997 is
untimely.
Accordingly, as a matter of law, the plaintiff has not shown that it did not know or could not
have reasonably known about the cause of action against defendant within the statutory period.
Therefore, the Court having reviewed the legal memoranda, affidavits and exhibits submitted by the
parties, and being fully advised, concludes that defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be granted.

Dated this

2b

day of July, 2000.
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ITEM 3

Order on Motion to Strike
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
Ronald C . Russell, Esq. (4134)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Defendants William S. Love
and Irene C. Love
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Post Office Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019
Telephone: (801) 532-7840

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC., a Utah
corporation,

Plaintiff,
ORDER

vs.
WILLIAM S. LOVE, IRENE C. LOVE,
CONMART, INC., a Utah corporation,
and JOHN DOES I through X,
Defendants.

WILLIAM S. LOVE and IRENE C. LOVE,
Counterclaimants and
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 960906947PR
Judge Stephen L. Henriod

vs.
ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; WILLIAM J. LOWENBERG;
WESTERN MANAGEMENT, a
partnership; SMITH HALANDER SMITH
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AND ASSOCIATES, a partnership;
MINSON-HALANDER, INC, a Utah
corporation; H. FRED SMITH; RONALD
W. SMITH; DALE N. MINSON; ROBERT
S. HALANDER; and JOHN DOES 1-10,
Counterclaim and
Third-Party Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

This matter came before the court on Plaintiff's Motion to Strike, or in the
Alternative, to Compel Discovery. Based on the record herein, the court having issued
its Minute Entry dated November 21, 2000, the court having issued its Minute Entry
dated January 5, 2001 denying plaintiffs motion to reconsider, and for good cause
appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Supplemental
Affidavit of Ronald W. Smith or in the alternative, to Compel Discovery from Defendants
Ronald W. Smith, H. Fred Smith, Dale N. Minson and Robert S. Halander is denied and
plaintiffs motion to reconsider the same is denied.
DATED this

(f

day of January, 2001.
BY THE COURT:
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APPR

Sherman C. Young, Esq. of
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Ronald (J. Russell, Est]/of
V
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Defendants William S. Love and
Irene C. Love
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the I P day of January, 2001 a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
L. Benson Mabey, Esq.
MABEY & COOMBS
124 South 600 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Sherman C. Young, Esq.
IVIE & YOUNG
226 West 2230 North
Post Office Box 657
Provo, Utah 84603-0657
Blake T. Heiner, Esq.
330 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Kevan F. Smith, Esq.
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
2001 South State Street, No. S-3600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190

Ronal
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Final Judgment
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ff/if4 judicial District
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Defendants William S. Love
and Irene C. Love
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Post Office Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019
Telephone: (801) 532-7840

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
JUDGMr — .
OF JUDG/ViEJiJS
0 ^ 0
DATE

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,
FINAL JUDGMENT

vs.
WILLIAM S. LOVE, IRENE C. LOVE,
CONMART, INC., a Utah corporation,
and JOHN DOES I through X,
Defendants.

WILLIAM S. LOVE and IRENE C. LOVE,
Counterclaimants and
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 960906947PR
Judge Stephen L. Henriod

vs.
ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC., a Utah
corporation; WILLIAM J. LOWENBERG;
WESTERN MANAGEMENT, a

Final Judgment @ J
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partnership; SMITH HALANDER SMITH
AND ASSOCIATES, a partnership;
MINSON-HALANDER, INC, a Utah
corporation; H. FRED SMITH; RONALD
W. SMITH; DALE N. MINSON; ROBERT
S. HALANDER; and JOHN DOES 1-10,
Counterclaim and
Third-Party Defendants.

The court having previously entered its "Order Granting Loves' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" dated
April 13, 1999, and its "Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss" dated July 25, 2000, and
the parties having stipulated to the dismissal of the remaining claims not adjudicated by
those two orders, and for good cause appearing, the court hereby enters this Final
Judgment.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
1.

For the reasons set forth in the court's "Order on Defendant [Salt Lake

County's] Motion to Dismiss" dated July 25, 2000, plaintiff's fifth and sixth claims for relief
set forth in its Amended Complaint are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
2.

For the reasons set forth in the court's "Order Granting Loves' Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment"
dated April 13, 1999, plaintiff's first, second and third causes of action set forth in its
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Amended Complaint are dismissed with prejudice; Judgment is entered in favor of
defendants William S. Love and Irene C. Love and against plaintiff on Count I of said
defendants' Counterclaim; and the court hereby declares and decrees that said defendants
are owners and holders of certain easements and right-of-ways appurtenant to the "Love
Property" (as defined below) and that burden the "Arnold Industries Property" (as defined
below), which easements and right-of-ways are more particularly described as follows:
A RIGHT OF WAY as was obtained by Grantor pursuant to that
Corrective Warranty Deed entered into between Western
Management, a partnership, as grantor, and conveyed and
warranted to William J. Lowenberg, as grantee, and dated January
22, 1991, and recorded January 23, 1991, in the Salt Lake County
Recorder's Office as Entry No. 5015202, in Book 6284, at Page
1366-1372. The property, subject to the right of way is described
as follows:

• .

BEGINNING at a point on the North line of
2300 South Street, said point being North
00o02'35" East, 1083.00 feet and West
2726.812 feet from the Salt Lake County Survey
Monument at the center of Section 22, Township
1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, and running thence North 104.00 feet;
thence North 16°02'36" West 67.00 feet; thence
North 73°57,24" East 82.00 feet; thence North
16°02,36" West 522.935 feet to the South line
of the "FM ramp of 1-215; thence South
58° 19-02" West 192.072 feet along said South
line; thence South 53°28'29" West 159.555 feet
along said South line; thence South 16°02'36"
East 526.912 feet to the North line of said 2300
South Street; thence Northeasterly 61.922 feet
around a 221.143 foot radius curve to the right
3
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(chord bears North 81 °58'42" East 61.72 feet);
thence East 169.16 feet to the point of
BEGINNING.
TOGETHER WITH A perpetual easement for the purpose of
providing access to and from a loading dock, as disclosed in that
certain Grant of Easement recorded April 08, 1980 as Entry No.
3421031, in Book 5084, at Page 322 and affecting the following
described property:
BEGINNING at a point which is North 0°02'35"
East 1083.00 feet, West 2666.520 feet and North
191.074 feet from the Salt Lake County Survey
Monument at the center of Section 22, Township
1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian; thence South 73057'24" West 5.30
feet to the West side of a concrete retaining wall;
thence North 00o02,39" West along said wall
4.68 feet; thence North 89°57'21" East 4.17 feet;
thence South 16°02'36" East 3.35 feet to the
point of BEGINNING.
The "Love Property" is located in Salt Lake County, Utah and is more
particularly described as follows:
BEGINNING at a point on the North line of 2300 South Street, said
point being North 0°02'35" East 1083.00 feet and West 2556.812
feet from the Salt Lake County Survey Monument at the Center of
Section 22, Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, and running thence North 848.434 feet to the South
. right of way line of the 1-215 "F" ramp exit; thence Southwesterly
69.833 feet along said South right of way line, around a 1146.23
foot radius curve to the left (chord bears South 59°46'53" West
69.822 feet); thence South 58°19'02" West along said South right
of way line 227.853 feet; thence South 16°02'36" East 522.935
feet; thence South 73°57'24" West 82.0 feet; thence South
16°02'36" East 67.0 feet; thence South 104.00 feet to the North
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line of said 2300 South Street; thence East along said North line
170.00 feet to the point of BEGINNING.
The "Arnold Industries Property" is located in Salt Lake County, Utah and is more
particularly described as follows:
Beginning at a point on the North line of 2300 South Street, said
point being North 0°02'35" East 1083.00 feet and due West
2726.812 feet from the Salt Lake County Survey Monument at the
center of Section 22, Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian; and running thence North 104.00 feet; thence
North 16°02'36" West 67.00 feet; thence North 73°57 , 24" East
82.00 feet; thence North 16°02 , 36" West 522.935 feet to the
South line of the " F " Ramp of 1-215; thence South 58°19'02" West
192.072 feet along said South line; thence South 53°28'29" West
159.555 feet along said South line; thence South 16°02 , 36" East
526.912 feet to the North line of said 2300 South Street; thence
Northeasterly 61.922 feet around a 221.143 foot radius curve to
the right (chord bears North 81 °58 , 42" East 61.72 feet); thence
East 169.16 feet to the point of beginning.
3.

For the reasons set forth in the court's "Order Granting Loves' Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment"
dated April 13, 1999, Judgment is granted in favor of defendants William S. Love and Irene
C. Love on Count IV of their Counterclaim and plaintiff Arnold Industries, Inc. and its
grantees, successors, and assigns are hereby enjoined and restrained from taking any action
to inhibit or preclude Loves, their tenants, and invitees from using the Love Easements.
4.

All other claims, counterclaims and third-party claims are dismissed without

prejudice.
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DATED this

\>

day of

Honorable Step
District CourftJu

"[\oO°{«Wl

6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Exhibit 6

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

EXHIBIT 6
Correspondence re Settlement Negotiation
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LUNDBERG'TMEADERS
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

May 23,1996
VIA FAX 524-1099
Geoffrey W. Mangum
PRINCE, YEA^FES & GELDZAHLER 175 East 400 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Claim of Easement by William Love

Dear Geoff:
Since our telephone conversation last week, 1 have received and reviewed copies of the
relevant documents. My conclusion is that Mr. Love does not have a valid easement across the
property owned by my client, Arnold Industries, Inc.
Throughout this letter I will refer to my client's parcel as the "Arnold Parcel" and to Mr.
Love's parcel as the "Love Parcel."
It is my understanding thai Mr. Love bases his claim on a "Corrective Warranty Deed" from
Western Management, William J. Lowenberg, and Smith, Halander, Smith and Associates, as
grantors, in favor of William J. Lowenberg, as grantee. The Corrective Warranty Deed was signed
on January 22, 1991 and recorded on January 23,1991, as Entry No. 5015202. Tne Corrective •
Warranty Deed purports to give an easement over all of the Arnold Parcel except for "existing
buildings, landscaping areas, and other improved areas not necessary or suitable for or incidental to
Granteefs use for access to his adjoining property..,"
Insofar as the Corrective Warranty Deed purports to grant an easement over the Arnold
Parcel, it is subject to the following flaws:
(1)
At the time that the Corrective Warranty Deed was signed and recorded, record title
to the Arnold Parcel was not vested in any of the grantors who signed the deed, but was
vested in HH. Fred Smith, Robert S. Halander, Dale N. Minson and Ronald W. Smith," as
individuals. These individuals obtained title by a Quit Claim Deed dated February 23,1987
and recorded March 13,1987 as Entry No. 4416765. They retained record title until March
8, 1991, when a Quit Claim Deed in favor of Conmart, Inc. was recorded (Entry No.
5036257.)
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Page 2
(2)
Although record title to the Arnold Parcel remained vested in H. Fred Smith, Robert
S. Haiander, Dale N. Minson and Ronald W. Smith until March 8,1991, actual ownership
of the Arnold Parcel was conveyed to Conmart, Inc. almost two months prior to the date of
the Corrective Warranty Deed. The conveyance to Conmarc was made by the Quit Claim
Deed described above which was dated November 28,1990 and recorded March 8,1991, as
Entry No. 5036257. It is true that this Quit Claim Deed was recorded after the Corrective
Warranty Deed, but there is strong evidence that Mr. Lowenberg, the grantee under the
Corrective Warranty Deed, knew or should have known about Conmart's interest when he
accepted the Corrective Warranty Deed. Conmart's Quit Claim Deed states that it was
recorded nai the request of L. Benson Mabey." Mr. Mabey was the attorney for Lowenberg
• • • in a quiet title action involving the Love Parcel. The quiet title action commenced in 1987
and was concluded in January, 1991, at the same time that the Corrective Warranty Deed was
recorded. Based on these facts, 1 have no doubt that Mr. Lowenberg had notice of Conmart's
interest and cannot claim priority over Conmart.
(3)
It is my understanding that GSA, which is the present occupant of the Arnold Parcel,
has been there for at least ten years. This is substantiated by several recorded instruments,
dating back to 1985, which refer to the Arnold Parcel as the HThe GSA Property." Although
GSA was in possession of the Arnold Parcel at the time that the Corrective Warranty Deed
was signed, no consent to the easement was obtained from GSA. In the absence of such
consent, any easement which your client might claim would be subject to the GSA Lease and
would not become effective until the end of the lease term and all renewals.
I am enclosing a copy of a letter delivered to me today by Vince Rampton. As you can see,
he has instructed me to seek a temporary restraining order immediately, unless Mr. Love agrees to
stop his vehicular traffic across the Arnold Parcel pending final resolution of this matter.
Please call me as soon as you have reviewed this letter so that we can try to work out a
temporary resolution and avoid litigation.
Very truly yours,

William A. Meaders, Jr.
cc:

Vince Rampton
Sharon Jones
Blake Heiner

enc.
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OFFICES OF

LUNDBERG & MEA.DERS
A PROFESSIONAL C O R P O R A T I O N

May 29,1996
VIA FAX 524-1099
Geoffrey W. Mangum
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
175 East 400 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake CityTtJtah 84111
Re:

Arnold Industries, Inc. — Bill Love Easement Claim

Dear Geoff:
I met yesterday afternoon with Sharyn Jones and Vince Rampton at the Arnold Industries
property. I informed them that Bill Love has made phone calls to both tenants in the south building
asking them to route all semi-trucks through 2200 West. Thank you for your help with this.
Sharyn was able to provide more information about the exact nature of the problem. There
has been an increase in traffic since the owner of the adjoining parcel placed concrete park stops and
barrels across his property to block access several months ago. Vehicles which previously accessed
your client's south building from the east began accessing it via the GSA parking lot. The large
semi-trucks cause shaking in the GSA building, but the smaller pickup trucks also present a problem
and pose a danger because they tend to speed across the parking lot to access the west loading dock
of the building. Arnold Industries was able to temporarily reduce the problem during the winter
months by piling snow on the parking lot in such a way as to discourage access to the west loading
dock. Now that the winter is over and the parking lot is clear again, the problem has increased. I
suspect there may also be a seasonal increase in traffic due to the nature of the tenant's business.
In light of this additional information, Arnold Industries is hereby requesting that Mr. Love's
tenants not use the west loading dock at all unless and until Mr. Love establishes the validity of his
claimed easement.
Very truly yours,
William A. Meaders, Jr.
cc:

Sharyn Jones, via fax
Vince Rampton, via fax
Blake Heiner, via fax
Arlen Taylor, via fax
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William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq.
Lundberg & Meaders
. 660 South 200 East, Suite 305
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

William S. & Irene C. Love — Right-of-Way Affecting
Property in West Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah

Dear Bill:
Reference is made to your letter of May 23, 1996 to Geoffrey W. Mangum, counsel
to William S. and Irene C. Love (the "Loves"), regarding the status of a certain right-of-way
(the "Right-of-Way") across property owned by your client Arnold Industries, Inc. We
represent the Loves in connection with the matter.
In the following discussion I use the term "Parcel 1" to refer to the parcel of realty
that is owned in fee by the Loves and the term "Parcel 2" to refer to the property owned by
your client and affected by the Right-of-Way.
1.
Effect of Invalidity of 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed. In your letter
of May 23, you contend that the Right-of-Way is invalid, due to the asserted invalidity, on
several different grounds, of a Corrective Warranty Deed that was given in 1991 and that
described the Right-of-Way (this Deed, dated January 22, 1991, and recorded on January 23,
1991 as Entry No. 5015202 in Book 6284 at Page 1366, is referred to below as the "1991
Corrective Warranty Deed"). The assumption seems to be that ineffectiveness of the 1991
Corrective Warranty Deed results in Parcel 2 not being burdened by the Right-of-Way. Our
review of the documents indicates that the assumption is incorrect.
The 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed refers to and purports to revise in certain
respects a Warranty Deed given in 1982 by Western Management, as Grantor, to William J.
Lowenberg, as Grantee (this Deed, dated January 27, 1982, and recorded on February 3,
1982, as Entry No. 3645188 in Book 5337 at Page 1149, is referred to below as the "1982
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Warranty Deed"). (Lowenberg is the predecessor 'in title to 'the Loves, as regards both
Parcel 1 and the Right-of-Way.) A copy of the 1982 Warranty Deed is enclosed for your
information. By its terms, the 1982 Warranty Deed conveyed to Lowenberg all but a small
part of Parcel 1, together with a Right-of-Way burdening Parcel 2 and the small part of
Parcel 1 ndt"conveyed to Lowenbergln fee. The legal description of the Parcel 1 property
appearing in the 1982 Warranty Deed differs from the Parcel 1 legal description contained in
the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed in that the 1982 description does not include a small
triangular piece on the West and also in that several of the perimeter dimensions vary slightly .
from the corresponding dimensions appearing in the 1991 legal description. The legal
description of the Parcel 2 property appearing as part of the Right-of-Way description in the
1982 Warranty Deed differs in the following four respects from the Right-of-Way description
contained in the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed:
(a)

The point of beginning is. described b\ reissue u a. lii/^ji-iu iii La-

ment;
(b)
Tne 1982 description includes in the property burdened by the Right-ofWay not just Parcel 2, but also the small triangular piece that the 1982 Warranty
Deed leaves out of the Parcel 1 legal description;
(C)
Midway through the description of Parcel 2 in the 1982 Warranty
Deed, the course "North 58°19'Q2" East 225.832 feet" appears, as regards pan of the
Parcel 2 boundary that coincides with the South line of the 1-215 interchange - the
course is in error, and should instead be South 58° 19'02" West 225.832 feet, as it is
given in the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed; and
(d)
At the end of the Parcel 2 description in the 1982 Warranty Deed the
radius of a curve is erroneously given as 22.1143 feet, instead of 221.143 feet (as it
is given in the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed), in describing a boundary line that is
coincident with the North line of 2300 South Street
Recitals in the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed indicate that its purpose was
twofold: (i) To correct the legal description contained in the 1982 Warranty Deed; and (ii)
To remedy a failure of the 1982 Warranty Deed to limit the coverage of the Right-of-Way as
regards Parcel 2, by making the Right-of-Way apply only to access ways located on Parcel 2
— rather than the Right-of-Way being applicable to the entirety of Parcel 2. (At least as
regards this second objective, the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed was intended to benefit
only the owner of Parcel 2, rather than the owner of Parcel 1. Your client might consider
where it would stand regarding the coverage of the Right-of-Way if it were to succeed in its
effort to invalidate the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed.)
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Assuming for purposes of argument that the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed
was invalid, as you contend, the result would merely be to leave the 1982 Warranty Deed in
effect and unchanged, and would not necessarily invalidate the Right-of-Way. It is therefore
necessary to consider what we have if left only with the 1982 Warranty Deed.
2.
Description Errors in 1982 Warranty Deed. The 1982 Warranty Deed
created a Right-of-Way over the entirety of Parcel 2 for the benefit of essentially (but not
quite) all of Parcel 1, unless deficiencies in the Parcel 2 description as contained in that Deed .
dictate another result.
Discussed below are the four differences between the description of Parcel 2
that was used in describing the Right-of-Way in the 1982 Warranty Deed and the Parcel 2
Right-of-Way description as contained in the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed:
(a)
The point of beginning of Parcel 2 is described in the 1982 Warranty
Deed by reference to a different monument than the one used in the 1991 Corrective
Warranty Deed. However, the two approaches describe the same or essentially the
same point of beginning. This difference in the descriptions therefore is not material.
(b)
The 1982 description of the property burdened by the Right-of-Way
included, in addition to Parcel 2, a small triangular piece of Parcel 1. By subsequent
conveyances, fee title to that triangular piece came to be owned by the same party as
was originally the holder of the Right-of-Way affecting it, and merger of the estates -.
therefore resulted in termination of the Right-of-Way insofar as it burdened the
triangular piece. Again, therefore, the difference in descriptions is not materials.
(c)
The course "North 58°19'02" East 225.832 feet" as used in the 1982
description should instead have been given as South 58°19/02w West 225.832 feet.
The fact that a 180° error was made in the bearing is obvious when one runs the 1982
description, particularly since the correct bearing was contained in the Warranty Deed
via which the Right-of-Way had originally been granted to Western Management, the
grantor under the 1982 Warranty Deed. (A copy of that Warranty Deed, dated
August 3, 1979, and recorded on August 6, 1979, as Entry No. 3318105 in Book
4916 at Page 962, is enclosed for your information.) Moreover, the boundary of
Parcel 2 that is intended to be described by the erroneous course is also stated in the
Parcel 2 description to be the South line of 1-215, making even more apparent that the
course given was in error. In any event, under well-established principles for
interpreting legal descriptions, the reference to the street line controls over the
inconsistent bearing given in the metes and bounds description. In addition, the
Right-of-Way — which was originally created (through use of the correct bearing) by
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the 1979 Deed — was an appurtenance of the Parcel 1 property conveyed by the 1982
Warranty Deed, and the Right-of-Way therefore automatically passed with the
conveyance of the Parcel 1 property, irrespective of the bearing error that was made
in the Parcel 2 description as contained in the 1982 Warranty Deed. Finally, the
1991~Corrective Warranty Deed — even if assumed not to be effective to actually
correct the mis-description contained in the 1982 Warranty Deed, served the purpose
of putting Arnold Industries (which acquired its interest in Parcel 2 18 months after
recordation of the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed) on notice that the 1982 Right-ofWay description was flawed and as to what the intended description was. Any one of
the foregoing factors alone results in the erroneous bearing in the 1982 Warranty
Deed not being fatal, but instead being required to be read in a manner consistent
with the facts and with w^hat was obviously intended.
(d)
The same kind of considerations as those noted in the preceding
Paragraph (c) are present as regards the incorrect curve radius of 22.11-3 feet (rather
than 221.1^3 feet) given at the end of the Parcel 2 description in the 1982 Warranty
Deed, where a boundary line coincident with the North line of 2300 South Street is
described. (As regards this description error, however, we concede that it was also
present in the description contained in the 1979 Warranty Deed referred to in
Paragraph (c).) For most of the same reasons as are noted in Paragraph (c), the error
was not fatal, and is instead reauired to be read in a wav consistent with the facts and
with what was intended.
For the reasons given above, it is clear that the 1982 Warranty Deed effectively described the Right-of-Way and conveyed it to the Loves' predecessor in title,
notwithstanding the errors that were part of the Parcel 2 description contained in that Deed.
3.
Priority Over GSA Lease. As pan of your argument that the 1991
Corrective Warranty Deed did not establish the Right-of-Way as an enforceable burden
against Parcel 2, your assert in your letter that the General Services Administration (the
B
GSAn) has been a tenant of Parcel 2 since 1985 and was in possession when the 1991
Corrective Warranty Deed was given. You in effect seem to be asserting that even if the
Right-of-Way is enforceable against Arnold Industries, it is not effective as against the tenant
GSA, since GSA's interest in Parcel 2 predates the Right-of-Way. As is discussed above,
the Right-of-Way did not originate with the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed. Rather, it
originated with the 1979 Warranty Deed and was described and conveyed by the 1982
Warranty Deed. The Right-of-Way therefore predated the GSA's interests in Parcel 2, and is
just as enforceable against the GSA as it is against the fee owner of Parcel 2.
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4.
Effectiveness of the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed. The considerations noted above demonstrate that the Right-of-Way is valid and effective, whether or not
the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed was valid. It therefore seems unnecessary to examine
the question of validity of the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed. Sufnce at this point to say
that various" considerations indicate tfiai the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed was indeed
valid, notwithstanding the factors relied upon in your letter in arriving at a contrary conclusion.
We would suggest that your client reconsider its position on the Right-of-Way, since
there seems to be no doubt that the Right-of-Way burdens its property. Please let me know,
however, if our analysis of the matter is somehow flawed.
Sincerelv.

Charles L. MaaK.
CLM:jxnh
Enclosures
cc:
William S. & Irene C. Love [Via Both Telefax, to 415-949-0251, and
First Class Mail]
Geoffrey W. Mangum, Esq. [Via Both Telefax, to 524-1098, and First Class Mail]
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June 26,1996
VIA FAX 532-7750
Charles L. Maak, Esq.
Kimball, Parr, Waddoups, Brown & Gee
185 South Staje, Suite 1300
Salt Lake Cit>\ Utah 84111.
Re:

William S. & Irene C. Love - Right of Way Claim

Dear Chuck:
I am writing in response to your letter of June 19, 1996. As I understand that letter, the
principal argument is that if the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed is invalid your clients will rely
instead on the 1982 Warranty Deed for their right of way. The 1982 Warranty Deed purports to
affect almost all of my client's parcel (the nWest Parcel") without limiting the right of way to access
ways.
I did not address the validity of the 1982 Warranty Deed in my letter of May 23,1996 to
Geoff Mangum, because I understood that Mr. and Mrs. Love were basing their claim solely on the
1991 Corrective Warranty Deed. It is my view, however, that the 1982 Warranty Deed adds nothing
to your clients' position. This view is based on the chain of title of the West Parcel. I will first
outline my understanding of the chain of title for this parcel for the relevant period of time, then
explain my conclusions.
Chain of Title of West Parcel:
The following is based on information provided to me by Metro National Title. I realize that
there are some small discrepancies between the boundaries of the West Parcel as described in some
of these conveyances and as it presently exists, but I don't think any of the discrepancies are relevant
to the present dispute, so I have not bothered to note them in this chain.
1.

On October 24,1975, both the West Parcel and the parcel now owned by William S. and
Irene C. Love (hereinafter the "East Parcel") were conveyed by Warranty Deed from
Research Industries Corporation, as Grantor, to Plan-Tech Corp., as Grantee. This deed was
recorded on October 28,1975, as Entry No. 2755041, Book 4009, Page 249. This is the
common source for both of our client's titles.
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On October 14,1975, Plan-Tech Corp., as Grantor, conveyed by Warranty Deed to MinsonHalander, a Utah corporation, as Grantee, the East Parcel and a portion of the West Parcel.
This deed was recorded on October 28,1975, as Entry No. 2755042, Book 4009, Page 250.

3.

On October 14,1975, Plan-Tech Corp., as Grantor, conveyed by Warranty Deed to Marcon
Investment, as Grantee, the remainder of the West Parcel which was not included in the
conveyance to Minson-Halander, described in paragraph 2 above. This deed was recorded
on November 18,1975, as Entry No. 2761314, Book 4029, Page 329.

4.

On August 10,1976, Minson-Halander, as Grantor, conveyed by Warranty Deed to Carrera
Corporation, as Grantee, the portion of the West Parcel then owned by Minson-Halander.
This deed was recorded on August 13,1976, as Entry No. 2845258, Book 4301, Page 102.

5.

On August 10,1976, Marcon Investment, as Grantor, conveyed by Warranty Deed to Carrera
Corporation, as Grantee, the portion of the West Parcel then owned by Marcon Investment.
This deed was recorded on August 13,1976, as Entry No. 2845259, Book 4301, Page 104.
After this conveyance, the entire West Parcel was owned by Carrera Corporation.

6.

On October 30, 1981, Carrera Corporation, as Grantor, conveyed the West Parcel by Quit
Claim Deed to H. Fred Smith, Ronald W. Smith, Dale N. Minson & Robert S. Halander, as
Grantees. This deed was recorded on November 24, 1981, as Entry No. 3625996, Book
5316, Page 554.

7.

On November 5, 1981, H. Fred Smith, Ronald W. Smith, Dale N. Minson, Robert S.
Halander, and Western Management, as Grantors, conveyed the West Parcel by Quit Claim *'
Deed to Carrera Corporation, as Grantee. This deed was recorded on December 28,1981,
as Entry No. 3634711, Book 5326, Page 47. It is important to note that Western
Management was a grantor in this deed. I do not believe that there were any easements in
favor of the East Parcel at the time this deed was signed and delivered, but even if there were
they would have been extinguished by this deed (since Western Management was the owner
at that time of the East Parcel.)

8.

On October 29,1982, Carrera Corporation, as Grantor, conveyed the West Parcel by Quit
Claim Deed to H. Fred Smith, Ronald W. Smith, Dale N. Minson, Robert S. Halander, as
Grantees. This deed was recorded on October 29,1982, as Entry No. 3724986, Book 5416,
Page 2273.
Conclusions Based on Chain of Title:

Based on the foregoing, it appears that when, in January, 1982, Western Management signed
and recorded the 1982 Warranty Deed purporting to create a right of way in favor of William J.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Charles L. Maak, Esq.
June 26,1996
Page 3
Lowenberg, Western Management did not own the West Parcel. Instead, the West Parcel was owned
by Carrera Corporation. Accordingly, the 1982 Warranty Deed did not create any easement rights
in the West Parcel.
In your letter, you also maintain that the claimed easement over the West Parcel predates the
GSA Lease, because it was first created^in the 1979 Warranty Deed from Minson Halander, Inc. to
Western Management (Entry No. 3318105.) This 1979 Warranty Deed suffers from the same
problem as the 1982 Warranty Deed - the grantor, Minson Halander, Inc. had no interest in the
parcel which the easement was intended to burden. Again, the West Parcel was owned by Carrera
Corporation at the time that Minson Halander, Inc. purported to create the easement.
The above analysis is entirely dependent, of course, on the accuracy of the title information.
Please let me know if you believe that my information is incorrect. Incidentally, I do not know
exactly when the GSA Lease became effective. It may have been long before 1985. I do know that
it was in effect by 1985 at the latest, based on references in the recorded documents.
You mentioned in your letter that you disagree with my analysis of the validity of the 1991
Corrective Warranty Deed. Since I am not convinced bv vour reliance on the 1979 Warranty Deed
*

mm

*

and the 1982 Warranty Deed, 1 would appreciate a further explanation of your views on the 1991
Corrective Warranty Deed.
Very truly yours,

William A. Meaders, Jr.
cc:

Vince Rampton
Sharyn Jones
Blake Heiner
Geoff Mangum
Arlen Taylor
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William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq.
Lundberg & Meaders
'.. 660 South 200 East, Suite 305
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

William S. & Irene C. Love - Right-of-Way Affecting
Property in West Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah

Dear Bill:
This is in response to your letter to me of June 26, 1996.
You assert that when Western Management signed the 1982 Warranty Deed in favor
of William J. Lowenberg, it did not own the West Parcel ("Parcel 2," in the nomenclature
used in my letter to you of June 19, 1996). You therefore conclude that the 1982 Warranty
Deed did not create any easement rights in the West Parcel (Parcel 2).
Even if one assumes, as I shall do for purposes of argument, that at the time (in
January, 1982) Western Management signed the 1982 Warranty Deed it did not hold title
either to the West Parcel/Parcel 2 or to a Right-of-Way burdening Parcel 2, the 1982
Warranty Deed still had the effect of creating the Right-of-Way which burdens Parcel 2. On
October 29, 1982 — a number of months after Western Management purported by the 1982
Warranty Deed to convey the Right-of-Way to William J. Lowenberg - the then-owners of
Parcel 2 (H. Fred Smith, Ronald W. Smith, Dale N. Minson, and Robert S. Halander)
conveyed Parcel 2 to Western Management by Quit-Claim Deed (recorded on October 29,
1982, as Entry No. 3724987 in Book 5416 at Page 2274). The chain of title information
contained in your letter of June 26 does not refer to this Quit-Claim Deed. Since the 1982
deed by which Western Management purported to convey the Right-of-Way in Parcel 2 to
Lowenberg had been a Warranty Deed, the doctrine of after-acquired title resulted in the
Right-of-Way being conveyed to Lowenberg thereafter — when Western Management itself
received title to Parcel 2 later in 1982. Consequently, it would appear that the 1982
Warranty Deed was effective to create and transfer the Right-of-Way to Lowenberg, whether
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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or not Western Management lacked title at the time the 1982 Warranty Deed was signed.
Because the foregoing considerations appear to demonstrate that the Right-of-Way is
valid and effective irrespective of the validity of the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed, it once
again seems unnecessary to go to the trouble of examining the question of effectiveness of
the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed,
This letter, like my first one to you, is written to call to your attention considerations
that seemingly should result in a resolution of the matter. As I'm sure you appreciate,
neither this nor my prior letter necessarily deals with all potentially relevant theories or facts
bearing on questions related to the Right-of-Way's validity, is exhaustive in its discussion of
other considerations bearing on the Right-of-Way, or is intended to waive any rights.
Please let me know what your client's position on the Right-of-Way is in view of the
considerations discussed above.
Sincerely,

Charles L. Maak
CLM:jmh
cc:
William S. & Irene C. Love [Via Both Telefax, to 415-949-0251, and
First Class Mail]
Geoffrey W. Mangum, Esq. [Via Both Telefax, to 524-1098, and First Class Mail]
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July 16,1996
Charles L. Maak
Kimball,J£arr, Waddoups, Brownjk Gee
185 South State St., Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019
Re:

.

William S. & Irene C. Love - Right of Way Claim

Dear Chuck:
I am writing in response to your letter of July 5,1996. I apologize for the delay in
responding, but I was out of town last week.
Your letter refers to the doctrine of after-acquired title. It is my opinion that this
doctrine has no application to the creation or perfection of an easement The doctrine is
codified, in Utah, in section 57-1-10 of the Utah Code (1953):
After-acquired title passes. If any person shall hereafter convey any
real estate bv conveyance purporting to convev the same in fee simple
absolute, and shall not at the time of such conveyance have the legal estate in
such real estate, but shall afterwards acquire the same, the legal estate
subsequently acquired shall immediately pass to the grantee, his heirs,
successors or assigns, and such conveyance shall be as valid as if such legal
estate had been in the grantor at the time of the conveyance. (Emphasis
added.)
The statute clearly applies only to conveyances of fee simple title. I am not aware of
any court cases in Utah or elsewhere where the doctrine of after-acquired title has been
applied to perfect an easement, as opposed to an estate in land.
My client, Arnold Industries, Inc., has an unbroken chain of title to the West Parcel
which contains no mention whatever of an easement benefitting the East Parcel. The deeds
which your clients rely upon for their claimed easement were all signed by entities which did
not hold record title to the West Parcel. Furthermore, the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed

ss2l:*±:.~-:
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was not signed by GSA, which has been in actual possession of the West Parcel since at least
1985. Under these circumstances, I do not believe that your clients hold a valid easement.
Very truly yours,

William A. Meaders, Jr.
cc:

VinceRampton
Sharyn Jones
Blake Heiner
Geoff Mangum
Arlen Taylor
Robert Burton
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H a n d Delivered

William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq.
Lundberg & Meaders
660 South 200 East, Suite 305
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

William S. & Irene C. Love - Right-of-Way Affecting
Property in West Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah

Dear Bill:
I too was out of town for a week, and as a result am somewhat tardy in responding to
your letter of July 16, 1996.
Your position that the after-acquired title doctrine does not apply to the creation of an
easement appears to be unsound, for the reasons noted below.
Section 57-1-10 of the Utah Code admittedly speaks in terms of the conveyance of a
fee simple absolute. The statute thus deals with the factual situation that undoubtedly is most
frequently present in instances where a grantor purports to convey real property that he does
not own. The fact that the statute does not deal with all possible cases hardly means that the
principle underlying it cannot be applied in other contexts.
As you're doubtless aware, the after-acquired title doctrine is merely another name
for the principle of estoppel by deed, which holds that a grantor who executes a deed
purporting to convey land to which he has no title or as to which his title is defective at the
time of the conveyance will not be permitted, when he later acquires the title he previously
lacked, to claim in opposition to his earlier deed as against his grantee or his grantee's
successor. See 23 Am Jr. 2d, Deeds § 341. The basis for the estoppel against the grantor
typically is an express or implied warranty, covenant, or assurance, given by him to his
grantee, to the effect that the grantor in fact had the interest he was purporting to convey.
Id., §§ 341, 348, & 351. Thus, a quitclaim deed, without more, usually cannot be made the
basis for an estoppel by deed, since in a quitclaim conveyance the grantor does not purport to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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action, since if the grantor after conveying with a warranty of title asserts an after-acquired
title against his grantee, the grantor will be liable in damages to the grantee. Id. at § 348.
As^you know, Section 57-1-12 of our Code specifies the warranties and covenants that
are provided to the grantee when a warranty deed is used. Those warranties and covenants
are the basis of applying an estoppel by deed against a grantor who purports to convey
something he does not own at the time of the conveyance. The rationale for the estoppel is
exactly the same whether the purported conveyance is of a fee simple absolute, an easement,
or anything else. It is clear that Section 57-1-10 of our Code was not intended to completely
supplant the general principle of estoppel by deed, but merely to codify the principle in its
most commonly encountered context. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
applying Utah law viewed the predecessor of Section 57-1-10 and the common law principle
of estoppel by deed as coexisting and as each yielding the same result. See Wall v. Utah
Coppe/Co., 277 F. 55, 58-59 (8th Cir. 1921). See also: 23 Am. Jr. 2d, Deeds § 347; Cox
v. Ney, 580 P.2d 1085, 1086-87 (Utah 1978) (where the court based its holding on § 57-1-12
as well as § 57-1-10, and gave as a reason for its decision the avoidance of circuity of action
rationale referred to above).
It is clear that in Utah the after-acquired title doctrine applies to easements just as it
does to fee estates. Consequently, if Western Management when it gave the 1982 Warranty
Deed lacked the interest in the West Parcel/Parcel 2 necessary to create the Right-of-Way,
then the Right-of-Way burdening Parcel 2 was created but a few months later, when Western
Management received title to Parcel 2.
It still appears to me that the Right-of-Way is valid and effective irrespective of the
validity of the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed.

Charles L. Maak
CLM:jmh
cc:
William S. & Irene C. Love [Via Both Telefax, to 415-949-0251, and
First Class Mail]
Geoffrey W. Mangum, Esq. [Via Both Telefax, to 524-1098, and First Class Mail]
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August 15,1996
VIA FAX 532-7750
Charles L. Maak
Kimball, Parr, Waddoups, Brown & Gee
185 South State St., Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019
Re:

William S. & Irene C. Love — Right of Way Claim

Dear Chuck:
In my previous letters, I have stated that the property owned by my client Arnold Industries,
Inc. has been leased to the U.S. Government (GSA) since at least 1985. I did not know until this
week how long that lease has actually been in effect. I have now learned that the lease was entered
into between Plan Tech Corporation and GSA in the Spring of 1977. Enclosed with this letter are
copies of the original lease (which, unfortunately, is not dated), two early amendments, dated April
22,1977 and May 12,1977, and the most recent amendment provided to me, dated December 16,
1993. You will note that each enclosed document refers to the original lease, Lease No. GS-08B10728. I have not enclosed the entire lease file because it is quite voluminous, but the file includes
66 "Supplemental Agreements" and a steady stream of correspondence showing that my client'spremises have been continuously occupied by GSA under this particular Lease from 1977 to the
present.
Since the documents your clients rely on to claim their easement are not signed by GSA it
seems to me that any right your clients could assert must be subject to the rights of GSA and that no
easement claimed by your client can become effective as long as GSA remains in possession as
lessee.
In response to your letter of July 29,1996, the broad common law doctrine of after-acquired
tide described in your letter may be the law in some states, but it is inconsistent with any reasonable
interpretation of section 57-1-10 of the Utah Code. If, as you argue, Utah common law already
recognizes the doctrine of after-acquired title for all types of conveyances, why did the Legislature
adopt a statute on the subject at all? Then, having decided to adopt a statute, why did the Legislature
single out conveyances "purporting to convey [property] in fee simple absolute?" Your
interpretation of Utah's common law makes this phrase in the statute ineffective and meaningless.
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Furthermore, the avoidance of circuity rationale mentioned in your letter does not apply to
a grant of an easemenL The warranties described in section 57-1-12 do not apply to appurtenances
(such as easements.) The section provides, in pan:
.^ _^Such deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a
conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises therein
named, together with all the appurtenances, rights and privileges thereunto
belonging, with covenants from the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives,
that he is lawfully seised of the premises: that he has good right to convey the same:
that he guarantees the grantee, his heirs and assigns in the quiet possession thereof:
that the premises are free from all encumbrances; and that the grantor, his heirs and
personal representatives will forever warrant and defend the title thereof in the
grantee, his heirs and assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever.... (emphasis
added.)
Section 57-1-12 draws a clear distinction between the premises conveyed in fee simple in a warranty
deed and the appurtenances belonging to those premises. Each warranty described in section 57-112 is made applicable specifically to the premises, rather than the appurtenances. In fact, at least one
of the warranties, the warranty of seisin, cannot possibly apply to an appurtenance such as an
easement, because one can only be seised of afreeholdestate. Section 57-1-12 therefore cannot be
relied on to imply warranties with respect to grants of easements.
This would seem to be particularly true where, as in this case, the description of the easement
is preceded by the words "subject to." Tnese words indicate that the described easement is excepted
from any warranties that might otherwise be stated or implied in the deed.
In conclusion, since there is no warranty as to the easement, there is no circuity which would
be avoided by application in this case of the doctrine of after-acquired title.
Very truly yours,

William A. Meaders, Jr.
enc.
cc:

Vince Rampton
Trinidee Hall
Blake Heiner
Randall Call
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Arlen Tavlor

... - Y

'• r~

«

•

•• •

U.S. GOYERKMENT
LEASE FOR REAL PROPERTY

*
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•

•
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C5-05B-10723

T l l l b 1.1 AaK. made and vmered into this d a t e hv and between

^hoxc address is

7LAN TSCH. C3BPC2ATIGH
1612 E a s t 3300 South
S a l t Lake C i t y , BT 84106

and wlu>*e interest in the property

hereinafter described Is that of

hctcinafier railed the Lessor, and the U N I T E D STATES O F AMERICA* hereinafter tailed the Government:
^ T T N I i S 5 ETH: T h e parties hereto for the consideration? hereinafter mentioned, covenant and aprcc as follows:
I. The Le*x»r hereby leasee to the G o v e r n m e n t the followmj: described premises:

106,500 n e t u n a b l e sqii&re f e e t of o f f i c e aird l a b o r a t o r y space i s a
nevly c o n s t r u c t e d b u i l d i ^ *£ 22^2 ¥ e s t 2300 S o u t h , S a l t Like C i t y ,
Utah,.

mbc usee for such p u r p o s e s a s determined by Gerseral S e r r i c e s A c z ± n i s t r a t i e c «
2. T O HAVE A N D T O H O L D the said premise* with their aprnjrtenam.es for the term beginning on

Date to be e s t a b l i a h e d by
S s s ? l e a e n t a l . JL&:TTV.at

10 y e a r s front
throuch .. .*.stablisb^...date

subject to termination

and rrae* «d r i c h u a* may be hereinafter set forth.
* The C'/ovcfTunent shaii pav the Lessor annual rent of S. T V 7 2 . « . S ~ Q . V Q 0 . .
at the rate of 5 3 9 * 4 . 0 5 . - 0 0
Rent f.»r a l«a»vr periled shall he prorated.

...

TH:r O C H t h .

_

Rent ihetkv shall W made pavable to: P i * * 1 ~ « o h

3300 South, S a l t Lake C i t y , UT

Corp • ,

| n arrears.
1612

XaSt

84106
fer^Trg t h e reneve 1 period

1. The Government may terminate thi* leave at a m t:mer*v ejvir.s at lease
ti» the Lo+*»r and n*» rental *hall a n rue after the cftcttivc d«*u ««f u-rntination.

7®

da\s* notice in writinc

Said n m u e shall he umtputed nimnwrn*

in:; iviui the Ja\ af f er the date of mailing.
V Thiv leave mav be renewed at the »iptit«n of the Government. I»ir the followinc terms and ac the following rentals:

For tvo (2) f i v e - y e a r p e r i o d s a t a a asnual r e n t a l c f $ 4 9 5 , 2 2 5 . 0 0 ,

P'.tii***! "...ii.v he civ^rn in wriiini: ««• the Le>*«>r at leavt

^w

d a w Sefore the em! of the original leave tvrm

• •< .rv. •wr-v^oi ' v r r v t1! —trrr •:•?!< zad \»indui»»n\ of this Ua*»- vhall remain the vame d u r i n - anv renewal term.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
V. .1 •• u *!tall JH loinrnitci! %••—•m-ru
Inc ^»th
themay
vLavcontain
after iric
date «»| mailing.
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6. T h e Le*>or *hal! furni>h i»» the C w ^ c r n m c s t . i \ part wf :*w; retuai v4»n>»4cT-axion, the following:

a.

S e r v i c e s , u t i l i t i e s and a t l n r e n a s e c l a accordance v i t h Schedule C axad
Attxchaean H o . 1
.

O n - s i t e p a r k i n g f o r 4 0 v i s i t o r and o f f i c i a l

vehicles

?. T h e folIo«»-iflg are attached and made a part hereof:
* • T h e General Provisions a n d Instructions (Scaccard Form 2-A. J S s y . 1 2 7 . 9 . ediiion). St A n t a c h n e n t 5 o .

1

b. S7C So. 76-38 and Addr-vhm* Xc. 1 and 2
c. ?ag& 3

8. m e following c h a n g o **erc made in tht* ieasr p r W to its execution:

a. The vcrda "during the renewal period** vere added ro Paragraph 4,
h.

Paragraphs 9 and 10 vere added to this Lease.

IN ^ l iXZSS ^'Kr-fvEOr, :he parties hereto h.i\c hereunto suhscribed their name* 4* of the date tifM »h"%
written.
•as£c* >

FUR TSCS C02K&AT105

(UlttUXtoftt

tS*g»*t*»*rt

t* mcstKZ or.
* N«< • . ' « - * • • * *

c---**^ , LXh*~£^L S « J L V . L U ^ AKHKISTEAT1CK

~\*t^, S T i T t - C-*

PUBLIC BUILDIKS SEIVTCZ
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C£X£ftJLi. SEl-.^CSS A O * ! ~ . * S T * A T X > *

NO.
SUPPLEMENTAL L£AS£ AG3EEMEHT

1

5-24-77

TO V.LAS4. H O .

C S 083-10723
• (.11 0 /

r«a»iS41

22L2 V e s c 2 3 0 0 Scruth
S a l t L*ka C i t y , U t x h

THTS AGRtZ^ENT. mcee end entered m s tnis bc:e by end between
CAZ2X2A CC*?CSJLTI0H , A UTAH CCEPCEATIOtf f SUCCESSORS I S ThTrSZST TO PLA.K T2CH CORP.
«ncse occrrss is

1612 S a s c 2200 South
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h

Straet
84106

herencfter ceiled r.e Lessar, end the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, hereinafter ceiled the Government:
WHEREAS. tfcepcrces hereto desre to onend t i e cheve Lecse.
NCW THEREFORE, these pcr-es b r the c m si deletion a hereinafter mentioned covenant one cere- thct tie s a d
Lees* :s actendec. effective _ J
A p r i l 2 2 . 1977
z s faiiews:
Paragraph 6 i s revised as follows*
"c*

Sub Paragraph

,f

c" i

addedt

A* parr of the rental consideration and upon acceptance cf the
building, the lessor ahall be reimbursed by lus? Suez payment in
the aacunt of $126,337«30 for the cost of providing and i n s t a l l *
i n s special pluabing, e l e c t r i c a l , EVAC, and filtering syacacjs
recuirad for the specixl purpose and laboratory space included
under the lease• This payeaent represents the fully depreciated
value of the soecial installations and the Governaent retxina
no interest in the special *m€"ll.*T*
fee
es

AI! other terms end conditions of the le-ese shell rerr.sa in force end effect.
IN VITNES3 Wr.£?.Z0F.
L W O K . CA23X

the pcrties subscribed their ncrr>es cr f the above date.
I I C S f A iTIAH CORPORATION

rZJJ'
r
J&1»& &5>£p
»UNl7£0 S T A T E S Q * A * l R t C A '

GZh~&3AI» S>£.^Yiu£^ A U A i . 1 i i Z a A j L i U A t

^

r\J.S-.LU a u j L ^ J - L T * ^
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^^JLt^uJL"

:. ...vf. SL- •»*»"•f: t.2 »::::si Picr*:rjl
zrrc
ruio-jc lutuotMC^ savvies
SJPPLE*EMTM. LEAS£ ACXEEMEMT

NO.
TO l O * t

5-24-77
«0.

C S O8B-1072S
>-***• c : * or

>*oi.ui

2212 V c i : 2300 South
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h

THIS AGREEMENT, rncce cr.d emerec ;.n:c r u s oc;e cy enc betvem
CXSSZZA CCRPOKATICS, A UTAH CCRPOSATIOH
^ : u o d c t i s :s

1612 2 U s t 3 3 0 0 S o u t h
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h

Street
84106

hereincfler = i l ed r.e Lessor, cr.d the UNITED STATES CF AMERICA, hereinafter ctiied the Government:
WHEREAS. the pcrtles hereto desire to amend the chev* Lecse.
NOW TKnrETOPE. these pomes b r the cor. si derations hereincite: mentioned covencr.t end ccree thct tie scid
Lees* i s extended, effective ¥ s v 1 2 . 1977
, c s fallows:
P a r a g r a p h s 1 , 2 , 3 , and 5 a r e c h a n g e d a s f o l l o v s :
,
" 1 . The L e s s o r h e r e b y l e a s e s t o t h e G c v e m a e n t t h e f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b e d p r e m i s e s :
1 0 9 , 0 0 0 n e t u s a b l e s q u a r e f e e t o f o f f i c e , l a b o r a t o r y , and s p e c i a l p u r p o s e s p a c e
c o a p r i s i n g a l l o f a c v o - s t o r y b u i l d i n g a t 2 2 1 2 V e s t 2 3 0 0 S o u t h , S a l t Lake C i t y ,
Utah, t o be used f o r such p u r p o s e s a s determined by General S e r r i c a s Adainistra-^
tiou.1'
" 2 . TU EAVZ AKD TC HOLD t h e s a i d p r n i s e s w i t h t h e i r a y p u r r a n a n c a a • f o r t h e term
b e g i n n i n g o n May 1 2 , 1 5 7 7 , t h r o u g h >iay 1 1 , 1 9 8 7 . sub j e e r t o t e r m i n a t i o n and
r a n e v a i r i g h t s a s » e y be h e r e i n a r r e r s e t f c r t i u "
"3.

JM5.

t h e Government s h a l l p a y t h e L e s s o r annual r e n r o f $ 4 5 7 , 2 3 0 * 0 0 a t t h e r a t a o f
$ 4 0 , 6 0 2 * 5 0 p e r sacnth i n a r r e a r s * Xent f o r a l e s s e r p e r i o d s h a l l be p r o r a t e d * £ent checks s h a l l be aade p a y a b l e t o : C a n era C o r p o r a t i o n , A Utah Corporation,
1612 l a s t 2 3 0 0 S o u t h , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 0 6 * "
This l e a s e » e y be rcneved a t t h e option o f t h e Government, f o r t h e f o l l c v i n g
t e m i s and a t t h e f o l l c v i n g r e n n a l s : ? o r a r o ( 2 ) f i v e - y e a r p e r i o d s a t an
annual r e n t a l o f $ 5 0 6 , 3 5 0 * 0 0 , provided a o t i c e be g i ^ e n i n w r i t i n g t o the '
L e s s o r a t l e a s t 9 0 d a y s b e f o r e t h e esid o f t h e o r i g i n a l l e a s e t a r n o r any
r e n e w a l t e r m ; a l l o n h e r t e r n s and c o n d i t i o n s o f t h i s l e a s e s h a l l r e o a i n t h e
s a a e d u r i n g a n y r e n e w a l t e r n . S a i d n o t i c e s h a l l b e cszsoutad cocsaencing
v i t h t h e day a f t e r t h e d a t e o f v e i l i n g , "

j All other terms end conditions of tne lecse shcil rem cm in force end effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the ocrties subsenbed their ncmes cs of the cbove dcte.
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Supplemental Agreement Number 66
Lease Number: GS-Q5H-1G72S
Dace: December IS, 129 3

address of Premises: Aerial Photography Tleld Cffice
2222 West 2200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119-2020
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this date by and between

whose address is:

C3 Commercial
(Attn: Lauren Sunt, Heal Estate Manager)
Prccertv Management Services
17G~ South Main Street, Suite 120C
Salt Lake City, Utah £4101-1605

hereinafter called the Lesser and the United States of America,
hereinafter called the Government:
WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to amend the above lease. To
provide all materials and labor to make alterations at the Aerial
Photography Eield Cffice.
NOW THEREFORE, these parties for the consideration hereinafter
mentioned covenant and agree that the said lease is amended as
follows:
AThe Lessor agrees tc provide all materials and labor required
to make the following repairs in room 50 and 10a in the Color
Section of the Photograpnic Branch:
1. Remove and replace damaged concrete around the trenches.
2. Remove and replace damaged ceramic tile.
3. Remove and replace damaged wallbcard.
4. Install masonite wainscot four feet high on walls.
5. Remove and replace vinyl base and VCT tile.
H- Upon completion of all work and final acceptancefcvthe Contracting Officer, the Government shall pay to the Lessor $2,841.6 =
Digitized byOrder
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Hunter43S44740013S
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Supplemental Agreement Number
Lease Number: G3-C-83-1Q72S
Daze: December 16/ 1S93

order number. Wcrx will be ccmplered within sixty (50) cays cf the
issue cf'^b.a purchase crier unless a written request for an
extension has been received and approved by tie Contracting
Cffiner.
CTie L e s s o r a g r e e s t o c o n t i n u e t o provide a"* ^ s e r v i c e s and
u t i l i t i e s t o t h e e n t i r e l e a s e d f a c i l i t y i n accordance w i t h t h e
requirements c f t h e l e a s e c o n t r a c t as amended. A l l r e q u i r e m e n t s c f
rhe Lesser under t h e t e r m s c f t h e l e a s e and s u p p l e m e n t a l amendments
remain i n e f f e c t *

L e s s o r : C3 Ccmmarcna-L
Lauren "Hunt rleal E s t a t e Manacer
17 (T S o u t h Main S t r s e i r S u i t e 1200
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 54101-1305

UNITED STATES CI AMZ2ZCA G2NESAL SS5VIC2S ADMINTSTPATICK
P u b l i c B u i l d i n c R e a l Zs^arrs D i v i s i o n S e a l t v , Branch 1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

LAW OFFICES O F

K I M B A L L , P A R R , WADDOUPS, BROWN & G E E
A ^ K O r t S S l O N A k CORPORATION
O A U A. K t M t A U
CLAtTOW 4. * * « «
S > m c WAOOOURS
KlCMAKO C IMOWN

MClOl E.C- LE!T«EAO
JOHN M. BUMKC
S T C ^ C N E.w. H * u t
DANIEL A. J C N S t N

O A V I O E. CCC
S C O T T W. L O V C L t S S
PATRICIA w. CMWSTtNSCN
DAVtO «C «COO

,

" , A N c - W-OVO
DAVID r. C R A S T R E E
C * C C O » T «, MCSS
T t « * T E. WELCH

!

SALT
* A W I

RO»E«T a. LOCMMEAO

jtrrncr j . HUNT

C A R T A. DODOE
R O B E R T S. C L A R *
AUAN R. ANDERSEN
KENT H. C O L U N f

RAUL C O R E C K S C L
CLAT w. STUCKI
T M O M A S R. L E E
O. MATTMtw OO^NY

MICHAEL M. LATER

JONATHAN o. MArtN

ROGER D. MEHRIKSEW
MATTHEW S , OURRANT
BRIAN J . ROM"lELL
GWEGOKT O. RHILLIRS

L A K E CITY. U T A H © * l * 7 - O O l »
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ * T» w ~ " *»
T E L E P H O N E (QOl) S 3 2 - T B * 0
• . * - « « . - . * #««,\ - n ^ . - r ^ ^ O

° r COUNSEL
* " U U U *****
^
^ ^ ^ ^

C H

SRECJAL COUNSEL
STANWCY D. NEELEMAN

T E L E C O P Y * (BOI) 332-77SO

CAROLTN t . MCMUCM
^MARK A, WACNCR
STEVEN J . CHRISTIANSEN J A R O A R E T Z.. W I U S O N
S C O T T r. YOUNG
RORERT A. M C C O N N t L U
VICTOR A, TAYWOR
»CNTt£Y J . T O U

ROHAUD c. RUSSELL

SUITE 1300
CTATE STREET
" S O U T H STATE S T R E E T
* * O S T O F r i C E B O X MO>©
c o u T W

o. CRA.C ^ W Y

AncmcTOT
^
*"

I\U

&

U3l

TJ„„A

- / ,

1QQ6
A^^VJ

T\*K~~~^A

n a n a Delivered

JACK M. MORGAN
CODY WINCHESTER TIELO
ERIC W. R E A R S O N

William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq.
Lundberg & Meaders
660 South 200 East, Suite 305
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

William S. & Irene C. Love - Right-of-Way Affecting
Property in West Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah

Dear Bill:
I've received and considered your letter of August 15, 1996.
In order to assess your assertion that the GSA Lease has priority over the Right-ofWay held by the Loves, we need to consider all of the documents related to that Lease. I'd
therefore appreciate your supplying me with a complete copy of the GSA Lease (you
included only the first page with your letter of August 15) and with complete copies of all
documents that have in any way amended, modified, or supplemented the Lease, including
all of the 66 or more "Supplemental Agreements" that apparently have been executed to date
and any correspondence that may have amended or supplemented the Lease.
Your position regarding the effect of Section 57-1-10 of the Utah Code on the
common law doctrine of estoppel by deed is not persuasive. In talcing that position you
appear to ignore all of the authority to the contrary which was cited in my letter of July 29.
Moreover, limiting applicability of the doctrine.exclusively to cases where a fee simple estate
is conveyed produces results that are completely inconsistent with the rationale for the
doctrine. It admittedly might have been tidier if the Legislature in Section 57-1-10 had
codified the overall doctrine of estoppel by deed, rather than doing so for just the most frequently encoimtered circumstance (purported conveyances in fee simple). However, the fact
that the statute did not occupy the entire area it potentially could have does not dictate the
conclusion that the general concept of estoppel by deed was thereby made inapplicable in this
state. This is particularly so when one considers the absurd results that would follow from
such a conclusion.
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William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq.
August 27, 1996
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Your reading of the language of Section 57-1-12 is overly narrow. As used in the
statute, the term "premises" is obviously intended to mean the property described as being
conveyed, whether that property be a fee simple estate in land or both such an estate and
whatever appurtenances accompany it. This is the way our Supreme Court in the case of
George v. Robinson, 63 Pac. 819 (Utah 1901), construed similar language contained in a
warranty deed (where the court held that warranties provided for in the deed there at issue
would not extend to water rights unless they were appunenances of the premises conveyed by
the deed). The more restrictive reading you suggest would mean that warranties of title
could never apply to anything but a fee simple estate. I know of no policy that would be
served by such a state of affairs.
In any event, however, the estoppel by deed doctrine as applied to the Right-of-Way
does not rise or fall with Section 57-1-12. The doctrine is applied even though a warranty of
title is not given, in instances where the deed involved reflected an intention to convey a
particular estate. See 23 Am, Jur. 2d Deeds, §§ 351, 352. That was clearly the case as
regards the 1982 Warranty Deed's treatment of the Right-of-Way described as being
conveyed.
The 1982 Warranty Deed conveyed the Loves' Parcel of property "subject to and
together with" the Right-of-Way. The "subject to" language may have been used because of
the Grantor's belief (or fear) that the Right-of-Way burdened not just adjacent property, but
also a portion of the land being conveyed in fee. Whatever the reason for inclusion of the
"subject to" part of the clause, however, it is the fee parcel that is indicated to be "subject
to" the Right-of-Way. The "subject to" language is obviously not intended to limit the
Grantor's warranties of title as they pertained to the Right-of-Way. If that had been
intended, the "subject to" language would have had to follow, not precede, the description of
the Right-of-Way and would also have had mention whatever it was to which the Right-ofWay was to be subject.
It seems to me that the conclusion must still be that the 1982 Warranty Deed
effectively created the Right-of-Way.
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William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq.
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I shall look forward to receiving the GSA Lease materials.
Since

Charles L. Maak
CLM:jmh
cc:
William S. & Irene C. Love [Via Both Telefax, to 415-949-0251, and
First Class Mail]
J. Randall Call, Esq. [Via Both Telefax, to 524-1098, and First Class Mail]

%
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LAW OFFICES OF

LUNDBERG & MEADERS
A PROFESSIONAL

CORPORATION

October 14, 1996
VIA FAX 532-7750
Ronald G. Russell
Kimball, Parr, Waddoups, Brown_& Gee
185 South State, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Arnold Industries, Inc. v. William S. Love, et al.

Dear Ron:
I received a telephone messagefromyou last Friday indicating that Arnold Industries1
temporary fence may be encroaching into your client's property. This was not our intention.
The fence was intended to be entirely within Arnold Industries1 property. I would like to
meet with you at the property within the next few days to look at the fence and at your survey
in order to understand the problem. I have asked Mary Sharp, Arnold Industries1
representative, to come. We are available to do this Tuesday afternoon after 3 p.m. or
anytime on Wednesday. Please let me know if you can meet with us then or if you are
available on another day.
It has been about ten days now since I delivered the Complaint and an Acceptance of
Service for this case to your office. Before doing this, I received verbal confirmation from
Chuck Maak that your office would accept service, but I have not yet received the signed
Acceptance. If you are authorized to accept service, please date and sign the Acceptance and
return it to me right away. If you are not authorized, please let me know so that I can arrange
personal service on Mr. and Mrs. Love.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Very truly yours,

William A. Meaders, Jr.
cc:

Ted Phelps
Mary Digitized
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Law Offices of

LUNDBERG & MEADERS
A Professional Corporation

FAX COVER SHEET

Fax#:
Date:
To:

pr^-1150

m

.v

# of pages:

From:
Re:

MESSAGE:

The information contained in this transmission is intended only for the personal and confidential use of the recipient!
named above. This message may be an attorney-client communication and, as such, is privileged and confidential. If]
jthe reader of this message is not the intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it to the recipient, you are
hereby notified that you have received this document in error, and that any review, dissemination, distribution orj
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October 17, 1996
_

HAND-DELIVERED
William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq.
LUNDBERG & MEADERS
660 South 200 East, Suite 305
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Arnold Industries. Inc. v. William S. Love, et al.
Civil No. 960906947

Dear Bill:
I am enclosing a copy of the survey that I reviewed with you at the property on
October 15, 1996. As was evident, the fence erected last week by Arnold Industries
encroaches on the property owned by my clients, William and Irene Love. We demand that
such encroachment be removed immediately.
As you know, it is our position that a right-of-way exists in favor of the Love
property that burdens Arnold Industries9 property. We have previously advised you of the
deeds of record establishing the right-of-way. Arnold Industries' erection of a fence directly
violates the right of the Loves and their tenants to utilize theright-of-wayand has caused and
will continue to cause significant damages to the Loves and their tenants.
In the above-referenced action, Arnold Industries has sought a determination from the
court regarding the Loves' right-of-way. The Loves will certainly file an answer and a
counterclaim seeking a similar detenxiination from the court. It is unfortunate that your
client chose to erect the fence and block the right-of-way prior to the court's adjudication.
Obviously, we view your client's actions to be inappropriate and a demonstration of bad
faith, particularly in light of the fact that the parties had previously been discussing ways to
define and limit the right-of-way to better suit the needs of Arnold Industries and its tenant.
On behalf of the Loves, we demand that Arnold Industries immediately remove the
* fence and restore the right-of-way to its prior condition. In the event the fence is not
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removed immediately, the Loves will seek appropriate legal redress, including recovery of all
damages caused by Arnold Industries' wrongful interference with the right-of-way.

RGR/wvk
Enclosure
c: William S. and Irene C. Love
Stephen G. Stoker, Esq.
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October 31, 1996

William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq.
LUNDBERG & MEADERS
660 South 200 East, Suite 305
Post Office Box 1290
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1290
Re: Arnold Industries. Inc. v. William S. Love, et al.
Civil No. 960906947PR
Home Office Claim No. 96-0020
Local Claim No. 96-13-18
Dear Bill:
Enclosed please find an Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint and
discovery requests we have filed in the above-referenced case. Because the GSA apparently
claims an interest in the Arnold Industries property and you have asserted that its interest is
not subject to my clients' easements, I have joined the GSA as a third-party defendant in the
lawsuit. I expect that the joinder of the GSA may cause some concerns to your client.
Consequently, before I serve my pleading on the GSA, I wanted to once again broach the
topic of settlement.
If Arnold Industries has interest in discussing the resolution of this matter along the
lines that were being discussed before you filed the lawsuit, please let me know right away.
We are confident that we can establish the existence and validity of the Loves' right-of-way,
but we still view the best long-term solution to be a negotiated resolution. If you would like
to continue settlement discussions, please give me a.

RGR/wvk
Enclosures
c: William S. and Irene C. Love
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Salt Lake City

January 10, 1997
VIA TELEFAX
WilHaft^A. Meaders, Jr.
LUNDBERG & MEADERS
660 South 200 East; #305
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and
Ronald G. Russell
KIMBALL, PARR, WADD0UPS, BROWN & GEE
185 South State, #1300
Sale Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

William Love - GSA Building Lease Easement

Gentlemen:
I contacted both of you on January 9, 1997 concerning a possible meeting at the GSA
building in Salt Lake City during the following week, to confirm the location and course of
the proposed easement in favor of William Love. In discussing the matter with each of you,
I find that Friday, January 17, 1997 at 10:00 is the most available time. If this creates a
problem, for either of you, please let me know. If I have heard nothing by Tuesday of next
week, I will assume that the time and date arc acceptable. I will be present with Peter
Arnold.
By this letter I would again request that Mr. Meaders make the surveyor available at
the meeting, in order to explain the survey and answer questions, Arnold Commercial
Properties will cover his costs.

Rampton
YCR:pn
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January 29, 1997

VIA TELECOPY
William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq.
LUNDBERG & MEADERS
660 South 200 East, Suite 305
Post Office Box 1290
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1290
Re:

Arnold Industries, Inc. v. William S. Love, et al.
Civil No. 960906947PR

Dear Bill:
As I indicated in our telephone conversation, I have discussed with Mr. Love the
topics addressed at our on-site settlement meeting. Mr. Love would prefer to review and
analyze a specific settlement proposal from Arnold Industries before scheduling another
meeting.
While we remain hopeful that settlement discussions will result in the resolution of the
matter, we need to keep the lawsuit moving forward. Accordingly, I would request that you
provide me with responses to the outstanding discovery requests and copies of the documents
that we have requested within the next ten (10) days.
Please call me if you have any questions or if you would like to discuss this matter.
sincerely,

RGR/wvk
c: William S. Love
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Salt Lake City
February 3, 1997
VIA HAND DELIVERY
William A. Meaders, Jr.
LUNDBERG & MEADERS
660 South 200 East, #305
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and
Ronald G. Russell
KIMBALL, PARR, WADD0UPS, BROWN & GEE
185 South State, #1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

William Love - GSA Building Lease Easement

Gentlemen:
Enclosed please find a survey of the GSA building showing a proposed easement and
barrier which will permit access to and from Mr. Love's loading dock across my client's
property. Please let me know as soon as possible if the enclosed drawing ijy acceptable.
Cordially

Enclosure

202753.1
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March 6, 1997

HAND-DELIVERED
Vincent C. Rampton, Esq.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Post Office Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq.
LUNDBERG & MEADERS
660 South 200 East, Suite 305
Post Office Box 1290
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Re:

Arnold Industries. Inc. v. William S. Love, et al.
Civil No. 960906947PR

Dear Vince and Bill:
As I have discussed with each of you, we have been waiting for Bingham
Engineering to complete its work before responding to Arnold Industries' offer of settlement.
Based on Bingham Engineering's review, the property exchange contemplated by the drawing
prepared by Robert Jones of Bush & Gudgell would not provide sufficient clearance to enable
large trucks to access the Loves' property. Moreover, Mr. Jones1 proposal would require
that access to the Love property be restricted to a narrow strip located too close to the
building located at the south end of the property. Such an approach to settlement is very
different from the concept of our original proposal which would have a shared entrance with
a designated lane for trucks to access the rear portion of the Love property. Accordingly,
we must reject your most recent offer of settlement.
I am enclosing herewith a map prepared by Bingham Engineering that we would
propose as a basis for settlement consistent with what we now understand to be Arnold
Industries' objectives. The arrangement shown on the Bingham Engineering map was
dictated by the following considerations: (1) it provides a barrier between the properties as
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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March 6, 1997
requested by Arnold Industries; (2) Bingham Engineering indicates that a width of 24 feet is
needed to accommodate large trucks; and (3) space must be left along the side of the building
on the south end of the Love property (indicated on the map as a 12' buffer) to protect the
building, the gas meter, and the tenant's quiet enjoyment. Given the GSA's insistence that
large trucks-be kept far away from-its building, it is certainly reasonable for some
accommodation to be made for the tenants of the Love property.
This proposal represents a substantial concession by the Loves. The Loves hold an
easement that entitles them to access their property over the entire Arnold parcel. The
buildings were originally designed and laid out to share common access as is apparent from
the location of loading docks. This shared access has functioned without any complaint for
many years. By agreeing to a new access configuration, the Loves would be giving up
substantial rights that will adversely impact the use and value of their property.
The Loves' offer to settle this matter would still be conditioned upon a payment of
$75,000 for the reasons stated in my letter of November 22, 1996. In addition, settlement
would be subject to our review and approval of a detailed plan for the proposed barrier,
Arnold's agreement to construct and maintain the barrier at its own expense, the preparation
of appropriate legal descriptions, and mutually acceptable documentation including mutual
releases and other provisions.
Please call me if you would like to discuss tKi^matter.

Enclosure
c: William S. and Irene C. Love
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Salt Lake City
March 21, 1997

William A. Meaders, Jr.
LUNDBERG & MEADERS
660 South 200 East, Ste 305
P.O. Box 1290
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1290
Ronald G. Russell
KIMBALL, PARR, WADD0UPS, BROWN & GEE
185 South State, Ste. 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019
Re:

William Love Easement Case

Gentlemen:
This is to follow up generally on the status of the above matter.
As you are aware, Peter Arnold is very anxious to get this matter concluded. We
have discussed various options for relocating the boundary line between the two properties in
such a manner as to give Mr. Love access to his loading docks, while still preserving the
integrity of the GSA Building's parking structure.
In my last communication with Bill Meaders, I was told that Mr. Love feels it is
important to locate the boundary line as indicated on the Bingham Engineering drawing
previously sent to us; however, he would be willing to move the central barrier between the
properties further back (so as to divide the GSA Building's parking area from his property,
but leave the drive area without a central median). By copy of this letter, I am passing this
proposal on to Peter Arnold, asking for his input.
My concern is that we seem to be exchanging alternatives over an extended period of
time, with no consensus being reached as to the resolution of the problem. As you are both
aware, Peter Arnold is in the process of refinancing the GSA Building, a process which
needs to close by March 31, 1997. If the loan cannot be closed because of an outstanding
easement dispute, damages would be significant.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Whatever resolution is reached, it needs to be reached promptly. Continued delay
past the end of March could create a problem which none of us wishes to deal with.
If you have any questions, please call me.

A

Cordiallyf

C. RAMPTON
VCRxh
cc:

Peter G. Arnold

208797.1
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March 24,1997
HAND DELIVERED
Ronald G. Russell, Esq.
Kimball, Parr, Waddoups, Brown & Gee
185 South-State, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Vincent C. Rampton, Esq.
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough
170 South Main, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re:

Arnold Industries, Inc. v. William S. Love, et al.

Dear Ron and Vince:
I have enclosed a new drawing prepared by Bob Jones. The drawing generally follows the
proposal contained in Ron Russell's letter of March 6,1997, but the barrier between the parcels has
been moved 8 feet to the east. In Ron's letter, he proposed a 12 foot buffer, plus a 24 foot access
lane. The enclosed drawing provides a 4 foot buffer for the gas meter and a 24 foot access lane. In
other words there is a clearance of 28 feet around the south building on the Love property. This
should be more than adequate to allow large trucks to access the rear portion of the Love property.
Obviously, there are still many issues to be worked out if the parties are going to settle this
case. In particular, we are far apart on the dollars to be paid. But I would like to see first if we can
agree conceptually on a proposed location of the boundary between the parcels. If we can't agree
on the boundary, then there can be no settlement. If we can agree on a proposed boundary
(contingent on working out the other issues), then it makes sense to continue settlement discussions.
Ron, please let me know as soon as possible whether or not this drawing is acceptable to Mr.
Love.
Very truly yours,

William A. Meaders, Jr.
cc:
enc.

Peter Arnold
Arlen Taylor
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April 15, 1997

William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq.
LUNDBERG & MEADERS
660 South 200 East, Suite 305
Post Office Box 1290
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Re: Arnold Industries. Inc. v. William S. Love, et al.
Civil No. 960906947PR
Dear Bill:
As I indicated in our telephone conversation, Mr. Love is not willing to agree to your
client's most recent proposal which would reduce the entrance drive by another eight feet.
Mr. Love remains willing to settle on the terms stated in my letter to you dated March 6,
1997.
It is our intention to move forward with the litigation and to serve the Third-Party
Complaint on the various third-party defendants. Ifvour client wants to settle this case on
the terms that we have previously offered, please Jetme know righpiway.

iG. Russell
RGR/wvk
c: William S. and Irene C. Love
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April 29, 1997

William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq.
LUNDBERG & MEADERS
660 South 200 East, Suite 305
Post Office Box 1290
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Re:

Arnold Industries. Inc. v. William S. Love, et al.
Civil No. 960906947PR

Dear Bill:
For my calendaring purposes, I am writing to confirm that you gave me a two week
extension to respond to the plaintiffs discovery requests in the above-referenced case.
Accordingly, I will provide you with our responses on or before May 12, 1997. If your
client is still interested in settling the case pursuant to oar proposal, please let me know.

RGR/wvk
c: William S. and Irene C. Love
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July 3, 1997

D- C R A I G P A R R Y

E R I C w. PEARSON

BRYAN T. ALLEN

William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq.
LUNDBERG & MEADERS
660 South 200 East, Suite 305
Post Office Box 1290
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Vincent C. Rampton, Esq.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Post Office Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444
Re:

Arnold Industries. Inc. v. William S. Love, et al.
Civil No. 960906947PR

Dear Bill and Vince:
On March 6, 1997,1 forwarded to you a specific offer for settlement of the
above-referenced case. Bill wrote back on March 24, 1997 with a new drawing prepared by
Bob Jones that would place the barrier closer to the Love property. As reflected by my
leuer dated April 15, 1997 to Bill, the Loves were not willing to agree to a further reduction
of the entrance drive, but remained willing to settle on the basis outlined in my letter of
March 6, 1997.
Because you have not responded to my letter of April 15, 1997, we must assume that
our settlement offer has been rejected. Accordingly, we have gone ahead and caused the
Third-Party Complaint to be served on the various third-party defendants and it is our
intention to proceed as quickly as possible to obtain an adjudication regarding the easement.
If there is any further interest in discussing the settlement proposal contained in my letter of
March 6, 1997, please let me know immediately. Once the third-parties have been joined
and our clients have invested additional time and money in pursuing the lawsuit, it will only
become more difficult to reach a settlement.

vy.*~?-.
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KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, J R O W N & G E E

William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq.
Vincent C. Rampton, Esq.
Page 2
July 3, 1997
If you would like to discuss this matter, pleiSfc give me a call
Sincerely,

• JV

RGR/wvk

R^halp G. Rus:
c: William S. and Irene C. Love
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Research Industries
24 Oct 75
28 Oct 75

W D 4009/249

Y
Plan-Tech Corp.
Love Property

Arnold Industries Property
14 Oct 75
18 Nov 75

14 Oct 75
28 Oct 75

WD 4C09/250
"A"

Minson-Halander
A Utah Corporation

Marcon Investment
a Partnership

10 Aug 76
13 Aug 76
IOAug76
13 Aug 76

Y
Carrera Corporation
a Utah Corporation

Carrera Corporation
a Utah Corporation

Smith. Smith. Minson
& Halander
30Oct8l
I8NOV8I

3 Aug 79
6 Aug 79

QCD53I4/5I7
"wild" "K"
Western Management
A partnership

Western Management
a Utah general
partnership

31 Oct 79
9 Nov 79

30 Oct 81
24 Nov 81

WD 4983/881
"C"

Western Management^
a partnerhsip
"^

QCD53I6/554

T

. Fred Smith, Ronald W.Smith. Dale N.
Minson, & Roberts. Halander
Western Management
a Utah general —
partnership

5Nov8l
8Dec8l

Carrera Corporation
a Utah Corporation

<\%1

27 Jan 82
1 Feb 82

William J. Lowcnberg
29 Oct 82
29 Oct 82

QCD 5416/2273

H. Fred Smith. Robert W. Smith. Dale N.
Minson & Robert S. Halander

29 Oct 82
29 Oct 82

QCD 5416/2274

Western Management
a Utzh general partnership
25 May 84
31 May 84

SPW 5560/2059
No "subject to"

Smith. Halander, Smith and

20Jun84

Kay L Walker & Lawrence A. McBictt
22 Feb 85
12 Mar 85

QCD 5636/614
•Q-

Smitft. Halander. Smith and

I8jun84
20Jun84

Kay L Walker & Lawrence A. McEilictt

22 Feb 85
12 Mar 85

QCD 5636/614
"Q"

Smith, Halander. Smith & Assoc
a Utah general partnership .< | m
Walker, McEliott. Wilkinson & Assoc
a Missouri general partnership (1/2) ~

QCD 5888/1248
"R-

l5Apr87
I3jun87

SWD
5930/347

H. Fred Smith. Robert S. Halander,& Ronald
W.Smith
and
Dale N. Minson
28 Nov 90
QCD 6296/1450

22Jan9l
23Jan91

8Mar91

Corrective Warranty
Deed
6284/1366

Conmart, Inc. a
Utah corporation

15 Jul 93
22 Jul 93

Arnold Industries Inc. a Utah Corporator
WD
7089/835

William & Irene Love

IOApr95

6 Feb 97
6 Feb 97

QCD 7130/1455
"G"

William & Irene Love Trustees

2212 West L L C . a Delaware
Umited Liability Co.

3 Apr 97
3 Apr 97

GSA2222West,LLC.,a
Delaware Umited Liability Co.
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